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Abstract
This thesis examines the legal duties of directors of UK public companies in the
light of the 'stakeholder' approach to the firm. It considers the theory that
directors are not simply agents of shareholders, but have a duty to take into
consideration and, where appropriate, to balance the interests of several
constituencies. Examples of suggested stakeholders include employees,
customers, suppliers and creditors, as well as the local community and the natural
environment. If this broad view of public company responsibility is warranted,
the role of the law in securing a 'stakeholder' style of management needs to be
examined, and this study attempts that task.
To this end, empirical research was conducted via interviews with public
company directors and secretaries from a range of public companies of different
sizes operating in many business sectors to investigate:
• the extent to which at present they view their role as requiring assessment and
inclusion of the interests of stakeholders
• the manner in which such assessment and inclusion is actually carried out
• the impact which a statutory formulation of duties to incorporate stakeholder
interests would or might have on decisionmaking in practice
• the effect of board structure on corporate decisionmaking.
The effect of 'stakeholder orientation' of company directors on the economic
performance and social impact of UK public companies was considered.
The DTI's Company Law Review Steering Group has referred to the distinction
between 'Enlightened Shareholder Value' and the 'Pluralist' approach. This
thesis further reviews those arguments and seeks to set them in their commercial
context.
It is highly probable that there will be a new UK Companies Act following the
next General Election. This thesis suggests a new statutory statement of
directors' duties and considers the impact which such statutory wording might
have.
If directors' legal duties were to be reformulated, that change would needs to
buttressed by a mechanism to protect stakeholder expectations, in court as a last
resort. This thesis argues that the most promising form for such stakeholder
remedies is that of the current 'unfair prejudice' action.
If the UK is to avoid being left behind internationally in its system of corporate
regulation, it needs to take its European Union obligations and the laws of other
Member States into account. It is argued that the UK can find much to learn from
the continental European traditions.
The conclusion of the thesis focuses on the Company Law Review and its
potential economic impact. It is argued that UK company law should address the
rights of all stakeholders if it is to be 'modern' and competitive'.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION - STAKEHOLDING AND COMPANY LAW
1.1 Introduction to the Study
This study considers the duties of directors of public companies in the light of the
'stakeholder' approach to the firm. It examines the theory that directors are not
simply agents of corporate shareholders, but have a duty to consider and, where
appropriate, to balance the interests of several constituencies, each of which has a
legitimate 'stake' in the company, its activities and development. Examples of
suggested stakeholders in corporate activity have included employees, customers,
suppliers and creditors, as well as the local community and the natural environment.
If this broader view of public company responsibility is warranted, the role of the law
in securing a 'stakeholder' style of management needs to be examined, and this study
attempts that task.
Empirical research was conducted via interviews with public company officers, from
a range of organisations operating in many business sectors, to investigate:
(a) the extent to which at present they view their role as requiring assessment and
inclusion of the interests of stakeholders;
(b) the manner in which such assessment and inclusion is actually carried out;
(c) the impact a statutory formulation of directors' duties to incorporate stakeholder
interests would or might have on decision-making in practice;
(d) the effect of the unitary board structure on corporate decision-making.
The consequences of the stakeholder orientation or otherwise of directors for the
economic performance and social impact of public companies was assessed in the
light of that evidence.
The DTI's Company Law Review Steering Group referred to the distinction between
'Enlightened Shareholder Value', which views the 'ultimate objective of companies'
as being 'to generate maximum value for shareholders', and the 'Pluralist' approach
(essentially stakeholding arguments by another name), which considers shareholders
as one constituency among many.' The Steering Group appeared to assume that the
two approaches were the only relevant schools of thought and that they were
necessarily in conflict. Considerable space in the Strategic Framework document
was devoted to discussing 'counter arguments to such pluralist views'; moreover,
some of the questions posed for discussion were somewhat loaded against those
views. 2 This study further reviews the arguments and seeks to set them in their wider
commercial and international context.
Company law in Britain has suffered from a regrettable period of neglect. 3 As
progress is made towards a new Companies Act (expected after the next UK General
Election), practical ideas for legislation are explained in the following chapters. It is
clear that the key areas for legislative attention are directors' duties and reporting
requirements. 4
 Both of these are very closely linked to the stakeholder agenda.
Proposals in the thesis are supported by discussion of management theory and the
literature on stakeholding. Examples from other jurisdictions and the thoughtful
comments of interviewees provided a valuable check on the feasibility of the ideas
advanced below.
1.2 Theoretical Background - Literature Review
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy - The
Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) para 5.1.
2 ibid Qus. 4 (a) and (b) and 5.
The Law Society: Company Law Committee, The Reform of Company Law (Law Society
Memorandum No. 394, February 2000) 36.
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy -
Developing the Framework (DTI, March 2000) chs 3 and 5.
2
Any consideration of directors' duties that is to be defensible and practicable must
proceed from an examination of the nature of the company and the role of directors,
drawing on the available legal and managerial material. The work of public
company boards has been said to include strategic planning, ethical leadership and
overall monitoring of management. The background to stakeholder theory as it
applies to companies will also be explored. In the context of public companies,
opinion as to their responsibilities is divided along political lines. This study will
attempt to reconcile aspects of these distinct perspectives to produce a coherent set of
priorities for public company directors. The place of the board in the system is of
central importance whatever one's perceptions of its task, and it is therefore essential
to be clear about what directors should be aiming to achieve.
The Law Commission's report on directors' duties excluded from consideration 'the
identification of the interests which company law should serve.' 5
 It is submitted that
this is not a coherent approach to reform, particularly given that the 'guiding
principles' for company law reform set out by the Law Commission included 'law as
facilitator', 'inclusivity' (defined in a somewhat circular fashion as 'concern that the
law should permit directors to take into account the interests of persons other than
shareholders, to the extent the law allows this'), 'usability' (defined as meaning that
'the law should be accessible, comprehensible, clear and consistent with common
sense'), and 'efficiency and cost-effectiveness'. 6
 It is difficult to see how these
matters can be judged without reference to the parties whom company law is
designed to protect or assist. The intention was that the Law Commission's
somewhat technical work on directors' duties should 'feed in' to the DTI's broader
Company Law Review. The Review's Steering Group has attempted to integrate
both elements of reform. To what extent has it succeeded and is there a better
approach?
Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a
Statement of Duties (Report No. 261, September 1999) 8.
6 ibid 25-26.
3
1.2.1 The Nature of the Public Company
It has long been argued that the public company functions as a social institution with
an independent existence, rather than as the private property of shareholders.
According to this 'organic' theory of corporate life, shareholders cannot properly be
regarded as the sole owners of public companies, given the practical separation of
'ownership' (of shares) from 'control' (which rests with management). This
separation gives the management some latitude to pursue goals other than profit
maximisation. If shareholders for practical reasons cannot undertake active
stewardship of the resources owned and controlled by public companies, the board,
which stands at the apex of internal corporate control systems, must perform that
task. No single participating group, neither shareholders nor managers, employees
nor consumers, has any natural claim to control of the company. Prosperity depends
on the strategic marshalling of assets to the advantage of all concerned, rather than
exclusive focus upon returns to shareholders.
In the view of Kay, the organic concept of the company has strong descriptive
validity:7
Much of the concern with corporate governance - a concern which is largely
Anglo-American - arises from the tension between that Anglo-American
model and the practical reality of how large companies operate everywhere.
The organic model of corporate behaviour - which gives to the corporation
life independent from its shareholders and stakeholders - describes the actual
behaviour of large companies and their managers far better than does the
principal-agent perspective, and this is as true in Britain and the United States
as it is in Japan.
4
Parkinson advances a normative argument for what he calls social enterprises:8
Since the public interest is the foundation of the legitimacy of companies, it
follows that society is entitled to ensure that corporate power is exercised in a
way which is consistent with that interest. To describe companies as social
enterprises is thus to make a claim about the grounds of their legitimacy, and
its practical significance is to hold that the state is entitled to prescribe the
terms on which corporate power may be possessed and exercised.
Opposed to this 'organic' interpretation of the company has been the theory that
describes a firm as a 'nexus of contracts'. This analysis holds that all those who deal
with companies, including employees, customers, lenders and local and national
government, can agree by bargaining at the outset the respective obligations of
themselves and the companies. Shareholders, as ultimate risk-bearers for business
who face practical difficulties in contracting for uncertain future events, are protected
by the fiduciary duties of directors. If boards had to consider other interests, it is
argued, directorial activity would become less focused and investment would be lost.
Only express contractual terms and laws restrict the decision-making of company
directors. Otherwise boards are charged with producing as much wealth as possible
for shareholders by whatever means directors see fit, since that is the investment
'contract'.
Macey and Miller put forward this contract-based view:9
It is desirable to maintain a system of corporate governance in which
fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to shareholders because no suitable
alternative means of protecting shareholders' claims exist other than by way
J. Kay, 'The Stakeholder Corporation' in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble, Stakeholder Capitalism
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 126.
i.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 23.
J.R. Macey and G.P. Miller, 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective' (1993) 43
University of Toronto Law Journal 423.
5
of a judicially enforced regime of fiduciary duties. By contrast, the
obligations owed to other claimants can be enforced by contract because they
are more precisely defined than the obligations to shareholders.
The primacy of shareholder wealth maximisation is staunchly defended by Van der
Weide in these terms:'°
[N ]onshareholder constituencies are in a better position to dictate corporate
behavior to their advantage through explicit contracting than are
shareholders. Other stakeholders who do not contract to prevent the firm
from restructuring, relocating or downsizing to their detriment generally have
chosen to take risks of restructuring, relocating or downsizing in exchange for
higher returns on their investment.
It does not, however, follow from the contractarian interpretation of the firm that
directors have no responsibility to consider the interests of non-equity stakeholders.
In order to operate and to develop, major companies need continuing, high-quality
inputs of all factors of production, including skilled labour arid natural resources, and
they need to gain recognition from customers, employees and authorities as reliable,
legitimate entities. In a free market, companies are always competing, not only for
capital, but also for sales and customer 'brand loyalty', for the services of the most
able employees and the most favourable supply terms. The excellent company
performs well in all of these competitions. If such excellence is to be achieved, co-
ordination is required to set goals and deal with the expectations of all key
constituencies. The board, as the ultimate supervisor of management, is in a position
to provide this co-ordination.
° M.E. Van der Weide, 'Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders' (1996) 21 Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law 55.
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Wright
Nexus of contracts theory views the firm not as an entity, but as an aggregate
of various inputs acting together to produce goods and services. Employees
provide labour and creditors provide debt capital. The role of shareholders is
viewed initially as providing equity capital and subsequently as bearing the
risk of losses and monitoring the performance of management. Management
monitors the performance of employees and co-ordinates the activities of all
the firm's inputs. Thus, the firm is treated as a nexus or web of contractual
relationships between its elements. Most importantly, because shareholders
are simply one of the inputs in the nexus, ownership is not a meaningful
concept.
Without constraints of ownership, the activities of the public company can be
orchestrated for the benefit of all its stakeholders. Even in terms of 'bottom line'
profitability, reliance on the strict terms of written contracts will often not be
sufficient to produce outstanding results. Mutual advantages can flow from extended
commitment rather than 'one shot' contracting. There is scope within contractual
theory for the recognition of implicit as well as explicit contractual terms between
the company and other parties, particularly those employees and suppliers who have
had or anticipate lengthy relationships with the company. Over time, such stability
of connections leads to shared expectations of quality and value. Successful and
lasting companies appear to develop an identity that comes from, and becomes
greater than, the sum of its contractual relationships.
There is, moreover, a recognition that the images of companies and of business
generally (and hence the public regulation to which they are subjected) depend in
large part on the degree of social responsiveness they demonstrate. To that extent it
M.J. Wright, 'Corporate Governance and Directors' Social Responsibilities: Responsible
7
is simply unrealistic to describe public limited companies as private contractual
organisations. Social expectations of public companies have grown beyond the
delivery of profits to shareholders. In an era when many citizens are investors and
employees, environmentalists and consumers, similar standards are expected from
companies encountered in all these roles. A new generation of public company
directors needs to adapt to changing circumstances. As the Department of Trade and
Industry's Company Law Green Paper (discussed below) made clear, legislation may
follow if voluntary standards of performance are found to be inadequate.
Carroll sets out four levels of responsibility for business - the economic ('be
profitable'), the legal ('obey the law'), the ethical ('do what is right, just and fair;
avoid harm') and the philanthropic ('contribute resources to the community, improve
quality of life'). They are briefly defined as follows:12
Economic Responsibilities
First and foremost, the American social system calls for business to be an
economic institution. That is, it should be one whose orientation is to
produce goods and services that society wants and sell them at a fair price - a
price that society thinks represents the value of goods and services delivered
and that provides the business with an adequate profit for its perpetuation,
growth and reward to investors.
In the UK too, the economic responsibility of companies is concerned with more
than simply making the largest possible profit and starts from the fair satisfaction of
genuine consumer needs.
Legal Responsibilities
Inefficiency or Irresponsible Efficiency?' (1996) 17 Business Law Review 178.
2 A.B. Carroll, Business and Society - Ethics and Siakeholder Management (Cincinnati: South-
Western Publishing, 2nd ed 1993) 32-33.
8
Just as society has sanctioned our economic system by permitting business to
assume the productive role mentioned above, as a partial fulfilment of the
social contract, it has also laid down the ground rules - the laws - under which
business is expected to operate. Legal responsibilities reflect a view of
'codified ethics' in the sense that they embody basic notions of fairness as
established by our lawmakers.
There is no room here for disregarding or flouting the law on the grounds that it
might be profitable to take the risk of doing so.
Ethical Responsibilities
Ethical responsibilities embrace those activities ani practices that are
expected or prohibited by societal members even though they are not codified
into law. Ethical responsibilities embody the range of norms, standards or
expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees,
shareholders and the community regard as fair, just and in keeping with the
respect for or protection of stakeholders' moral rights.
These duties may not be so precisely defined, but stakeholders are likely to exert
pressure on a board that does not strive to meet appropriate standards. It is for
directors to keep themselves informed of the current ethical expectations of their
stakeholders and to act accordingly.
Finally, there are the voluntary efforts, which result from business's own desire to
engage in socially useful activities, but are neither required by the law nor generally
expected of business (though many large, and some small, companies do engage in
such efforts). Charitable giving is one example of this category of actions, as is
direct community involvement via employee placements. These may have
commercial benefits if they enhance the company's reputation in the community.
However such 'spin-offs' are practically difficult to quantify.
9
The way seems to be open for a reconciliation of 'organic' and 'nexus of contract'
theories of the company in terms of corporate identity constructed through key
relationships. This possible synthesis will be the subject of Chapter Two. One can
argue from either perspective that management is at the hub of a set of spokes that
make up a company's activities. Directors have the task of providing economic and
ethical structures for, and overall monitoring of, organisational decisions. Where
there is failure to meet the standard an important constituent expects, it is directors
who must ultimately shoulder responsibility. Corporate power comes about because
of the financial and political strength of the organisation, but the concomitant
responsibility needs to be vested in an identifiable group, which in law is the board
of directors.
1.2.2 The Role of Directors
In corporate management theory, the idea has been set out that the board of directors
should not simply be a senior executive committee, but ought to take a broad-ranging
long-term view of the company's activities and objectives. Public company directors
in reality may well not attend exclusively to maximising shareholder returns. The
long-term enhancement and prosperity of the corporation for the benefit of all its
stakeholders often is, and arguably should always be, the board's primary goal.
Accountability to all those who directly contribute to the company's activities, and
for the company's reputation and status, rests with the directors. Several key
objectives for the corporate board, not all of which sit easily with the duties and
structures currently required by company law, have been canvassed by management
theorists. Some observations on key directorial tasks follow and interviews with
public company officers themselves provided further insights.
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Any corporate governance system needs to enable businesses to be driven forward.
If the board does not make sufficient time to construct an effective overall strategy
and keep it under regular review, all the activity of management and employees will
not produce optimal results. Directors do not always ensure that they concentrate
enough on strategic planning as opposed to operational review. Board agendas and
efforts have to be structured to achieve a correct balance between audit and
organisation. Individuals who lack the capacity to contribute to a strategic vision for
a company are not needed on its board, whatever their other skills. Technical experts
and specialist executives can be asked to advise directors as and when required.
Directors as such have an altogether broader remit.
The board has also been said to function as the 'corporate conscience', setting the
overall standards and reviewing major plans from legal and ethical standpoints.
Company managers take their lead from, and expect to be accountable to, directors in
this respect. Preparation of codes of ethics, for example, is normally initiated by
directors whose commitment or otherwise to the whole concept sets the tone for such
exercises. In daily decision-making throughout the company, the attitudes of
directors and the consequences of breaches of corporate codes are a constant
influence and communication channels to disseminate this knowledge are extremely
important.
Mills expounds his view of this directorial task and its wider effects:'3
It [the board] is the keeper of the company's conscience and the measure of
corporate morality. By setting the standards of corporate courage it delimits
the management's morale. From the boardroom to the shopfloor, both
productivity and performance are most closely affected by morale, which is
itself most visibly affected by visible morality. The effective company meets
3 Sir Geoffrey Mills, Controlling Companies (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 21.
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its creditors on time, especially the small ones; does not abuse its suppliers or
maltreat its physical environment; is clinically correct with its customers,
employees, auditors, analysts, shareholders, lenders and taxmen.
The monitoring role of directors vis-à-vis managers is highlighted by Goldschmid as
follows: "
The first function of the board. . . should be to provide a meaningful,
independent check. The focus would be on the corporation's structure,
process of management, and decision-making techniques. Second, the board
should choose, evaluate, and, if necessary, discharge all senior corporate
officers. Third, it should review and approve major corporate policies and
long-range objectives.
Effective accountability is the other important factor in corporate governance.
Indeed, giving substance to the monitoring task of the board might be the most
valuable contribution the law can make. Increased use of outside directors and board
committees (e.g. to deal with audit and remuneration) is intended to make board
scrutiny of management more effective. Regular communication and reporting
requirements in themselves act as a discipline for managers. This appraisal demands
more time and attention than non-executive directors have traditionally allotted to
their role. In advance of full monthly meetings, one day's formal preparation and
fact-finding and discussion by non-executives are the minimum to ensure that board
members can contribute with confidence. Such requirements impose a natural limit
on the number of non-executive directorships an individual can handle. A full-time
executive would normally be unable to attend to more than one non-executive post,
" H.J. Goldschmid, 'The Governance of the Public Corporation: Internal Relationships' in D.E.
Schwartz, Commentaries on Corporate Structure and Governance. the ALl-ABA Symposiums 19 77-
78 (Philadelphia: ALl-ABA, 1979) 174.
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while four public company directorships would provide an ample portfolio for a
professional independent director.
In addition to the time factor, other practical matters can affect board performance.
A board that is too large is likely to prove ineffectual. The consensus in practical
management literature seems to be that above a dozen or so members, the group
tends to operate much less cohesively and swiftly. The provision of full and frank
(not overwhelming or obscure) information to board members for proper
consideration in advance of meetings is obviously important. Arrangements for non-
executive directors to have access to company sites and records, to meet with
employees and perhaps key customers and suppliers, need to be made. More
generally, a culture that encourages sharp questioning, rather than deferential
politeness, is certainly required in every boardroom. All of these issues have had to
be considered in relation to non-executives working on the boards of NHS Trusts.
The lessons to be learned by the private sector from 'new model' public sector
experiences, including the privatised utilities and the role of the law in spreading
good governance practice will be briefly considered.
Cannon 15
 regards directors as being responsible for trusteeship of corporate assets as
a whole, primarily for the shareholders:
The responsibilities of the trustee centre on the disinterested care of assets
belonging to another party. The executor is an agent entrusted with the
deployment of resources on behalf of another. A manager is expected to
marshall assets to get the best return for his employer. Each of these
components are included in the notion of effective governance.
Sappideen's view is different:'6
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[T]he symbiotic nature of the relationship between all stakeholders must be
highlighted. Managers are not mere agents of shareholders. They are
fiduciaries of the corporation and play the role of intermediary to the various
claimants against the corporation. Shareholders and employees are claimants
against the corporation to whom management is accountable, and for whom
management is responsible via the corporate structure.
Some theorists have explicitly discussed the board as a forum for the balancing of
interests of constituencies concerned with or affected by the company. This is the
essence of the board's role in a corporate governance system that takes stakeholder
interests seriously. Any credible balancing effort requires the directors to
demonstrate far wider vision than is implied by the shareholder primacy model and
will need teamwork and advice to obtain relevant information. A keen awareness of
the parties affected by or who affect the company's operations, their needs and
expectations, is essential to successful decision-making.
It is not asserted that public company boards succeed in meeting, or even attempt to
reach, all of these targets at present, but that in principle they emerge as the key tasks
of directors. All of this work, which will be further examined in Chapter Three,
presupposes a certain detachment of the directors as a body from day-to-day
organisation. Long-term priority-setting, ethical monitoring, performance appraisal
of executives and overall balance of interests of competing parties in the operation of
the company all require an adequate measure of independence from management.
Possible ways of ensuring this objectivity will be considered below.
1.2.3 Stakeholding Theory
T. Cannon, Corporate Responsibility (London: Pitman, 1994) 135.
R. Sappideen, 'Ownership of the Large Corporation: Why Clothe the Emperor?' (1996) 7 King's
College Law Journal 53.
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As far as companies are concerned, stakeholder theory proposes that all parties
affected by the activities of a company should be given a place in corporate decision-
making. This may be by direct participation, by representation or other appropriate
consideration of their interests. 17 As a matter of general principle, stakeholding seeks
to achieve a balance of risks and rewards, of rights and responsibilities that is
properly inclusive and fair in a way that the present order has not been. In practice,
to give one example, the primacy of shareholders within the UK system has often
resulted in employees bearing the brunt of economic difficulties. The advocates of a
stakeholding approach often contend that it enhances both social justice and
economic prosperity. Trusting relationships are said to foster investment and
development which, in turn, produce rewards for all stakeholders.
From a stakeholding perspective, the substantive questions are whether employee
and customer interests could be more effectively protected and whether other
stakeholder groups are entitled to recognition. Examples often quoted include sub-
contractors, lenders, environmental monitors and the community in which the
company is situated.' 8 There are practical issues around involvement of all such
bodies, quite apart from arguments of principle. Direct participation in decision-
making at board level is one possibility. Another is the creation of enforceable duties
on the part of directors to have full regard to stakeholder interests and to consider
appropriate representations when making their decisions. Greater shareholder
involvement should itself also be part of the stakeholding agenda.
7 N. C. Smith, Morality and the Market (London: Routledge, 1990) 55 et seq. and 84, points out that
board-level participation is not the only option and may be impractical because of conflicts of
interest.
8 See, for example, Parkinson, n 8 above, ch 9 and Cannon, n 15 above, ch 3.
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The (essentially political) argument moving from the economic and social impact of
large companies to the assertion that current company law is inadequate is succinctly
put by Williamson:'9
Employees are affected by the wide range of decisions that impact upon their
employment with the company; customers are affected by decisions on the
price, specifications and standards of products; suppliers are affected by
purchasing decisions; creditors are affected by financial procedures; and the
local community is affected by recruitment policy and environmental
impact.. .The groups directly affected by the operation and decisions of a
company can be said to have a stake in that firm; they are its stakeholders.
The law as it stands, while it reflects the need for companies to take some
note of the interests of stakeholder groups, in no way reflects the true weight
and complexity of company - stakeholder relationships. What is required is a
new approach to corporate governance, one in which it is recognised that
companies are not just vehicles for the maximisation of shareholder value but
institutions with a life of their own in which the interests of several disparate
stakeholder groups are vested.
Just as in a democratic state, parties affected by decisions are involved in the making
of those decisions, so in a company, relevant groups should enjoy appropriate input.
The democratic model can be a powerful influence on corporate governance
thinking. Stakeholder theory goes beyond both the simple attempt to describe the
realities of substantial corporations and the assertion that stakeholder satisfaction
produces better results in the long term. At its core is the moral imperative of
balancing varied property rights, none of them absolute but all of them valid.
Donaldson and Preston express this normative case for stakeholding as follows:20
9 J. Williamson, 'The Road to Stakeholding' (1996) 67 Political Quarterly 209, 212.
16
(1) Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural
and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. Stakeholders are identified
by their interests in the corporation, whether the corporation has any
corresponding functional interest in them.
(2) The interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That is, each group
of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not merely because
of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as the
shareowners.
There is no conflict between the moral assertion that all stakeholders have intrinsic
value and the empirical claim that a balanced stakeholder approach will produce
better long-term results for the benefit of all parties. A cursory examination of public
company Annual Reports reveals that some seem to focus particularly on customer
relationships, some on employee development, others on technological advances, as
well as on delivering returns to shareholders. British Airways and Marks & Spencer,
Glaxo Weilcome and Id, are not known for exclusive focus on short-term dividends.
The challenge for advocates of a stakeholding approach is to foster a proper regard
for key relationships in all major companies. Distributions that have been weighted
too heavily in favour of the shareholders will need to change. The benefit will be
that the company's network of relationships as a whole will become stronger.
Where the British system falls short, there may be lessons from other competing
jurisdictions that place more emphasis on the stakeholding concept. If they are
producing better results over time, the implications of that have to be assessed. As
Michael Porter of Harvard Business School writes:
The Japanese and German systems.. .appear to come closer to optimising
long-term private and social returns. The greater focus on long-term
20 T. Donaldson and L.E. Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: Concepts, Evidence and
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corporate position - encouraged by an ownership structure and governance
process that incorporate the interests of employees, suppliers, customers and
the local community - allow the Japanese and German economies to better
capture the social benefits of private investment.21
Porter's comparison was with the US, but the UK is open to similar criticisms.
Philosophical and political dissatisfaction with the Anglo-American system has been
widely expressed in recent years. As Lord Dahrendorf succinctly put it:
[Cjompanies are more than profit machines. As employers, as purchasers and
suppliers, and as centres of community life, they are the nub of a network of
stakeholders. Shareholders can dispose of their assets; stakeholders are at
risk of being disposed of themselves. Are we right to concentrate on
shareholders to the exclusion of all others?22
The message is that it is neither just nor reasonable to expose other contributors to
the risks of corporate activity, while shielding investors who can and do protect
themselves by holding diversified, fast-moving portfolios of shares.
Corporate activity is not an end in itself, even if managers may sometimes be
inclined to treat it as such. Its purpose is to contribute to the satisfaction of needs
and wants - not only the desire of shareholders for income, but also the aspirations of
employees, the requirements of customers, the work of suppliers and value added for
the community. The appropriate balance of interests will vary between different
companies, as, for instance, some are more labour-intensive than others and some
have a particular environmental impact. Exclusive or excessive concentration upon
Implications' (1995) 20 Academy of Managemnent Review 67.
21 M. Porter, 'Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry' in D. Chew, Studies in
International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
13.
22 R. Dahrendorf, 'On the Dahrendorf Report' (text of a speech delivered to the House of Lords on 21
February 1996) (1996) 67 Political Quarterly 195.
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only one element of the whole network will mean, on the stakeholding view,
unacceptable neglect of others who are also entitled to due consideration and fair
treatment. There will inevitably be conflicts between the interests of the various
groups, which must be carefully handled as to retain the trust and confidence of all
for the future. Managers must strive to make decisions and deploy resources in a
manner consistent with the claims of relevant stakeholder groups.
Chapter Four will consider the justifications for the stakeholder approach and the
task of identifying and classifying stakeholders. The essence of the stakeholding
vision is not artificial equality but inclusion for all, in the corporate setting as in the
wider political sphere. Those who directly contribute to the company's performance
(e.g. employees, customers, suppliers, investors) can be dealt with differently from
those who are affected by the company's outputs (such as community and
environmental groups). For directors, it is argued that the priority should be to assess
the network of stakeholders in their company and the requirements and relative
claims of each of them.
1.3 Legal Implications
If stakeholder principles are to be put into effect in the daily operations of public
companies, the law as it now stands may well be inadequate. Many proposals have
been put forward for changes to the fiduciary duties of directors, mechanisms for the
enforcement of directorial duties and alterations to the structure of the board itself.
The law should reflect the reality that boards need to pay proper attention to all
stakeholders. In the absence of effective sanctions to back them up, however, new
legal responsibilities are likely to prove ineffectual. Without sound work by, and the
commitment of, board members who set the agenda for companies, advances towards
inclusive behaviour will be blocked. Legislation can be something of a blunt
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instrument, but its use is sometimes essential to bring about change where cultural
shifts are unacceptably slow.
Since relationships are two-way, stakeholders themselves need to demonstrate the
ability and the willingness to interact with public company leaderships. Other
jurisdictions have much to teach the United Kingdom in this respect. Voluminous
legislation governing relations with stakeholders, including specific employment and
environmental measures, is already in place, but typically takes the form of restraints
on the most egregiously harmful or socially unacceptable practices, rather than
positive measures to improve engagement and dialogue. Nor does a plethora of
detailed prohibitions necessarily contribute to a holistic view of corporate
responsibility on the part of business leaders. Details of annual and more frequent
reporting requirements are also practically important to all those who interact with
public companies. What, then, is the proper role of 'core' company law?
1.3.1 Changes to Company Law to Broaden Responsibilities of Directors
There have been arguments advanced for a change in UK companies legislation to
reflect a stakeholder approach towards directors' responsibilities. This would
supersede the duty to take decisions 'in the interests of the company', which has been
interpreted as meaning the interests of shareholders. The enactment of such a
provision can be said to have two potential benefits:
(a) it would legitimate the actions of directors in considering factors other than the
maximisation of shareholder returns;
(b) it would foster a change in boardroom culture to accommodate recognition of the
importance of a company's relationships with its employees, customers and
suppliers and the community and environment in and through which it operates,
as well as those with providers of capital.
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One conclusion of the RSA's Tomorrow's Company Inquiry 23 was that directors
were being led by a misunderstanding of current law to believe that they were
obliged to take a more short-termist and shareholder-centric view of planning than
was actually required. It was pointed out that the current law did not prevent
directors from having regard to the interests of non-member stakeholders if they
judged that to be in the best interests of 'the corporation' - not only present members,
but also future investors. Without the stimulus of changes to the law, it is, however,
difficult to foresee a change of culture such that balanced long-term planning would
become the norm for UK public companies. The existing law limits any
accountability to stakeholders within a framework of, and to the overall purpose of,
profit maximisation for shareholders. A more fundamental change in legislation is
appropriate if it is accepted that all stakeholders have value in their own right, as
ends in themselves. Shareholder concerns will not invariably be aligned with the
demands of customers, employees and suppliers, let alone legitimate environmental
and community concerns, and the law should explicitly permit directors to address
these issues as part of their task.
Kay proposes the following wording:24
A director of a PLC shall at all times act in the manner he considers in the
exercise of his business judgement best fitted to advance the interests of the
company. The interests of the company include:
the payment of returns to shareholders and investors sufficient to remunerate
past investment and encourage future investment in the company;
the development of the skills and capabilities of employees and suppliers of
the company;
the achievement of stability and security in the company's employment and
trading relationships;
23 RSA Inquiry, Tomorrow's Company (London: RSA, 1995).
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the provision of goods and services of good quality to the company's
customers at fair prices; and
the enhancement of the company's reputation for high standards of business
conduct.
Such provision would not demand major change in the way effective public
companies are already run but would legitimate their actions and help to bring others
to the same standard.
Goyder supplies a general objects clause to be incorporated into the Memorandum of
Association of a public company:25
To make the company economically and financially strong in order to ensure
its continued growth and future development as a means of providing good
service, secure employment and a fair return to its investors and shareholders.
To provide goods and services of the best quality and the most reasonable
prices consistent with its other objectives.
To give its employees every reasonable opportunity for their interests to be
heard within the company and for their promotion and development in skill
and to allow reasonable time off for attention to public duties.
To act towards the community of which it is a member in as responsible a
manner as would be expected from a responsible citizen in like
circumstances.
Such a formula would be a public declaration of intent against which subsequent
performance could be publicly judged.
24 Kay, n 7 above, 137.
25 G. Goyder, The Just Enterprise (London: Free Press, 1993) 56.
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Since the board is the body that has the task within the current system of setting the
corporate agenda and monitoring managerial performance, it seems appropriate to
give responsibility for balancing stakeholder interests to directors in the manner Kay
suggests. This makes board members clearly accountable for delivering
stakeholders' objectives. It is not clear from Goyder's work whether the suggested
objects clause would be mandatory or if a narrower approach could be adopted in a
particular company much as an individual corporate constitution may (normally will)
vary Table A at present. The enforcement of objects clauses is currently limited to a
right of shareholders to restrain ultra vires conduct before a legal commitment has
been entered into, which would not be an effective mechanism to secure performance
of a wider set of obligations.
Criticisms of such proposals include the argument that the range of issues for
consideration would reduce efficiency when compared with the shareholders' wealth
maximisation standard. Clarity is required to guide the everyday discussions of
boards. The fair expectations of customers as to prices, employees as to earnings and
the community as to involvement by corporations would, however, all be linked to
company performance and market conditions, just as dividend expectations are now.
Too broad a requirement to examine the public interest in the round, on the other
hand, would be uncertain and demand of directors that they attempt tasks to which
politicians would be better suited. A specific, focused formula that reflects popular
expectations of public companies is required in order to command the adherence of
directors. Chapter Five sets out a possible definition of directors' duties composed in
the light of the above matters.
Codification of existing duties that in the UK have been set out in caselaw is one
objective of company law modernisation. It will be a missed opportunity, however,
if consideration is not given to a more fundamental re-appraisal of the role of
directors and of companies themselves. Non-Governmental Organisations such as
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[A] remedial cause of action structured around the least common
denominator of the new board's duties: the duty not to harm. Each
constituent identified by legislation as entitled to the board's consideration
would be permitted to bring an action against the board asserting that the
board had breached its duty not to harm; that is, in making a corporate
distribution or distributions, or by failing to do so, it allocated excessive
corporate costs or insufficient corporate wealth to the complaining
constituent. The court would be required to evaluate the terms of the
constituent's initial contract with the corporation, to study the course of the
constituent's relationship with the corporation to determine the overall
fairness of its treatment by the board, and then to determine whether the
board had harmed the constituent in light of the contract and relationship.
Stakeholders would have a direct incentive to act if the board Ic)) short of )ts
responsibilities, rather as shareholders can now claim 'unfair prejudice' and, if
successful, gain one of a range of remedies.
Du Plessis and Dine have suggested what is described as an 'associative model' of
the company. 28 The holders of associative rights would be those, such as some
employees and lenders, who had 'very close' relations with a company. Such parties
would be able to petition the courts if their associative rights were being disregarded.
The procedure in the event of dispute would be:
[A] derivative action reflecting similar features to a shareholder derivative
action. Thus, such an action could only be brought to defend the interest of
the company and the eventual 'wirmer' of any successful action would be the
company itself. The action would only succeed where the court was able to
determine that the interests of the company had been contravened. Where
associative rights had been totally disregarded the action would succeed, but
28 J•J• du Plessis and J. Dine, 'The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law' [1997] JBL 45-
46.
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where associative rights had been considered and other interests had prevailed
a successful action would be rare indeed.
This type of action is premised on the assumption that the survival and prosperity of
the company will be advanced if it maintains its key relationships.
If stakeholder inclusion is thought of as being valuable for its own sake, a direct right
of petition to the courts for stakeholders whose rights have been violated would be
deemed appropriate. This may mean that returns to shareholders are reduced while
other parties benefit. If satisfaction of stakeholders is regarded as a means to the end
of profitability for investors, an arrangement more closely comparable to a derivative
action would be preferred. The objective would be to protect the profitability of the
firm. The view advanced below is that, in the context of a proven associative
relationship, recovery should be allowed to a stakeholder who had suffered unfair
prejudice. Without the eventual threat of such a sanction, it is difficult to foresee real
changes in corporate decision-making.
It is suggested that employees, customers and suppliers who could show that the
business of a company had been conducted in a manner that was unfairly prejudicial
to their interests (having regard to the investment of time and/or funds they had made
in the relationship with the company and their reasonable expectations of proper
consideration) would have a right of redress. The remedy provided would be flexible
but might include compensation or enforcement of agreements or understandings.
The claimant would need to bring evidence of their expectations and how the
company had violated that trust. The balance to be struck between the interests of all
relevant constituencies would be explicitly acknowledged and no one constituency
would be able to claim automatic priority.
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Chapter Six will examine the arguments for and against such a new species of
stakeholder action, its possible boundaries and the standards the courts might use in
adjudicating such claims. Procedural complexities such as those which inhibit
current shareholder challenges to board decisions would need to be avoided by
legislation if new rights were to be effective. Among the points to be considered are
these: I-low far would this legal change move matters from where we now stand in
the UK? Would it, as some commentators argue, allow courts to intrude too far into
business decision-making? The law needs to keep corporate decision-making in line
with modern social expectations without unduly hampering board creativity.
1.3.3 The Structure of the Board and European Models
If the board is to achieve the objectivity discussed above, its composition must be
critically examined in two important respects:
(a) the proportion of executives to non-executives and backgrounds of potential non-
management directors;
(b) the unitary board structure as compared with the separate management board and
supervisory tier.
The European Union Draft Fifth Company Law Directive on public company
structures provides for the unitary board to be retained if preferred by a member
state, and enables employee representation to take place other than at board level.
Nevertheless the functioning of two-tier board systems in Europe, with the duty to
establish Works Councils in enterprises of significant size, will have a substantial
impact on UK practice over time. Some pan-European convergence of corporate
governance systems is already discernible, with continental jurisdictions tightening
up their rules on financial reporting and accountability to shareholders while the UK
examines possible mechanisms for non-equity stakeholder input at or near board
level.
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Extension of the non-executive role should indeed improve shareholder protection if
a genuinely independent stance can be maintained in the monitoring task. In
continental Europe, this formal separation of functions has also been associated with
a more participative, community-orientated view of the company as an institution.
The issues of effective monitoring and stakeholder representation are not logically
linked. Nevertheless, British suspicion of worker participation in management has
tended to lead to rejection of supervisory boards.
Within the UK context and looking from a practical angle, Mills concludes:29
At times even the non-executive, if alone, can stray from objectivity, and
'desperate courage makes one a majority' can become quite exhausting. So
one-third of the board is a workable minimum. If two-thirds of the board is
non-executive there may not be room for the good executives, so this
proportion represents a workable maximum for the largest boards. Between
one-third and two-thirds thus constitutes a working range, with fewer non-
executives on the smaller company boards, and more on the larger company
holding boards.
Similarly, the Hampel Committee noted that:3°
Non-executive directors have an important part to play in corporate
governance. We believe that it is difficult for them to be effective if they
make up less than one third of the board.
Board decision-making in British public companies remains dominated by
management, despite the efforts of the Cadbury Committee 31 and PRO NED 32
 to give
29 Mills, n 13 above, 95-96.
° Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report (January 1998)
para 3.14.
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non-executive directors higher profiles and clearer roles. A minimum requirement of
one-third non-executive representation would seem to meet with an emerging
consensus. How much would a strengthening of the non-management element
improve the quality of decisions from the stakeholding viewpoint? As far as direct
stakeholder 'voice' is concerned, continental European experience shows that it
would be practicable to institute a legislative system of employee representation in
public companies, if the political will existed to do so. Other participants, such as
subcontractors and community representatives, are more diverse in their
characteristics. Any board member will, of course, only be effective if he or she has
the skills and personality to be sufficiently persuasive.
As for the various stakeholding groups, the first question is whether they should have
representation in a supervisory board separate from core managerial decision-making
or whether a unified board structure is preferable. The danger of separate
supervisory bodies is that they can become isolated from daily decision-making and
depend for their information on reports from management. 33 If they are to play a full
part in influencing the direction of management, it may be preferable, in the British
context, to grant representatives seats on unitary boards. The consensus has grown
up within the present system that the Chairman should be someone other than the
Chief Executive and should be an individual sufficiently experienced and skilful to
act as a check on the Chief Executive. The board has the task of setting the
company's direction for the benefit of all who are involved with or affected by its
activity. The quality of the members and their capacity to work together will be of
prime importance, as will the reliability of the information they receive from the
management.
' Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Adrian Cadbury), Final
Report (December 1992).
32 The organisation established in 1982 'to promote the use of non-executive directors and to provide
a register of suitable candidates for non-executive directorships' (PRO NED Code Clause 4).
B This is a difficulty for non-executive directors generally - see I.C. Stratton, 'Non-Executive
Directors - are they Superfluous?' (1996) 17 Co. Law 162.
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Chapter Seven discusses the lessons to be learned by the UK from continental
Europe. In the global market, responsiveness to customers, the skills and
adaptability of employees and reliable supply chains are increasingly important,
particularly for businesses that are seeking to compete not on price alone, but on
added value. For this reason a brief discussion is included of how France and
Germany, as the dominant continental European economies, deal with these issues.
It is at least useful to note that there are other methods of stimulating and disciplining
executive directors than the Anglo-Saxon takeover market with its often over-
inflated bid prices.
The German and Dutch systems feature emp(oe r 	 svaticw1,
reason why, for example, environmental experts could not also have an input into
public company supervision. It would be logical for the number of employee
directors to be proportional to the number of the company's employees, starting at,
say, one board member for 500 employees. Environmental factors obviously vary
with the nature of the business but as a baseline, each division or department of
operations needs proper 'green' assessment that carries weight at board level. The
importance of sub-contractor links and community ties will vary from industry to
industry and company to company and it is therefore less practical to prescribe
specific methods and levels of representation, though consultation on key decisions
could certainly be encouraged far more than it now is. The possibilities for
diversification of the board have barely been explored in the UK to date. Wider
stakeholder representation would be more practicable if the board were to
concentrate on its monitoring and supervisory role than if it were also attempting to
manage operational detail.
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Hutton states the position strongly, but in practical terms does not greatly exaggerate,
when he writes: 'The chairman of the board, who may also be the chief
executive.. .can appoint whoever he likes to the board as a non-executive director to
bolster his own position; can set the level of his own salary; need not consult nor
communicate with his workforce; and can manipulate the firm's constitution to get
his way.' 34
 The Cadbury Committee Code of Best Practice recommended that public
company boards should have non-executive directors 'in sufficient numbers and of
suitable status to provide a genuinely independent voice in decision-making.'35
\Vhere genuine independence is particularly crucial, as in setting executive salaries
and contract termination, non-executives of proven calibre, trusted by shareholders
and other stakeholders, should have their say.36
 Given the importance of their task,
appointments of public company non-executive directors need to be approved by
shareholders, or perhaps in time by another key constituency (e.g. employees,
creditors) and to be for a fixed term of, say, three years with perhaps the possibility
of one re-election.
Chapter Seven will discuss the arguments for and against provisions in law, for
example to require a set proportion of non-executives on public company boards, and
who such directors might be, across the European Union. Pragmatically it could be
said that the task for legislators (or regulators) is to make universal those standards
that have been shown to succeed. Going further, if boards are to be effective as
standard-setters and monitors, a separate supervisory level completely distinct from
management may be logically desirable. This also opens up the prospect of direct
participation by particular stakeholders - not necessarily only employees, but also
major creditors and, where a company's impact is great, appropriate community and
environmental experts. Whether in a separate tier or not, however, the crucial point
W. Hutton, The Stale We're In (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995) 294.
Cadbury, n 31 above, Code of Best Practice section 2.
Study Group on Directors' Remuneration (Chair: Sir Richard Greenbury), Final Report (July 1995)
Code of Best Practice Section A and passin.
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is that the distinct task of direction be recognised and done well. If this can be
achieved within a unitary structure, the need is satisfied.
1.4 Public Company Officers' Views
Empirical work was required in order to ascertain whether directors of public limited
companies already viewed their role in the manner envisaged by advocates of
stakeholding and indeed whether boards would approach matters differently if a
stakeholder formulation of directors' duties were to be legislatively enacted. The
issues of the breadth of board responsibility in terms of stakeholders and the impact
of potential enforceability of duties to stakeholders were raised to gauge the reaction.
Most, if not all, public company directors are, of course, aware of general
stakeholding and corporate responsibility arguments. The opportunity to air their
views on the debate as to possible legislation was generally welcomed by
interviewees.
Issues for discussion at interview included the primary responsibility of directors, the
groups taken into consideration in decision-making and the 'ranking', if any, of these
groups. As far as possible changes to the law are concerned, the participants were
asked how they reacted to the prospect of an inclusive stakeholder-centred statement
of directors' duties and quasi-derivative enforcement actions. Nineteen individuals
from eighteen public companies took part in meetings over the Summer and Autumn
of 1999. Their roles included Chief Executives, with one former ChairmanlChief
Executive and one recently retired ChairmanlChief Executive, Finance Directors,
Directors of Business Development, Company Secretaries and Legal Directors, a
Personnel Director with a board seat and two very experienced non-executive
directors. Within the small group of interviewees, representation from a broad
spread of industry sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) was obtained. There were
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also representatives from a cross-section of public companies in terms of size within
the sample.
It is worth considering the personal impact upon directors (and managers) of freedom
to address social and environmental issues when acting on behalf of their company as
they might in personal dealings. Pressure to disregard the consequences of corporate
activities for non-equity stakeholders has perhaps caused discomfort that was offset
by the effects of collective responsibility and 'groupthink' in boards. Errors have
resulted from inflexible cultures, which denied individual values and fostered
collective overconfidence and arrogance. 37
 An examination of the concerns of those
connected with the company - customers, employees, suppliers, neighbours - is a
healthy corrective to such narrow visions.38
Mitchell writes persuasively on the psychological issues involved:39
[A] single-minded focus on efficiency, on the corporation as a narrowly
defined economic institution, sacrifices the human values of those who play a
part in its functioning. The efficiency model does this by legally cabining the
actions of corporate actors within confining, distinctly nonhuman roles. It is
this denial of humanity, which ultimately denies reality, that is at the heart of
the current debate over stakeholder status.
When people are not expected to divorce their working behaviour from the rest of
their lives or to use different value systems at work from those which operate at
home, it seems plausible that they are likely to experience less stress and far greater
job satisfaction.
H.S. Schwartz, Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay (New York: New York University Press,
1990) discusses various examples including General Motors and NASA.
38 j p • Kotter and J.L. Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance (New York: Free Press, 1992)46
and passiFn.
L.E. Mitchell, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law' in (1993) 50 Washington & Lee
Law Review 1479.
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Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson note that, conversely, when managers are
motivated by vision other than profit, they are more likely to act for the benefit of the
company and use its resources in a way which will benefit stakeholders as a whole
over the long term:4°
Managers whose needs are based on growth, achievement and self-
actualization and who are intrinsically motivated may gain greater utility by
accomplishing organizational rather than personal agendas. Likewise,
managers who identify with their organizations and are highly committed to
organizational values are also more likely to serve organizational ends.
Finally, situations in which the managerial philosophy is based on
involvement and trust and the culture is based on collectivism and low power
distance generally result in principal - steward relationships.
This observation is consistent with the findings of classic organisational 'success
studies' such as Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excellence4 ' and Porras and
Collins' Built to Last.42
A significant minority of those interviewed clearly understood their role as being
agents of the shareholders, with all other responsibilities subordinate to that
relationship. Others spoke of balancing the concerns of investors, employees and
suppliers and the community and environment where applicable. It was found that to
some extent the emphases placed on different constituencies varied with the activities
in which the interviewee's company was engaged - for example, primary production
or services. At present the Company Law Review Steering Group is seeking a
° J.H. Davis, F.D. Schoorman and L. Donaldson, 'Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management' in
(1997) 22 Academy of Management Review 47.
41 T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (London: Harper and Row, 1982).
42 J•c• Collins and J.I. Porras, Built to Last (London: Century Business, 1994).
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compromise and, while supporting the 'Enlightened Shareholder Value' approach,
aims to emphasise the importance of companies' relationships.43
Major changes in public company structure, for example two-tier boards, were
almost universally unpopular as a legislative matter. Some commentators felt that
corporate governance requirements were already too onerous. The key point made
was that valuable executive time spent, for example on reporting, must be seen to
have an output. Improved relationships with contributors and increased 'brand
value' would be such a benefit.
Many of the directors believed that the dichotomy posited in the Company Law
Review Steering Group's Strategic Framework document between shareholder value
and pluralism was false. They endeavoured to pay due attention to all key
stakeholders, particularly customers, employees and suppliers but also the natural
and social environment, as part of their daily work, being conscious of the economic
impact of good or poor stakeholder management. 44
 Several interviewees, however,
spoke of the demands of the market, and particularly institutional shareholders,
constraining freedom of action. New rules to give other stakeholders more attention
would have to be accompanied by a cultural change on the part of major
shareholders. Public company directors and secretaries, on the evidence collected in
these meetings, well understand that the board's responsibility is to develop and
maintain the business for the long term. The extent to which they feel able, in
practice, to do this depends on the demands of finance providers.
1.5 Conclusion - Trust and UK Public Companies
Company Law Review Steering Group, n 4 above, paras 3.37-3.58.
See P. Whysall, 'Stakeholder Mismanagement in Retailing: A British Perspective' (2000) 23
Journal of Business Ethics 19; M. LaBerge and A. Svendsen, 'New Growth: Fostering Collaborative
Business Relationships' (2000) 23 Journal for Quality and Participation 48.
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The likely impact on company performance of board adherence to a stakeholder
management style (in the sense of continued efforts to balance the interests of all
stakeholders in the company) will be addressed in Chapter Nine. The literature on
the benefits of trust within a company's network of relationships is important in this
context. 45
 Even without active acceptance of the case for stakeholder management
on philosophical or political grounds, the prospect of strong economic advantages
could lead to widespread adoption of its main precepts. The basic instrumental
argument for stakeholding highlights the fact that explicit and detailed contracting is
costly. Trusting relationships and reputations for trustworthiness can reduce the need
to incur that expense. This is in addition to the fact that shareholders themselves
may hold (and increasingly will demonstrate, e.g. via ethical investment funds) a
preference for companies that deliver quality to their customers, treat their employees
well, respect their environment and play a constructive role in the communities
where they operate.
Hutton's view is that:46
If a firm could trust its shareholders to refuse a takeover offer while its profits
were temporarily depressed during a period of investment or restructuring,
then it would be more likely to go ahead with the action. If workers knew
that in a recession they could trust the firm not to lay them off (as long, say,
as they offered some temporary wage cut in return), then it would be worth
their while to retrain and upgrade their skills. Trust is the key ingredient to
stop contract capitalism dissolving into a hire-and-fire, slash-and-burn market
jungle. For the more solid a trust relationship, then the more solid the
implicit contract that, whatever shocks the relationship may receive, neither
party is going to desert the other.
See e.g. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1995); F. Bidault, P-Y Gomez and G. Marion, Trust: Firm and Society (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1997).
W. Hutton, The State to Come (London: Vintage 1997) 31.
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In a similar vein Cannon writes:47
When executive management does not trust its investor groups to back its
judgement and let it manage, it will lose confidence in its ability to succeed.
Often this will prompt conspicuous consumption, overhead growth - to cover
every option - and risk avoidance. When shareholders do not trust executive
managers to act with proper diligence they will lose confidence in their
ability to prosper. This produces increasing demands for more information,
power and action. Together they create a vicious circle of decline. Due
respect for the rights and responsibilities of both parties provides the only
way to break this and build a virtuous circle of development.
If all parties can be confident that the board is taking proper account of all relevant
interests in its leadership of a public company, mutually beneficial interchange of
ideas and efforts becomes more likely. When difficult choices have to be made by
the board, they will enjoy the confidence of those affected and can work with these
groups to find constructive solutions. The perceived need for yet morc specific
legislation and regulations to protect employee, consumer, environmental and
community interests may also be reduced. With greater board openness and
accountability, all-round satisfaction with business performance can be increased.
Existing public companies in the UK, as well as models from other jurisdictions,
have shown this process at work over long periods. What is now required, as the
current Company Law Green Paper acknowledges, 48
 is to bring others up to the
standard of the best companies for the benefit of all their stakeholders.
47 Cannon,n 15 above, 139.
48 DTI Consultation Paper, Modern Company Lawfor a Conpetitive Economy (DTI, March 1998).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NATURE OF THE COMPANY
2.1 The Organic Theory of the Company
The separate legal identity and legal personality of the company is at the heart of
modern company law.' If a venture fails, it is this device that enables entrepreneurs
and investors to enjoy limited liability; if the business succeeds, it permits a
company to outlive its first leaders and develop in ways the founders could hardly
have imagined. 2
 It is, therefore, perhaps surprising that economic and legal theorists
should have questioned the concept that a company has a genuine independent
existence, distinct from that of its members, directors, employees or lenders. 3 Yet
the notion of the company as a real entity has long been a matter of academic
dispute.
The conduct of public companies themselves, not only in targeting customers but
also in training employees and dealing with suppliers and neighbours, fosters the
idea of a consistent, identifiable unit with dependable, enduring values. The
desirability of setting clear goals for the company is expressed in many popular
management texts. 4
 There has been considerable academic research on the cultures
of business organisations and their impact on economic performance. 5
 It is the
employees 'in the front line' who must act out corporate codes and policies which
'The company is at law a different person altogether from its subscribers' Saloman v Saloman & Co
[1897] AC 22, per Lord Macnaughton; 'The undertaking is something different from the totality of
the shareholdings' Short v Treasury Commissioners [19481 AC 534, per Evershed U.
2 See J.C. Collins and J.l. Porras, Built to Last (London: Century Business, 1994) for selected
examples and discussions of'clockbuilding' and core values.
Lee v Lees Air Farming [1961] AC 12 (a sole director and major shareholder may also be an
employee of a company); Macaura v Northern Insurance Co,npany [1925] AC 619 (property owned
by a company does not legally belong to its members).
"e.g. T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (London: Harper and Row, 1992).
e.g. J.P. Kotter and J.L. Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance (London: Free Press, 1992);
M. Casson, The Economics of Business Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); D.R. Denison,
Corporate Culture and Organisational Effectiveness (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1990); A.D.
Brown, Organisational Culture (London: Pitman, 1995).
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are usually formulated by directors. In relation to public companies specifically, two
initial observations may be made:
(a) companies have, and seek to have, social identities and appear to believe that
these images will have an impact on their performance;
(b) it is the board of directors that sets the tone and the targets in a major public
company, just as the partners (or perhaps more accurately, equity partners) do in
professional firms.
In the name of the company, premises will be leased, staff employed and contracts
made to purchase supplies and sell products. The company can protect its own legal
interests (e.g. by suing overdue creditors) and is subject to liabilities (e.g. to pay
Corporation Tax) in its own right. Griffiths notes:
Public companies have evolved into organisations which are far more
powerful and autonomous than would have been possible without the
governance structure provided by the standard legal model, and their size and
longevity has enabled them to exploit other facilities provided by the law,
such as property rights, contracts nic cries, to a wixck' tt\'t.
The contribution of law to the development of public companies is a basis for
arguing that there is a legitimate public interest in their affairs which justifies
some form of public accountability beyond mere accountability to
shareholder 'owners' 6
The organisation's purposes are independent of those of individual participants.
Sheikh and Rees comment: 7
 'The modern corporation is perceived as a 'caring
corporation' which discharges social as well as economic obligations' so that, for
instance, plant closures may cause protests in affected communities, even if they
A. Griffiths, Corporate Governance and the Uses of the Company (Manchester: University of
Manchester Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 18, 1993)5.
S. Sheikh and W. Rees, Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (London: Cavendish, 1995)
2.
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appear to be economically justifiable, 8
 and charitable activity is widely supported,
even if unconnected with the main business goal. Furthermore, these companies
function as public institutions, in that their impact on the economic and social
environment is inevitably substantial. Whether as extractors of primary materials,
users of technology in manufacturing industry or retailers who define Britain's
townscapes, they have a great impact on national life. White makes the point as
follows:
The language of making money is wholly inadequate, even in the most
conservative view - especially in the most conservative view - as to what goes
on and should go on in the business world. In my view, the proper way to
talk about this is to subordinate economic language to a formula such as the
following:
"The business corporation should always endeavour to act as a responsible
citizen in its economic and other activities."9
The question of possible changes to the law to reflect a socialised view of
corporations will be discussed in Chapter Five. If directors themselves take the view
that they have both private and public obligations, any new legislation would do well
to acknowledge both sets of concerns. 10
 The organic theory of the company provides
a firmer basis than the alternative models for separate legal personality and the
powers of the directors. It is to their considerable autonomy that attention now turns.
2.1.1 Separation of Ownership and Control
Senior executives gained de facto control of most widely-held industrial companies
from World War I onwards, as dispersed, passive shareholders lost the ability and
inclination to exercise any real hegemony. Recognising this phenomenon as long
The recent controversy (April 2000) over BMW's disposal of Rover's operations at Longbridge in
the West Midlands are a prominent case in point.
J.B. White, 'How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and of
Citizenship' (1983)94 Yale Law Journal 1416, 1424.
0 As A. Wolfe, 'The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?' (1993)50 Washington
andLee Law Review 1673, 1693 asserts.
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ago as the beginning of the 1930s, Berle and Means in their text The Modern
Corporation and Private Property" famously suggested that top managers might use
their considerable freedom of action to address social concerns in running major
corporations. Herman points out that there may nevertheless be variations in and
constraints on managerial activity:
There is...an ambiguity in the managerialist premise, which tells us that
management controls, but leaves open the question of the determinants of and
the limits to managerial authority. The premise is thus sufficiently elastic to
accommodate a range of possibilities, extending from unrestricted managerial
discretion to levels of constraint that raise questions about the extent and even
the reality of management	 12
Not only markets for capital (financial and technological), labour (managerial and
operative) and products, but also governmental and public regulation, are capable of
constraining management's discretion. Since the 1970s in the UK, there has, for
example, been far greater employment and consumer protection than Berle and
Means would have contemplated when writing in the pre-Worid War II US.
In law, subject to these limits, the public company board is invariably given the
power to make all day-to-day decisions.' 3
 Directors are subject to no instructions
from the shareholders or anyone else in their daily work.' 4
 Almost universal among
the larger public companies is the practice, expressly permitted by the 'standard
form' of corporate constitution,' 5
 of delegating routine matters to an executive
committee, which runs the organisation between full board meetings - and this
despite political opposition from major companies to formal two-tier boards in the
UK. Shareholders place their funds in the hands of the executive, in principle under
"A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:
Macmillan 1932, revised ed 1968).
12 E.S. Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981) 14.
' Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (S.I. 1995 No. 805), Table A Art 70.
e.g. John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 111 CA; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER
582.
n 13 above, Table A Art 72.
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the regular scrutiny of the full board, whilst employees, suppliers and customers
must accept directorial decisions (within the limits of the law) or avoid dealing with
the company.
The retention of capital to finance corporate growth has been a cornerstone of the
modern industrial system, facilitating technological progress and social change.
Major US corporations from the 1890s through to the 1950s, and Japanese and
German industrial groups since then, appear to have had more freedom to reinvest
their earnings than their British counterparts, which are far more obviously subject to
the disciplines and constraints of an active stock market.' 6 Nevertheless, in the UK
as elsewhere, it is the directors who declare company dividends, and they have
discretion to withhold considerable sums of profit for investment. This capital
accumulated from retained profits 'belongs' to the shareholders only once a dividend
has been declared and the courts are unlikely to question the board's decision.'7
With over 70 per cent of shares in UK quoted companies now held by financial
institutions (such as insurance companies, pension funds, unit and investment trusts),
there has been some reconcentration of corporate membership in recent years. Even
so, a study in the early 1 990s found that the four largest institutional shareholders
could not have carried a resolution on their own in any of the large listed companies
examined and they would have succeeded alone in only a limited number of
medium-sized companies,' 8 while there are severe practical obstacles in the way of
building a coalition of five or more members. Moreover, as will be seen below, so
long as others can be found to purchase their shares, investing institutions are
disinclined to involve themselves in company management. While the dividend
expectations of major investors are generally understood by management, it can be
6 W. Lazonick and M. O'Sullivan, 'Big Business and Corporate Control' in M. Warner, International
Encyclopedia of Business and Management (London: Routledge, 1996) 365.
R. Marris, 'The Economic Theory of "Managerial" Capitalism' in G.C. Archibald, The Theory of
the Firm (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971) 301.
s G.P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996) 111-116.
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argued that such requirements are not different in kind from other factors, such as
pay demands and customer requirements, which executives and the board must
address when planning corporate strategy.
2.1.2 Power Relations
The organic model of the public company envisages it as a truly public sphere where
the choices of contracting parties are not always sovereign. One cannot ignore
externalities occasioned by corporate activity for which none of the beneficiaries has
to pay (e.g. environmental pollution, health risks). Those who may be affected by
the company's present acts well into the future or in an unpredictable fashion cannot
easily contract with it to deal with risks. Without regulation, those who manage
corporate activity, except to the extent that specific legislation applies, could
therefore disregard the social consequences of the business.
If obedience to the law is treated as having value above and beyond profit
calculations, the purely private element is already being supplemented by rules that
do not arise from contract. The state's right to set bounds to activity carried out in
the name of private profit is also being acknowledged. The optimum level of
violations of the law is itself not zero, in the 'profit maximisation as the agents of the
shareholders' version of directors' duties. If compliance would increase costs or
reduce sales, thereby damaging corporate profits, and there is no legal penalty which
would cost as much, taking into account the likelihood of being caught, from an
economic perspective the directors should break the law.
Very large companies are not subject to immediate market pressures in their product
pricing, nor sometimes in salary rates and materials prices. Competition policy deals
with avoiding cartels and abuses of monopolies or oligopolies, but it acts slowly and
will not prevent employee and supplier dependence. The executives of the public
company are again taking the decisions that shape the futures of customers,
employees and suppliers as well as neighbours. A narrow view of corporate
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responsibility without acknowledgment of these political factors is surely unrealistic
in modern circumstances.
Power imbalances are inherent in the organisation of production itself Potential
employees in areas of job shortages and small supply firms needing orders in
competitive markets will not be able to propose, let alone to dictate, terms to public
companies. In other circumstances, from consumer protection to judicial review, the
law intervenes to prevent or curtail any abuse of power. Governmental action is
subject to scrutiny in court and it is submitted that that of public companies is no less
a matter of genuine and legitimate public concern.
2.1.3 Managerial Theory
The corporate form is a legal vehicle for business which, together with employment
contracts and trade connections, produces a combination of continuity and flexibility.
This led to the rise of incorporated business over the partnership format. In their
writing on behavioural studies for business and management, Fincham and Rhodes
link work culture explicitly to an 'organic' concept of organisational reality and
suggest that this fosters employee commitment. 9 Internalised goals and a sense of
common purpose are said to produce an adaptive organisation, which, in turn,
enables work habits and authority structures to be modified according to changing
demands.
Buchanan and Huczynski, when commenting on organisational behaviour, point out
that for common values, beliefs and forms of behaviour to evolve, a reasonably
stable group of people needs to 'share a history' at work, including dealing with
problems. A company provides the setting for such collective history and learning,
which in turn produces a culture and pattern of work that can endure. 2° New
R. Fincham and P.S. Rhodes, The Individual, Work and Organisation (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 2nd ed 1992) 412.
20 D. Buchanan and A. Huczynski, Organizational Behaviour (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 3rd
ed 1997)519.
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employees are socialised into the culture, customers and suppliers develop a clear
idea of what to expect and, importantly, potential investors can choose whether to
'buy in' to the approach chosen by management. Companies that survive and thrive
tend to have strong traditions and leaders.
2.1.4 Implications for Social Activism
A recognition of the power already wielded by major companies leads to caution by
way of the 'specific competence' argument, which runs to the effect that business
should stick to its economic task and avoid seeking social influence which it is not
qualified to handle. 21 Since this applies to charitable giving and community projects
outside the company's normal sphere of activity, it does not preclude attention to
constituencies that participate in, or are affected by, those usuaf business activities.
Charitable giving often purports to serve some strategic business purpose, but the
outcome of donations is often not specifically measured as the results of other
expenditure would be. Since management appears to have a relatively free hand in
choices of donations and sponsorship, restraint by law may seem to be reasonable.22
The rationales for corporate charitable donations are usually that the company, as a
major force in the community, has a responsibility to 'put something back' and that
the image of the company is improved by such deeds. Shareholders have not so far
objected to the (admittedly modest) sums of UK public companies' charitable
giving,23 despite the lack of proof that such donations do bring financial benefits to
the company.
Those who view public companies as autonomous and powerful institutions are more
likely to favour allotting to them a wide range of social responsibilities, from fair
treatment of employees, consumers and suppliers, to showing respect for neighbours,
21 T. Cannon, Corporate Responsibility (London: Pitman, 1994) 37-44.
22 J• Clarke, 'Shareholders and Corporate Community Involvement in Britain' (1997) 6 Business
Ethics: A European Review 201; G. Moore, 'Corporate Community Involvement in the UK -
Investment or Atonement?' (1995)4 Business Ethics: A European Review 171.
23 M. Fogarty and I. Christie, Companies and Communities: Promoting Business Involvement in the
Conmunity (London: PSI, 1990).
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political decisions and the environment. Individuals conducting business in a
community are held accountable for their actions and made to pay for any breach of
communal rules. Public companies, wielding greater social and economic influence,
stand in need of no less exacting treatment in law. Allen writes:
The social model (of the corporation), in one of its weaker forms, is highly
consistent with the managerialist concept of the firm that has, in fact,
dominated the real world of business and politics since the great depression.
That view sees senior management as empowered to give fair consideration
to workers, communities and suppliers as well as to suppliers of capital.24
If the political element in the independent life of corporations is lost, the will for
adopting any regulatory initiative at all can be lost with it. In the case of the
privatised utilities, for example, it was found that the original model of 'light touch'
regulation did not satisfy public demands and more needed to be done to
acknowledge and protect the needs of consumers and employees and satisfy
environmental and community expectations. 25 The corporation exists through the
survival of political and social accommodations with business. It needs to be
recognised that the current regime is a policy choice.26
2.2 The Nexus of Contracts Theory of the Company
There is a group of theorists in law and economics who see the company in terms of
contracts made between the participants, each for their own assumed benefit. The
legal fiction of the company merely provides a vehicle to enable activities to be
arranged at lower cost than in a 'spot market' for labour and supplies. Market
sourcing of factors of production can be very costly. Having employees and
24 W.T. Allen, 'Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law' (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law
Review 1395.
25 e.g. P. Ham, 'Regulating for the Common Good' (1994) Utilities Law Review 88; see now the
Government's Consultation Paper, tellingly entitled A Fair Deal For Consumers (DTI, March 1998)
on regulation of utilities.
26 M. Albert and R. Gonenc, 'The Future of Rheinish Capitalism' (1996) 67 The Political Quarterly
184 gives an overview of a different system from the Anglo-American model.
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equipment ready each working day to perform the tasks the management deems
necessary represents a significant advance in efficiency.27
The notion of companies as voluntary associations of self-seeking individuals has
strong intuitive appeal. Within the firm itself, contracts are generally set to run for a
longer timescale than is the case with outsiders, but this is because both parties to
each exchange rationally value certainty above flexibility. If they are to perform
their task efficiently (that is, to compete in the open market on strictly economic
terms) it is argued that they should be free of any non-essential constraints in their
initial bargaining. A system of free contracting is said to move resources (including
labour and materials) to their most highly valued use. There may be a place for legal
intervention where imperfect information limits the rationality of decision-making by
a party or where there is some potential for dishonest or self-serving conduct, but
very seldom otherwise.
The fact that shareholder approval is required for major transactions and for changes
to the company's constitution seems to support the proposition that members
contract with the management for the company to be run as the shareholders choose.
In the public company setting, however, there is great practical difficulty in the way
of effective instruction or monitoring by the shareholders. Griffiths notes: 'There is
a significant co-ordination problem to overcome before the shareholders can act
collectively and a large body of shareholders is in any event only suited to the
crudest kind of decision making.'28
As Brudney puts it: 'Scattered stockholders cannot, and do not, negotiate with
owners who go public (or with management - either executives or directors) over
27 R.H. Coase's classic paper 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Economica 386 discusses market
costs and co-ordination costs in detail; O.E. Williamson's 'The Logic of Economic Organisation'
(1988)4 Journal of Law Economics and Organisation 65 extends and refines the basic approach.
28 Griffiths, n 6 above, 4.
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hiring managers, over the terms of their employment, or over their retention.' 29 One
should note that similar arguments could be put forward in relation to employees and
suppliers, except perhaps where there is a powerful organisation in place to represent
their interests (e.g. trade unions, trade associations). As there is no single contracting
party that negotiates to protect the interests of the local community and the natural
environment, those interests are not represented in boardrooms. The notion that all
affected parties are present at the bargaining table, let alone that they all have real
opportunities to contribute, is illusory. All direct participants have a choice of
whether to involve themselves in the company or not, but economic circumstances
may limit their realistic options; other relevant constituencies are currently absent,
both from the establishment of the company and from its structures thereafter.
Managers contract personally with the company (for their own pay and conditions)
and also deal with contractual arrangements made on its behalf. In a public
company, the terms on which shareholders join the business are set by managers for
acceptance by those who decide to join, just as individual employees and suppliers
will not realistically be able to negotiate changes to standard form contracts. The
board must oversee the use of resources in toto and the conditions on which the
company does its business. This co-ordination needs to reflect a long-term view,
even if individual arrangements are made primarily for immediate advantage.
2.2.1 Transaction Costs
If all the contracts needed to sustain production were precise and specific as to future
requirements - what workers were to do, how managers were to act, the terms of
provision of capital and what suppliers were to deliver - there would be no cost
benefits to creating a company as compared with negotiating each contract
separately. Since it is to reduce production costs that the corporate vehicle is used,
there must be a zone of discretion as the business progresses. The principal
29 V. Brudney, 'Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract', (1985) 85
Columbia Law Review 1403, 1412.
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advantage of the employment contract is that an employee can be required to perform
any one of a whole range of functions. Similarly, the benefit of the delegation of
decision-making by shareholders to executives is precisely that the shareholders do
not have to spend time considering corporate decisions.
Given the existence of such presumptively efficient discretion, someone must decide
how it should be exercised and in public companies the management, and ultimately
board members, take on the task. They can choose to pursue any of a whole range of
policies - for example they may aim for high sales volume at modest prices or high
profit margins on more expensive goods, focus the business on a core set of activities
or pursue a range of diverse opportunities, expand production in new areas or close
down existing sites. 3° As the law stands, employees, suppliers and the community
will have little influence on such choices, despite being directly affected by them.
Investors will enter the company if they approve of an existing policy and exit if
things change to their distaste.
2.2.2 The Contract with Shareholders
Fama and Jensen note that 'open corporations' (quoted public companies in UK
terms) are characterised by use of unrestricted common stock3 ' - that is, ordinary
shares, which do not carry any obligation to become involved in company
management and are freely alienable. Such stock is said to be attractive to finance
the start of complex, relatively risky activities and to facilitate capital investment by
its capacity to supply 'large amounts of wealth from residual claimants on a
permanent basis (sic).' The authors hypothesise that such separation of residual risk-
bearing from decision management leads to the separation of decision management
(by executives) from decision control (by directors), in order to control the discretion
30 The Annual Reports of Dixon Group and Argos, John Waddington and Beresford plcs, show
examples of different approaches.
31 E.F. Fama and M.C. Jensen, 'Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983) XXVI Journal of Law
and Economics 312.
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of managers.32
 The arrangement whereby investors provide funds to be utilised by
managers is assumed to be advantageous for both sides despite (or perhaps because
of) the indeterminate nature of the agreement.
The contract with shareholders is said to mandate the directors to set objectives,
oversee management and return profits to shareholders. In practice, where a public
company is concerned, shareholders will know the business strategy and main
activities of the company in which they invest - institutional investors are well
qualified to obtain and evaluate this information and professional advice is available
to individuals. A choice is made between different industrial sectors and different
managerial approaches. The investors do not expect to dictate terms of business - it
is a matter of standard form contract. It may not be in the long-term financial interest
of the shareholders that employees and equipment be mistreated or neglected,
suppliers and customers antagonised or that the standing of the firm in the
community should suffer. Furthermore, investors may be content knowingly to put
their money into a company that sets out to do more than the legally prescribed
minimum in terms of social and environmental standards.33
2.2.3 Firm-Specific Investments
The notion that shareholders, as residual risk-bearers for the company, should enjoy
special privileges is widespread. In fact, it is not only shareholders who make firm-
specific investments - for example, employees may devote time to training which is
of use only in the firm 34
 and suppliers may invest in machinery to meet customer
requirements. It is more practicable for shareholders to spread their risks by
diversification than it is for employees, and often for suppliers, to deal with several
32 ibid322.
Websites such as those of the UK Social Investment Forum (www.uksifor) and Shareholder
Action Action Service (www.thesasuk.com ) and online databases such as www.corporate-
çster.com
 and www.ethicsforuss.org.uk
 provide information for investors in a more accessible
manner than previously.
For a discusson of the employment contract in relational terms, see K. van Wesel Stone, 'Labour
Markets, Employment Contracts, and Corporate Change' in J. McCahery, S. Picciotto and C. Scott
Corporate Control andAccountability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 61.
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firms. The potential for exit is very much greater in developed stock markets than
tight labour markets or competitive supply situations.
Even Friedman, well known for his restrictive definition of corporate social
responsibility as profit maximisation within the 'rules of the game' (as set by law and
custom),35
 notes the unique quality of the collection of factors in a firm:
If these (profitable) firms could be reproduced by assembling similar
collections of hired factors, there would be an incentive to do so. The fact
that (in long-run equilibrium) there is no tendency for new firms to enter
means that they cannot be reproduced, implying that the firms own some
specialized factors.36
Some firms fend off new competition because they have developed particular
combinations of factors, which are extremely difficult to emulate. If it were possible
to contract in the market to secure the same labour and materials, as Friedman points
out, others would do so. They cannot, because not all the relevant information can
be encapsulated in the language of formal contract - continuing relationships add
value.
Where, for the reasons discussed above, all the details of a contract are not set out ab
initio, there may be profits to be gained for shareholders from action going against
the spirit of previous arrangements with employees, suppliers and even customers.
Takeovers produce premiums for target shareholders, it has been argued, because
others associated with the company lose out on the long-term arrangements they had
made with the ousted management team. 37
 If breaches become commonplace, it
seems likely that other parties will start to insist on more closely defined terms and
greater short-term rewards (for example, employees who do not believe promises of
security will demand higher salaries, while suppliers will want higher prices.) The
M. Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits' in T.I. White,
Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993) 162.
36 M. Friedman, 'Theory and Measurement of Long-Run Costs' in Archibald, n 17 above.
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whole corporate structure, which permits retention of profits for future growth, then
comes under threat.
Managers themselves invest their time and personal reputation in their chosen
company. This gives them an incentive to plan for the future of the business. After a
prolonged incumbency, their value in the labour market is linked with the
performance of the company, for better or for worse. Since they will not wish to be
forced to move, their contract implicitly contains a bias towards long-termism.
2.2.4 Implications for Social Activism
With the acceptance of contractualism comes what is sometimes called the
'Shareholders' Money' argument 38 - the assertion that it is an improper deprivation of
investors to allocate resources to employees, suppliers, community involvement or
environmental protection, beyond what market forces absolutely demand. Nor may
those who are entrusted with investors' money exercise personal preferences to the
detriment of profit maximisation. This presupposes that the contract between the
shareholders and managers acting on their behalf requires that profit be extracted by
any means (or perhaps by any legal means), as otherwise the executives would not be
meeting their obligations to shareholders. Non-executive directors, in particular, are
said to be responsible for monitoring management on behalf of members. Quite
apart from the fact that many shareholders (including the millions of small investors
represented by the institutions) may choose to see social and environmental standards
upheld even at the expense of maximising their monetary returns, it seems far from
clear that they should have the right to profit from actions that go against other
interests in the economy and society. Contracts with key parties also contain implicit
J.C. Coffee, 'Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web' (1986) 85 Michigan
Law Review I assesses the winners and losers in this situation.
38 J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 333-335 e
seq.
52
understandings as well as explicit terms, all of which require respect if the integrity
of commerce itself is ultimately to be upheld.39
The proponents of the 'nexus of contracts' theory at times deploy it to deny that the
corporation can partake of any responsibility in society. All the participants on this
view are sheltered from moral responsibility by the contracting process itself.
Fischel argues:
A corporation.. .is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for
a mass of contracts which various individuals have entered into for their
mutual benefit. Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is incapable of having
social or moral obligations much in the same way that inanimate objects are
incapable of having these obligations.40
None of the human persons responsible for making the decisions about activities
which produce corporate profits, on this reasoning, is required to take account of
these other considerations, so long as those directly involved (employees, customers,
suppliers) have voluntarily agreed prices. A business upon incorporation is said to
undergo a qualitative change that takes it from a realm of individual or joint and
several liability to one where there is no effective locus of accountability. 4 ' The
directors are relieved of the financial responsibilities of ownership although they are
making the decisions. Shareholders enjoy limited liability and do not involve
themselves in management.
In no sense are conscious contracts made with all the participants in a company - for
the most part they do not know they have made contracts and would not recognise
In J. Jacobs, Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993) 37-40 'Respect Contracts' is discussed as a precept of the
'Commercial Syndrome' on which it is said trading is based.
'° D.R. Fischel, 'The Corporate Governance Movement' (1985) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1259,
1273.
41 C.D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York: Harper
& Row, 1975) spells out the difficulties of maintaining ethical sensibility and legal accountability in
large corporations and see K.E. Goodpaster and J.B. Matthews, 'Can a Corporation Have a
Conscience?' [1982] Harvard Business Review 132.
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the idea if it were suggested to them. 42 Economic issues remain important for
regulators, but they can take a far broader view than is implied by talk of trying to fill
in contractual 'gaps'. The board is the co-ordinator at the centre of the whole web of
contracts. In a public company there is no a priori reason why directors should seek
to favour one party with whom they deal over others.
2.3 The American Law Institute and the UK Experience
In extremely protracted and controversial deliberations, the American Law Institute
(ALl) grappled with these fundamental issues of corporate law and their implications
for 'model' regulation. The ALl's Principles of Corporate Governance were finally
published in 1992 and it was probably inevitable that they would advance a
compromise solution. The Principles' governing section on The Objective and
Conduct of the Corporation contained two distinct subsections. The first, 2.0 1(a),
reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) and Section 6.02 (Action of
Directors That Has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited Tender
Offers), a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.43
This appears to set the Principles squarely on a contractarian, stockholder-centred
footing.
However, the second part, 2.01 (b), states:
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law;
42 A point addressed by David Campbell in the seminar on the Theory of the Firm, Leeds University
30th April 1998.
' American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
(ALl, 1992) 55.
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(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the conduct of business;
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes.44
Examples of ethical considerations that may be permissible are said to include
responsibilities towards employees, customers, suppliers and members of the local
community.
2.3.1 Evaluation of the Principles
In his review of the Principles, Eisenberg regards the two-part approach as basically
satisfactory, since each part reflects an important truth of corporate life:
The business corporation as an instrument through which capital is assembled
for the activities of producing and distributing goods and services and making
investments. Accordingly, a basic premise of corporation law is that a
business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of such
activities with a view to enhancing the corporation's profit and the gains of
the corporation's owners, that is, the shareholders [the premise underlying
subsection 2.01(a)J...4
A second premise of corporation law is that in pursuing the profit objective,
the corporation should conduct itself with regard to the fact that it is a social
as well as an economic institution. Accordingly, the pursuit of corporate
profit and shareholder gain must be constrained by social imperatives and
may be qualified by social needs [the premise underlying subsection
2.0 1(b)].46
On this view, it is accepted that shareholders are the owners of the company and
directors are their agents. In appropriate cases, the company may temper profit-
seeking zeal with a social conscience. 'While the reference to 'social imperatives'
ibid.
MA. Eisenberg, 'Symposium on Corporate Governance: An Overview' (1992) 48 The Business
Lawyer 1271, 1275.
46 ibid 1276.
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suggests obedience to law and is assumed to be mandatory, the suggestion of
voluntary restraint where 'social needs' are in issue is more problematic. It is far
from clear in this model when the economic duty can be overridden for ethical
reasons.
In contrast, Mitchell criticises the ALT on the grounds that, by trying to pacifi both
sides of the debate, it ended up not satisfying anyone and producing an incoherent
result:
If the values (to be served by corporate regulation) were enhanced efficiency
in the interests of stockholder owners, then it would be difficult to quibble
with the convincing arguments put forward by the contractarian school. If,
on the other hand, corporate regulation is to serve a more explicitly public-
directed purpose, market efficiency is not determinative...47
Instead of asking the fundamental question of what corporate law should
achieve, the ALl seems to have proceeded on the fallacious assumption that
this question is best left unanswered. The ALT has thus produced a set of
statements that combine all aspects of the current debate in unhappy
discord.48
The Illustrations to section 2.01 clearly show that the combination of its two
subsections in fact gives the top decisionmakers in companies complete discretion
with very little guidance. For instance, it is said that a corporation may choose to
honour a contract that is technically unenforceable, on the ethical ground that
seriously made business promises should be kept and therefore 2.01(b)(2) applies.49
On the other hand, if the corporation decides not to honour the contract, it will be
acting in accordance with 2.01(a). 5° There is no breach of the Principles either way.
' L.E. Mitchell, 'Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALl Principles of Corporate Governance' (1992)
61 George Washington Law Review 871, 879.
ibid88O.
n 43 above, Illustration 11 at 64 (even disregarding possible economic gains from enhanced
reputation).
n 43 above, Illustration 12 at 64.
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To quote another example, a corporation may purchase an annuity for a long-time
worker who is incapacitated by an accident, because ethical considerations suggest
making provision for an employee in such circumstances and therefore the
expenditure can be justified under 2.0l(b)(2).5' If the corporation does not make
such provision, 2.01(a) will apply. 52
 Neither course would depart from the
Principles. This indicates that trying to embrace both points of view is not helpful in
practice.
2.3.2 UK Company Law Reform
The UK Government's first Consultation Paper on Company Law Reform contained
only a brief reference to the responsibilities of directors and the 'stakeholder' debate
without any commitment or evaluation:
A wider issue for the review is whether directors' duty to act in the interests
of their company should be interpreted as meaning simply that they should
act in the interests of the shareholders, or whether they should also take
account of other interests, such as those of employees, creditors, customers,
the environment and the wider community.53
The Steering Group's Strategic Framework Document gave fuller consideration to
these issues, in a manner which placed great weight on the practical difficulties that
are seen to stand in the way of what it calls the more 'pluralist' options. 4
 The Law
Commission, in reporting on directors' duties, took a technical approach which
attempted to avoid the whole controversy. 55
 In a reference to section 309 of the
Companies Act 1985, the Draft Statement of Directors' Duties contains a bland
n 43 above, Illustration 13 at 66 (setting aside the possibility of improved employee morale adding
to profits).
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n 43 above, Illustration 14 at 66.
DTI Consultation Paper, Modern Company Lawfor a Competitive Economy (DTI, March 1998)
para
3.7.
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy - The
Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) para 5.1.
Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a
Statement of Duties (Report No. 261, September 1999) 8.
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statement that 'A director must have regard to the interests of the company's
employees in general and its members.'56
The Hampel Committee Report, in contrast, was definite in its conclusion that
shareholder returns must be the priority for boards:
The single overriding objective shared by all listed companies, whatever their
size and type of business, is the preservation and the greatest practicable
enhancement over time of their shareholders' investment.57
Business organisations, particularly City institutions and major corporations, would
use this function as a defence against regulation of all kinds.
The Company Law Review Steering Group's first major Cons1taon Paper n )999
placed considerable emphasis on the efficiency of the system and its favourable
ranking by business in an international marketplace. 58 There is therefore every
reason to expect that the review will produce an outcome favoured by public
company directors themselves. 59 The way in which they exercise their freedom,
particularly in public companies, was not seriously addressed. Guidance is certainly
wanted in terms that resonate with the feelings of board members and express social
and environmental concerns.
The document 'Developing the Framework' published by the Steering Group in 2000
contains a draft statement of directors' duties, which states that:
c. The circumstances to which (the director) is to have regard.. . include in
particular...:
' ibid 184.
Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report (January 1998),
para 1.16.
DTI, n 53 above, para 4.7.
Hampel, n 57 above, also shows this feature - for example section 3.12 on the structure of the board
refers to 'overwhelming support' (in business) for a unitary board, 'little enthusiasm' for change and
the desire for structural flexibility.
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aa. the company's need to foster its business relationships, including those
with its employees and suppliers and the customers for its products and
services;
bb. the impact of its operations on the communities affected and on the
environment; and
cc. its need to maintain a reputation for high standards of business conduct.6°
This is however all subject to the overriding requirement that:
(the director) must exercise his powers in the way he believes in good faith is
best calculated in the circumstances, taking account of both the short and the
long term consequences of his acts, to promote the success of the company
for the benefit of its members as a whole.6'
While attempting 'to spell out the "inclusive" nature' of directors' overriding duties62
and even emphasising that well-managed companies already adopt this approach,63
the Steering Group rejected the idea of omitting the reference to members (which in
effect maintains shareholder primacy). 64 This contrasts with the inclusion of the
importance of long-term business planning. 65 It is submitted that, certainly for public
companies, this approach is inadequate. These matters and details of drafting will be
pursued in Chapters Five and Six.
It should be noted at this point that UK company law has already recognised that two
non-shareholder constituencies may be taken into consideration in the running of
companies. Under section 309(1) of the Companies Act 1985, it is the duty of
directors to have regard to the interests of the company's employees in general, who
nevertheless do not have locus standi to challenge board decisions in the courts. The
duty to employees is not enforceable by employees themselves, but by members
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Framework (DTI, March 2000) para 3.40.
61 ibid.
62 ibid para 3.55.
ibid para 3.58.
64 ibid para 3.52.
65 ibid para 3.54.
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taking derivative actions, making it unlikely to have much practical impact. 66 When
a company is no longer solvent, or arguably when it is approaching insolvency, the
residual risk falls on creditors who are ahead of the shareholders in the distribution
queue. The directors at that point owe their fiduciary duties to the creditors.67
Exclusive directorial accountability has thus not been reserved to shareholders for
quite some time (if it ever was). This is, of course, aside from the voluminous
environmental and planning and health and safety legislation and regulation to which
all boards must pay close attention.
On the general question of whether any particular set of corporate governance
arrangements should be mandatory, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the corporate
regime ought to provide a set of default rules - 'off- the-rack' terms which can be
used by parties, if they so choose, to avoid the cost of negotiating 'from scratch'Y'
In small private companies where there is discussion between all the participants, this
may be plausible. Where a public company is involved, both the practical difficulties
of realistic contracting and the wider importance of the organisation lead to the
conclusion that arrangements should reflect social and political requirements. 69
 This
points to the need for a mandatory governance system with effective enforcement
mechanisms.
In order to meet the needs of the economy and of society, the purpose to be served by
company law needs to be defined. Property rights, contractual expectations and
But see for example Re Welfab Engineers [1990] BCLC 833 in which directors accepted an offer
for purchase of their ailing business from a buyer who was prepared to continue the business and
preserve employment, rather than a higher cash offer for the premises alone following completion of
which the employees would have been made redundant. Hoffmann J. held that the directors were not
liable to contribute to the insolvency because they had acted properly in taking employment prospects
into account.
67 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v Dodd(1988) BCLC 250 where it was said (at 252) that creditors in
insolvency 'become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the
power of the directors and the shareholders to deal with the company's assets' (per Dillon U).
68 F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, 'The Corporate Contract' (1989)89 Cohimbia Law Review
1416.
69 See e.g. M.A. Eisenberg, 'The Structure of Corporation Law' (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review
1461.
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political authority all have parts to play. If the shareholders of public companies are
indeed regarded as their owners and directors are agents to pursue their interests, any
legal restraint on the pursuit of profit becomes difficult to justify. If ownership is
treated as problematic, there is space to explore the totality of power relations that
define the company.
2.4 Ownership of the Company
The concept of the company as the property of the shareholders has underpinned the
argument that directors have a duty to maximise profits and coloured the perceptions
of many directors as to their responsibilities. The idea does not sit easily with the
observation that shareholders are no more committed to the public company than
other parties. Nor does it square with the underlying assumptions of the nexus of
contracts model or the organic model. If public companies can be said to be 'owned'
at all, it is argued that that shared 'ownership' rights must extend beyond
shareholders.
In relation to quoted public companies, the shareholders have voluntarily ceded part
of their surplus capital to be used in the business, in the hope and expectation that the
rewards from so doing will surpass those from safer investments such as savings
accounts and government stock. Public company shares with diffuse ownership
became in reality a source of steady income carrying little risk of loss and not
attached to any participation in company management. It is anomalous and
unwarranted to leave rights of control in the hands of shareholders alone when their
interest is increasingly difficult to distinguish from that of other lenders. 7° Annual
returns on equity are more variable than those on loan capital, but the increased
possibility of periods without returns is balanced by the expectation of higher
rewards when times are good. The level of risk preferred, and hence the type of
investment chosen, is a matter for the investor. With a balanced portfolio,
70 A point addressed by Paddy Ireland in the seminar on the Theory of the Firm, Leeds University
30th April 1998.
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furthermore, a predictable stream of income can be assured from equity investment
alone, since reductions in one company's dividend will generally be offset by
increases in another.
Partners, for example in professional firms, retain ownership because they are all on
an equal footing and all capable of sharing control. Other firms, such as complex
manufacturing and volume retailing, require far greater volumes of capital than one
entrepreneur or group could normally provide and need specialist managers - this
was the genesis of the public company. Public company investors are likened by
Handy to punters at the races, who choose a likely prospect and bet cash on it. They
know the 'form' and something of the prospects of the company they choose and the
potential returns are connected, if imperfectly, to the risks undertaken. 7 ' If targets are
not met, they are free to 'back another runner'. There is no expectation of direct
involvement from day to day, just as stabling and training is left to others in racing.
Punters are not owners. The pressures for returns and shareholders' automatic right
to sell out can impede business success.
In law, each member has a set of rights and the shares are the holder's property, but
the company is not. The only way of securing a return of capital to members is by the
break-up of the company. An experienced observer of corporate governance
systems, Charkham also resorts to a gambling metaphor: 72 '...shares in a company are
not a special form of gambling chip, but part ownership of a living organisation...
that is intended to endure for several generations. Even when controlled by
experienced fund managers, however, shares have not been deployed in a way that
reflects this view.
2.4.1 Institutional Investors
71 C. Handy, 'What is a Company For?' in Beyond Certainty (London: Arrow Books, 1996) 63-66
(Text of lecture delivered at the RSA in 1990).
72 J• Charkham, Corporate Governance and the Market for Companies: Aspects of the Shareholder's
Role (London: Bank of England, 1989)4.
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With the concentration of public company holdings in the hands of the large
institutional investors, the potential for active and knowledgeable shareholder
involvement appears to have grown, challenging the Berle and Means thesis, which
was based on a more dispersed and ill-informed membership. In fact, institutional
investors have shown little appetite for close involvement in the management of the
companies in which they invest. 73
 Dialogue between management and large
shareholders in private keeps executives appraised of the requirements of institutions,
but without any consideration of the impact of decisions on other parties, including
the other shareholders. Shareholder intervention, when it has come, has been by
action late in the day to change a completely discredited management.74
Furthermore, most institutions sell out of problem companies far more frequently
than they intervene. 75
 The position does seem to be one of institutional power
without acknowledgment of responsibility.
The volume of institutional holdings gives fund managers the potential to exert direct
influence. If those managers are pressing for distribution of short-term profits, the
increasing weight of their votes adds to the uncertainties faced by other
constituencies. It remains practically difficult for them to co-ordinate their efforts to
engineer managerial changes, but an individual holder with a notifiable interest76
 can
affect the price of shares, and therefore board prospects and often directors'
remuneration, by selling. While inadequacies in the present system of information
and consultation to and from shareholders may need to be rectified if they are to play
their proper role in the life of public companies, nothing can make them act as true
1 i.E. Parkinson 'Company Law and Stakeholder Governance' in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble,
Stakeholder Capitalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 144; Stapledon in his study of the issue, n 18
above, 281 states that: '...99.24% of quoted UK companies were (each year) untouched by serious
institutional intervention during the early l990s. While it is undoubtedly true that the great majority
of quoted UK companies are managed well, it is hard to believe that only seven-tenths of one per cent
suffer from very poor management.'
Stapledon, n 18 above, 122-129.
15 B.S. Black and J.C. Coffee, 'Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation' (1994)92 Michigan Law Review 1997, 2053 quote a 10:1 ratio of sale over action
estimated by a fund manager.
76 Three per cent or more of the nominal value of the share capital (s 199 Companies Act 1985).
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owners if they do not want to do so. 77 Measures designed to increase the
accountability of directors to such powerful capitalists will in effect decrease the
responsiveness of public companies to society. Fund managers who are subject to
competitive quarterly performance measurement make unlikely committed investors,
as Charkham has commented:
[I]f fund managers do see themselves as being under such short-term
pressures it must preclude their taking a long-term view of most companies in
their portfolios and of establishing relationships with them. The more they
are inclined to view the shares they hold as trading counters the less they will
be sympathetic to the longer term view which is concerned with the
underlying quality of a business and its nianagenectt78
The Hampel Committee Report, like Cadbury, counsels consideration of an 'active
voting policy' and endorses the idea of 'dialogue' between companies and
institutions about objectives 79, without proposing to place any obligations on
shareholders. Short and Keasey perceive a contradiction at the heart of expectations
of greater institutional shareholder involvement and commitment:
In their role as major shareholders, the Cadbury Report expects institutions to
take the role of the large shareholder, who will monitor company
management on behalf of smaller shareholders. Hence, in this context,
institutions are expected to take a long-term view of their shareholding
positions, and, where necessary, incur expenditure in intervening to correct
mismanagement. However, in their role as investors, institutions need to be
free to move funds around in order to find the best returns for the
beneficiaries of those funds. In this respect, it is difficult, certainly in the
current ideological free-market climate, to argue that institutions should
" P.L. Davies 'Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom' in D.D. Prentice and P.R.J. Holland,
Conteinporaiy Issues in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 88-93, points out
that intervention is only one of a range of possibilities, including sale, in cases of concern, and fund
managers will select the most cost-effective beneficial option.
78 Charkham, n 72 above, 12.
Hampel, n 57 above, para 5.
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continue to hold equity positions in problem companies and incur additional
expense intervening in management.. 80
An institutions may, however, come to own a holding too large to be disposed of
without affecting the share price. Such 'lock-in' to a mature blue-chip company is
not an entrepreneurial business risk but an investment decision. The presence of
established shareholders can assist the stability of the enterprise and its investment
and planning. If those members are primarily interested in a predictable rate of
return, it does not mean that they will be inclined to intervene in the running of the
company. Fund managers have their own businesses to run and targets to meet. The
level of returns demanded by UK institutions has for decades been far higher than
that of any other major industrialised country 8 ' and this has lead to considerable
misgivings about their influence. Other stakeholders, it is said, are treated unfairly
because of dividend pressures from institutions. The focus of attention now broadens
to take in those other participants.
2.4.2 Other 'Owners'?
In order for business to continue and develop, a company needs to be assured of an
appropriate quality and quantity of all the factors of production - labour, supplies,
financial capital and organisation. No one input provider is properly entitled to claim
ownership (where this is defined as 'possession' and 'proprietorship') when every
input is necessary to the continuation and success of the business. Ownership itself
is not a readily applicable concept where the functioning of the organisation depends
on the assemblage of the appropriate parts. Universities and hospitals carry out their
complex functions without an owner at all; surely public companies could get along
equally well likewise.82
° H. Short and K. Keasey, 'Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance' in K. Keasey and
M.J. Wright, Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration (Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons, 1997) 26.
SI W. Hutton, The State We're In (London: Vintage, 1996) 160-162.
$2 J. Kay and A. Silberston, 'Corporate Governance' (1995) National Institute Economic Review 84,
87-88.
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Porter argues that the concept of ownership should be expanded to embrace not only
shareholders, but also directors, managers, employees and customers and suppliers.
It is asserted that expanded ownership will foster true commonality of interest and
help to make investors aware of 'spillovers', such as more highly skilled workers,
that strengthen firms and also benefit related industries and the economy as a
whole. 83
 It is suggested by Porter that significant 'owners' (i.e. of stock), customers,
suppliers and community representatives be nominated to the board so as to broaden
its perspective. Such proposals for inclusion of stakeholders will be discussed in
Chapter Seven.
It is important to recognise the claims of these groups and their entitlement to proper
consideration by directors. When all have different and sometimes conflicting
interests, it is perhaps less than helpful to label these entitlements as amounting to
'ownership'. The law often permits ownership rights to be divided between several
claimants, for example by leases of land and life interests in funds. At the end of the
period of devolution, however, there is a freeholder or remainderman with the right
to dispose of the property, rather as the Takeover Code is designed to ensure that the
majority of shareholders determine the outcome of a hostile bid for a public
company.84
In the 'nexus of contracts' explanation, while participants own and choose to sell a
company their individual contributions, nobody can actually own the totality, since
the company itself is treated as an 'efficient fiction'. In the 'organic' explanation, the
preservation and welfare of the corporate enterprise come before the claims of any
individual stakeholder. Both major theories of the corporation thus refute the
argument that the shareholders are the owners of a public company with some claim
M. Porter, 'Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry' in D. Chew, Studies in
International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
14.
84 A. Paul, 'Corporate Governance and Takeovers' in Prentice and Holland, n 77 above, 139-143.
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to automatic priority in decision-making. Freed from the constraints of ownership,
those who are running and supervising public companies can plan for corporate life
well beyond their individual tenures.
2.5 Relationships and the Company
The reasons for choices made by customers, suppliers, employees and investors
deciding between dealings with rival companies are difficult to identify. In the real
world there is not time to perform detailed analysis and investigation of records
before each contracting decision, even if the individual has the knowledge required
to make such assessments. 85 Parties therefore rely heavily on anecdotal and
experiential evidence in choosing with whom to deal. Those companies known to
have produced good results for the individual or group concerned in the past are
taken to be likely to do so again.
The well-known 'prisoners' dilemma' situation occurs when two parties to a given
deal would both make themselves better off by co-operating. However, the co-
operative act will entail some initial risk and neither party is willing to take the first
gamble, since he or she is unsure that the other party will co-operate. Both,
therefore, are lead by their self-interest to settle for an outcome where both have get
less than they could have gained by co-operation. 86 In the corporate setting, Jacobs
describes 'a great web of trust in the honesty of business' on which gossamer thread
'much that we take for granted in business' hangs87 ; the fostering of relationships of
mutual confidence is the way to ensure that co-operation grows in the face of the
'prisoner's dilemma'.
85 J• Cyert and J. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) discuss the role
of rules and routine in decisionmaking within firms and also the problems posed by bounded
rationality and individual opportunism.
A lucid outline is D. Hofstadter, 'The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Evolution of Cooperation' in B.
Castro, Business and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 183-190; see also T.M. Jones,
'Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics' in (1995)20 Academy of
Management Review 404, 412-415.
87 Jacobs, n 39 above, 5.
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A supplier's investment in new technology to meet the requirements of a particular
customer and an employee's investment in training in company processes are
examples of investments which are unlikely to be made without trust. The company
that wishes to succeed by building supplier partnerships and maintaining a well-
trained workforce has an incentive not to renege on deals with its workforce and
partners, just as it has good reason to keep delivering reliable returns which enable it
to access capital. 88 The development of relationships of confidence is the way to
avoid losing out in the market environment. If the company is known for aggressive
exploitation of all possible opportunities to cut costs and pursue profit, that
development will not take place.
The assets of public companies include their reputations, customer loyalty and
supplier connections and the skills and commitment of employees. These advantages
are not susceptible to ownership in the sense of possession or proprietorship and as
matters stand they are not valued on the balance sheets. 89 Yet they do affect the
profitability of the enterprise's operations and its equity value (since the share price
of a functioning company will exceed the value of its physical property). The
corporate image consists of more than logos and colourschemes - it covers the
impression generated by a company's products, premises, people and publicity,90 and
it is important for the board to ensure that the desired corporate personality is being
projected.
2.5.1 Customers
There has been increasing attention in many sectors to customer-base analysis and
building up customer loyalty, by means from supermarket discount cards to
L.T. Hosmer, 'Trust: the Connecting Link Between Organizational Theory and Philosophial Ethics'
(1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 379, 386.
89 S. Sheikh, Corporate Social Responsibility and Practice, (London, Cavendish, 1996) ch 9,
discusses corporate social reporting and social audit provisions to broaden management's perspective.
e.g. J. Smyth, C. Dorward and J. Reback, Corporate Reputation: Managing the New Strategic
Asset (London: Century Business, 1992); G.R. Dowling, Corporate Reputation: Strategies for
Developing the Corporate Brand (London: Kogan Page, 1994).
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photocopier rental arrangements. Marketing is expected to enhance existing
relationships as well as to seek new ones. 91 Honest dealing, fair treatment and
attention to the needs and wants of each client are vital if repeat orders and customer
recommendations are to be secured. In the service industries in particular, a well-
known and highly respected name is a valuable asset. As far as suppliers to industry
and commerce are concerned, there is a desire to be associated with long-established
and well-regarded major customers, not only for security but also for prestige.
Technical specifications and delivery requirements are naturally a matter for both
parties working co-operatively.
Customer demand has induced new developments including 'just in time' delivery
and comprehensive 'zero defects' systems. Constant attention to customers is
proclaimed as a key feature of most business strategies. Relational strategies develop
this the next logical step further from traditional market researc1n approac1nes. upp\y
of a product, traditionally seen as a 'one shot' transaction, is now quite often
regarded as the start of a continuing relationship, for example in computing. Supply
of materials in relational contracts demands quality and reliability. Companies that
offer the reassurance of a substantial history and time spent getting to know
individual customers can go on to reap rewards in increased sales from repeat
business and client recommendations.
2.5.2 Employees
So far as employees are concerned, if they do not feel part of a trustworthy network
of internal relationships, or if they do not understand the direction and objectives of
the organisation, they are unlikely to deliver their best work. As Solomon puts it,
summing up the thinking of many managerial researchers and organisational
psychologists:
' M. Koiranen 'Custopreneur Coalitions in Relationship Marketing' in J. Nasi, Understanding
Stakeholder Thinking (Helsinki: LSR-Publications, 1995) 184-187.
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What makes a corporation efficient or inefficient is not a series of well-oiled
mechanical operations but the working interrelationships, the co-ordination
and rivalries, team spirit and morale of the many people who work there and
are in turn shaped and defined by the corporation.. .Employees of a
corporation do what they must to fit in, to perform their jobs and to earn both
the respect of others and self-respect.92
If the image and aims of a company do not fit in with those of the most able people
for its jobs, the company will not retain the best workers. If working relationships
and communication within the company are not personally satisfactory, employees
will again be de-motivated and may leave, particularly when the economy is strong.
Full-time, long-term employment has been reduced in the UK over the past twenty
years. People hired on a consultancy basis or those combining a part-time job with
other paid or unpaid work quickly need to know the ethos of the company and to feel
that they are valued if they are to give their best contributions.93
2.5.3 Supply Networks
Between themselves, companies are building up their relationships in ways that
challenge the traditional boundaries of the firm. 94 The impetus for this comes from
both sides: suppliers who wish to be more responsive to their customers and so gain
greater regularity in their business and purchasers who aim for greater quality
assurance and price stability. Examples often quoted are the Japanese keiretsu
system and the German industrial networks, which are said to have produced greater
long-term economic success than Anglo-American competitive contracting. If it
works well, the network produces the benefits of co-ordination and yet avoids the
costly bureaucracy of a single vertically integrated firm.
92 R. Solomon, 'The Corporation as a Community' in Castro, n 86 above, 195.
C. Handy, 'The Coming Work Culture' in n 71 above, 23-28.
G. Teubner, 'The Many-Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order Collective Actors' in
McCahery, Picciotto and Scott, n 34 above, 41.
70
Technological advances and product improvement can be facilitated by co-operation
between companies through the production chain, as the Japanese experience seems
to demonstrate well. Dore has studied the Japanese system in detail and notes three
major advantages to long-term relational supply contracting:
First, the relative security of such relations encourages investment in
supplying firms... Second, the relationships of trust and mutual dependency
make for a more rapid flow of information...Third, a by-product of the system
is a general emphasis on quality. What holOs the re)ation together is a sense
of mutual obligation.95
2.5.4 Economic Advantages
Why are jobs with some companies, but not with others in the same sector, eagerly
sought after by able graduates and managers? Why do suppliers set such store by the
winning and retention of contracts with particular companies and not with others?
Expectations of reasonable continuity, fair dealing and high standards, usually built
up over time, all provide part of the answer. The public company develops a unique
personality and an institutional framework that would be extremely difficult for
others to replicate.96
When a company builds up a relationship with its customers in the retail sector,
reputation leads directly to added value: branded goods sell for higher prices than
their generic alternatives, even where the products are identical for all practical
purposes. Where services are concerned, franchises from fast food to photographic
processing succeed because a recognised name enables a business to do well in new
locations. Differences in the cost of capital between apparently similar firms also
arise because of trust and relationship effects influencing lenders. The price and
quality of materials also has an obvious impact on financial returns and these may be
R. Dore, 'Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism' in P.J. Buckley and J. Michie, Firms,
Organisations and Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 375.
D.M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory' in Buckley and Michie, ibid 246-250.
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improved if companies invest in committed relationships with their suppliers and
thereby gain better long-term deals than their competitors.97
The public company will become far more adaptable if it can expand its labour force
quickly to meet demand and can work with other organisations to extend its
geographical and technical sphere of operations. If it has a reputation for fair dealing
and integrity, the company will be more able to find high-quality workers and
partners when it needs them. This will be a great competitive advantage in a fast-
changing business world, as Goldberg and Sifonis note. 98 The public company is a
set of strategic relationships. When any of them fall down, corporate development
may suffer. Kay has discussed the 'architecture of a company's relationships' as a
crucial factor in business success,99 while the 'inclusive approach', emphasising
customer, employee and supplier involvement and community relations has been
studied and promoted by the Centre for Tomorrow's Company following the RSA's
Tomorrow's Company study.'°°
The board of directors has responsibility for developing the overall policy and
strategy of the company. Board members must set the tone for management
decisions and the conduct of employees throughout the company's operations. This
involves taking account of the interests of all constituencies and acknowledging
responsibility for all the impacts of the company's activities. Proper assessments
need to be made of relationships and restraint exercised as far as possible where the
consequences of proposed changes would be undesirable for a key participant.'°'
2.6 Conclusion
S. Deakin, C. Lane and F. Wilkinson, ' "Trust" or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of
Contractual Relations between Firms' (1994)21 Journal of Law and Society 329.
98 J.G. Sifonis and B. Goldberg, Corporation on a Tightrope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
63 etseq.
' J. Kay, Foundations of Coiporate Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
too M. Goyder, Living Tomorrow's Company (Aldershot: Gower, 1998) ch 6.
lOt RE. Freeman, Stategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984) sets out the
practical process of stakeholder analysis and management.
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The nature of the public company has been the subject of controversy for almost
seventy years, and indeed since chartered trading companies first emerged with
monopoly power and the capacity to raise funds from the public.' 02
 The leaders of
public companies do appear to exercise their freedoms to explore various different
routes - some dedicating themselves to shareholder returns by whatever business they
can be produced, others devoted to customer service or technological leadership.103
In the midst of this diversity and against a fast-changing business and social
background, the law has given little guidance. The company has been treated as a
private domain with incursions to address issues of employee rights, consumer
protection, environmental impact and so on as the political climate has dictated.
Public companies are designed to provide a reliable investment vehicle and often do
so by aspiring to leadership in a particular market. They have, of course, no
mandate to carry out charitable activity as such, but they are expected to set high
standards of conduct in business.
Professor Davies in Gower 's Principles of Modern Company Law distinguishes two
separate functions of profit-making companies. On the one hand, there are those
formed 'to enable a single trader or a small body of partners to carry on a business'
in which 'the members retain control and share the profits.' On the other side are
those companies whose function is 'to enable the investing public to share in the
profits of an enterprise without taking part in its management' and used 'to facilitate
the raising and putting to use of capital by enabling a large number of owners to
entrust it to a small number of expert managers.' 104 These two uses of the corporate
form are different in kind, and quoted public companies (small in number but
dominant in economic strength) fall into the second category. The law needs to
acknowledge that large open companies are distinct from small closed companies.
102 P.L. Davies, Gower 's Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed
1997) 2 1-27.
03 As examples, the Annual Reports of WassaIl, House of Fraser, Smiths Industries, Delta, ASDA and
Peugeot plcs show different orientations.
04 Davies, n 102 above, 10.
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The latter do behave as real organic entities and depend on lasting relationships if
they are to grow and prosper.
The separate legal personality of the company is an aspect of commercial life that
deserves to be taken more seriously in future. Certainly it means that directors and
other executives should not treat the company as 'their' property and it is appropriate
for them to be held to strict standards of conduct and prohibitions against self-
dealing. Logically, it also means that shareholders have no right to control the
company for their own exclusive benefit. The continuing healthy existence of the
public company is an end in its own right and is best pursued by developing the
relationships needed for corporate success.
It is true that contracts of employment, leases of premises and agreements for the
purchase and sale of materials and products respectively determine the daily
activities of the company to a large degree. However these arrangements are
generally moulded to a predetermined pattern to fit the individual requirements of the
company and rely on understanding rather than detailed explanation. Nor can the
part played by legal rules, both those of company law and other regulation of
business, be disregarded. Thinking in terms of reliance on private contracts alone is
a considerable over-simplification of reality in public companies.
Companies have their primary economic function and also wider tasks in accordance
with the social practices and expectations of their particular period and location.
Where shareholding is diversified (by small individual holdings or through the
institutions that represent millions of UK investors), the shareholders as a body will
be broadly representative of social experience and expectations. They will not wish
to see damage to the economy, which may result from supplier or employee
maltreatment, nor will they want to be party to abuse of consumers or the
environment. Stakeholders frequently deal with companies in more than one
capacity and ultimately always respond as individuals.
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It would be more economically productive for all public company boards to pursue a
vision of the nature and purpose of the company that satisfied all key participants
over a long period. Evidence from other economies and from individual examples
points to the business efficacy of this approach. In addition, as a reflection of
political will, the law could do more to stamp democratic requirements on the
deliberations of directors. This has been done with much social and environmental
regulation already.
The analysis of relationships with customers, employees and suppliers, whilst also
acknowledging the wider social and environmental context, provides the best vehicle
for understanding the activities of public companies today. These relationships are
richer and more complex than mere contractual terms and, over time, define the
company as an institution. Shareholders cannot own a public company, whether the
latter is conceived of as a hypothetical bundle of contracts or a soda) entity. It is the
trust of all key stakeholders that makes any enterprise a lasting success and this can
only be gained by treating them all with respect and justice. The treatment of and
payments to different constituencies will depend on the nature of the relationship that
has been put in place. There are interests that should not be overridden in the pursuit
of profits.
Quantitative, non-financial information, as well as qualitative financial reporting, is
relevant to and is needed by both corporate managers and stakeholders in public
companies. Some company Annual Reports discuss the employees other than in a
perfunctory manner, but many do not; some give a picture of customer profiles and
demands, while others do not; a few discuss their supplier relationships. Reporting
on community involvement and environmental impact is at present largely confined
to major retailers and primary producers respectively and seems to be motivated
mainly by public relations concerns. In a stakeholder approach, managers are seen as
the agents of multiple stakeholders instead of the shareholders alone. Directors must
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monitor progress from the standpoint of all stakeholders and be prepared to engage in
open dialogue. The role of the board will be the subject of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF DIRECTORS
3.1 The Focus of Board Attention: Strategy v. Monitoring
If legal input to directors' duties is to be relevant and useful, legislators must be clear
about what the public company board is intended to achieve. The key to the role of
directors is the allocation of their working time. Active involvement by the board in
managerial issues has to some extent to be traded off against the independence
required to monitor the executive. In the first instance, somebody must give
instructions as to the activities of the company and its manner of working. Where
there is no 'owner-management' to decide business priorities, it must be for the
board to set business targets and plan for the long term. Management is then focused
on meeting those targets and keeping company operations running smoothly.
Several guides to directorship (e.g. those of Coulson-Thomas,' Sir Adrian Cadbury,2
Sir Geoffrey Mills 3 and the Institute of Directors 4) emphasise that directors are
distinguished from management by their longer time horizon and broader strategic
outlook. All counsel that directors should not be appointed merely because they
have succeeded in management roles or served in executive posts, but because they
have oversight capabilities.
That said, a public company board, which meets monthly or 10 times per year can
expect to make only a small number of important decisions itself. Most of the time,
directors are reliant upon their managers to deliver the outcomes they have set for the
organisation. Delegation cannot, in law, become abdication of duty. Responsibility
for key administrative and financial matters rests with directors, who face personal
liability or disqualification from directorship if filing requirements are persistently
C. Coulson-Thomas, Creating Excellence in the Boardroo,n (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 1993) ch
4.
2 Sir Adrian Cadbury, The Company Chairman (Hemel Hempstead: Director Books, 2nd ed 1995) 30-
37.
Sir Geoffrey Mills, Controlling Companies (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
Institute of Directors, Guidelines for Directors (London: Director Publications, 6th ed 1995) 19-22.
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not complied with, or if fraudulent or wrongful trading prejudices creditors. 5 The
presence of a well-qualified, reliable team of managers is no justification for the
neglect of the monitoring task. Oversight by directors motivates executives to
perform well and to follow company policy faithfully. It is also for the board as a
routine matter to put in place systems that measure progress towards the goals it has
set. There is some danger with infrequent directorial meetings of new issues being
discussed while ongoing projects are not kept effectively under review.
In any public company, the board as such will not be running daily operations and it
would be unrealistic to frame directors' duties in those terms. Nevertheless, the
notion that a public company director has no responsibility even to attend board
meetings, 6 nor to bring to bear any particu)ar experñse in the service ol the
company, 7 is no longer supportable (if it ever was). In line with the strictness of their
fiduciary duty not to make personal profits from corporate assets (including
information), a requirement that all board members, both executives and particularly
non-executive directors, be attentive and thorough in supervising managerial action
meets modern investor expectations. This supervision clearly includes particular
attention to the Chief Executive, which is unlikely to be forthcoming if he or she is
also Chairman and the board is filled with compliant executives and ill-informed
non-executives.
It is not denied in mainstream management literature 8
 that directors must consider
and develop all relationships that are relevant to the future success of the company.
Managerial systems for analysis of stakeholders have been set out in some detail over
the past 15 years or so. 9 They require directors to communicate with the key parties
Insolvency Act 1986 ss 213-214; Company Directors (Disqualification) Act 1986.
Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 Ch. 100.
Re Bra:ilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [191111 Ch. 425.
8 Nor by the Hampel Committee Report (see section 3.5 below) paras 1.16-1.17.
A.B. Carroll, Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management (Cincinnati: South-
Western Publishing, 2nd ed 1993); R.E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach
(London: Pitman, 1984).
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levels. Shareholders clearly benefit from this work of directors, but given that
customers and employees and suppliers need to be satisfied and the community and
the environment protected for the long term, monitoring has to be more extensive
and sophisticated than simply analysis of financial results. It may be appropriate for
specialist input from particular board members and even separate committees to be
used (such as standing groups on Research and Development in manufacturing, or
Sales and Consumers in services). In Chapter Seven, the question of whether these
constituencies should have their own representatives on public company boards will
be further considered. Even without such changes, public company directors are
answerable to a wider audience than shareholders alone, as the board members
themselves acknowledge in many Annual Reports. If they are to build up the
company for the benefit of future shareholders and society, they must invest in
relationships with other parties.
The monitoring task would be enhanced if modernised duties of skill and care and
the long-term 'relational' approach were to be reflected in a new Companies Act.
While in recent years, the courts' expectations of directors of major firms have
gradually been rising, the position is still neither very clear nor in line with investor
and community expectations of those business leaders. Section 214 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 is based on the assumption that directors will exercise the skill
and care which are to be expected of a director in their position and also any
additional skills and qualifications that that director has. In Re D 'Jan' 4 and Norman
v Theodore Goddard,' 5 the Insolvency Act tests were applied to the operations of
corporate 'going concerns'. It was emphasised that delegation to competent officers
is still permitted so far as regular operations are concerned. Specific standards are
not effectively enforced against public company directors in respect of conduct
affecting employees and customers, let alone the wider environment and community.
The Law Commission's report suggested that the dual subjective and objective test
4 ReD'Jan of London[1994] 1 BCLC 561.
Norman v Theodore Goddard [1992] BCLC 1028.
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be embodied in legislation) 6
 It also recapitulated section 309 of the Companies Act
1985)
In the US context, the Business Judgement rule protects directors from having their
commercial decisions overturned in court if they obtained adequate information
before reaching their final decision, had no personal interest in it and acted bonajIde
in what they rationally believed were the best interests of the company.' 8
 They must
show that they made an effort to exercise their judgment and did not neglect their
duty, for example by accepting management proposals without question. Advice
given to US directors in the light of their law suggests that they should avoid rushing
their choices, ensure they obtain and consider all material information, ask questions
of management or consultants, keep records of discussions and take appropriate
professional advice) 9
 It would be beneficial if UK directors similarly knew the
procedures they were expected to follow. UK courts are also, in practice, reluctant to
interfere in board judgments, but the expectations of public company directors are
less certain. A statement in legislation would make it plain to all boards that
entrepreneurial freedom is bought at the price of compliance with directorial
processes which inhibit self-dealing and encompass all relevant constituencies.
The so-called 'hypothetical bargaining' model of company law (where the aim is to
reproduce the regulations the parties would themselves have agreed if they had had
the time and farsightedness to debate the issues) is inadequate because in real
negotiations, managerial concerns often gain the ascendancy. Utset argues that
current corporate structures primarily reflect executive concerns and interests.20
6 Law Commission, Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Report
No. 261, September 1999) 184.
' ibid.
8 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendation (ALl:
1992) Para 4.01 and notes.
9 G.A. Varallo and D.A. Dreisbach, Fundamentals of Corporate Governance (American Bar
Association, 1996) 33-36.
20 M.A. Utset, 'Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm' (1995) 80 Cornell Law Review 540, 546-
547.
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Even if all parties would like to see a larger corporate pie, they will still disagree as
to how the pie should be sliced - and managers, who have the best information and
practical control of assets, will try to obtain as much as possible for themselves in
salary and benefits. 2 ' This points once again to the need for a transparent, open
system of decision-making.
According to the agency theory of the firm, the price the shareholders must pay for
hiring managers to run the business on their behalf includes the costs of monitoring
the potentially self-seeking behaviour of those managers. 22 It can hardly be expected
that Chief Executives and their managerial subordinates will be able to take an
unbiased view as a leadership team unless that team also has good outside input.
Beyond the shareholders, however, there is no reason why other parties affected by
the company's deeds should be denied consideration in its regular process of
decision-making. Non-executive directors, if expected to give more time to their
positions and exercise more true independence than many currently do, have an
important role to play in enforcing fair dealing and broadening the public company
board's outlook.
3.2 The Accountability of the Board: Delegates v. Consciences
The notion that directors are the agents or servants of the shareholders and, as such,
are obliged to follow their instructions does not accord with UK company law.
Where powers of management are delegated to the board in the Articles of
Association, the shareholders cannot usurp that authority. 23
 Directors' fiduciary
duties are owed to the company as a continuing entity, not to individual shareholders
within it. 24 For example, in deciding whether to recommend acceptance of a takeover
21 ibid 608-609.
22 ibid550-551.
23 John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltdv Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113. The present 'standard form' Table A
Art 70 provides that the board's power of management is subject to 'any directions given by special
resolution.' This is most unlikely to be of relevance in a public company.
24 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421.
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offer, the board can properly have regard to the interests of the company, which may
or may not coincide with producing the greatest profit for current shareholders.25
There is a set of transactions and activities for which the board is obliged by the
Companies Act to seek the approval of members. These include: dealings where the
directors are encumbered by a conflict of interest (e.g. substantial property
transaction with a director, 26
 long-term executive service contracts 27
 and
compensation for loss of office 28) and major events in the company's development
(e.g. change of name29
 or objects,3° increase3 ' or reduction32
 of the company's caia1
and voluntary winding up 33). In practice, however, the likelihood of shareholders
rejecting a proposal made by the board is slim. The course of action is set by board
members and shareholders who disagree with it are inclined to sell out, if they can
still do so at a reasonable price, while other interest groups are overlooked.
So far as selection of directors is concerned, the members elect the directors and have
theoretically unrestricted powers to dismiss them by ordinary resolution. 34
 However,
the Institute of Directors35
 and Sir Adrian Cadbury 36
 acknowledge that candidates
chosen by existing public company board members are almost universally re-elected
without opposition. Nor does the power of dismissal carry much weight when
executive directors would retain the benefit of long notice periods and substantial
25 Dawson Internat iona/ p/c v Coats Paton p/c (1988)4 BCC 305 (Court of Session (Outer House)).
26 Companies Act 1985 s 320.
27 ibids 3 19(3).
28 ibids 312.
29 ibids 28(1).
30 ibids4.
' ibids 12 1(4).
32 ibids 135(1).
Insolvency Act 1986 s 84.
Companies Act 1985 s303. In Bushe/lv Faith [1970] AC 1099, the House of Lords permitted the
use of weighted voting rights in a small private company to enable a director - shareholder to defeat
such a resolution. However, the Stock Exchange would not permit the inclusion of such rights in the
constitution of a quoted company, in which executive directors typically own only a very small
proportion of the shares.
Institute of Directors, n 4 above, 36-37.
36 Cadbury, n 2 above, 58-59.
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compensation under their service agreements. While a 'Just Vote No' campaign
(against re-election of directors) may register a lack of enthusiasm for, or confidence
in, the current regime,37
 it cannot change the board unless there is sufficient backing
for an alternative 'slate' of candidates (and even then only one-third of the board will
normally retire at each AGM, making it impractical for a 'dissident' group to gain
control at once).38
British institutions, unlike the German banks, have little experience of putting
forward names for board candidature, though there are exceptions such as venture
capital company 3i plc's practice of recommending experienced directors to support
growing companies. 39
 The law forbids directors to take decisions in the interests of a
nominating sharehokier (even a sok owner, rather than the. car o
board he or she serves.40
 On the other hand, a shareholding institution or company
that appoints its employee to the board of another company is not vicariously liable
for the decisions of that nominated director as such. 4 ' It is clear that, in law, all
directors have the same allegiance and responsibility - to and for the present and
future prosperity of the company itself.
By analogy with trustees, directors are not permitted to make a personal profit from
their position unless the contrary is agreed in general meeting or allowed by the
company's constitution.42
 Any major transactions with the company must be
approved by the shareholders in general meeting and the director must declare (in a
board meeting) any personal interest in any contract to be concluded by the
R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Watching the Watchers: Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First
Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 142-143.
Institute of Directors, n 4 above.
Cadbury, n 2 above, 55-56.
40 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324.
' Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd[1991] I AC 187.
42 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942]! All ER 378; [1967] 2 AC I 34n; Industrial Development
Consultants v Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443; see also Queensland Mines v Hudson [1978] 18 ALR 1
(PC) and PrudentialAssurance Co. Ltdv Newman Industries (No.2) [1981] Ch 257 which show a
less restrictive approach.
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company.43 The Law Commission has recommended that the former safeguard
should be retained but the duty of disclosure should be subject to exceptions, inter
alia where a court is satisfied that 'the interest did not give rise to a real risk of an
actual conflict of interest' or that 'the rest of the board were aware of the nature and
extent of [the director's] interest before the directors approved the transaction.' 44 The
Company Law Review Steering Group accepts these qualifications with minor
amendments.45 Lengthy service agreements are also subject to ratification by
members and there is no automatic entitlement to remuneration for work done for the
company.46 The requirements for disclosure of remuneration have been made more
extensive since the publication of the Greenbury Report in 1995, though the
presentation of pension and share option arrangements in Annual Reports is often
very far from easy to follow. The Law Commission recommends that the upper limit
on the length of service contracts permitted without shareholder approval should be
three years, rather than five as at present. 48 Again the Steering Group agrees with the
proposal.49
Reference to the board as the 'corporate conscience' 5° emphasises the complexity of
moral problems that the directors face. Again, once a company moves beyond owner
management, the board is the only body with the authority, the coherence and the
distance from operations to handle those issues. Each party involved with the
company has its own agenda and will be concerned to promote its own financial
interests. If morality, rather than strict law, is to enter into corporate decision-
making, it will be via the boardroom. Directors are not free to follow their own
Movitex Ltd v But/field [1988]! BCLC 104 (re. fulfilment of duty to disclose).
' Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a
Statement of Duties (Report No. 261, 1999) paras 16.7, 16.22-16.33, 16.36-16.37.
' Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy.
Developing the Fra,nework (DTI, March 2000) 413-414.
Guinnessplc v Saunders [1990] 1 All ER 652 (re. fees paid to Thomas Ward).
At this early stage, the Hampel Committee was understandably reluctant to make further changes to
the Greenbury provisions on remuneration.
48 Law Commission, n 16 above, para 16.34.
" ibid4l7-418.
° Institute of Directors, n 4 above, 15.
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personal rules of conduct if these do not further the interests of the company - which
have been interpreted as equating to the interests of the shareholders. 5 ' Adherence to
collective decision-making and a variety of experiences among board members will
be of assistance in addressing ethical problems.
The actions of managers and employees throughout the company's operations will
naturally be guided by the directors' maimer and decisions. Codes of corporate aims
and values are usually prepared by the board, albeit generally after a consultation
process to ensure wide acceptance. 52
 Practice that is not in accordance with public
statements of aims and values is likely to bring more unfavourable publicity.
Investors and consumers are demonstrating that they will make choices in
accordance with their ethical expectations and these may make a real financial
difference to companies of which they disapprove. The boundaries laid down by
directors need to be enforced so that corporate culture is adapted to those ethical
requirements. The directors can be personally involved in only a limited number of
decisions, but they can ensure that other activity is monitored. As Sir Adrian
Cadbury has remarked:
It is helpful to everyone concerned if the board agrees a written social policy,
to which ready reference can be made. The test, however, which managers
will apply to board statements on social responsibility, is how far adherence
to them is recognised in decisions on their pay and promotion.53
In the US, 'other constituency' statutes generally permit, but do not require, directors
to take into account the interests of non-shareholder constituents when making their
decisions. 54
	Their critics have attacked them for reducing management
' See well-known comments in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co. (1883) 23 Ch D 654, per Bowen U
at 672-673; Parke v Daily News (1962) Ch 927, per Plowman J at 962-963.
52 P. Hill, Towards a New Philosophy of Management: the Corporate Development Programme of
Shell UK Ltd. (London: Gower, 2nd ed 1976) describes an interesting early example of this process.
Sir Adrian Cadbury, 'Rules for a Responsible Company', article reproduced in S. Rock and C.
Kennedy, Power, Perfor,nance and Ethics (London: Butterworth Heinemann, 1992) 49, 50.
R.S. Karmel, 'Implications of the Stakeholder Model' 61 George Washington Law Review 1156.
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accountability and giving executives the opportunity to 'empire build' and protect
their positions under the guise of assisting employees or consumers. 55 If a similar
provision were to be introduced to UK company law, as further discussed in Chapter
Six, it would require some remedy in favour of named constituencies to ensure its
effectiveness. It would give public company boards the opportunity to balance
competing interests from their unique position at the centre of the enterprise.
Company law deals ineluctably with issues of power and this provides an
opportunity for them to be dealt with openly. The board then introduces an ethical
dimension into corporate decision-making for the benefit of all those affected by
company activity.
Stone has suggested that, if corporations are to act responsibly, they need to have
some process that is analogous to the decision-making of a responsible individual.56
This entails not behaving in an impulsive or self-centred manner, weighing decisions
according to a definite moral code, and considering the consequences of al proposed
actions. There is more to ethical conduct than simply compliance with the law - it
involves being accountable and setting out priorities. Responsible corporate
behaviour will, Stone argues, help companies to avoid the costs of rigidity and
enforcement which arise from legalism. If stakeholders perceive that corporations
are acting irresponsibly towards them, it is foreseeable that they will press for more
legislation, though how successful they are may depend on their combined political
strength. 57
 In order to forestall such campaigns, public companies will have to
undergo 'moral development' analogous with that of human persons, a process
which can be set in motion and overseen by the directors.58
e.g. R. Ward, Twenty-First Century Corporate Board (NY: Wiley, 1997) 329-332 (the chapter is
entitled 'How Many Stakeholders Can Dance on the Head of a Pin?').
56 CD. Stone, 'Corporate Social Responsibility: What it Might Mean If It Were Really to Matter'
(1986) 71 Iowa Law Review 557, 559-560.
ibid567-568.
58 J.M. Logsdon and K. Yuthas, 'Corporate Social Performance, Stakeholder Orientation, and
Organizational Moral Development' (1997) 16 Journal of Business Ethics 1213.
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Shareholders do not have sufficient knowledge of or interest in the daily operations
of public companies to inject into business the systematic ethical thinking envisaged
by Stone. Individual managers are too closely identified with their particular
functional responsibilities and targets to take the necessary overview. If the process
described by Stone is to be encouraged, the board as a cohesive group must take the
lead. Directors must also be prepared to accept public responsibility for their ethical
policies. Stone's own preferred solution is that public directors should be introduced
to represent the general interest in very large companies. 59 Even in the absence of
such formal schemes, there seems little doubt that a varied group of able non-
executive directors will best equip the board for its moral leadership task.6°
3.3 Corporate Stewardship
A recent but developing conception of the corporate directorial role is that of the
board as stewards of the company's assets, employed to care for and judiciously
develop the corporate brand. Like the managers of great country estates in past
generations, on this view directors would use the company's property (including its
human resources and goodwill) to derive an income and pursue opportunities for
growth, while safeguarding the physical and social fabric of the company. 6 ' The
objective of directors as stewards would be to care for the property and to benefit the
'owners' (shareholders), the 'labourers' (employees), the 'tenants' (customers) and
the community and the environment. Where a public company is a major employer
or has significant environmental impacts, the analogy with responsible landholding is
particularly apposite.
Following the collapse of Barings Bank, proceedings for the disqualification of
directors (the deputy group chairman, a product manager, and the head of
Stone, n 56 above, 574-575.
° L. Griggs and J. Lowry point out that non-executive directors 'from much the same social circle' as
management, often friends of the chief executive and likely to share a very similar approach; 'Finding
the Optimum Balance for the Duty of Care Owed by the Non-Executive Director' in F. Macmillan
Patfield, Perspectives on Company Law2(London: Kiuwer Law International, 1997) 203, 212.
61 M. Goyder, Living Tomorrow's Company (Aldershot: Gower, 1998) 107-110.
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settlements) highlighted major failures of supervision within the group. 62 Those who
should have been overseeing the activities of trader Nick Leeson all too often did not
appear to understand what was being done at his Singapore office or to be concerned
about the financial risks he took.63 In determining the periods of disqualification,
Jonathan Parker J. stated that directors, collectively and individually, had a duty to
acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge of the company's business to enable
them to discharge their responsibilities. Directors' powers of delegation, it was made
clear, did not absolve them from the duty to supervise the discharge of delegated
functions. There was a link between the position of directors in the management of
the company and the expertise and assiduousness of oversight that could be expected
from them.64 Walters has commented that the disqualification of directors is the
most efficacious means in current UK law of keeping company directors good
stewards and setting minimum standards of competence.65
'Break-up' takeovers, largely unknown in Japan and Germany but common in the US
and the UK, also do not fit with the steward's traditional commitment to places,
people and posterity. Profits from the sale of property and reductions in the
workforce are 'one-off windfalls that end the life of a corporate entity. Kay writes:
Some British companies have seen it as entirely appropriate, in pursuit of
shareholder value, to dispose entirely of an existing collection of businesses
and buy a new one.. .A new vice-chancellor of Oxford University, or trustee
of the National Gallery, who suggested that the University should become an
international language school or that the Trafalgar Square site would make an
excellent shop and restaurant complex, would be seen as having
fundamentally misunderstood the nature of his responsibilities.66
62 Re. Barings p/c (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433 at 528-529, 574-575, 600-602).
63 ibid 505-508, 570-572, 582-593.
'4 ibid 486-489.
65 A. Walters, 'Directors' Duties: The Impact of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986'
(2000)21 Co. Law 110, 118.
66 J. Kay, 'The Stakeholder Corporation' in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble, Stake holder
Capitalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 135.
89
This does not mean there is no need to update products and modernise practices - a
trustee should seek to make effective use of resources and build for the long term. It
does mean that the company's core competencies are to be utilised and business
values maintained.
Where there is a real culture of commitment and involvement, with shared values
and open dialogue, the stewardship approach is most likely to evolve among
executives. It can also spread from the board to encourage all staff to safeguard
corporate assets, including reputation. The costs of direct monitoring may be
reduced if all who have control of company property understand the ethical codes
that govern their use. In so far as oversight is still required, in the absence of an
effective private 'owner', political representatives are empowered to set out mutually
beneficial rules of conduct in legislation. Neither the Law Commission's report nor
the DTI's consultation paper mentioned above adverts to the stewardship approach.
They seem to posit either a 'shareholders' money' priority or a juggling of
incompatible interests with no overall goal in mind, where the stewardship approach
offers something distinctive from either of them.
Directors operating on the stewardship model would need to understand and respect
the traditions and priorities of the company and to see its customers, employees and
suppliers and the community as partners in an ongoing enterprise. Stewards are not
only guardians of another's property, they are obliged to retain it for the long term
while producing satisfactory returns from it. 67
 It is submitted that many public
company directors (both executives who have come up 'through the ranks' and non-
executives who accept appointments at 'blue chip' organisations) do see themselves
as part of a line of managers building upon and continuing a history. Where
67 G. Goyder, The Just Enterprise (London: Free Press, 1993) ch 10 (entitled 'The Directors as
Trustees') argues that directors should become responsible for carrying out the company's objectives
as set out in the new general purposes clause of its memorandum for the benefit of all stakeholders,
not solely the shareholders.
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takeovers have lead to the splitting of asset portfolios, there is little evidence to show
they have created extra value for new shareholders in the medium-to-long term.68
3.4 Balancing Diverse Stakeholder Interests
Directors need to address the concerns of all whose support they require to stay in
business. It is the board that has the ability to take an overview. In the absence of
shareholder 'ownership', which is implausible in public companies for reasons that
were discussed in Chapter Two, the directors can address all the relevant
relationships without presumptions as to the order of priority. The imç'orance of
customer relations, of supplier dependability, of community ties and environmental
impact, depends on the nature of the business itself
Within a small group, the board cannot necessarily contain direct representation of
all groups affected by corporate conduct. Changes to UK board structure would be a
challenge to the national business culture. There must, however, be a range of
experience and willingness to listen to the relevant constituencies (including
representations made through trade unions, consumer groups and politicians). The
Employment Relations Act 1999, the Utilities Act 2000 and European Union social
and environmental legislation69
 all emphasise the breadth of accountability.
Communication strategies for all these stakeholders are important. It is for directors
to take account of these disparate responsibilities and fashion a coherent strategy
from them.
This approach is linked to the stewardship concept discussed above. No one
stakeholding group has an absolute right to exploit company property and people for
its own benefit. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson argue that:
68 M.C. Jensen and R.S. Ruback, 'The Market for Corporate Control: the Scientific Evidence' and
G.A. Jarrell, J.A. Brickley and J.M. Netter, 'The Market for Corporate Control: the Empirical
Evidence since 1980' are quoted in R. Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993) 244 and 251 respectively.
69 Measures under Articles 117-127 and 130r-130t of the EC Treaty (as amended by the Single
European Act).
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Stewards in loosely coupled, heterogeneous organisations with competing
stakeholders and competing shareholder objectives are motivated to make
decisions that they perceive are in the best interests of the group.. .A steward
who successfully improves the performance of the organization generally
satisfies most groups, because most stakeholder groups have interests that are
well served by increasing organizational wealth.7°
It is true that increasing wealth gives directors more options to satisfy all
constituents, but a group which believes that it has been overlooked or unfairly
treated is unlikely to rest content. Just as a government with increased revenue in
prosperous times can cut taxes, increase services or try some mixture of the two in an
attempt to please voters, so public company boards can exercise their various options
as resources allow.
Stakeholding has been downgraded, if not abandoned altogether, as a political slogan
since the General Election of 1997, to the chagrin of its proponents. 7 ' It is certainly
no longer a matter of party political rhetoric as it was. However in business debates,
consultancy and writing, it has become common currency, as in pensions reform. 72 It
is an approach to business and society with a practical on outcomes, as Chapter Four
seeks to explain.
The development of stakeholding theory and the identification and classification of
stakeholders will be further discussed in the next Chapter. Clearly this role is more
complex than the traditional task of profit maximisation and has its critics as a
result. 73 Ultimately, however, with large institutional investors representing millions
of small UK investors, it is in the interests of capital providers for the corporate
° J.H. Davis, F.D. Schoorman and L. Donaldson, 'Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management'
(1997)22 Academy of Management Review 25.
W. Hutton, The Stakeholding Society (London: Polity, 1999) 263-274.
72 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 Part I.
e.g. R. Ward, n 55 above, 333-334.
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sector to be run in an inclusive, investment-orientated way. A new generation of
business leaders will have to meet this challenge.74
3.5 The Cadbury and Hampel Approaches to Corporate Governance
In response to serious apparent failures of financial monitoring by UK boards, the
1992 Cadbury Report and accompanying Code of Best Practice75
 recommended a
strengthening of the 'outsider' director's position and a streamlining of directorial
work by the use of board committees. The appointment of a separate Chairman to
counterbalance the power of the Chief Executive, the introduction of non-executive
directors of 'sufficient calibre and number' for their views to carry real weight and
the establishment of committees to deal with the audit process and remuneration
were all established as 'best practice'. There was no compulsion for public
companies to follow all these guidelines. Listed companies do, however, have to
report on their record of compliance or otherwise. 76 Peer pressure then develops for
all companies to comply if most are doing so. The revised Code of Best Practice
discussed below will be monitored in the same way.
In 1998, the Hampel Report's conclusion on corporate and board priorities was clear
- directors should focus on shareholder satisfaction and all else is purely incidental.77
Following the Cadbury Report, the use of committees to make functions such as
audit and remuneration more visibly independent of the executive is endorsed in the
context of unitary responsibility for leadership and oversight, and the addition of a
nomination committee as 'standard' is also advised. 78
 Directors are taken to be
properly accountable to shareholders alone, so that if board responsibilities were
defined to include stakeholders, they would not be effectively accountable to anyone.
C. Carnall and S. Maxwell, Management: Principles and Policy (Cambridge, ICSA, 1988) 146-
150.
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Adrian Cadbury), Final
Report together with Code of Best Practice (December 1992).
76 ibid Recommendations 1-4.
Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report (January 1998),
paras 1.16- 1.17.
78 ibid paras 4.11-4.12 and 6.3-6.4.
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Leadership and control are said to be vested in the board as a whole, despite the
acknowledgment that many use the executive committee structure and so mirror the
two-tier board. 79 In general, Hampel leaves the basic governance scheme unchanged
in terms of board structure and institutional monitoring. Active attempts to manage
potential conflicts of interest within commerce and industry are not openly discussed
(unsurprisingly given the membership of the committee concerned).
Where Cadbury attempted to balance out giving directors the freedom 'to drive
companies forward' with an assurance that they did so within a 'framework of
effective accountability', Hampel is even more concerned to preserve 'managerial
freedom' while attempting to ensure that an appropriate standard of conduct is
maintained. 80 Little reference is made to issues of corporate responsibility or the
social role of public companies. The agency model of directorial responsibility (that
is, that directors are ultimately answerable to members alone) is accepted without
much questioning of its relevance to modern public companies. 'Best practice'
standards, from which individual companies may derogate, are indicated as the
appropriate form of corporate governance regulation on most issues. There is indeed
a renewed emphasis on principles, rather than regulatory detail. No change in the
non-legal status of recommended standards is proposed. Nor is any real model
provided of how effective corporate governance and board processes might look in
action, 8 ' so there may be wide variations even between different companies in the
same sector. There is only cursory discussion of audit and accounting standards82
without much effort to supply an alternative measure of 'good behaviour'.
ibid paras 3.11 and 3.12.
80 ibidparas 1.11 and 1.12.
81 Professor J.W. Barnard of the College of William and Mary Law School, Williamsburg, VA,
contrasts this with this with the prescriptiveness of the US SEC (paper given at the Conference
'Beyond Hampel: Theoretical Perspectives on Corporate Governance', Newcastle University, 31st
March 1998) 9-10.
82 Hampel, n 77 above, paras 6.16-6.19.
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When compared with Cadbury, Hampel does tighten up some of the proposals: it
recommends that non-executive directors should constitute not less than one-third of
the board (at Recommendation No. 12) and that Annual Reports should state which
of the non-executives are considered to be independent (at Recommendation No. 9).
Beyond that, the new Report introduces few fresh ideas to the debate. It is not
proposed that the roles of Chief Executive and Chairman should be split as a matter
of regulation or legislation. 83 However, it is recommended that a 'senior independent
non-executive director' be named in the Annual Report, whether or not the top roles
are separated. 84 Where there is a non-executive Chairman expressing 'outsider'
concerns openly to the Chief Executive, as is increasingly the case in UK quoted
public companies, it may seem unclear what value a further 'leader' of the non-
executives would add. There is, however, merit for a different reason in having a
separate leading and independent director publicly identified. If such a director were
available, employees and customers would have a direct channel of communication
to the board if dissatisfied with the leadership. Such special responsibility for
ensuring that stakeholder concerns were brought to the board's attention would add
value to the senior non-executive's contribution.
Relations with shareholders are accorded prominence in the Report and suggestions
made for the improvement of Annual General Meeting procedure. 85 Useful ideas
about communication, such as the provision of written answers to questions that
cannot be answered immediately and the preparation of a resume of the proceedings
to be sent to members unable to attend, are suggested by way of examples. There is
no acknowledgment of the need for directors as policymakers to consult with and
listen to the company's employees (despite the advent of European Works Councils
in the UK) or indeed its customers (without whom there would obviously be no
profit at all). These issues are left entirely to the discretion of each corporate
leadership, obviously within existing laws. Stakeholders, when discussed at all, are
83 ibid, para 3.17.
84 ibid, para 3.18.
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treated in an entirely 'instrumental' fashion, as means to the end of 'business
prosperity.' There is a strong emphasis on the need to make the corporate surplus
larger than it might be without sound leadership, but almost no attention to the use or
division of the profits.86
Another concern of Hampel is the avoidance of mere 'boxticking' - that is,
compliance with the letter of a set of governance prescriptions, without real attention
to the spirit and purpose of the rules themselves. 87 The number of non-executives,
for instance, will not be determinative of their influence on the board, as their calibre
and the attitude of the executives will be crucial in this. It is submitted that there is a
difference, however, between stating that compliance with rules will not be sufficient
in and of itself to ensure good practice and arguing that there should be no absolute
rules at all. The Hampel Report at times seems to slide from the first of these
positions to the second. While financial audit is tightened to some extent, board
information on, and consideration of, broader issues such as corporate social
influence and environmental impact are not addressed. In saying:
Public companies are now among the most accountable organisations in
society. They publish trading results and audited accounts; and they are
required to disclose much information about their operations, relationships,
remuneration and governance arrangements88
the Committee fails to address the concerns of employees and consumers who do not
share any feeling of involvement or confidence in the public companies that depend
on them.
The new Combined Code (Principles of Governance and Code of Best Practice) for
listed companies is now part of the Listing Rules, having been annexed to them in
1998. For accounting periods ending on or after 31 December 1998, listed
ibid, part 5.
C.A. Riley, 'The Hampel Report : Content and Context' in 'Beyond Hampel', n 81 above, 3-4.
87 Hampel, n 77 above, paras 1.13 and 1.14.
88 ibid,para 1.1.
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companies must include a statement in their annual report on (a) how they have
applied the corporate governance principles of the Combined Code and (b) the extent
to which they have complied with the more detailed provisions of the Combined
Code. This will place some additional market pressures on quoted public companies
to meet Greenbury and Hampel's best practice' requirements. There is still,
however, no effective sanction if they fail without good reason to do so.
The Government is far from satisfied that the Greenbury objectives of accountability,
transparency and linkage of rewards to performance have yet been achieved.
Compliance with best practice was monitored by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the
Department of Trade and Industry. 89 Weaknesses in the independence of board
remuneration committees, complexities in disclosure of board remuneration and
reluctance to put remuneration to shareholder votes remain common. Strengthening
of best practice and potential legislation on these issues even in advance of a new
Companies Act are indicated. The Government states that it does not wish any costs
or restraints to make UK companies and listing uncompetitive internationally.
However, it argues that business would be improved if top pay were more closely
tied to corporate performance.9°
3.6 Practical Ouestions for Boards
3.6.1 Board Size
The size of any operating group has a profound effect on the nature and effectiveness
of its work. Beyond a certain number (Coulson-Thornas quotes l2l5.91 Cadbury
nine-12, 92 Bowen also around 12 and Parker anything beyond eight 94). the
possibility of worthwhile individual contributions swiftly diminishes and the quality
DII, Directors Remuneration: A Consultative Document (DII, July 1999) ch 2.
9° ibid Annex E.
I Coulson-Thomas, n I above, 94-96.
92 Cadbury, n 2 above, 42-43.
° W.G. Bowen, Inside the Boardroom: Governance Dv Directors and Trust.'es (Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons, 1994) 40-43.
H. Parker, Re-ernpowering the Board of Directors' in Monks and Minow, n 37 above, 296-297.
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of the team effort suffers. Inevitably the central figures will become an inner
decision-making circle when the full group is too big for efficient communication. If
non-executive directors are to play a full part in its work, the number of 'automatic'
executive appointments must fall to keep the board to a manageable size. In
suggesting that six to eight is an optimum size of board, Sir Walter Puckey draws on
practical experience:
Too many board meetings display verbosity among a few and almost
complete silence among the rest. The correct board size encourages all to
contribute within a reasonable length of meeting, and this depends greatly on
the number of directors present.95
Use of executive committees (consisting of executive directors, sometimes with other
senior executives, chaired by the Chief Executive) streamlines decision-making
between full board meetings. It must, however, be remembered that such groups are
essentially senior management sessions reflecting operational concerns. If the full
board is too large, it will not function properly in its task of policy oversight. A
board that behaves as a 'rubber stamp', dealing perfunctorily with decisions that have
substantively already been made, will not escape the attention of liquidators and the
courts if things do go badly wrong. 96 Once companies grow beyond 'owner-
management', there needs to be an effective and cohesive top team in place. A range
of specialisms and personalities will be required for it to function effectively.
The board needs to draw on the talents and skills of all its members. This means
utilising their individual expertise in an efficient way (and employing other
professional support when necessary for sound decision-making). A responsible,
professional board needs to contain varied specialisms if it is to fulfil its duties
effectively and in the case of UK quoted companies, the Stock Exchange's listing
requirements help to ensure that there is an appropriate mix of strengths. Nor, with
Sir Walter Puckey, The Board Room, (London: Hutchinson, 1969) 85-86.
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some exceptions, does the traditional US model of a dominant CEO have much
influence in the UK. Effective 'technocracy' requires that at least two or three whose
knowledge and personalities are complementary work together at the head of a
company. This also avoids concentration of excessive power in one pair of hands,
however safe they may initially seem.
3.6.2 Executive/Non-executive Balance
The balance between executive and non-executive input, between inside knowledge
and outside scrutiny, has also been the subject of debate for some years now. Parker
in his 'Letters to a New Chairman' suggests that on a board numbering around 12,
three qualified and effective non-executives 'is just about the practical minimum.'97
In order for a public company to comply with the Cadbury Report's
recommendations as to remuneration and audit committees composed of non-
executive members, three such directors would be required. Six or seven non-
executives, according to the Letters, 'would probably represent the workable
maximum.' 98 This is presumably on the basis of needing to leave room for executive
contributions and perhaps difficulty in finding sufficient people of the appropriate
calibre who are able to devote adequate time to the company.
By the standards of their main employment, executives are not remunerated
particularly well for part-time directorships (though for others their board fees may
represent a substantial portion of their income). 99 If all of the non-executive directors
are themselves executives in comparable, if not competing, companies, they are not
likely to bring to bear any really distinctive and critical views on matters, such as
managerial remuneration and audit, where objectivity is crucial. In particular, the
practice of executives serving as non-executive directors on the boards of one
another's companies in a direct exchange (board interlocks, in the US parlance) is
Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd. (in liquidation) v Maxwell (No. 2) [1994] 1 All ER 261;
Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498.
H. Parker, Letters to a New Chairman (London: Director Publications, 1979) 19.
98 ibid.
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one which clearly diminishes independence and which should be prohibited via the
listing rules for quoted companies.' 00 Corporate culture may encourage deference to
insiders and an unwillingness to 'rock the boat', particularly if current results appear
to be satisfactory. The chairing of meetings and arrangements (or lack of them) for
ad hoc communications between directors are important factors in this connection.
Hampel, following Cadbury, merely recommends that the 'majority' of the non-
executive directors should be independent, in the sense of having no financial ties to
the company other than their directors' fees (and possibly owning shares). Former
executives and professional advisors may therefore be sitting, albeit in a minority, on
audit and remuneration committees. This is not acceptable if the function of the
board is to oversee management in the absence of effective ownership. The
definition of independence does need to be primarily financial and should be
tightened to exclude those in receipt of other fees and pensions from the non-
executive 'quota'. While the calibre of board members is of the first importance in
securing their effective performance, the appearance and actuality of independence
are crucial for handling potential conflict of interest situations. Others such as retired
executives and legal and financial professionals may have valuable contributions to
make, but if the board is already relatively large, one might ask whether provision of
a board seat is necessary to secure the advice of the individual.
3.6.3 Information
Board members, especially the non-executive directors, are reliant on management to
provide them with accurate and timely information, as Hampel clearly
acknowledges.'°' This regular information needs to cover financial and social
performance of the company and its departments and subsidiaries (if any). Not only
are the figures required in a format which will aid ready understanding, but data from
surveys of customers and employees, in particular, may be very helpful. A number
' ibid297.
'°° Monks and Minow, n 37 above, 188-189.
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of organisations provide assistance with environmental and ethical auditing and
research among stakeholders.'° 2 If information is to be credible, this is as important
as the annual financial audit by independent professionals. As Farrington puts it:
Non-executive directors are expected to call for information to satisfy
themselves as to the propriety of a course of action and that it is in the best
interests of the company. They cannot rely on the fact that action is
recommended by the executive members.'°3
Directors in large companies are often perceived as being remote from the real issues
of the workplace and the market. If the increasingly common division of
responsibilities operates as usual, the Chief Executive needs to be a respected leader
in the company while the Chairman takes primary responsibility for conducting
external relations. For good performance of both these tasks, and for the proper
functioning of other board members, sensitivity to the opinions of key constituencies
is essential. 'Where difficul.t decisions do fail to be made, the process is made easier
if the fabric of relationships woven by the board is a strong one. This points to a
need for non-executives to commit to spend at least two full working days per month
on company business, aside from reading papers relating to board meetings.
The ALl Principles of Corporate Governance, coming from an environment where
most public company directors are not 'insiders' and openness is valued, provide
that: 'Every director has the right...to inspect and copy all books, records and
documents of every kind, and to inspect the physical properties, of the
corporation...in person or by an attorney or other agent' 104 (exceptions being where
information is not reasonably related to the performance of directorial duties or if it
'°' Hampel, n 77 above, para 3.4.
102 Such as ethics etc..., Business in the Community and the National Centre for Business and Ecology
- see n 13 above.
03 D.J. Farrington, 'Universities and Corporate Governance: a Model for the Future' in Sir Lewis
Robertson, Corporate Governance (Hume Papers on Public Policy Vol. 3 No. 4 , Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1995) 30.
04 ALl, n 18 above, para 3.03.
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is likely to be used in violation of directors' duties to the company). A similar
expression of 'informational rights' for directors could be highly significant in the
UK where it is often expected that non-executives will not obtain sensitive
documents or 'walk the shop floor' except by prior arrangement with the Chief
Executive.
3.6.4 Time
The amount of time available for their directorial duties naturally constrains the
effectiveness of board members. In addition to monthly board meetings, a non-
executive will need at least another day to study reports and time to make his or her
own enquiries on site; equally importantly, an executive has to set aside time from
managerial tasks to address directorial responsibilities. For a retired executive who
is making a career of non-executive directorship, four directorships (averaging out at
one board meeting every week) would seem to be a realistic maximum
commitment,'° 5 bearing in mind committee work and the fact that at crisis points, any
of the companies may require extra attention. For a heavily committed executive
director, two non-executive posts, conscientiously fulfilled, would represent almost a
working week each month and more than one would generally be unfeasible;
acceptance of any outside appointment should depend on the principal employer's
understanding and approval of the work involved.
When their appointment is first discussed, prospective directors should be clearly
informed of the time commitment that will be expected from them. Many well-run
public companies have a board calendar showing the meetings and events the board
members will need to attend, committee schedules and also the 'cycle' of matters
(budgets, accounts, personnel, marketing etc.) which directors will address through
the year. Would-be non-executives should also bear in mind that unforeseen events
in operations or markets might demand additional attendance. Executives invited to
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join the board are entitled to ask questions about the extra assistance they will
receive as they take on more tasks in the context of an existing full-time managerial
workload.
If there are fewer, but more important, decisions to be made in the board role than in
senior management posts, enough support needs to be given to enable those key
choices to be made effectively. For large public companies, a suggestion of
Drucker's'°6 that the board should have its own secretariat to help digest information
and research key business issues may be worth considering. Just as Government
Ministers with wide ultimate responsibilities need reliable briefings and assistance,
so it seems many public company directors have too much detail to assimilate
without support teams. Bringing experience and judgment to bear on the key issues
from a sound basis of policy is the most important function of any board and the
assistance of capable staff will help with this.
3.7 Examnles from Public Services
3.7.1 NHS Trusts
National Health Service Trusts are bodies corporate constituted under the National
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. Their structure and proceedings are
provided for in some detail by the legislation itself. Following the Cadbury Report,
the report of the Corporate Governance Task Force, Public Enterprise Governance in
the NHS, contained a Code of Conduct for Trust Directors. Great emphasis was
placed here on the independence of chairmen and non-executive directors. When
compared with the Cadbury approach, the NHS governance arrangements were far
more prescriptive - for example, they provide: 'that there is a clear division of
responsibility and boards are required to meet regularly." 07 Issues of conflict of
'° R.J. Gilson and R. Kraakman, 'Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors', paper presented on June 14-15 1990 at the Saloman Brothers Center and Rutgers Centers
Conference on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors quotes six as an upper limit.
06 P.F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (London: William Heinemann,
1974) 624-626.
107 A. Belcher, 'Codes of Conduct and Accountability for NHS Boards' (1995) Public Law 288, 292.
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interest are also strictly dealt with, partly because Trust operations are substantively
in the public domain with the addition of some private management techniques.
The Corporate Governance Task Force reported six functions of the Board itself:
setting strategic direction;
overseeing and monitoring performance and financial stewardship;
ensuring high standards of corporate governance and personal behaviour and
overseeing employment of senior executives;
supervising dialogue between the Trust and the community.
While this list is weighted towards monitoring functions (as one might expect in
dealing with a body whose funding and responsibilities are essentially publicly
determined), the areas of standard setting and communication with the community
have lessons for many public companies. The Board itself is designed to provide a
balance of inside views, from the chief officer and chief finance officer and also
relevant specialists - a doctor or dentist, a nurse or midwife - with non-executives
from the relevant area. This is a combination of perspectives from which public
companies might learn.
As far as non-executives are concerned, NHS Trusts have absorbed outsider input
from business people and community leaders who had little or no experience of
medical issues. The Audit Commission in its paper Taken on Board'°8 explored the
lessons learned and good practice encountered to date and these may have relevance
to non-executive director involvement generally. New NHS non-executives
emphasised the importance of induction and training in preparing them for their
demanding roles.'° 9 In business, even experienced managers joining a new company
as a part-time independent voice on the board have many of the same needs. In
short, during the 1990s it was realised that the complexity of public services such as
108 Audit Commission, Taken on Board - Corporate Governance in the NHS. Developing the Role of
Non-Executive Directors (Audit Commission, 1995).
09 ibid 7-8.
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the NHS could rival that of major businesses. Skills from the development and
oversight of one sector could usefully be transferred to the other."°
Among the general points raised by 'Taken on Board' are the following:
The strategic input of non-executives adds independent judgment to the
planning process."
Having a mix of skills among non-executive directors 'is fundamental to the
board's effectiveness'."2
Non-executives are seen as having a particular responsibility for public
consultation and accountabiijty•3
The chairman can lead questioning of the executive or can constrain it, while
a nervous or defensive chief executive can kill discussion if the board is not
persistent.'
More specific suggestions include the following:
Sufficient (but not overwhelming) information must be provided to non-
executives, in appropriate, manageable amounts and in clear form. 'Away
days' to brainstorm aims and priorities can be helpful."5
'Walking the shop floor' to obtain independent information is seen as part of
the non-executive task and facilitates expression of staff concerns."6
Feedback from - and to - the chairman is important and should be a regular
process, as should review of the executive's performance."7
110 L. Ashburner, 'Corporate Governance in the Public Sector: The Case of the NHS' in K. Keasey, S.
Thompson and M.J. Wright, Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997) 289-290 notes that in an extensive survey, over two-thirds of Trust
chairs and almost half of Trust non-executives were private sector directors.
ibid 19.
112 ibid8.
" ibid 23-26.
" ibid 14-17.
ibid 19-20.
' ibid 11-12.
ibid 9-10.
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Non-executive directors 'should be in touch with the concerns of local
people' and the board should be prepared to explain its decisions in public,
for example in well-organised local meetings. Community surveys and focus
groups may be informative.'18
For public company boards, there are lessons of openness and diversity to be learned
from this. Greater public scrutiny of social and environmental performance is to be
expected by those running public companies as well as leaders of public services.
The input of directors from a wide range of backgrounds and their genuine
involvement in a range of policy issues is to be welcomed in business, not feared.
Clear goals, the cultivation of external relationships and the availability of a range of
specialist skills are prerequisites for modem business success.
3.7.2 The Privatised Utility Companies
In the utility industries, formerly publicly owned, now in the private sector,
regulatory bodies (OFTEL, OFWAT and OFGEM) were established to protect
consumer interests (in prices and quality of services) and to enforce the licences
under which privatised companies operate. Employee issues and environmental
impacts also need to be weighed in the balance by those overseeing such companies.
The Directors-General of these regulatory authorities are aware that their various
responsibilities can conflict, as when expenditure to meet strict environmental
criteria may cause price increases. In the absence of full and free competition
available to ordinary consumers, there is a need for an independent, publicly
accountable body to set the priorities. Utility regulators have viewed their role as a
temporary and diminishing one as competition is introduced and strengthened.TM9
Their relationship to the major companies has been one of occasional antagonism
118 ibid 23-26.
e.g. OFTEL, Annual Report 1996 (OFTEL, 1996) 2: 'regulation must seek to replace monopolised
markets by competitive markets from which regulation can withdraw...Our aim is to establish a
coherent framework which encourages entry, innovation, efficiency and sustainable competition...'
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focused on the Directors-General, with disputes ultimately refereed by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission.'2°
Many of the disagreements have arisen because the chairmen of utility companies
have wanted to keep the structure intact and free of open competition until
modernisation inside the business had been accomplished. 12 ' If competition is
designed only to drive down consumer prices, quality levels and environmental and
employment standards may suffer in pursuit of that goal. If the proper goal of
competition is seen as being the satisfaction of all participants and the attainment of a
sustainable balance between all their interests, the approach will be somewhat
broader.' 22 It may never be entirely practical to have unbridled 'free entry' where
infrastructure and environmental implications and social and political consequences
are significant, but managerial attitudes can be transformed.'23
The present Government appears not to be satisfied that the expanding marketplace
alone will produce corporate operations which are in the public interest or indeed
free of directorial impropriety. It has accordingly brought forward the Utilities Act
2000, which addresses the accountability of utilities companies and declares that the
principal objective of gas and electricity regulation is 'to protect the interests of
consumers', including disabled or ill persons, pensioners, consumers with low
incomes and those in rural areas.' 24 The Secretary of State has power to issue
guidance regarding the contribution gas and electricity companies can make to
Government social and environmental policies.' 25 Those companies are also required
to disclose to regulators any remuneration of directors that is linked to levels of
120 M. Bishop, J. Kay and C. Mayer, The Regulatory Challenge (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) 13.
121 ME. Beesley, Privatisation, Regulation and Deregulation (London: Routledge, 2nd ed 1997) 45.
22 S. Ogden, 'Corporate Governance in the Privatised Utilities: The Case of the Water Industry' in
Keasey, Thompson and Wright, n 110 above, 263-264 notes water company innovations in customer
relations and representation in response to regulatory pressure.
23 ibid54.
124 Utilities Act 2000 ss 9 and 13.
12S ibidss 10 and 14.
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performance in regulated services.' 26
 New legislation can act as a spur to change
practice and indeed to justify investment expenditure such as environmental projects
and customer service initiatives to shareholders. Other businesses clearly also have
major environmental and social impact and logically should expect to face some of
the same political demands, while some, such as supermarket chains, appear to be
aware of this and emphasise news of community activities in their advertising and
publicity material.
In the US, there is a tradition of more inclusive, open decision-making, with time and
space for the contributions of consumer and environmental representatives as well as
management and employees. The expense of such consultation exercises is seen as a
price well worth paying in a mature democracy.' 27
 There are lessons for
'mainstream' public companies to learn from the utilities' experience of public
disaffection (for example at executive pay while the industry faced little competition
and the same work had been done at far lower salaries, quite often by the same
l'8individuals, before privatisation). - The fact that the utility companies now put
significant effort and resources into their environmental programmes and into
community relations shows what needs to be done.
Contractual reasoning underlay privatisation programmes and has dominated
political life for almost 20 years. It may sometimes be of quite dubious relevance,
for example where employee and environmental awareness issues are involved and
the bargaining power of the respective parties is unequal. Political discussion of
rights and responsibilities applies to business leaders as to other individuals and the
discourse of community and co-operation is similarly applicable to business. As
social dependency on major business organisations grows, political accountability
also needs to develop.
126 ibidss 61 and 97.
127 See C. 1-larlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 1997) 332-336.
128 I.M. Millstein, 'The Responsible Board' (1997)52 The Business Lavyer 407, 4 12-414, points out
that this perception extends to the US.
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Wherever there is an element of market power and control, it is easy to argue that
there is a public interest element to management of a company.' 29 Commenting on
the utility regulation process as a (quasi-) contract between the companies and the
Government, Bishop, Kay and Meyer note that:
The government acts on behalf of consumers and local communities in the
case of industries where environmental considerations are of
importance.. .The contract lays down certain conditions that privatised firms
have to satisfy: the provision of services of certain quality for particular
groups of consumers...[in return for a reasonably certain income stream].'3°
Similar observations could be made of some large industrial arid retail UK public
companies. Government Ministers, particularly in the DTI, are lobbied by various
interest groups and attempt to avoid abuses of market power or of the environment.
3.8 Conclusion: Priorities for Directors
Without a clear sense of mission flowing from the boardroom, a company is liable to
drift or stagnate. Any substantial changes to the activities of the company should be
decided by the directors as a body, executives and non-executives alike. The same
would apply to acquisitions and disposals. Regular analysis of the external
environment is essential to successful board performance. Given the current UK
unitary system, there is the opportunity for inside knowledge of the executives to be
complemented by outside perspectives from non-executives. Neither group should
be (or feel as though it is) excluded from policy considerations.
In addition, the board needs to be well organised and constantly diligent in its
monitoring role. The Chairman carries a major responsibility for ensuring that this is
129 As Milistein puts it in 'The Professional Board' (1995) 50 The Business Lawyer 1427, 1428:
'...boards of directors are not only fiduciaries for their respective owners and, less directly,
accountable to other corporate constituents, but they are also responsible, in effect, for their nation's
economic well-being. The larger and more pervasive the private sector, the greater the responsibility
for the national interest.'
30 Bishop, Kay and Mayer, n 120 above, 6.
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so. Non-executives should develop their own sources of information and allow
sufficient time for themselves to become conversant with the organisation, so that
they do not depend solely on details provided by executives. The 'outside' directors
may find it helpful to meet together for discussions without their 'insider' colleagues
on a regular basis. Executives when acting in their directorial capacity also need to
feel that they are not constrained by the managerial hierarchy from raising doubts
and airing questions. The Chief Executive must in turn expect and submit to
particularly rigorous examination on the company's operations generally.
Public company directors will need to be more socially and politically aware in the
future than most have been in the past. Millstein calls: 'efforts to balance societal
concerns of employees, customers, suppliers and communities - without
compromising shareholder wealth...central to the board's role." 3 ' It is not enough to
be adept only at satisfying the investors - there must be a more sophisticated, multi-
faceted approach. He points out that: 'any involvement in major policy decisions
requires professionals who understand that they need, and are willing to insist upon,
the requisite information for each level of involvement, and then spend the requisite
amount of time for each level." 32 A sharp intellect is essential if one is to assimilate
complex matters quickly. In order to obtain such a professional service, it may be
necessary for public companies to pay high-calibre non-executives rather higher fees
than they currently receive, while executive pay will continue to depend on that
market.
If stewardship values become prevalent in a board, the details of committee structure
and audit procedure may grow to be less important over time. There must first be a
clear statement of basic purposes and principles against which decisions and actions
can be measured. Directors motivated by satisfaction at the company's achievements
and loyalty to the company's approach will align themselves naturally with the
' Milistein, n 128 above, 408.
32 Millstein, n 129 above, 1433.
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company's regular constituents. Balancing the interests of all a company's
stakeholders will never be a simple matter. Public pronouncements, at any rate,
nevertheless indicate that UK public company directors are paying attention to all
constituents and attempting to show fairness to them all. To date, British
shareholders have raised few objections to this.
Drucker many years ago defined board functions as involving the following
elements:
1. A review organ to 'counsel advise and deliberate with top management'.
2. A monitoring body to 'remove top management that fails to perform'.
3. A 'public and community relations' group.
This corresponds approximately to the strategic, monitoring and stakeholder
consideration work discussed above, though the terminology was different when
Drucker wrote his piece.'33
Tricker's definition of company board functions includes these four elements:
1. Formulating corporate policy.
2. Developing strategic thinking.
3. Supervising business performance.
4. Accounting to owners and others.'34
The first two are long-term forward-looking business roles. The second pair of tasks
relates to current activity as a whole. None of them are issues which a manager,
based in one department and concentrating, quite properly, on efficient daily
operations, would have the time or capacity to consider.
Within a unitary structure, non-executive directors have an important contribution to
make both to the monitoring of management and to the wide-ranging ethical
evaluation of decisions. Senior executives are well able to supply the internal
' Drucker, n 106 above, 63 1-634.
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leadership and maintain links to major shareholders and customers, but it is not
realistic to think that they can themselves scrutinise executive conduct or critique
moral judgments with the necessary detachment. From the realisation that
shareholders are not the sole owners follows the observation that financial and social
monitoring can be about more than protecting investor wealth. The challenge is to
assemble a fairly cohesive group of people who can represent all those with a
legitimate interest in the company's success while having the skifls to drive it
forward.'35
The major practical issues of board size, executive/non-executive balance,
information and time are unlikely to the subject of fundamental legislative or
regulatory input, at least in the absence of a radical restructuring of UK public
company boards (possibilities for which are discussed in Chapter Seven). However,
it is suggested that several straightforward measures could usefully be introduced in
the context of the current UK unitary board containing 30-50 per cent non-
executives:
1. Individuals should be prohibited from sitting on the boards of more than four
public companies at any one time and it should be understood that a public company
executive would normally accept only one additional non-executive appointment.
2. As a requirement for listed companies, a leading senior non-executive should be
named and should make him/herself freely and regularly accessible to employees and
customers as well as to government-appointed regulators and community leaders.
These steps would emphasise the time commitment involved in public company
directorships and provide a stronger formal link between stakeholders and the board
itself.
3. 'Board interlocks' between directors of listed companies should be prohibited by
the listing rules.
134 RI. Tricker, Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Poit'ers in British Companies and
their Boards of Directors (Aldershot: Gower, 1984).
J.G. Sifonis and B. Goldberg, Corporation on a Tightrope (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) 77-84.
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4. Directors should be counted as independent and able to sit on audit, remuneration
and nominations committees under the listing rules only if they have no financial
connections with the company apart from board fees and any shares owned
('pensioners' and consultants would be excluded).
These steps would advance the aim of providing a strong, truly independent, voice on
the board as Cadbury and Hampel both suggest.
5. Directors should be obliged by law to take proper account of all relevant
information in reaching their decisions, should not be permitted to vote on matters
where they have a personal interest and should exercise their individual judgment on
all issues before the board.
6. As a corollary to the above, all directors should have the right by statute to see and
copy company documents, inspect premises and speak to any employee at any time,
as required for the fulfilment of their board duties.
Such measures would make it clear to all that directors, including non-executives, are
part of the decision-making group and entitled to full information accordingly.
Specific time commitments in directors' contracts and the availability of well-
qualified research staff should also be considered by major companies.
Development of strategy, monitoring of executives and the oversight of business
relationships are, then, the three essential tasks of public company leadership, which
are all performed by the unitary board in UK public companies. 136 Company law,
listing requirements and directors' own terms of appointment should all help to make
these accountabilities understood. As far as shareholders are concerned, Lord
Hoffmann in O'Neill v Phillips' 37 discussed circumstances in which a promise may
affect a person's conscience even if it were not legally binding. The courts will
Matheson, JH, and Olson, B, 'Relationship Management and the Trialogical Imperative for
Corporate Law' (1994) 78 Minnesota Law Review 1443 discuss three board functions: policymaking,
monitoring and also relationship management with investors and stakeholders.
137 O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 All ER 961.
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enforce the constitution of a public company but it is not always clear at present how
much further its rulings will go in upholding agreements or understandings.'38
The Cadbury and Hampel Reports and the Combined Code were to a great extent
missed opportunities for substantial changes to corporate governance in UK public
companies. The standards expected of directors remain uncertain and the ongoing
company law reform process is an obvious opportunity to improve matters. Other
possible board structures will be considered below, and could, of course, be
discretionary rather than mandatory for all UK pubic companies. Short of such
measures, it is submitted that greater directorial time commitment and more genuine
independence for non-executives would make a great difference to board
effectiveness.
138 Re Carringlon Viyellaplc (1983) 1 BCC 98.
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CHAPTER FOUR
STAKEHOLDING THEORY
The Concent of Stakeholdin
The theory of stakeholding in the corporate context posits that those who participate
in or are affected by the company, as individuals and groups, all merit consideration
and involvement in its decision-making - they have a stake in it. This quality of
'membership' entails responsibilities on the part of all involved, as well as the rights
associated with 'belonging'. A stakeholder philosophy starts from the premise that
inclusion, social, political and economic, is a valuable concept. The mutually
responsive connection of persons in the social, economic and political systems, so it
is argued, produces better results for all than the depersonalised market. From the
management of individual companies, the idea extends to political principles about
society as a whole and economic organisation in particular. In the following
comments, the concern is with the application of the theory specifically at the
corporate level, but the connections and points of comparison with the political
system will become evident.
Concerning the label itself, Hutton comments:
Part of the process of ideological self-definition is finding a word to describe
the variety of capitalism one is championing, and stakeholding is an attractive
choice. The idea has long been deployed in management literature and
various firms have described themselves as stakeholder companies. The best
types of overseas forms of capitalism have been achieved by striking the right
balance between commitment and flexibility. Stakeholding is a neat way of
encapsulating just that.'
Regard and respect for individuals as such is the core of the political economy
delineated here. The name 'stakeholder' itself implies that the size of a person's
W. Hutton, 'The Stakeholder Society' in D. Marquand and A. Seldon, The Ideas that Shaped Post-
War Britain (London: Fontana, 1996) 300.
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stake depends on what he or she has contributed to or put at risk in the company.
Curiously, the Company Law Review Steering Committee in its Consultation
Document avoided the use of the term, preferring to use the expression 'Pluralism'
(which was contrasted with 'Enlightened Shareholder Value'). 2 The change of
wording marks a subtle shift of emphasis from the inclusivity and rights implied by
'stakeholding' to the diversity and conflict emphasised by 'pluralism'.
Stakeholder awareness poses a direct challenge to a one-dimensional shareholder-
centric management approach. Comparably with discussion of 'social inclusion' in
politics, it is concerned with thawing out th fulk pottriti oc ?L1
law provides a framework of minimum standards in specific important areas - for
example, on employment rights and environmental protection - to further this
process, and here the current UK Government, in association with its European
partners, has shown itself willing to embrace new development within limits. So far
as corporate governance itself is concerned, the present Company Law Green Paper
indicates that directors' duties may be altered in a new statute to reflect a
stakeholding perspective if it appears that 'best practice' is not achieving the required
results. 3
 Some major public companies are already employing the stakeholder
approach with enthusiasm. 4
 Others have leaders who strongly resist the idea and
express their views without hesitation.5
The idea of organised labour as a full 'social partner' in workplaces is an important
principle of the continental European (particularly German and Dutch, also French
and Scandinavian) legal tradition, which has been carried over into European Union
2 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy - the
Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) para 5.1.
DTI, Modern Company Lawfor a Competitive Economy (DTI: March 1998) 10.
Sir John Browne of BP, speaking in the BBC's prestigious Reith lectures for 2000 on the theme of
sustainable development, set out his strong views on the importance of relationships with employees
and customers as well as shareholders and the centrality in those relationships of environmental and
social responsibility (broadcast on Radio 4, text at www.bbc.co.uk .)
Sir Stanley Kalms of Dixons plc, a vocal opponent of the Euro and of business regulation, is an
example of this category.
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labour law. The two sides of industry were empowered by the Maastricht Protocol
on Social Policy to reach binding agreements which will themselves become part of
European law, 6 so both trade unions and business associations are more important
than ever before in setting standards at work. The ideal is that all parties work
together for a common goal and obtain shared benefits, 'opting in' to the business's
project. Employees at all levels will be more productive, so it is asserted, if they
understand, and feel part of, the company's plans. 7 More than that, however, if the
potential for stakeholder involvement is to be realised, the objective itself must be
one that does not damage the interests of the community. If employees, instead of or
as well as the shareholders, were put in the position of seeking first their own short-
term interests, that would not produce balanced long-termist decision-making in
public companies.
Suppliers and customers who are involved in dealing with a public company over an
extended period also find their prospects entwined with those of the corporation, and
in that sense have a significant stake in it. Japanese networks or keiretsu, centred on
commercial banks, with significant cross-shareholdings and joint directorial
meetings, place these business relationships between firms in different industrial
niches on a co-operative long-term footing. 8 In the UK, on the whole, relationships
are more atomistic and price-sensitive. Within the same sector, different approaches
are taken - for example, of the major supermarkets, Sainsbury's has a reputation for
working with suppliers over extended periods while Tesco typically uses many
different providers to maintain price competition. Dore, who has studied Japanese
business extensively, notes that commitment in trade relationships is associated with
1991 (Maastricht) Agreement on Social Policy, Articles 4 and 5 (now endorsed by the United
Kingdom and the new European Union Member States). Agreements may be implemented either in
accordance with labour law procedures of Member States or by European Council decisions on
proposals from the European Commission at the request of the parties.
The European Works Councils Directive 94/45 [1994] O.J. L254/64 also reflects the same view.
8 H. Kim and R.E. Hoskisson, 'Market (United States) versus Managed (Japanese) Governance' in K.
Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial
Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 174.
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higher quality and better profit margins. 9
 At present, small suppliers to UK public
companies are at risk of being sent into collapse without warning if the main players
experience trading difficulties.
The stakeholder economic system, on the national scale, is said by critics of 1980s
Anglo-American individualism to have produced more equitable and sustainable
success in the German and Japanese contexts than the less co-operative style of
business seen principally in the UK and the US. Differing emphases have emerged
through the various commentaries. Will Hutton believes that the UK financial
system is not serving the needs of employees or consumers, nor the aim of business
prosperity, very well and that it requires an overhaul, including new companies
legislation.'° Greater commitment by owners of shares and less ease of transfer of
control of companies are strongly advocated. John Plender argues, more moderately,
that companies need balanced long-termist management in order to prosper."
Employees, it is asserted, perform best if they feet that their effort is servinu, a
worthwhile common purpose.
Another British advocate of stakeholding, John Kay, views the company not as an
asset constantly available to be bought and sold, but an entity to be stewarded and
maintained for the long run.' 2
 Directors' duties in law should set out the appropriate
parties for the board's consideration. Margaret Blair, of the Brookings Institution,
argues that the 'shareholder ownership' model of the company is outdated and the
employees are among the most important players in business. Corporate governance
R. Dore 'Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism' in P.J. Buckley and J. Michie, Finns
Organiations and Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 359, 3 77-378.
0 W. Hutton, The State We're In (London, Jonathan Cape, 1995) and The State to Come (London:
Vintage, 1997) and articles in The Guardian and The Observer; A. Giddens, 'After the Left's
paralysis', New Statesman, 1 May 1998, 18,21 simply asks: 'Can government create a stakeholding
business culture? Of course it can, through a mixture of incentives and controls, although this will
have to be on a transnational as well as a national level.'
J. Plender, The Stakeholding Solution (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1997) and leading articles in The
Financial Times.
2 Kay, 'The Stakeholder Corporation' in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble, Stake holder
Capitalism (Basingstoke: Macrn illan, 1997) 125, 126-13 1.
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arrangements should reflect that new reality as far as possible. 13 The point has
frequently been made that many companies' profits owe more to their employees'
abilities and efforts than to physical assets, yet provision of real job security is
inconsistent with the flexibility required to compete in a global marketplace.' 4 Clear
understanding and agreement from a basis of principle are needed to overcome the
difficulties caused by this contradiction.
The stakeholder approach requires an enlightened management and a well-trained
workforce, drawn together by the board. Public company directors must take
seriously views already often expressed in the Aimual Report and at General
Meetings about 'inclusiveness'. The position taken by the German Constitution (Art.
15) is that property rights entail corresponding obligations to promote the general
welfare by their use. Shareholders and others, including managers, must come to
heed this in the US and UK too, if business culture is to change.' 5 Harnessing
innovative talent is in the collective interest when effort is directed to serving
customers and building markets. Market-based capitalism itself works best when
there is a framework within which new developments and ideas can flourish.'6
4.2 The Uses of Stakeholding
The concept of stakeholding can be seen as one suggestion among many of how
things should be done within a public company, whatever the current reality.
Alternatively, it could be regarded as a description of matters of fact with no
3 M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century
(Wash ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995) Chapters 7 and 8; B. Longstreth, 'Implications of the
Wealth Maximising Standard in the Law' in M. Blair, Wealth Creation and Wealth Sharing: A
Colloquium on Corporate Governance and Investment in Human Capital (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1996) 55, 57 says of Blair's suggestions: 'Under corporate law today, directors
owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders alone...So for directors to become
representatives of other stakeholders, a statutory change in fiduciary alignment is needed.'
C. Handy, 'Are Jobs for Life Killing Enterprise?' in Beyond Certainty (London: Arrow Books,
1996) 87.
5 See generally A.F. Alkhafaji, A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance (New York,
Quorum Books, 1989) ch 9 (entitled 'The European Model').
6 
• Clarke, 'The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age' (1998)
31 Long Range Planning 182.
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implications whatsoever for the improved conduct of business. The principle of due
attention to all parties may be regarded as 'just' part of morality. Otherwise, use of
the concept might be 'just' in formation of strategy as a planning tool. It is, ideally,
deployed as both.' 7 The real strength of the idea lies in the fact that it leads on from a
descriptive analysis of how companies function to a suggestion of how to make them
operate better, grounded in a principle of fairness and inclusiveness.
Theoretical writings about stakeholding have fallen into the following categories:
1. Descriptive observations - 'the way things are', interdependence of corporate
participants'8
2. Instrumental procedures - focus on business objectives, analysis to aid
profitability'9
3. Normative statements - pronouncements on ethics, principles of participation in
business.20
These distinct uses of the term are not always clearly demarcated in the literature.
The real 'job' of stakeholding theory can be seen as the synthesis of ethics and
economics, doing well in an economic sense by doing what is right in one's dealings.
Public companies need to have leadership that is responsive to all the relevant parties
if they are to fulfil their business potential. From the description of facts (for
example, associates such as employees are obviously necessary for the business to
continue in operation) and the possible strategic benefits (for example, suppliers who
anticipate future orders will be more concerned about quality than those who do not),
one moves to the normative basis of rights as belonging with responsibilities.
Corporate social power and influence legitimate the inclusion of the community and
the environment as stakeholders deserving of consideration by boards.
' T. Donaldson and L.E. Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence
and Implications' (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review (1995) 65.
8 eg C.W.L. Hill and T.M. Jones, 'Stakeholder - Agency Theory' (1992) 29 Journal oft1anagement
Studies 131.
9 eg L.E. Preston and H.J. Sapienza, 'Stakeholder Management and Corporate Performance' (1990)
19 Journal of Behavioral Economics 361.
20 eg J.W. Kuhn and D.W. Shriver, Jr., Beyond Success: Corporations and their Critics in the 1990s
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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A method set out by Harrington for the ethical analysis of public policy can be
applied to management decisions generally. In the descriptive phase: 'stakeholders
and stakeholder groups must.. .be identified along with the interests of those
stakeholders.' In the normative phase, the decisionmakers then need to ask: 'does a
particular...policy provide disproportionate benefits to certain stakeholders at the
expense of others?' Far from being an additional drain on profits, 'ethical analysis
structured in this way can enhance the ability of business entities to meet the needs of
their stakeholders...' 2 ' bringing an instrumental advantage. In discovering whom
their stakeholders are and what members of each constituency would like to obtain
from their dealings with the company, the directors gain the incalculable advantage
of a broader and deeper understanding of the business. In determining how benefits
and costs should be shared at any time, the board looks to its strategic mission and
ethical code.22
Competitive pressure is not always an absolute or effective restraint on behaviour,
especially for large companies. The market generally does not preclude social
action, and certainly does not prevent the fair and ethical treatment of employees and
suppliers. 23
 At the normative level, however, lies the justification for stakeholding
on which all others are founded. This analysis goes to the heart of corporate activity
and its purpose. Implementation then involves understanding how the firm works
and that co-operation as well as competition is needed to allow the company to
continue and thrive. The leadership's attention then turns to making it more
21 L.K. l-larrington, 'Ethics and Public Policy Analysis: Stakeholders' Interests and Regulatory Policy'
(1996) 15 Journal of Business Ethics 375, 379-3 80.
22 M.B.E. Clarkson, 'A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and Evaluating Corporate Social
Performance' (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 92.
23 C.K. Prahalad, 'Corporate Governance or Corporate Value Added? Rethinking the Primacy of
Shareholder Value' in D. Chew, Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 48, 51-54.
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effective, by applying a system to discover and compare the needs and wishes of the
various groups involved.24
To the extent that the law restrains the board in looking at any interest other than that
of the shareholders as an ultimate goal, it restricts the scope for investment and for
the company to play its part in the life of the economy and society to the full. This is
a situation the stakeholding perspective could help to change if it were reflected in
company law. 25
 The board of directors would have greater freedom, in the sense that
they would not be confined to looking only at the impact on dividend returns and
share prices. In another way, it would be subject to more effective scrutiny as more
stakeholding groups were empowered to monitor corporate decisions and protect
their expectations. The law has accepted that the interests of employees and creditors
must play a part in corporate decision-making on appropriate occasions - as key
contributors, they cannot routinely be ignored. There is further competitive
advantage to be gained by developing appropriate committed relationships with
customers and suppliers in industry, but at present UK law gives little or no support
to this where arguably it should aim to do so.26
One critic of stakeholding has asked:
Should all stakeholder interests be treated equally, along the lines of a
utilitarian calculus? Few defenders of the stakeholder approach advocate
treating all interests equally. Alternatively, should the stockholders' interests
have special priority? If this route is taken, then the stakeholder principle is
merely an extension of the profit principle.27
24 R.E. Freeman, 'Stakeholder Thinking: The State of the Art' in J. Nasi, Understanding Stakeholder
Thinking (Helsinki: LSR-Publications, 1995) 35.
25 J• Williamson, 'The Road to Stakeholding' (1996) 67 The Political Quarterly 209.
26 5• Deakin, C. Lane and F. Wilkinson, "Trust" or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of
Contractual Relations Between Firms' (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 329.
27 J• Fieser, 'Do Businesses Have Moral Obligations Beyond What the Law Requires?' (1996) 15
Journal of Business Ethics 457, 460.
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It is submitted that neither of these extreme approaches need be accepted. The
'inside' (directly contributing) stakeholders will have priority at different times and
all need to be kept satisfied over a term if corporate plans are to succeed, while more
wide-ranging considerations (social and environmental impacts) may on occasion be
of sufficient weight to rule out a course of action.
'Stakeholder' companies will be better able to build effective alliances between
themselves for geographical and operational expansion purposes. They will find it
easier to strike satisfactory deals with employee and consumer representatives. They
will be at less risk over time of customers or suppliers choosing to deal with another
company on price grounds alone. Public companies run in this way will enjoy
greater scope to plan for investment in facilities and research. 28
 In return, they will
have to be prepared to honour their commitments and live up to shared expectations.
The competitive, cost-cutting mentality will need to give way to a more co-operative
ethos focused on higher performance to benefit all stakeholders.
4.3 The Identification and Demands of Stakeholders
The original and perhaps the broadest definition of corporate stakeholding refers to a
stakeholder as 'any party which can affect or be affected by the activities of a
business'. 29
 Those individuals and groups who have a direct impact on the
productive work of a public company are naturally the most pressing in terms of day-
to-day consideration, while the others come into play at the relevant times and can
cause problems to management if mishandled or forgotten. All stakeholders ought to
be treated as valuable in their own right, not simply as a means to the end set by
others. Nor does any one group have an absolute claim to priority. 30
 This is not to
say that all their claims are on the same level or are relevant in all situations. The
interested parties will depend in each case on the actual decision being made.
28 M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness: A Systems View of International Business (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990) ch 5.
29 RE. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984) 25.
30 s• Sheikh, Corporate Social Responsibilities: Law and Practice (London: Cavendish, 1996) 171.
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expansion or contraction, is planned, the board can and should be held responsible
for assessing the outcome for those secondary stakeholders as well as all primary
parties.33
To qualify as a corporate stakeholder, a party must show genuine grounds for
wanting to influence the behaviour and direction of the company. The level of input
sought by a contributor might range from daily participation to making comments on
major plans. The employees, the investors (of equity and capital) and customers and
suppliers (save in competitive markets where they enjoy a ready choice when
contracting) will want their voice to be heard in public companies as they make
direct contributions, whether of labour, material or cash. 34
 In many cases, however,
operations will also affect the quality of the environment, the amenity of the area and
the broader economic picture. Where recognised bodies exist to represent those
interests also, it is undemocratic and unrealistic to shut out their input and deny their
interest. In addition to compliance with ad hoc environmental and social legislation,
it would accordingly be appropriate to mandate public company boards by law to
have regard to these factors generally.35
Investors need to be provided with appropriate disclosure and are interested first and
foremost in dividend returns. Employees need to be developed and encouraged
through genuine involvement and are interested above all in their salaries and
conditions of employment. Customers can have their feedback heard and expect
progress in products and services. Suppliers can be included in co-operation and
expect honesty and reliability in dealings. As far as the local community is
concerned, relevant information and some monetary returns by way of investment
D. Wheeler and M. Sillanpaa, 'Including the Stakeholders: the Business Case' (1998)31 Long
Range Planning 201.
L. Zingales, Corporate Governance (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1998) 5.
US state legislatures have made varying efforts to do this by means of 'constituency' statutes
enabling directors to have regard to the interests of named non-stockholder groups
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and philanthropy are anticipated from major businesses associated with a locality.36
The most effective public company environmental policies will focus on
sustainability and dealing with campaigns and groups that have drawn attention to
specific corporate problems.37
The mission of a public company may well be best served if it can enter into
carefully selected agreements to exchange technical information or for the
distribution of its products. Risks can be dealt with explicitly and shared between
the parties who stand to gain from the company's success. 38 This produces a greater
incentive for all involved to be innovative and diligent. In recent years there has
been a growing trend towards joint ventures, though it is not one that every public
company has joined. A concerted effort to communicate with all business partners
and keep them informed is in any event a matter of good business sense. Research
and development projects may be too large to be funded by one company alone (as
developments in the European aircraft and defence industries show), in which case
progress depends on the ability to construct satisfactory arrangements whereby the
stakes of all parties can be clearly established.
More generally, there is the danger of a company losing its 'Licence to Operate' - its
informal social approval, in the wording of the RSA Tomorrow's Company inquiry
report39 - if public confidence is not earned and maintained. The political climate,
public opinion and media coverage are important in creating this legitimacy, as are
industry contacts and reputations. Defining one's 'Success Model' - the long-term
stakeholder-centred plan, as the Centre for Tomorrow's Company labels it - for the
As far as consultation with employees is concerned, Roger Lyons, General Secretary of MSF, gave
the example of the sale of BOC, a major British company, without any discussion with trade unions,
in contrast to what would have been required in Germany (speech to Young Fabians on 'The Ethics of
Good Business', 17 July 1999 at KPMG London, at 8 in transcript report).
Bill Eyres of the Co-operative Bank, ibid at 31 in transcript report, discussed the bank's pledge of
'ecological sustainability' and how performance is assessed.
P. Mariti and R.H. Smiley, 'Co-operative Agreements and the Organisation of Industry' in P.J.
Buckley and J. Michie, Fir,ns Organi:ations and Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
276, 284-287.
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company and thinking about balanced measurement of its various parts are key
leadership functions, as discussed by the Centre for Tomorrow's Company.4°
However large the organisation, the directors need to be involved in this essential
work. Management and board openness to the greatest degree possible is 'both right
and sensible' (per Sir Adrian Cadbury). 4 ' Interest in what public companies make
and market is widespread among investors and suppliers, as well as workers and
consumers who want to gain a rounded picture of the business.
In a given company, the emphasis placed upon the various stakeholder claims will
depend to some extent upon the type of business it runs - whether or not it is labour
intensive, uses costly raw materials, requires substantial research funding and so on.
The impact of operations on consumers, on employment, on technology, on society,
on the industry and the environment must be examined in the round. 42 One may be
dealing with any one of a host of stakeholder combinations. Public interest will
naturally be greater if the company has significant environmentai impacts or is a
major employer. The corollary of separate corporate personality should be that the
company, or more particularly the group at the apex of It, Is responsible for the
consequences of its actions. 43 It is top managers and directors who must take the
personal risk of having their decisions examined, in the last resort, by the courts.
Handy has suggested that core employees are the real 'citizens' of the corporate
'community.' Other workers, when needed, will be brought in as 'associates' and
also need to be treated with fairness and respect. In addition:
[Partnership or associateship] are... terms that are easier (than citizenship] to
apply to two other stakeholders - the suppliers and the customers. It is
M. Goyder, Living Tomorrow's Company (Aldershot: Gower, 1998) 92-94.
40 ibid 95-10!.
41 Sir Adrian Cadbury, The Company Chairman (Hemel Hempstead: Director Books, 2nd ed 1995)
121.
42 M. Blair, 'For Whom should Corporations be Run: an Economic Rationale for Stakeholder
Management' (1998)31 Long Range Planning 195.
Alkhafaji, n 15 above, ch 10 (entitled 'The Stakeholder Model').
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important for any company to win the trust and co-operation of the largest
and most important of these groups, along with the most significant of their
investors. Were citizenship to be formalized in any way, it would be
appropriate to see these other stakeholders as associate citizens, with at least
the right to be kept informed, to be consulted whenever appropriate. This
form of associate citizenship should help to bond these crucial players into
the long-term aims of the organization and to build a degree of mutual trust
by the sharing of information.44
The possible legal expression of this associative status vis-à-vis a public company
will be examined in Chapter Six. In addition to the rights to be informed and
consulted, it should also encompass provision for some compensation when
expectations born of long association are breached.
4.4 The Classification of Stakeholders
Stakeholders can be divided fairly naturally into what have been called their
'Primary' and 'Secondary' groups.45 Primary stakeholders are all those who count
on a 'strictly business' basis, without whom the business simply could not function.
They consist of managers (who are at the hub of the whole network), customers,
employees, shareholders and suppliers. These participants all require day-to-day and
month-by-month attention from directors and legally, this needs to be acknowledged
in any new Companies Act. Secondary stakeholders have influence and effect in
specific, important situations of concern to them. The national and local media
(central to corporate external communications), the community and the environment,
all of which can be essential to success at critical times, fall into this category. No
major change in the operations of a public company can be conducted without
attention to those vital constituencies. Information systems serving the board of
C. Handy, The Hungry Spirit (London: Random House, 1997) 181.
P. Goldenberg, 'Shareholders v. Stakeholders: the Bogus Argument' (1998) 19 Co. Law 34, 37
speaks of 'groups that have market relationships with a company' (consumers, employees, suppliers
and financiers) who are 'on the inside track' and 'public pressure' and 'interest groups' to which
directors may view it as in the company's interests to respond.
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directors need to provide relevant and clear briefings on the aforementioned areas of
concern.
Another division, suggested by David Wheeler and Maria Sillanpaa, both formerly of
the Body Shop plc, is that between the 'social' and 'non-social' classes of
stakeholder. These are said to be distinguishable by the fact that the former can be
communicated with directly by the company while the latter caimot. Future
generations, the natural environment and non-human species, plus environmental
pressure groups and animal welfare organisations acting as their representatives, are
included in the category of 'non-social stakeholders'.46 This raises the question of
how widely 'society' is to be defined (past and/or future; local and/or global). The
difficulty with listing the stakeholders in such an all-encompassing manner is that it
brings to prominence groups which can rarely have a direct bearing on decisions to
be taken by directors and managers 'here and now'. This is not to deny that major
choices of location and production, which will have an impact on an area for a
considerable time, should be subject to rigorous analysis of their physical and
economic impacts. Few UK public company directors are presently qualified to
assess such factors, as opposed to making financial projections. There are, however,
independent advisors and consultants who can assist in carrying out the necessary
studies.
Public companies wield power and enjoy social and economic influence to an extent
that makes it credible and appropriate to regard the wider polity as a stakeholder in
them. The tax contribution of major businesses is, of course, very substantial,
though governments are aware of the danger that multinational companies may
relocate if the tax rates are too far out of line with the other states.47 Employment
policies cannot be delivered in market economies without the support of the large-
D. Wheeler and M. Sillanpaa, The Stakeholder Corporation: A Blueprint for Maxiinising
Siakeholder Value (London: Pitman, 1997) 167-168.
S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1992), in
particular chs 4, 6, 8 and 10.
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scale private sector. Economic factors, such as inflation rates, are also determined to
a considerable degree by the prices set by public companies. It was argued in
Chapter Two that directors as the leaders of such businesses are in a position of
substantive autonomy and social and political power. As a quid pro quo for this
privilege, they owe an obligation to respect the law and to give consideration to the
social interest as expressed primarily by elected representatives.48
Stakeholders can also be rated according to their economic and political power. As
between investors, clearly those who have contributed most have the loudest voice.
Where employees are concerned, if a particular group (such as providers of
professional or technical support) could damage or stop the company's work if it
withdrew its co-operation, that group will have corresponding influence. Among
customers and suppliers, those with the longest and closest ties to the company will
have priority. 49
 This is not simply a pragmatic issue for the management. Where a
particular stakeholder has the power to harm or exclude others, it may be appropriate
for the law to address this.
Another type of stakeholder comprises the 'normative groups' who lay down the
rules by which public companies must carry out their work. National and local
government, regulatory agencies and also the influential consumer and
environmental groups fall into this category. Trade and professional associations, the
Stock Exchange and increasingly the Financial Services Authority also set standards
by which public companies must operate. 5° Individual companies will benefit if they
have good relations with, and good reputations among, these bodies, which, in the
last resort, have the power to restrict or stop business operations.
48 R.C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993) 184-185.
R.K. Mitchell, B.R. Agle and D.J. Wood, 'Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts' (1997)22 Academy of
Management Review 853.
G.R. Dowling, Corporate Reputations (Melbourne: Longman Professional, 1994) 26.
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Dowling calls campaigning groups and others (including journalists) who take an
interest in the work of a company where it impacts on their concerns 'diffused
groups.' The name may not be attractive (though it does avoid the slightly pejorative
connotations of 'special interest groups' or 'lobbyists') but these stakeholders are
indeed widely dispersed in that their remits may cover many aspects of corporate
life. Their attention may well come during times of corporate difficulty or crisis.5'
Again, it will be helpful at such times if familiarity with and the confidence of
relevant people have already been established.
The regulation of utilities, as the New Statesman magazine's treatment of the subject
indicated, is not an exclusive example of public companies being required to show
more far-reaching concerns than returns to shareholders:
In reality public authorities have long struck bargains with private concerns in
order to meet wider social criteria: planning gain is one example - build a
supermarket in return for a roadlcreche/new park; the 'polluter pays' principle
is another. The 'natural' operation of the market is frequently constrained or
distorted in the wider social interest.'2
Social and environmental measures are not left to general legislation and
enforcement - they are introduced as part of the internal strategic processes of the
public company. The privatised utilities also illustrate the potential for controversy
when directors and shareholders are perceived to be benefiting disproportionately
from corporate performance compared with customers and employees.'3
Explaining major business decisions to all those parties who may otherwise raise
'misguided' objections is a board function and often one for the Chairman in person.
Market capitalist economies vary in the power wielded by the various groups:
American shareholders, German employees and Japanese managers are all pivotal
within their respective systems. Arguably the most effective combination of all is an
ibid 27.
52 New Statesman Special Supplement, The Bare Necessities (utilities regulation), 24 July 1998, III
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'insider' system involving committed investors, matched by robust competition in
the consumer market. 54 The labour market and supplier arrangements are also
inextricably linked to varying national governance arrangements and economic
performance. We may be witnessing some convergence of advanced industrial
systems as they all attempt to find an appropriate balance between the interests of the
major parties, acknowledging shareholder rights while respecting the rights of
employees and expectations of consumers. 55 Certainly it is increasingly difficult for
one national government alone to establish and enforce social, environmental,
consumer and labour standards when business is operating on a multinational basis.56
4.5 Relations With and Between Stakeholders
Stakeholders do not exist, nor do they deal with companies, in isolation - they
interact and communicate between themselves. Social network analysis deals with
these interconnections (the amount of oveclap between isxtevests' awi the c&Xc c
particular parties (the figures at the hub of the connections and those out on the
periphery) and can be helpful to companies in understanding stakeholder relations.57
To complicate analysis further, people as inth'7icluals often Xeal 'ñth p'othc
companies in more than one capacity - employees may also be customers,
shareholders are pressure group members, for example - and expect to see a
consistent corporate approach. It is certainly not satisfactory today to give one
'message' about the company's plans to a meeting of major investors and a different
impression to trade union representatives and the same applies to other corporate
A. Simpson and K. Bingham, ibid, XII-XIII.
C. Mayer, Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance (Paris: OECD Economics
Department Working Paper No. 164, 1996) 15-16.
" Price Waterhouse, Converging Cultures - Trends in European Corporate Governance (London:
Price Waterhouse, 1997).
' J.K. Galbraith, The Good Society (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1996) goes so far as to say (at 119):
'The economic and social responsibilities are a transitional phase. The ultimate goal is a transnational
authority with the subsidiary powers, not excluding the raising and spending of revenue, that go with
it.'
T. J. Rowley, 'Moving Beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder Influences' (1997)
22 Academy of Management Review 887.
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communications. 58
 The board should examine not only the workforce, but also the
customer and supplier bases, to see whether the maximum advantage is being
extracted from existing connections and whether there might be costs benefits to
reducing the number, and increasing the strength, of contacts. A full corporate
'stakeholder mapping' exercise for the directors' use will also include public bodies
and community and environmental issues and take into account relevant Non-
Governmental Organisations.
Multiple stakeholders inevitably present conflicting demands at times and the board
as the ultimate arbiter of policy matters must come to a final decision about them.
The power, legitimacy and urgency of each source of pressure must be carefully
weighed. 59
 Where there is a clash between the interests of the key groups - for
example, shareholder dividend requirements and employee pay demands - the
balance has to be one that serves the continuing prosperity and deve'opment of the
corporation as an entity. Other 'single issue' pressure groups which take an interest
in the company's development must be paid due attention and reasons given for the
refusal or acceptance of their proposals, but their special interests must be set in the
context of an overall framework of responsibilities for the company. An organisation
that receives many requests for donations, most of which it has to turn down, will be
best equipped to deal with matters efficiently and to show it has behaved fairly, if it
has an agreed policy as to the types of cause it will normally support. In the same
way, economic demands from stakeholders are best dealt with in the context of a
predetermined business strategy and code of ethics.
Trust is a link between companies and stakeholders that does not require negotiation
of elaborate contracts. The decision to trust, in business as elsewhere, centres on
interpersonal expectations, the willingness to accept temporary vulnerability and
J. Smythe, C. Dorward and J. Reback, Corporate Reputation (London: Century Business, 1992)
assert (at 8) that:
'" The traditional public relations role must be buried for ever, and
* The promise offered by the organization to the outside world must match reality.'
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optimism about one's partner's behaviour. As the Prisoners' Dilemma game shows,
trust and dedication to duty are the way to go beyond immediate self-interest and
provide a forum for advantageous exchanges to happen. 6° The company's most
important intangible asset, its reputation, crucially determines its ability to achieve
the benefits of trust. Nothing can replace the interpersonal flows of information in a
small company and the larger a corporation grows, the more difficult it is to ensure
accurate transmission of messages. Integrated systems of communication for
insiders and outsiders need to be arranged to tackle the problem. 6 ' The more fast-
moving and complicated the external commercial and technological environment, the
greater the benefits of trust may be. The law can act as a failsafe mechanism to
provide some recompense for actual loss caused by detrimental reliance on promises.
The choice to trust leaves open the possibility of abuse as well as gain; those who
have invested their time and money in the expectation of a satisfactory relationship
may find that their faith proves to be ill-founded. Without detailed contractual terms,
expectations can be founded on misunderstandings. In a public company, top
management, overseen by the board, is continually responsible for preventing this.
Relationships are often worth more than short-term gains - for example, the
international success of Germany and Japan has partly been built on implicit
contracts. 62 Confidence in the integrity of the top team is vital, as it will need to
respond to crises quickly and appropriately. The Johnson and Johnson Tylenol
poisoning incident63 and British Airways' dispute with Virgin Atlantic 64 are
frequently-cited examples of near-instinctive responses, which enhanced or
diminished companies' images with all their stakeholders.	 If other key
° Rowley, n 57 above, 896-90 1.
60 B. Prodhan, Corporate Governance and Long Term Performance (Oxford: Templeton College
Management Paper 13,1993) 2-3.
E. Scholes and D. Clutterbuck, 'Communication with Stakeholders: An Integrated Approach'
(1998) 31 Long Range Planning 227.
62 J• Kay, 'The Stakeholder Corporation' in Kelly, Kelly and Gamble, n 32 above, 125, 133-134.
63 R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Watching the Watchers: Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First
Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 42-44.
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constituencies had access to procedures, comparable to shareholder actions, to
question board decisions they believed had been made in bad faith or unfairly, the
temptation of directors to opt unquestioningly for quick profits would be lessened.
Chapter Six will explore the practical implications of this approach.
Managerial flexibility and attention to stakeholders can, happily, go together:
An organisation with a reputation for honorable behavior toward its
employees, shareholders, customers and the community is an organisation
that can be flexible, because it can attract the kind of workforce and strategic
allies it needs when it needs them. Such Ti o'ga	 tiov so
to do new things, introduce new products arid services more easi'y because
people trust that an organization with a good reputation will stand by its
products and services, even those it has never offered before.65
Commitments, once made, should be honoured if the organisation's image is to be
protected. At the same time, that image can help the company to 'builà new aThances.
The company must have a distinctive essence and purpose at its core, if it is to
remain adaptable but coherent. Blurred boundaries will characterise new
relationships with customers and suppliers as they exchange information, share costs
and become more technologically dependent on one another. Greater flexibility
comes from having a good reputation for integrity, as arrangements can be more
open-textured. When there is a changing workforce and shifting supplier alliances,
new partners welcome the reassurance of knowing that the central organisation does
operate on a basis of principle. If the board had to consider the interests of all
relevant stakeholders and the standards expected of directors were more clearly
defined in law, the position would become simpler overall. The most retrogressive
A. Kitson and R. Campbell, The Ethical Organisation: Ethical Theory and Corporate Behaviour
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) ch 3.
J.G. Sifonis and B. Goldberg, Corporation on a Tightrope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
59.
135
public company leadership needs to be stimulated to achieve the standards of the
most progressive.
Some individuals and groups, as well as being stakeholders themselves, act as
opinion leaders. They spread information about a company's goods and services,
and about how it treats its workers and suppliers, through the groups that may deal
with the company in the future. Formal announcements will have little effect if such
'word of mouth' adversely contradicts it. Directors are generally aware of their
influential stakeholders and spend time communicating with them. 66 The level and
quality of board contacts with trade unions and consumer groups will greatly
influence the likelihood or otherwise of conflict and disruption. Good relations with
such official representatives of stakeholder groups are greatly to be desired by any
public company board.
In the final analysis, as long as the shareholders hold the power to replace the
directors, they will receive attention and communication to keep them satisfied.
Senior employees known to have skills and knowkdge that are vaua'be to the
company (and potentially useful to its rivals) will also be high on the list for board
contact. Greater public knowledge and scrutiny of corporate plans should be part of
the routine price for the capacity to raise funds from the public. While Department
of Trade and Industry inspectors have near-draconian powers to act if wrongdoing is
suspected, 67 disclosure provisions except in such crises are weak. Improved links
between different stakeholder groups (for example, employees receiving information
about customer requirements, shareholders being informed about environmental
work) would also lead to less misunderstanding and confrontation between
constituencies. It is for directors to build and maintain those bridges.68
66 N.J. Mitchell, The Generous Corporation: A Political Analysis of Economic Power (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1989) ch 8.
67 Companies Act 1985 Part XIV (ss 431-453).
68 M. Porter, 'Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests In Industry' in Chew, n 23 above,
5, 13-16, speaks of measures to: 'Better align the goals of capital providers, corporations, directors,
managers, employees, customers, suppliers and society.'
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4.6 Corporate Stakeholders and Economic Performance
The basic philosophy of the responsible public company, like that of the individual
businessperson, is centred on honesty, maintaining personal integrity, not cheating,
never stealing and honouring commitments. If these principles are not seen to be
valued at the highest levels of a large organisation, they will very likely be
disregarded lower down the hierarchy as well. If the majority of the employees
would not be happy to be treated as they are expected to treat others during their
working time, to tell their spouses and children about business decisions and see
them discussed in local or nationa'i newspapers, there may ^e ócu'thes ^i
and commitment. 69
 Rigid ethical separation of professional life and private life is
both unrealistic and unsatisfactory for the well-educated, thoughtful workforce
needed by most public companies today. Other stakeholders, including consumers
and investors, are becoming increasingly aware of their ethical influence on
directors. If they wish a particular set of social and environmental standards to be
upheld, customers and institutions can, in effect, vote for it with their cash.
There are several possible stances for a public company in relation to corporate
social responsibility issues:
reactive - fight all the way to avoid non-financial questions
defensive - do what is required to avoid trouble but no more
accommodative - be progressive in attitude
proactive - lead change in the industry concerned.70
It is primarily for the management, under the guidance of the board of directors, to
establish the position that will be taken by a public company, and there is
considerable variation among competing businesses at present. Legal rules simply
lay down minimum standards for business, which are socially accepted and endorsed
R.K. Mueller, Anchoring Points for Corporate Directors: Obeying the Unenforceable (London:
Quorum, 1996) 102-105.
° A.B. Carroll, Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management (Cincinnati: South-
Western Publishing, 1989) 4 1-45.
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by the democratic process. They do tend to lag behind the standards set by the most
advanced public company leaderships for themselves. Businesses must, of course,
be distinguished from charitable or social welfare bodies, but can contribute a great
deal of expertise to the non-commercial sector and to social progress. Above all,
having decided on its commercial objectives, a company should be concerned to
address the direct impact of its activities and treat all those who come into contact
with it with honesty and decency.7'
Fostering a general atmosphere of stability and loyalty brings benefits in terms of
reduced transaction costs and increased participant commitment. Permitting the
greed and ambitions of a business elite to carry the day would benefit only those at
the top of the corporate hierarchy. The law can play a part in introducing moral
responsibility to public company operations. Processes used naturally by morally
responsible individuals can be adapted for the public company boardroom.72
Rational choice for individuals involves a lack of impulsiveness, care in examining
the alternatives and consequences and clarity of purpose. If directors were required
to show that they had considered all the available materials and exercised their
judgment in the interests of the company, that would put such a process at the heart
of corporate deliberations. Respect for the lives and interests of others as valuable in
themselves is a further element of morally responsible decision-making. The
stakeholder approach enshrined in law, listing relevant parties and protecting their
interests, would go some way towards promoting this.73
In 1960, McGregor indicated that so-called 'Theory X', the traditional management
view of direction and control (that people in general have an inherent dislike of work,
must be coerced or threatened to push them to make an effort, wish to avoid
responsibility and have little ambition) could more accurately and profitably be
71 E. Sternberg, Just Business (London: Warner, 1994) ch 4.
72 P. Maclagan, Management and Morality (London: Sage, 1998) ch 11.
K.E. Goodpaster and J.B. Matthews, Jr., 'Can a Corporation have a Conscience?' (1982) Harvard
Business Review 132, 134-135.
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superseded by 'Theory Y' (that the expenditure of physical and mental effort at work
is just as natural as rest or play, that people will exercise self-direction in the service
of objectives to which they are personally committed, that such commitment is a
function of the rewards associated with attainment of the objectives, that the average
person learns to seek responsibility under suitable conditions and has the capacity to
exercise a high degree of imagination and creativity in solving work-related
problems). 74 In the customer service and technology-related businesses that play an
ever-larger part in the economy, these observations are increasingly relevant. In
addition, there is a 'Theory X' of relations with suppliers and partner firms (which
assumes that they will do a poor job if not formally checked, that they cannot
usefully show initiative or make suggestions and that they will cheat given the
opportunity), as opposed to a newer 'Theory Y' (which assumes professional
standards of conduct, a willingness to work hard and the possibility of co-operation
towards a common goal). The latter view is evidently not as widespread in the UK
as in some other industrialised economies.75
At present, it is only shareholders who can legally challenge board decisions if they
feel that their interests have been unfairly prejudiced and their legitimate
expectations not met, and they may well do so if, for example, dividends have been
low while management remuneration has remained generous. Other groups which
have also 'invested' in the company's activities by co-specialising in them, including
employees and major suppliers and dependent customers, ought to have a similar
ultimate right of veto. 76 As Teubner puts it:
To privilege one group, whether shareholders or management, that acquires
flexibility through contractual arrangements would be bound to be sub-
optimal in the interest of the corporate actor... 'Organisational surplus value'
arises (1) through the building up of long-term cooperative arrangements
which would be continually destroyed by contractual flexibility; (2) through
D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960) chs 3 and 4.
Plender, n 11 above, chs 6 and 12.
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the diffuseness of 'commitments' in the organisation which by comparison
with rigid, sharply defined contractual obligations produce more situational
flexibility and finally (3) in the orientation towards the organisation's interest
which provides stronger orientation than mere linkage to a contractual
purpose.77
The benefit of doing business through an ongoing firm, as opposed to relying totally
on one-off contracts, is that transaction costs are saved by not having to spell out in
detail in advance all the work that will be required, for example, of employees and
suppliers. The board is charged with bringing together the various elements of the
business mix in order to produce goods and services that will be profitable for the
company and they can best do this by paying adequate attention to all of these
constituents.78
Some of the most important facets of a responsible, successful business are its value
as a long-term investment, innovativeness as an enterprise, the ability to attract, to
develop and retain talented people, general awareness of community and
environmental matters, the provision of goods and services to high standards and
philanthropy that fits in with the corporate mission. These elements all interact and
satisfy various stakeholders while contributing to sustainable business growth. 79
 A
solid business reputation will attract additional custom, encourage good performance
from suppliers and assist in building a strong team. As far as donations are
concerned, these need to be carefully targeted and managed according to a policy that
relates to the company's purposes.8°
4.7 Stakeh older Management
76 Maclagan, n 72 above, 148-15 1.
G. Teubner, 'Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person'
(1988) 36 American Journal of Comparative Law 130, 154.
78 s Leader, 'Private Property and Corporate Governance Part I: Defining the Interests' in F. Patfield,
Perspectives on Company Law (Deventer, Netherlands: Kiuwer, 1995) 85-88, 104-107, 112-113.
Sternberg, n 71 above, 87-90.
80 A.B. Carroll, ' Stakeholder Thinking in Three Models of Management Morality: A Perspective with
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In order to be able to serve its stakeholders well, the successful public company must
undertake a process of studying and mapping its relationships - that is, assessing who
its main participants are and who has an interest in its activities. The question: 'Who
can stop your business operating?' is a good one for directors to examine,
remembering required inputs, desired outputs and issues of public interest. They
must go on to ask: 'What will the reaction of those parties be if we take this
particular step?' 'Other constituency' statutes like those of US states follow basic
public relations imperatives in this respect. The public company board in future will
need to consider hiring independent auditors, not just of financial results but also of
social and environmental impacts, and the production of clear, attractive reports and
accounts of relevance to all the main parties. The companies that make such efforts
will reap many rewards in smoother co-operation and new opportunities.
Powerful and influential stakeholders, who may well include core employees and
suppliers and lenders, must be given priority, albeit in differing measures according
to the circumstances, and if important decisions do not go in their favour, the reasons
need to be explained in order to retain their support. Persuasive and interested
stakeholders, such as community and environmental groups, who are not direct
participants in the business hut may be concerned about its major decisions, need to
be informed and consulted to avoid costly errors of judgment. The board has a
responsibility to ensure that it sees adequate information from data and surveys,
preferably conducted by experienced independent persons, to keep it up to date with
the views of all parties.81 Personal communications with employees, major
customers and suppliers and relevant interest groups, also need to be maintained by
the board. A duty upon directors to obtain and consider relevant information before
reaching their decisions, failing which any key party aggrieved could seek review of
the outcome, would contribute greatly to this process. The framing of such directors'
duties in legislation will be examined over the following two chapters.
Strategic Implications' in Nasi, n 24 above, 47, 70.
St Wheeler and Sillanpaa, n 46 above, ch 12.
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The public company Annual Report contains accounts for evaluation of financial
performance, details of board membership and remuneration, (usually perfunctory)
statements of employment policy and (even shorter) accounts of payment times for
suppliers. Independent environmental audit, full disclosure of all charitable and
political donations and customer and supplier profiles could usefully be added to this
compendium in the future. 82
 In cases of good corporate performance, such reports
would enhance the company's public image. It must be for each company to decide
how then to use the Annual Report to set out details of its products and services and
its overall plans. It should keep in mind that individual customers and consumer
groups, community leaders and environmental organisations, may all refer to the
document and gain positive or negative impressions from it. Attractive presentation
is also important for this reason. Under the proposals of rie Company 'Law 'Ree'w
Steering Group, public companies would be compelled to provide a far fuller and
more 'rounded' review. 83 Some compulsion in this respect would make comparisons
between different public companies rather easier.
Another opportunity for communication with the whole range of stakeholders is the
company's Annual General Meeting. As noted in the previous chapter, the Hampel
Committee have commended the practice of some public companies in making
business presentations, having all board committee chairs as well as the Chief
Executive and the chairman available to answer any questions and producing a
summary of the proceedings for distribution afterwards. 84 The meeting is already the
company's largest public examination and yearly opportunity to set out its aims and
objectives. It should be recognised that customers, long-term suppliers and bonafide
82 R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Corporate Governance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 67-74, cite the
examples of Atlantic Richfield and Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates in the US as regards social
accounting.
83 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Fra,nework (DTI, March 2000) paras 5.79-5.92.
84 Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report (January 1998),
part 5 section IV.
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community representatives and environmental groups have a legitimate interest in
the progress and plans of a public company too and arrangements should be made to
enable them to attend. For reasons of practicality and time, it may be necessary to
stipulate that questions from these stakeholders be submitted in writing in advance or
to limit them in number, but there seems no good reason to exclude them altogether.
An exchange of views might inform all stakeholders of each other's priorities. The
Steering Group considered whether public company Annual General Meetings
achieve anything of value, but concluded that the time was not yet right to abolish
them. 85 Extending the meeting to provide a wider forum for debate could help to
revitalise the event.
Within a framework of stakeholder relationships, the board will be looking to build
up a stable core of investors and, in practice, will do this by communicating regularly
with the institutional shareholders. More strategically, it may investigate which
major investors might be expected to hold its shares but currently do not. 86 Pension
funds, in particular, often have a 30-year span between receiving contributions and
making payments to a given client, so they are the most natural long-term investors.
However, the purpose of investment and research and development needs to be set
out clearly in order to gain institutional support. 'Where the corporate situation
warrants it, the major equity holders who wish to exercise their rights as long-term
stakeholders may consider establishing a formal shareholder committee as a means
of dealing with the directors on important corporate issues. The tradition in the UK
has been for discussions with large institutions to take place privately, which itself
leads to allegations of favouritism and even insider dealing.87
The question of whether stakeholder groups should have representation on the board
will be further discussed in Chapter Seven and is linked to possible changes in public
Company Law Review Steering Group, n 83 above, paras 4.25-4.50, 4.6 1-4.64.
86 M. Useem, 'Shareholders as a Strategic Asset' (1996) 39 Ca1fornia Management Review 8.
87 Cadbury, n 41 above, 134 suggests more open, businesslike presentations for interested investors,
and fewer private briefings ('free lunches') for a select audience, to avoid this difficulty.
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company structures. Prima facie it seems more valuable to stakeholders for them to
have substantial input in the strategic and planning process than in review after the
event. Within a unitary board system, both stages are the responsibility of all the
directors, the executives and non-executives. The board cannot avoid the task of
balancing relevant interests as it seeks to drive the business forward. The question is
whether it will have in place a sensible and defensible framework for taking those
decisions. A group which has little knowledge of customer and supplier bases and
which is all of much the same mindset as far as community and environmental issues
are concerned is not likely to perform as well as a more balanced team.
The Institute of Directors in its initial response to the Company Law Consultation
Paper stated that:
Company law should highlight that in making decisions, both coective as
part of the board and individually, must act in the generai interests of the
company ... However, company law should not attempt in any way to
prescribe how boards of directors should carry out their decision-making
function. 88
While private sector organisations such as the Institute of Directors can play an
important part in spreading best practice and providing training for directors, it is
surely unsatisfactory that the law itself should give no guidance at all in statute on
the routine behaviour expected in the boardroom. There is a great deal of possible
middle ground between leaving public company directors subject to no regulation at
all and being excessively rigid in prescribing their conduct and how they spend their
time at work.
It should be remembered that managers, including the executive directors, are
themselves corporate stakeholders whose time and reputation, as well as their income
prospects and often some of their capital, are bound up with the company. They
Institute of Directors, The Government's company law review Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy - The loD 's initial response (London: JOD, 1998).
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therefore have a powerful incentive to ensure that the organisation consistently
performs to high standards, especially as pride and prospects are boosted when the
individual's association with the company generates a positive response. So far as
the financial rewards for the managerial contribution are concerned, these need to be
as fair and reasonable, in the light of market conditions and the situation of the
company, as the treatment of the other primary stakeholders. Independent
assessment by objective, experienced non-executive directors and submission of each
'package' for shareholder approval are changes which are becoming widespread and
are welcome. More explicit ties to treatment of other stakeholders include making
assessment of any bonus conditional on improving customer service and
satisfaction89 and even capping top executive salaries to a fixed multiple of those of
the lowest-paid workers in the company. 9° If management rewards continue to
behave in a manner which is out of line with the benefits which other stakeholders
are deriving - and there is little sign that non-executive board remuneration
committees have yet made much impact on this - the legislature may proceed to
introduce those measures in sectors where they are perceived to be needed.
The ethos of stakeholding, particularly as regards attention to customers, employees
and business partners, needs to pervade the management team and appropriate
training for all employees in social and environmental policies needs to be provided
if change is to be effective and lasting. Customer care and quality criteria, which are
integral to the management philosophy of efficient public companies, 9 ' are natural
parts of a stakeholder organisation. Legal advice should be sought where doubts
arise and always followed precisely - any sense that directors and management are
happy to 'bend' the rules may translate in time to unethical conduct by employees.
89 Some of the privatised utilities companies, for example, including Scottish Power and Anglian
Water have adopted this approach and more are following that lead.
90 As suggested by the Channel 4 Commission on Poverty in Britain their published report (London:
Channel 4 Publications, 1996).
91 J.S. Oakland, Total Quality Management: Text with Cases (Oxford: Buttenorth-Heinemann, 1995)
quotes examples including Esso, EXXON, CarnaudMetalBox plc and Pirelli Communication Cables.
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Ethical codes can be prepared which are sufficient in most cases and can be
augmented by the availability of an advisor to assist employees in cases of doubt.
The effect of the stakeholding philosophy is to turn relationships of many different
kinds which are usually temporary into more lasting arrangements for the benefit of
the company. Supermarket and garage customer 'loyalty cards' and retailer and
manufacturer main supplier lists are straightforward, commonplace ways of trying to
achieve this. Even without the agreement at the outset of precise terms, the law can
act where necessary to uphold the bargain struck by the prtts 'rt brcc!
arrangements for future business dealings were in place. 92 In the event of a takeover,
relationships which had been envisaged as enduring ones are broken and there is a
case for parties which had planned in the expectation of continuity to be protected, as
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Empoyment ig'nts) Regu\ations \'
safeguard employees.
4.8 Conclusion: Principles in Practice
It is in the business as a workplace that stakeholding principles can make an
immediate impact, as those who invest their time in the company's life see their
status as participants increase. Business partners dealing with the corporation should
also notice a real difference in prompt payments and negotiations for long-term
partnerships. It is for governments to set social priorities, but large companies need
to 'fall into line' if they are to be treated as part of the solution to social and
environmental problems and accorded political respect. The change to an inclusive
approach will not happen without the understanding and permission, at least, of
institutional fund managers, who themselves ought to be planning for long-term
growth, especially where pension funds are concerned. Motivation and effectiveness
are likely to improve dramatically when people (both employees and suppliers and
customers and neighbours) understand the aims of the company. If difficulties
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nevertheless arise in a competitive environment, there is no a priori reason why one
constituency should always bear the costs.
Stakeholding has rather modestly been described as a matter of 'taming' the 'harsher
aspects of capitalism', 93 but could provide something more positive by supplying a
model for good companies to aspire to without being overly prescriptive. It has the
potential to be a more humane, yet more flexible, alternative to traditional
management, a kind of 'Third Way' for large-scale business, 94 one which neither
relies on excessive contractualism nor invites over-regulation to correct its
imbalances. No group that has made a contribution to corporate success should find
itself going unrecognised. The stakeholder model is highly adaptable in that, outside
the core area of employees and managers, each company will have different groups
that follow its fortunes and affect its activities. Where appropriate, the opportunity to
build constructive relationships with customers and suppliers ought to be seized.
Directors need to be alert and accessible to make it work well, but when it does, the
foundation for truly sustainable growth is constructed.95
The demarcations between customers and suppliers and internal operations, and
between permanent employees and casual labour, are becoming less and less clear.96
The overall responsibility of the public company board, with its top management, for
the conduct of its operations should not be put in doubt by this. Treatment of labour
providers, whether core staff members or not, and of suppliers, those within the inner
circle and others outside, of customers both large and small and of investors in debt
and equity, is ultimately the responsibility of the directors jointly. Standards that
92 E. McKendrick, 'The Regulation of Long-term Contracts in English Law' in J. Beatson and D.
Freeman, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 305, 316-321 and
pass mi.
' Plender, n 11 above.
' A. Roddick, 'A Third Way for Business, too?' New Statesman, 3 April 1998, 24.
A. Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) 15 1-153 gives a cautious
analysis of contrasting national systems.
96 W.M. Fruin, The Japanese Enterprise System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) chs 7 and 8
discusses interfirm networks and corporate interdependence in the Japanese context.
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will not be compromised need to be agreed and promulgated by each individual
board to suit the circumstances in which it finds its organisation. The role of the law
is to provide a framework for the level of care and attention expected of public
company directors, providing that their business judgment will be respected if they
have considered all the relevant evidence and made their decision in the best interests
of the company. This means greater freedom than is possible in a relentlessly
shareholder-driven system, but liberty exercised within a zone of responsibility.
A blinkered view of what constitutes 'business success' restricts opportunities for
worthwhile business development and leads to unfairness in the treatment of
important stakeholders. The economy and polity suffer when short-termist views
prevail in public company strategy. 97 Traditional UK accounting rules have
encouraged such a limited outlook, counting employees only as a cost and putting no
value on the company's network of connections. Human resources and investment in
customer and supplier bases should at least be reflected in the Annual Report and
statements of the directors. There is also the much-remarked bias of UK public
company management and boards towards accounting expertise, which may be
contrasted with German emphasis on technical specialisms and perhaps a Japanese
regard for personnel skills. This further strengthens the argument for a more
representative board of directors.
All stakeholders must count with directors, but none too much. Provides of equity
and debt capital are vital constituencies, but if a board has confidence in the
corporate direction it wishes to pursue and some of the shareholders or the lenders
think it excessively risk-taking, the directors should ultimately be capable of 'selling'
their plans to other financial backers. The top management team itself is one of the
primary objects of board attention (along with product and stock market performance
which shows the external verdict on those people and their decisions) and is neither
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irreplaceable nor unaccountable in a stakeholder setting. Directors should indeed
communicate to management the company's responsibilities to its constituencies and
ensure that departments and functions play their part. Both corporate finance and
executive appointments are ultimately matters for the directors in the light of the
plans they have formed for the company - neither more nor less. Board decisions
will be much easier to make and defend in the light of a clear set of corporate
responsibilities.
Many UK public company boards currently do not know enough about the views of
all stakeholders to avoid serious and costly errors nor to plan for future prosperity.
This is in part a function of the fairly narrow social group, with much shared and
similar experience, from which directors of those companies have traditionally been
drawn. 98
 It also comes from the narrowly financial focus of reporting and audit with
which the directors must deal. As the Hampel Report pointed out, a great deal of
attention has been given to ensuring the financial probity of public companies and
less to finding new means of enhancing their performance. It is here submitted, in
contradistinction to the Hampel Committee's view, however, that improving
communications with and attention to all the stakeholders can best advance the latter
aim. The company will then develop a stronger identity and greater loyalty from its
customers and suppliers as well as workers.
Responsiveness to the concerns of all parties interested in the business is the key to
corporate success in the new Millennium. A statutory formula specifying the many
stakeholders to whom directors must have regard would lead to a change of
approach, where needed, and provide this advantage. Not all the stakeholders in any
public company can be satisfied with business decisions all of the time, but proper
A. Tylecote, Y. Doo Cho and W. Zhang, 'National Technological Styles Explained in Terms of
Stakeholding Patterns, Enfranchisements and Cultural Differences: Britain and Japan' (1998) 10
Technology Analysis and Strategic Managenent 423.
' J. Paxman, Friends In High Places (London: Michael Joseph, 1990) gives an illuminating account
of the social milieu that produces British leaders, not only for business but for other areas of the
nation's life.
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explanations must be given by directors to pre-empt, as far as possible, uimecessary
disaffection and damage to the corporate reputation. In the final analysis, primary
contributors, be they core employees, relational customers and suppliers or investors,
merit protection from exploitation as a matter of fundamental principle. 99
 Companies
legislation can assist this development by spelling out the primary stakeholders and
giving them capacity in the last resort to question board decisions which are, or
appear to be, seriously inequitable. Public companies are not in any realistic sense
the property of any one group, and it is outmoded for them to be treated as such.
Speaking to business leaders in Singapore, Tony Blair stated during the run-up to the
1997 General Election:
We cannot by legislation guarantee that a company will behave in a way
conducive to trust and long term commitment. But it is surely time to assess
how we shift the emphasis in corporate ethos from a company being a mere
vehicle for the capital market to be traded, bought and sold as a commodity,
towards a vision of the company as a community or partnership in which each
employee has a stake, and where a company's responsibilities are more
clearly delineated.'00
If this is to be made a reality, legislative change in the context of a new Companies
Act is an obvious place to start. If employees and major customers and suppliers and
others with a stake in a public company had a statutory right to information and
consultation and in certain circumstances to seek review of corporate decisions, the
rhetoric of stakeholding would be given substance in Britain.
R.C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 179-186.
T. Blair, speech to the Singapore Business Community, 8 January 1996, quoted in New Britain
(London: Fourth Estate, 1996) 291, 295.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN LEGISLATION
5.1 Proposals for Change
The political climate is currently favourable both to fresh discussion of the
responsibilities of directors and to treating public companies as a distinct business
medium for the purposes of regulation. The Government's stated priorities are to
ensure that the legislation emerges in a modernised, more 'user-friendly' state
than the present lengthy amalgam of detail and to enhance the competitiveness of
British industry. The Green Paper 'Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy' left open the question of changes to the formulation of directors'
duties. It specifically noted that one issue for review was whether board
members' fiduciary responsibilities should take account of interests other than
those of the shareholders.' The possibilities for clarification and modification of
directors' duties were also addressed. While the work of the previous
Committees on Corporate Governance, most recently the group chaired by Sir
Ronald Hampel, was praised, the Government, which has used the rhetoric of
inclusion and partnership in society and in business, 2 considers that the
stakeholding approach should be examined. This was not followed up by the
Company Law Review Steering Group, which, as was noted in Chapter Four,
used the term 'Pluralism'. 3 In the subsequent draft statement of directors' duties,
ultimate primacy for shareholder interests was deliberately retained.4
The Law Commission Consultation Paper entitled 'Company Directors:
Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties' 5 was
intended to connect with, and feed in to, the company law review process. 6 The
document examined in some detail Part X of the Companies Act 1985, which
'DTI, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (DTI, March 1998) 10.
2 T. Blair, The Third Way (London: Fabian Society, 1998) 3-4, 8-1 1.
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Econo,ny - the
Strategic Framework (DII, February 1999) para 5.1.
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy -
Developing the Framework (DTI, March 2000) paras 3.40 and 3.51-3.52.
Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and For,nulating a
Statetnent of Diii ies (Consultation Paper No. 153, September 1998).
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deals with directorial 'conflict of interest' situations. The objective was to
consider whether the existing requirements were appropriate and whether they
could be simplified. The second part of the paper dealt with the advantages,
disadvantages and problems of codifying directors' duties. The project was,
however, specifically expressed to exclude such matters as 'the question whether
directors should owe duties to persons other than the company such as employees
and the community' and 'any duties of good citizenship the company may owe to
the community.' 7
 The Law Commission was therefore concerned with the form
and presentation of directors' duties under 'the current general law', rather than
with a fundamental re-appraisal of the legal position. 8
 In the final report,
following empirical work by the ESRC Centre for Business Research, a brief
(non-exhaustive) statutory statement of directors' duties was proposed, which
reflected the existing common law.9
 This was largely accepted by the Steering
Group.'°
The current scheme of regulation of directorial conduct is, in form, a mixture of
traditional common law, recent legislation" and City-based self-regulation.'2
Individual cases are still very important when an overall understanding of board
responsibilities is required, although key judgments are not conveniently
accessible to and useable by directors. There are procedural requirements,
designed to avoid self-dealing, which must be met where an individual director is
making commercial contracts with the corporate body.' 3
 In addition, where the
company is in some financial difficulty, legal advisors to directors must draw
their attention to the risks of personal liability, not only for fraudulent trading, but
also for 'wrongful' continuance of trading where there is no likelihood that debts
6 ibid2.
ibid 19.
ibidChapter 16.
Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a
Statement of Duties (Report No. 261, September 1999) Part 16 and Appendix A.
Company Law Review Steering Group, n 4 above, para 3.40.
e.g. Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
2 e.g. Combined Code (Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, annexed to
Listing Rules).
e.g. Companies Act 1985 ss 3 19-320.
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can ultimately be paid.' 4
 The relevant part of the common or statutory law
depends on the financial stage of the company's life that has been reached.
Fiduciary duties (to the company and its stakeholders) and rules against self-
dealing are related in practice and should be addressed as part of a coherent
package.
As to the content of the existing rules, there is a discrepancy between the
stringency of formal procedures designed to counter directorial self-dealing' 5
 and
the lack of specificity where corporate decision-making procedures are
concerned. On the one hand, even where its utility is dubious, the current law
requires disclosure to the board of individual directors' interests in contracts
made by the company.' 6
 On the other hand, executive and non-executive
directors of public companies can be appointed without ensuring that they have a
clear understanding of their accountability in law or their place in what might be
called 'public life'.' 7
 The promulgation and enforcement of stricter standards for
board decision-making would do much to ensure probity while making public
companies more 'inclusive'. Both of these areas have been matters of public
concern, as press coverage of privatised utilities well illustrated. Business leaders
are now expected to show social awareness in their 'core' work even as they are
invited to help solve social
Insolvency Act 1986 ss 2 13-214.
5 Companies Act 1985 Part X contains detailed rules on payments to directors on loss of office,
substantial property transactions and loans or quasi-loans to directors, but no effective control for
shareholders over annual remuneration packages.
6 Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd. v Fitgerald [1996] Ch 274, relating to a sole
director, is called by Davies (in Gower 's Principles of Modern Company Law, London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 6th ed 1997, at 629) 'the apotheosis of meaningless disclosure'. Runciman v
Walter Runciman plc [1992] BCLC 1084 effectively disregarded the omission to disclose an
interest which was known to other directors, but as Davies remarks (ibid, 630) this 'does nothing
to put in place effective disclosure provisions'.
" The CBI's PROBE set of 'benchmarking' tools includes CONTOUR, which focuses on
Environment and Health and Safety Best Practice, Stakeholders and Organisation and Culture
(www.cbi.org.uk ).
18 Education Action Zones and urban regeneration projects such as those in Hulme, Manchester
and Easterhouse, Glasgow, seeking private sector involvement alongside local authority strategic
planning are two prominent recent examples.
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The courts have employed various analogies (with trusteeship,' 9 partnership,2°
employment2 ' and agency,22 to name four examples) in formulating their
conceptions of the duties of company directors. As commercial and social
expectations have progressed, and despite the doctrine of precedent which has
been restrictive in other areas, the courts have changed their expectations. They
are also less inclined to show leniency to a public company director or one who
professes special expertise than to a person of relatively modest means running a
small business through the medium of a company. 23 Nevertheless, the
interpretation of concepts such as 'duty not to make a private profit' or 'duty to
act in the best interests of the corporation as a whole' 24 has been a matter for the
individual judge in each particular situation. This has made possible a wide range
of interpretations of directors' duties. Taking the caselaw as a whole, there has
been cautious judicial deference to the decisions of board members and their right
to manage the company's affairs.25
There is, however, a core set of basic duties and fundamental responsibilities
attaching to fiduciary positions in general and to all those who are, as Adam
Smith described company directors, 'managers rather of other people's money
than of their own'. 26
 The Law Commission identified a core of 'reasonably clear'
basic duties for fiduciaries: the 'no conflict' rule', the 'no profit' rule, the
'undivided loyalty' rule and the duty of confidentiality. 27
 Where a director makes
a profit on his or her own account, using knowledge possessed by reason of the
9 Se/angor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073.
20 C/egg v Edinondson(1857) 8 De GM & G 787.
21 Lister v Stubbs (1890)45 Ch D 1.
22 Great Eastern Railway Co. v Turner (1892) 8 Ch App 149.
23 eg compare Secretary of State for Trade and Industry V Baker (No 6)1999 BCLC 433, which
concerned the collapse of Barings Bank and expressly emphasised that the greater the
remuneration of a particular director, the greater the responsibility that may be expected, with
cases such as Secretary ofStatefor Trade and Industry v Rosenfield[1999] BCC 413 which
emphasised public protection and commercial necessity.
24 See for example the subtle change in rhetoric between Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade
[1983] BCLC 244 and Dawson International p/c v Coats Paton plc [1991] BCC 278 where the
board's duties in the event of a takeover are concerned.
25 e.g. Re Tottenharn Hotspurp/c [1994] 1 BCLC 655 where Nicholls V-C said (at 660): 'Whether
Mr [Terry] Venables' dismissal [as Chief Executive] was in the best interests of Tottenham is not
a matter for the court to decide. That is a matter for the Tottenham board to whom the decision is
entrusted under the company's constitution...'
26 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776; Everyman's Library ed, 1910) Vol ii, 229.
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office, the director is liable to account for that profit to the company. 28
 The
director must not put him- or herself in a position where his or her duties conflict
with those of the corporation as an entity. 29
 While it may generally be true, as the
Law Commission has suggested, that the 'fair dealing' rules are well understood,
their enforceability is threatened if directors are not effectively monitored.3°
There is a relatively stringent regime of procedures to involve shareholders in
controlling corporate deals with directors, contracts in which they are interested
as individuals and loans to them.31
A statutory list that brought together the duties of directors would provide a much
clearer focus for both directorial and judicial attention than the existing law. The
knowledge that one may have to demonstrate the basis of one's strategic
decisions and the information used in arriving at them is likely to be a powerful
incentive for measured, well-planned corporate behaviour. 32
 Should there be any
dispute of fact about the matters which had been taken into account by a company
board, that is the kind of issue which judges are experienced in assessing. The
collection and assessment of evidence that may dispose of a matter before trial, or
in the courtroom if necessary, is a feature of the British legal process. If the role
of the private sector generally, and public companies specifically, is to serve the
public's demands and interests as responsibly and efficiently as possible, primary
legislation must be the place to determine how this is to be done. Where,
historically, UK public companies have paid greatest attention to returns on
capital, and German and Scandinavian employees' rights have imposed high costs
on business in those countries, genuinely forward-looking legislation should seek
a sustainable balance of interests.33
27 Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Report No. 236, December 1995) 2.
28 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134.
29 Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq 461.
30 The CBI published a guide entitled Fraud: Risk and Practice (London: CBI, 2000) and states:
'Corporate fraud costs business hundreds of millions of pounds each year. Ignoring the risk is not
an option.'
Companies Act 1985 Part X ('Controlling Self-Dealing by Directors').
32 Commission on Public Policy and British Business, Promoting Prosperity: a Business Agenda
for Britain (London, Vintage, 1997) 107 recommended that UK company directors be
empowered by new legislation to take a broader view of their role.
B E. Loredo and E. Suarez, 'Corporate Governance in Europe: Is Convergence Desirable?'
(1998) 15 International Journal of Management 525.
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More fundamentally, if responsible conduct is to be demanded of corporate
business, there is a problem of locating in a real person the accountability for
producing that behaviour. 34 In a volume edited by the consumer activist Ralph
Nader, the matter is expressed as follows: 'Much of the deterrent effect of heavy
fines on individual businesspeople comes from the social stigma of a criminal
conviction. But individuals within a corporation may feel shielded from any
stigma that attaches to the corporate entity...' 35 The reconnection of managerial
leadership with corporate responsibility is crucial to restoring faith in large-scale
enterprise and rests on identification with directors. 36 They must, of necessity,
delegate responsibility for daily operations, but they need to establish decision-
making processes that reflect contemporary political demands on business. The
incremental development of the law through precedent is inadequate by itself to
send the clear signals that are needed.
5.2 Arguments against Change
In 1995 the Law Commission's report on fiduciary duties concluded that
legislation in this area as a codifying measure should not be recommended, as it
was thought to be both impractical and undesirable. 37
 The options of complete or
partial codification of trustee-type duties were re-examined in 1998 and the
'arguments against' legal change were again well canvassed. 38 The critics of
codification examined two possible approaches: the use of broad, general
language which itself 'would not make the law accessible' and would 'still need a
J. Gobert, 'Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault' 14 Legal Studies (1994) 393 argues
(at 409): 'Companies should bear responsibility for crimes occurring in the course of their
business without the need for the Crown to attach fault to specific persons within the company. It
should be the company's responsibility to collect information regarding potential dangers
possessed by its employees, collate the data, and implement policies which will prevent
reasonably foreseeable risks from occurring.'
R. Nader and C. Shugart, 'Old Solutions for Old Problems' in R. Nader, No Access to Law:
Alternatives to the American Judicial System (New York: Academic Press, 1980).
36 Willia,ns v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 577 reasserts the principle that an
individual is not liable for negligence committed as an officer of a company through which he
exercises corporate business. In the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, no individual member of the
hierarchy was sufficiently senior to be identified with the P&O corporation: R v P&O European
Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1990) 93 Cr App R 72.
Law Commission, n 27 above, 89.
Law Commission, n 5 above, 275-277.
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professional to mediate [for the lay user]' 39 or the use of comprehensive
codification with 'a loss in flexibility' and 'a real risk that a situation occurs
which is outside the statutory code but where the law ought to have applied'
Other methods of bringing legal duties to the attention of company directors, such
as 'authoritative pamphlets' and prescribed forms were also considered.
As far as the substance of board members' day-to-day responsibilities is
concerned, there has been (and remains) resistance to the notion of developing
any separate duty to examine the interests of parties other than the shareholders.4'
It can be argued that UK public company boards are subject to efficient markets
(for their products and their shares) and examination of stakeholder interests to
the extent necessary to further performance in those markets is not a concern for
private sector management. 42 If markets do not produce socially acceptable
results (for example in the level of employment generated or the use of small
suppliers), that is a matter for direct government action (e.g. Welfare to Work
programmes, legislation on prompt payment of debts). Any provision that might
be more prescriptive as to the structure of board operations is resisted as
potentially detrimental to 'entrepreneurial drive'.
Turning to the practicalities of prescribing matters for directorial attention, it has
been argued that if the board had to consider factors other than wealth
maximisation for shareholders, it would lose its focus and business performance
would suffer, to no constituency's benefit. 43 Board members, so it is asserted,
need the 'North Star' of shareholder value alone 44 to set their course in their
business judgments. Results and benefits other than profit may be diffuse and
relatively difficult to quantify. Many UK public company directors would not
consider themselves qualified to analyse social and environmental data, for
example. Economic efficiency feeds into social benefits through a combination
Law Commission, n 5 above, 277.
40 Law Commission, n 5 above, 276.
Company Law Review Steering Group, n 4 above, paras 3.25-3.30.
42 J• MacIntosh, 'Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law' 43 University of Toronto Law Journal
425.
' E. Sternberg, Just Business (London: Warner, 1995) 32-35, 26 1-262.
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of taxes, wages, demand for materials and returns to shareholders as the market
dictates. The place for redistribution of the wealth created, if rebalancing is
needed, is through the activities of governments.
The issue of adjudication between the different groups of constituents is also
presented as a difficulty. Where the claims of, for example, employees and
shareholders conflict, a statement of duties that adverts to both while giving no
guidance as to their 'rankings' is of little practical assistance to the public
company director. 45
 Each primary stakeholding group (as discussed in the
previous chapter) has a legitimate expectation of fair and reasonable treatment as
a baseline. Where choices have to be made between groups, the long-term well-
being of the organisation must be at the forefront of the directors' minds. The
chosen course of action must be the one that secures and promotes the future of
the company with the minimum of present difficulties to the participants. The
duration and extent of the relationships between the company and stakeholders
(for example, key customers and suppliers) will also be relevant.
The collection of information and its analysis by a fairly small team of directors
is relevant to the practicality of extended fiduciary duties. If they are to remain a
coherent group, the directors can only sensibly handle and actively discuss a
finite number of factors in their regular meetings. Both executives and non-
executives have a range of duties outside the boardroom, nor would most of them
wish to restrict their range of work. The point is made that directors are therefore
best held to the pursuit of profits alone, since they do not have the expertise or the
resources to scrutinise employee requirements, supplier and consumer links and
so on to adequate levels. Better, it is said, that they address one key issue, which
they fully comprehend and handle well, than that they attempt to pay attention to
several groups and deal with none of them satisfactorily.46
R. Ward, Twenty-Fir-st Century Corporate Board (New York: Wiley, 1997) 334.
M. Van der Weide, 'Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders' (1996)21 Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law 27.
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Deregulation in the interests of national competitiveness has also been presented
as an argument against more specific legislative 'rnterference' in executive
'prerogative', both under UK governments of the 1980s and within the present
administration.47 The example often quoted is that of US corporations choosing
to locate in Delaware, which is perceived to have the most liberal rules from the
board standpoint.48 However, during the 1990s the federal regime has in fact
become somewhat more regulatory, from the increased minimum wage level and
tougher environmental standards to yet greater openness on accounts and
compulsory institutional voting in corporations. The perception that it would
enforce undesirable uniformity is also advanced as an argument against fresh
legislation directed to corporate board activity. In the free market economic
system (and undeniably 'capitalism has triumphed for the moment in the great
battle with socialism - if socialism is understood to mean a planned economy,
extensive public ownership, negligible private property rights and a directed
society',49 even though the 'End of History' argument5° downplayed fundamental
socio-political differences between different forms of capitalism), if companies
have different management styles, that is welcome as the market will determine
the success of each of them.
Turning first to the point about directorial capacity, practical steps could quickly
be taken to increase the skills of boards that at present lack confidence in dealing
with multiple constituencies. Their own membership could be diversified to
include the necessary areas of expertise and if new wording encourages
movement in this direction, it will be beneficial to business. Investigations and
reports to the board by individual directors, often with the assistance of suitably
qualified executives, are already featured in public company board meetings.
D. Fischel, 'The Corporate Governance Movement' (1982)35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1259,
1285-1286.
DTI, n I above, 12-13.
48 R. Romano, 'The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law' (1987)8 Cardo:o Law Review
709 discusses other reasons for the success of Delaware, such as the 'stock' of company law
precedents and experienced corporate counsel, which the UK could attempt to emulate in the
European setting.
W. Hutton, The State To Come (London: Vintage, 1997) 4.
° F. Fukuyama, The End of Histoiy and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
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Directors in large, complex organisations, might consider the engagement of a
small, intellectually able support team (discussed in Chapter Three).
Without some explicit and authoritative guidance as to the identity and status of
all the protagonists in the corporate drama, the danger is that UK public company
directors will continue to be too limited in their outlook and deliberations. The
formal listing and acknowledgment of all relevant stakeholders in the primary
legislation could therefore be a matter of some significance in itself. The
fundamental expectations of each of the groups can be noted in the same place
and the principle of monitoring constituents' views established. These provisions
will not be exhaustive for any company, since each has its own set of
relationships and concerns, but it wiJi set out the essentiai issues. Each board wiJJ
then need to ensure that it has in place adequate systems for communicating with
and monitoring the views of relevant groups. This 'Stakeholder Mapping'
exercise is itself a valuable business discipline, as shown by well-documented
incidents such as the Nestle boycott 5t and the Shell Brent Spar52 dispute (both of
which could have been handled more effectively with earlier consideration of
corporate responsibility and consumer reaction).
It has been asserted that ethical investment funds perform well 53 precisely because
their managers have to get to know the business policies and operations of the
companies in which they invest, rather than simply relying on past 'bottom line'
figures. In a similar fashion, boards that have to investigate the needs and wishes
of consumers and employees will be in a better position to plan for successful
future operations. 54 The awareness that long-term corporate strategy will be
W. Frederick, J. Post and K. Davis, Business and Society (Singapore: McGraw-Hill. 7th ed
1992) 560-573.
52 
'Greens Claim Victory as Shell Recycles Brent Spar', The Independent, 29 January 1998,
Environment section; 'All at Sea over Disposal of Oil Rigs; Industry and Environmentalists
Remain as Far Apart as ever Despite Solution for Brent Spar', Financial Times, 29 January 1998.
J McCallin, 'The Engagement Ring: How Shareholders are Starting to put Pressure on
Management', The Guardian, 6 May 2000 Money section; J. Papworth, 'Ethical Investment
Keeping Pensions Free from Pollution: Moves to Bring In Socially Responsible Investment', The
Guardian, 6 May 2000, Money section.
S4 Centre for Tomorrow's Company, The Inclusive Approach and Business Success: The Research
Evidence (Aldershot: Gower, 1998) discusses relevant research material.
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reviewed and criticised not only by investors (including institutions) but also by
employees, customers and perhaps suppliers may also lead to a sharper and more
balanced programme. Public scrutiny of accounts has historically been accepted
as part of the price to be paid for use of the corporate form55
 and greater openness
about future plans will come to be accepted. The very knowledge that corporate
strategy will be open to discussion by parties from a range of perspectives means
that board members are less likely to put into operation plans with unintended
consequences. 56
 New ideas for the business itself may also emerge from wider
communication.
Constituency statutes in many of the United States have indeed been perceived by
critics as an 'executives' charter' to block mergers which would be profitable to
shareholders but would threaten managerial security or privileged lifestyles.57
While self-dealing by directors still needs to be firmly tackled, it is true that there
is a social interest in putting damage to employees and suppliers and customers
on the agenda in all discussions of strategy. US public corporate directors,
moreover, are subject to a more investigative business press and a greater culture
of freedom of information. 58
 It is appropriate that a broader range of board
accountability be accompanied by a fresh culture of scrutiny inside boardrooms.
The Company Law Green Paper discussed the use of Codes of Practice, as
appended to the reports of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees and
consolidated by the Stock Exchange post-Hampel, as an alternative to legislation
in the corporate governance field. Among the advantages of the non-legislative
approach were said to be the following:
Best practice is more flexible: individual companies can apply it in a way
that best fits their own circumstances and it can be kept up to date more
The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 provides for disclosure of comparable financial to
that required of small companies.
56 A. Wilson, 'Business and its Social Responsibility' in P.W.F Davies, Current Issues in Business
Ethics (London: Routledge, 1997) 50, speaks of 'discerning' customers, investors and employees.
" Ward, n 44 above, 331.
J. Barnard, 'Hampel: A Transatlantic Critique' (1998) 19 Co. Law 110.
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easily. The government does not intend to replace the use of best practice
by legal rules, provided best practice is seen to be working.59
The inconsistency of approach between competing companies can make it
difficult for those which wish to pursue a managerial policy other than one of
maximum short-term returns to shareholders to survive in the capital market;
paradoxically, then, lack of regulation can restrict freedom of action for
managers. 'Best practice' does not in reality produce the intended results if it
does not set a timetable for specific action (the length of time taken to eliminate
'rolling' or long directors' contracts is one example of this).
The volume of business activity in the economy produces a tendency among
corporate executives perhaps comparable to that seen and documented among
investment managers, in that there is irrational overreaction to promises of
prosperity and excessive panic whenever the horizon seems clouded. 60 Indeed the
phenomenon of 'boom and bust' in investment projects by public companies is
connected to the behaviour of the Stock Market, which is not in fact a logically
predictable, self-correcting system but a chaotic and unpredictable ebb and flow
of funds. By giving recognition to other parties, hich ant o t
activity and economic stability, fresh wording would reduce the pressure to be
seen to expand the business at a time of rising prices and to contract rapidly after
the peak in the economic cycle. The process of consideration of the whole range
of interests in the company is a discipline which would be likely to lead to
steadier but more sustainable progress.
5.3 Constituencies for Consideration
Given the unsustainability of the 'shareholders as owners' argument in public
companies and the recognition that leaders of such organisations do not base their
decisions solely on the production of maximum returns by way of dividends (if
nothing else, they are also concerned about their own long-term security and
prospects), any statement of duties which did not reflect the responsibilities of
DTI, n I above, 9.
60 see e.g. J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, Rational Frenzies and Crashes (London: CEPR, 1991) and
J. Campbell, Media, Mania and the Markets (London: Fleet Street Publications, 1994).
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directors to a range of participants in corporate life would be less than
intellectually honest. Nevertheless, the programme of 'privatisation' in the UK in
the 1980s and into the 1990s was founded on a belief that a leadership focused on
running a core business as efficiently as possible would produce greater
satisfaction for consumers than an anonymous executive with a vague
responsibility to 'society'. There must be a clear sense of purpose at the head of a
company, and this may best be achieved by including the relevant groups in
understanding and acceptance of that mission. In the age of internet access and e-
mail networks, shutting employees or customers out of the planning process
becomes difficult.6'
There is a delicate balance to be struck between breadth of approach and realism
in the number and kind of constituencies that can routinely be taken into
consideration. If the law is overly prescriptive, it will risk damaging the
competitiveness of UK business and creating resentment among managers. If it is
not sufficiently inclusive, it will cause an unwarranted balance in favour of too
narrow a sectional interest, be it shareholders or employees or others. A
manageable, coherent list, with clear statements of their rights, is the most useful
way forward. The Law Commission, at the start of its discussion of 'Economic
Considerations' in lawmaking, referred to 'technical efficiency' (rules to
minimise costs such as agency costs) and to 'allocative efficiency' (rules to
allocate scarce resources in a way which maximises their value to society). 62
 The
remainder of the Consultation Paper concerned itself with producing the most
'user-friendly' version of the rules while largely ignoring the social impact of
corporate activities, an approach that has filtered through to the remainder of the
law reform process.
61 C. Fabian, 'Answering Hard Questions in the Stakeholder Age', Marketing, 17 February 2000,
24.
62 Law Commission, n 5 above 33-34.
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The demise of the corporate ultra vires rule, firstly by the expansion of objects
clauses63
 and ultimately by removal of shareholders' rights to challenge acts
which were beyond the scope of the company's objects unless the latter are
discovered before they become legal commitments,64
 left the directors
accountable (through the stock market) for delivery of dividends, but not for the
development of core businesses. Particularly in the 1980s, public company
boards seemed to hesitate little before switching markets and activities in order to
utilise the capital-raising power of the corporate name and its assets to greatest
revenue-producing effect. 65
 Without a 'main object' and a constituency
monitoring adherence to it, the identity of a public company was divorced from
any specific business. A fresh legislative reminder that large business operations
create a relationship of mutual interdependence with employees (this is ever more
the case as 'knowledge work' replaces unskilled tasking) and customers and
suppliers, would help to refocus board attention on serving a market rather than
'betting' on various activities at will.
Both Kay66
 in his discussion of the interests of the company and Goyder 67
 in his
proposals for a new 'general purposes' clause (for the company's Memorandum
of Association) include customers, employees, shareholders and the community;
environmental responsibility could appropriately be added, as could a reference to
suppliers where relevant. The main concerns of each group are not difficult to
articulate in general terms: fair prices and good products in the case of customers,
fair wages and good conditions for employees, fair returns and good profits to
investors. All share an interest in consistent and improving corporate
performance and are usually willing to accept the consequences of genuine
market pressure. If they lose confidence in the central decisionmakers, they may,
e.g. through the devices seen in cases such as Cotman v Brougham [19181 AC 514 and Bell
Houses Ltdv City Wall Properties Ltd. [19661 1 QB 207 and latterly with the option of
incorporation as a general commercial company (Companies Act 1985 5 3A).
Companies Act 1985 s 35.
65 The Maxwell and Polly Peck affairs demonstrate the ease with which loan capital was available
for expansion of activity by a 'proven' managerial 'team' (or leader).
66 J Kay, 'The Stakeholder Corporation' in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble, The Stakeholder
Corporation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 137.
67 G. Goyder, The Just Enterprise (London: Free Press, 1993) 56.
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however, begin to mistrust the corporate system as such. 68 A simple statement
that public company directors are obliged to take into account the interests of
these essential groups would make it impossible for board members to disregard
the representations of those groups. The recognised office of Senior Independent
Non-executive Director (discussed in Chapter Three) would provide a channel
through which named groups could 'feed in' their views directly to board
discussions.
The danger in producing a statutory stakeholder list is that it will come to be seen
as exhaustive of corporate management's responsibilities, rather than as a guide
to an appropriate managerial approach. There is certainly a prima facie case for
close scrutiny of any corporate activity and expenditure that does not benefit any
of the core stakeholding groups. There is already a requirement for the amount of
charitable donations made, if they are in aggregate above a very low baseline, to
be disclosed in the Annual Report. 69 Party political involvement is already
against the policy of many major companies7° and, in principle, there seems no
reason why company members should not enjoy the same rights as trade union
members to 'opt out' of making political contributions. It should, however, be
emphasised that the current level of general charitable giving in the UK is way
below that in the US and has caused no evident concern to shareholders.
The emphasis placed on satisfaction of particular groups of constituents will vary
between public companies in different sectors. Some participants are a sine qua
non of success in any business (the customers, the employees and often the
68 H. Glasbeek 'The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement' (1988) II Dalhousie Law
Journal 363 points out (at 385): '...it is part of the popular understanding that the adoption of the
corporate form is a convenient means by which to dodge responsibility...the large corporations'
claim [in Canada] that they deserve respect and should be left as unregulated as possible because
of their utility to the economy is spoilt by the fact that a huge number of organisations - which
have the same legal form but are much smaller in size - are seen to serve no socially useful
purpose.' One might add that public companies, individually and as a whole, obviously serve a
whole range of purposes and a focus on a main object as discussed above might help directors in
conveying the utility of their company.
69 Companies Act 1985 sch 7 para 7(3) - the limit below which disclosure is not required is £200.
° ibid, para 7(5) - in the case of payments for political purposes the recipient has to be identified.
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suppliers, as much as shareholders). 7 ' In other instances, public companies can be
expected only to adhere to standards set out in specific legislation.
Environmental improvement and social welfare burdens cannot be shouldered by
(even large) companies on a voluntary basis in a competitive market. It is
important to legitimise the inclusion in boardroom discussion not only of direct
contributors but also of proper examination of the social and environmental
consequences of company activities. Without such a statement, the tendency is
for companies to attempt to adhere (or aim to be able to document adherence) to
statutes but treat as taboo any discussion of proceeding further.
5.4 Board Decision-making Models
Companies legislation has been silent, and the courts generally quiet, on the
decision-making practices of, and matters for consideration by, company
directors, provided only that fraud is avoided. Executives are often elevated to
board level in consideration of their achievements as functional or departmenta'
administrators, with little clear conception of the distinctive role of the board.
The best 'passport' to a non-executive directoiship, in turn, is still executite
board membership in a prestigious company. 73 As a result of these traditions, a
narrow pool of talent is used in public company boardrooms and there is a clear
mismatch between current social demands on business and the understanding of
many boards. What developments in law might improve public company
performance in this respect?
The nexus of directorial accountability to the company ('Enforcement of Fair
Dealing' as the Companies Act 1985 entitles it) with standards of decision-
making is found in answering procedural questions such as what information
directors need to seek, and whose views they should take into account, when
R. Brooks, 'Why Loyal Employees and Customers Improve the Bottom Line' (2000) 23
Journal for Quality and Participation 40.
72 Many corporate leaders protest against these: for example, the Institute of Directors publishes
RegAlert, highlighting new regulatory burdens, and the author Richard Baron said in the 27 April
2000 issue: 'Jobs will only be secure if directors can concentrate on developing their businesses.'
E. Mason, 'The Problem of Legitimacy in the Modern Corporation' in B. Sutton, The
Legiti,nate Corporation (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993) 148 discusses 'fit' and 'togetherness' as
featured in board selection.
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determining company policy. The variation in approach between companies
within the same sector, as referred to in Chapter Four, has been found to be
related in general terms to their respective long-term performances.74
 The use and
distribution of the profits made by a given enterprise in turn reflects its
investment and time horizons. Training for board service, as long discussed by
the Institute of Directors and others, is also relevant here. 75
 If it were possible for
new directors to be given as part of their induction, a copy of a set of principles
for board service, that would be a helpful innovation in itself.
The fact that even a listed public company could still legally be run by two
directors76
 shows how far removed the major companies legislation is from the
reality of life in these large and complex organisations. The delegation of many
board functions to an executive committee, which knows the detail of daily
business operations and can conveniently meet between monthly 'full' meetings,
is common, while the input of non-executive directors varies widely from
company to company. Any efforts to obtain a broader perspective from the full
board are defeated if the executives have determined matters before all the
directors meet. The proposed statement of individual responsibility on the part of
each director to all of the primary stakeholders would give non-executives a tool
to assist them in engaging with management and challenging the institutional
ways of thinking. Both internally promoted candidates and outside experts can
and should be concerned with taking a broad and balanced view of the
organisation' s role and responsibilities.77
In future, significantly more time will need to be spent on board duties by many
public company directors if they are to become aware of the implications of their
decision-making from the points of view of primary stakeholders. Given the pace
of change in business life, full meetings less often than monthly will probably
' Centre for Tomorrow's Company, n 54 above, summarises the current state of knowledge in
this field.
The Institute of Directors has launched a 'Chartered Director' qualification for Members and
Fellows, which is designed to promote high professional standards.
76 Companies Act 1985 s282.
" P. Stiles, 'Corporate Governance and Ethics' in Davies, n 56 above, 39.
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prove to be inadequate (while even more frequent gatherings could allow
insufficient time for reflection and slip to the status of routine administration
rather than strategic planning). The number of non-executive directorships held
by individuals and the size of the regular agenda will obviously have an impact
on the time dedicated by an individual to each board assignment (see the
discussions in Chapter Three). The prospect of having to justify the chosen
decision-making process should act as an incentive to directors to put in place a
clear structure for all board meetings and reports. While the frequency and
agenda of meeting for individual organisations cannot sensibly be prescribed,
benchmark standards can be set by legal rules.
Techniques such as SWOT 78 analysis and PEST79 trend analysis can usefully
include systematic consideration of the company's primary stakeholders.
Inclusion of key constituents was piloted in a Tomorrow's Company scheme,
which showed that employees and customers welcomed the chance to contribute
their ideas and businesses that engaged in such communication were more
commercially successful than rivals who did not. Direct involvement in decision-
making is also likely to reassure even those constituencies who may not agree
with the conclusion reached by the board on a given matter that the relationship is
nevertheless worth pursuing. It is for directors as part of their decision-making
processes to listen and also to explain their understanding of and vision for the
corporate entity.
The possibility (noted in Chapter Three) of a 'Business Judgement Rule' as in the
United States was discussed by the Law Commission 8° with reference to the 'safe
harbour' provided for directorial decisions. There was also reference to the draft
Australian provisions in a similar vein. If directors are to be required to make
complex analyses of interests and effects, they should know how they are
expected to come to those conclusions. Good practice can be spread by
enforcement of these standards. Both in terms of 'easing uncertainty in the minds
78 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats facing the company.
Political Economic Social and Technological trends.
80 Law Commission, n 5 above, 296-298.
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of directors about a statutory statement of the duty of care' and 'encouraging
[directors] to make appropriate enquiries', the Law Commission noted the
possible utility of such a rule.
The full board of a large public company will not necessarily be an efficient body
to consider all the possible implications of a suggested course of action, and
indeed the use of specialist committees to advise and report to the whole
membership is already widespread. 8 ' On the political 'select committee' model,
it could become commonplace for a public company to have one group, including
directors and managers, addressing itself to the needs of each of the key
constituencies and taking evidence from those involved. The employee
committee, the customer committee, perhaps the business partners committee and
the public affairs committee could monitor corporate progress from the point of
view of the relevant groups and report on specific key issues of their own motion
and report to the full board. While there has been some attempt in transnational
corporations across the European Union to make progress with employee
representation in the shape of European Works Councils, these are unlikely to
gain influence unless they have links to the board. Other groups, including
customers and suppliers, also merit systematic attention from directors.
A strategy of measuring likely impacts and deciding in what circumstances a
given result will be accepted has produced only modest gains in the
environmental arena but it is an integral part of successful public management.
In the employment field, it is not encouraging that many public company leaders
have been publicly hostile to the limited protective measures introduced in the
UK since 1 99782 In consumer markets, the competitive retail sector in the UK
has not stopped customers from being far more heavily squeezed for profits than
SI Aside from the independent nomination, remuneration and audit committees recommended as
best practice by Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel) Final Report
(January 1998), paras 3.19, 4.11, 6.3.
82 Commenting on the CBI's Employment Trends Survey (23 May 2000), John Cridland said:
'Firms are working hard to balance business and employment needs, but more legislation could
tip the scales in the wrong direction.'
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their neighbours in France. 83 The need for appropriate impact assessment is one
which can sensibly be met only in an integrated fashion for all key groups.
Where non-executive directors do not have the time or expertise to construct such
programmes ab in 1(10, there are models to which they can turn, 84 just as they have
traditionally worked within accounting rules on financial affairs.
5.5 Formulation of New Legal Duties
The primary statutory wording dealing with directors' duties needs to be
sufficiently clear and precise to be readily understood and followed by board
members themselves. If it is not to be counterproductive in effect, however, it
cannot be so specific as to bind directors in a straitjacket of procedure, which
becomes purely formalistic rather than enhancing the quality of board decision-
making. The Hampel Report's disparaging reference to 'box ticking' (arranging
for all the formal requirements of new regulation to be met while continuing to
make substantial decisions much as before) is very pertinent here. 85 New
legislation needs to flow with the most progressive managerial movements and
the tide of opinion while carrying the more retrogressive elements in some public
companies along in its wake. It is right to have extensive prior consultation and
would be erroneous to grant the wishes of any one group (including 'business
leaders' themselves) automatic primacy.86
The legislative drafting process in the UK is biased towards the reproduction of
traditional statutory forms of wording. 87 It is also subject to shortage of time for
D. MacShane, 'The Great Supermarket Rip-off', New Statesman, 4 September 1998, 14.
R. Kaplan and D. Norton, 'Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System'
(Jan 1996) Harvard Business Review 75 (a book is forthcoming by the same authors from
Harvard Business School Press on 'How Balanced Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New
Business Environment').
85 Hampel, n 81 above, para 1.12.
' M. O'Sullivan, 'Sustainable Prosperity, Corporate Governance, and Innovation in Europe' in J.
Michie and J. Grieve Smith, Globali:aiion, Growth and Governance (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998) 203 writes that: 'If sustainable prosperity is the objective, proposals to reform the
corporate governance system must be based on a theory of the innovative enterprise. Without
such a theory, stakeholder arguments run the risk of encouraging other groups, besides
shareholders, to become claimants in a given, and even diminishing pool of returns.'
87 M. Zander, The Law-Making Process (London: Butterworths, 4th ed 1994) quotes Francis
Bennion, a senior legislative draftsman who was roundly criticised for attempting to use 'tried his
best' in place of the time-honoured 'used his best endeavours' (at 20).
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production of the final wording, against the backdrop of political demands. 88 The
Company Law Green Paper attempts to deal with both of these constraints. It
speaks of Table A's being 'rewritten using plain English' and emphasises a clean
break with the past in terms of style. 89 It also sets out a deliberately lengthy
timetable with the intention of providing ample chance for consultation and
scrutiny90 (political pressure, or lack of it, from opposition within Parliament will
obviously depend on its membership after the next General Election).
Some past attempts to reform UK rules in line with European Union law
principles have not been successful in achieving their intended effect, nor in
producing wording which was easy to understand (one thinks of the reform of
ultra vires9 ' and, outside the corporate context, equal pay provisions 92). More
positively, British judges, though schooled in literal statutory interpretation, have
shown themselves able and willing to adopt a more teleological approach when
handling statutes produced to implement European Union obligations. 93 Lack of
prescription as to outcomes should not therefore be a barrier to the effectiveness
of legislation in practice. As the effort to graft European Union requirements on
to a traditional British company law framework is reconsidered, 94 the place for an
overarching statement of directors' duties looks more secure.
The aims of the company as an entity, its survival and prosperity, would be
central to the board's thinking under a new Companies Act. However, corporate
financial results are not ends in themselves - they are produced in order to benefit
individual people, as consumers, employees, investors (including holders of
pensions) and citizens of communities. Parties may not have invested equity
88 ibid, 15-19, quoting Sir Granville Ram and Sir Harold Kent who had also worked as draftsmen.
DTI, n 1 above, 6.
90 DTI, n I above, 21.
' Now at Companies Act 1985 s 35.
92 Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority O.J. 152 84 (1986).
e.g. Litster v Forth Dry Dock Co. Ltd. [1990] 1 AC 546; Webb v EMO Cargo (No. 2) [1996] 2
CMLR 990.
One of the disappointments of the Hampel Report was the almost total failure to address the
responsibilities emanating from and the models available from European Union partner states:
see C. Villiers, 'Do Employees have a Role in Corporate Governance?' (Paper delivered on 31
March 1998 at University of Newcastle Law School).
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capital, but instead may have contributed in another way to public company
results. They accordingly merit respect and a statement of their entitlements.95
Stakeholders will also benefit by being able to call to account the individuals who
are responsible for the policies of 'faceless' companies. While specific laws on,
for example, environmental standards will change as society and technology
move on, the fundamental principles of inclusiveness in corporate dealings are
likely to stand the test of time.
Bearing all of this in mind, new wording along the following lines is suggested:
A director of a public limited company shall in all his/her conduct and
decision-making so act as to advance the development of the company in the
interests of its customers, its employees and its shareholders and with proper
regard for the effect of its operations on the environment and on the
community. The interests to which a director of a public company should
give due consideration include:
the provision for customers of safe and effective goods and services of good
quality at fair prices
the provision for employees of fair remuneration and secure work with
reasonable opportunity for their interests to be heard within the company and
for their promotion and development of skills
• the provision for shareholders of fair returns to remunerate past investment
and encourage future investment in the company
• the provision for key business associates including suppliers of goods and
services of secure relationships and ongoing co-operation where such
connections offer advantages to both parties
the provision for the community of programmes to monitor and minimise the
environmental impact of the company's operations and advance responsible
conduct towards the company's neighbours.
M. McNulty, 'A Question of Managerial Legitimacy' in B. Sutton, n 73 above, 160 again
relates this to business prosperity: 'The injustice perceived by the individual when his
contributions to the organization are not appropriately recognized and rewarded normally might
be reflected in a homeostatic process whereby inputs become curtailed to restore the balance...It is
suggested that there exists a parallel with the political sphere in that the underlying basis of these
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This would apply to all UK public companies.
As compared with the Company Law Review Steering Group's this gives much
more detail as to what can be expected by participants in 'business
relationships'. 96 It also makes clear that the company is to be run with a view to
its success benefiting all the participants, rather than exclusively for 'the benefit
of its members as a whole'. 97 Put simply, any company director needs to ensure
that customers are satisfied and employees treated fairly, for without repeat and
referral business and enthusiastic staff commitment, there is little long-term
future for development of a business. Perceived irresponsibility in social action
and environmental performance is likely to damage the organisation in that
customers will choose alternatives, good potential employees will not apply and
investors will avoid the company, if not on principle, then from self-interest
because of those other effects.
The Company Law Green Paper emphasised the need for deregulation of the
small company and for greater distinctions in law between companies of different
sizes, which fulfil distinct economic functions. 98 It is submitted that this is the
correct approach. While it would be wholly unrealistic to subject every
individual who decided to incorporate his or her business to the scrutiny of
employees and customers beyond the specific legislation, it is equally
inappropriate for persons appointed to boards of public companies simply to seek
to behave like start-up entrepreneurs. They have advantages in the marketplace,
which should be tied to expectations of genuine public service. Public companies
have the resources to ensure that within the boardroom 'team' there is an
appropriate mix of skills including the financial, the technical, the market-related
and the employee-focused. The ultimate responsibility for 'pulling together'
these strands rests with the Chairman who, appropriately, will usually be the
public face and voice of the company.
theories and their manifestation in the business world rests on the extension of the contractualism
within the traditionally autocratic bureaucracy of the corporation.'
Company Law Review Steering Group, n 4 above, para 3.40 Principle Ic.
ibid Principle lb.
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stakeholders have not yet been fully explored. A comprehensive codification of
directors' duties would be a signal to the courts to take a somewhat more
interventionist line on dealings by directors with property owned by a company.
The vigilance of 'watchdogs', including not only shareholders but also employees
and customers (who may in many instances have a greater proportionate stake in
the honest and effective management of the public company), may then be
expected to improve standards of managerial propriety and performance.
Clear, accurate, up-to-date financial information is of importance to all concerned
with a company and is far from being guaranteed by current accounting rules.'°3
The present Directors' Report for public limited companies'° 4 contains a long but
unco-ordinated list of issues on many of which most companies evidently say as
little as they feel they legally can. More generally, board policy for the
corporation's future cannot effectively be challenged if it is not known until
specific plans are at an advanced stage. Greater consultation as a part of
information gathering before decisions were made would also indicate to the
parties contacted the possible direction of corporate change. Consumers could
better communicate their requirements, employees prepare to adapt to change and
investors be appraised of the cost and timescales for expenditure if all were
included in discussions, rather than being viewed as outsiders to be compelled to
deal with any plan chosen by the management. Holders of five per cent of shares
in a public company'° 5 have the right to circulate resolutions and comments on
agenda items prior to general meetings, while large European-based corporations
will have to 'consult' with their employees on issues such as plant closures and
reconstructions.'°6 Even so, while shareholders risk having to meet the costs of
such a campaign and employees have no automatic right to board discussion of
their views, the appearance of openness is not much more than illusory.
103 The fact that public companies are allowed up to seven months between year end and filing
and laying of accounts is in itself a constraint on the usefulness of full accounts (Companies Act
1985 s 244).
04 Companies Act 1985 sch 7.
'° Companies Act 1985 s 376.
06 European Works Councils Directive 94/45 [1994] O.J. L254164.
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Public companies' Annual Reports vary greatly in what might be called their
production values (colour, glossiness, use of graphics, readability of text) but
very few are really suited to the needs of the whole range of key participants
discussed above. In a modem context where the UK Government is itself
publishing an Annual Report to show progress towards its goals in all key areas,
the bare publication of a selective set of figures and 'policies' appears all the
more inadequate." For public elected authorities and appointed agencies alike,
the articulation of sets of targets across a range of operations and measurement of
outcomes have become a fact of life and public companies need to respond to
this. This does not mean vaguely aspirational 'Mission Statements', but broader
discussion of business strategy and long-term objectives for the whole
organisation.
Provisions for 'inclusive' reporting would cover attention to employee conditions
and to customer satisfaction, as well as company environmental and social
policy." 2 For public companies, which already expend large sums on publication
and dissemination of the Annual Report and which should (as a matter of good
modern business practice) already be collating information on its workforce and
business partners, the burden would not be great. Coupled with the provisions for
enforcement (of wider directorial responsibility), which will be explored in the
next chapter, rules as to reporting are central in ensuring compliance with the new
decision-making process. The senior executives can themselves explain the
'trade-offs' made between the demands of different participating groups and their
understanding of environmental and social responsibility in the setting of a report
that is both readable and wide-ranging.
5.7 The Impact of New Legislation
Parkinson sees reformulation of directors' duties as part of a process of cultural
change 'so that managers place greater weight on the development of the
"° See comments of European Commissioner Chris Patten on Governance in the Year 2000 Reith
Lectures, text at www.bbc.co.uk .
M. Leonard, 'Why the Annual Report might just Restore Faith in Politics', New Statesman, 7
August 1998, 18.
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company's relationships and pay increased attention to the welfare of groups
affected by corporate activity.' He stresses that in his formulation 'the intention
is not to give an expanded role to the courts." 3 Where the stated aims and
objectives of companies in the same sector vary greatly, a tightening up of
legislative duties to bring all into line with the best is in tune with developments
in the public sector. Accountability for a range of targets and to a range of
stakeholders is now expected by those in senior positions in hospitals and
schools, for example. Those at the head of public companies are responsible for
the stewardship of even larger sums, ultimately provided by the general public
(mainly via institutional investors) and, as such, should expect to face
performance targets and 'benchmarking'.
Explosion of the myth of shareholder ownership of public companies, discussed
in Chapter Two, would be another potentially powerful effect of stakeholder
constituency legislation. Where the same people, or members of the same family,
have headed a company from its earliest days to a Stock Market flotation, there
is, understandably, a particular tendency for them to regard the company as
subordinate to the wishes of its long-standing members. If a different set of
priorities is in reality more appropriate, a new UK Companies Act for the twenty-
first century will best serve society" 4 if it reflects that point of view. While
Richard Branson, Alan Sugar and others may decide that the reduction in
personal control outweighs the benefit of a Stock Exchange listing, most leaders
of public limited companies are happy to take a more collegial view in return for
the benefits of public status. It is managerial folly, as a business grows, not to
take on board (quite literally) the range of expertise needed at its head and a non-
executive team can also provide valuable insights into the views of customers and
suppliers as well as investors.
112 Company Law Review Steering Group, n 4 above, paras 5.79-5.92.
" J. Parkinson, 'Company Law and Stakeholder Governance' in Kelly, Kelly and Gamble, n 66
above..
114 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) ch 12
(entitled 'Is Wealth a Value?') distinguishes increases in social wealth from improved value and
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For such non-executive directors, the fact of a statutory and systematic reference
to all key corporate constituencies would give them a lever to open up discussion
about extending the board's outlook and utilising expertise in the consumer and
employment areas. A small, well-qualified committee in consultation with
external auditors carries out detailed scrutiny of accounting records and
performance in listed companies. Where there is a dominant figure (be he or she
titled Chief Executive, a founder promoted to the Chairman or holding both titles)
this can leave the full board without a clear focus. A specific list of stakeholder
groups and issues for consideration could revitalise directorial discussion in many
such cases. It may be that the current board members are not the right people to
play the new role, whether from a lack of time or expertise or otherwise. The
Takeover Code's principle of fair treatment for all participants and the Stock
Exchange's insistence on full, timely information are not discredited but, on the
contrary, extended, to cover all those with a stake in the company's performance.
Turning to executive officers, they are in an even better position than the part-
time board members to assess the needs and wishes of customers and employees.
As the interviews extracted in Chapter Eight made clear, however, most feel that
their performance is judged principally on the share price achieved by the
company and the support or otherwise of institutional investors. A wider set of
legal responsibilities and business objectives is in harmony with most executives'
perception of their own proper task, as the interviews revealed. Not surprisingly,
most expressed full commitment to product quality and service delivery and to
their workforce and believe that profits will flow from the focus on these
fundamentals.
What might be called the 'democratic control of capital' argument posits that, if
company law is to be about more than the financial results, its formulation of
responsibilities of directors needs to deal with more than the enforcement of
financial propriety. Primary legislation passed by Parliament and overseen in the
argues that a society with greater wealth is not for that reason alone better or better off and hence
the law should operate on grounds of principle, not policy.
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final analysis by the courts is able to reflect the interests, not only of capital, but
also of other groups deemed to be worthy of proper attention and protection. The
law can be stated in a form suited for enforcement by parties who have an
appropriate interest in the expectation that the existence of such powers will
normally produce the desired conduct. The very fact that, once in place, it would
be expected to last for a generation 115 would give it an authoritative status lacking
in codes, which are designed to be procedural and flexible.
The Institute of Directors, in the context of discussing recruitment and training to
boards, has sometimes expressed concern that the status of company director has
been tarnished, or at least 'downgraded', by the easy and cheap availability of
corporate status and the activities of a miscreant minority.' 16 From a public
relations perspective, the ability to point to a set of directors' duties that reflected
common social concerns would in fact be an asset to responsible business leaders.
In time, it would shape the expectations of a new generation with ambitions to
head public companies. By emphasising skills other than financial expertise,
legal change may in time encourage a wider range of able young people to
embark on careers in business in the UK.
5.8 Conclusion
Public companies are part of long chains of capital manipulation, as Cotterrell
points out:
Corporations own the shares of other corporations in complex chains in
which the agency of human beings seems dwarfed by the structures of
capital holdings. The twentieth-century discussion of a collapse of
shareholder power over the management of corporations - the divorce of
ownership of capital from control of capital - seems to suggest a
recognition that the corporation is to be seen as the modern holder and
' As the Companies Acts of 1908, 1929 and 1948 did.
" On II May 2000, the Institute of Directors published the results of a MORI survey, which
showed that in the UK only 29% of adults and 22°c of 11-15 year olds admired people who stated
their own busunesses.
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embodiment, in itself, of capital; that capital is the actor whose instrument
is the corporation."7
The obvious candidates for the task of controlling that economic power and
humanising and socialising the use of capital are the directors - a point noted by
many commentators since Berle and Means commended the idea of the corporate
board as a 'neutral In the UK, however, the tendency has been
for the board to be permitted to operate without direct intervention from its
shareholders" 9 and without specific reference to the interests of employees' 20
 or
trade creditors.' 2 ' The various statutory incursions into this directorial freedom'
have not yet succeeded in changing the culture in UK public companies.
The line between the public and private sectors has in any event become
somewhat blurred where economic regulation is concerned. The question
therefore arises: 'For whose ultimate benefit is the state regulating the
management of corporations?' Once the misunderstanding of shareholder
ownership has been cleared up, there is no compelling reason why shareholders
alone should benefit from consideration by public company boards. As Ogus
points out,' 23
 the functions of regulation to correct market defects are varied: to
provide more information, to mimic competition in natural monopolies and so on.
If the market tends to lead to a myopic focus on short-term shareholder returns, a
multi-stakeholder statement in statute of their duties could provide a necessary
corrective lens for public company directors.
The fact that major economic and corporate systems are interdependent and that
many of the main public companies operate in several nations across and beyond
111 R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1984) 137.
118 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (London: Transaction,
new ed, 1997) and see M. Stokes 'Company Law and Legal Theory' in W. Twining, Legal
Theo,y and Com,non Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) 'Implications for the Study of Company
Law'.
" 9 iohn Shaw & Sons Salforc) Ltd. v Shaw [19351 2 KB 113; Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v
London & S[folk Properties Ltd. [1989] BCLC 100.
120 Parke v Daily News Ltd. [1962] Ch 927.
121 Re Horsley and Weight Ltd. [1982] 3 All ER 1045.
22 Companies Act 1985 ss 309 and 719 and Insolvency Act 1986 ss213 and 214 among them.
123 Ogus, n 102 above, ch 3.
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Europe does not mean that there is no scope for appropriate national regulation.
As far as specifically financial regulation (focused on raising capital) is
concerned, a system which is clear in its objectives and is well administered is
likely to command respect and improve the standing of the state concerned as a
good place to do major business. Again the global trend, supported by the UK, is
towards greater regulation to ensure transparency and fairness in international
capital flows.' 24 Piloting the extension of similar principles to cover the concerns
of other stakeholders is an effort that would benefit the UK as it modernises its
system of company law.
There are many other issues to be addressed in the process of reforming company
law as a whole (among them the rules dealing with share capital and accounts),
many of which concern board members. In addition to the specific
responsibilities and technicalities in which the UK has remained somewhat
heavier than many other common law jurisdictions, there is a need for a more
general statement of responsibilities such as the one described above. That the
primary company law statute should not even address the responsibilities of the
public company board is simply an anachronism. While there may be flexibility
as between different companies when it comes to determining how to fulfil its
duties to stakeholders (for example, the use of committees or delegation to
individuals), core responsibilities of directors as such should not be left in doubt.
The objective of such legal change is not simply to protect existing standards and
promulgate good practice but to set a course for future development. The
interests of a majority of mainstream opinion can be reflected through the
political process as a counterweight to the traditionally narrow background and
approach of board members. Cotterrell notes the foundation of legal change
generally is that:
The basic assumption which underlies the view that law in contemporary
Western societies can operate as an instrument for inducing widespread
124 See speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown at the Council for Foreign
Relations in New York on 16 September 1999 (text at www.treasur y . gov.uk) and Department for
International Development, Departmental Annual Report 2000, ch 5 (text at www.dfid.gov.uk ).
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change in citizens' behaviour patterns and beliefs or attitudes is ... clear.
It is that the organisational and power resources of government in
contemporary Western societies and the technical resources associated
with modern legal institutions are such that law can confront mores and
overcome them.'25
The legislature in a state can impose its will even when not directly reflecting
'democratic opinion'; attitudes and practices can be changed by laws.
This is not to say that the practical needs of public company directors should not
be carefully considered in formulating rules that will govern their decisions and
actions. The present situation in which many key duties are set out in cases
decided many generations ago and relevant statutory provisions are almost
equally inaccessible and unwieldy is clearly unsatisfactory. A consensus seems
to have emerged to the effect that codification of the duties is possible and
desirable. The challenge, taken up in this chapter, is to produce a statement that
reflects best modern practice and social values while leaving the necessary scope
for business judgment.
In drafting new legislation, the aim should always be to produce a document that
can be used by public company directors themselves. Those who attain such
positions are, one assumes, experienced and intelligent people who should not
require constant expensive, professional interpretation of what the law demands
in their decision-making. At the same time, the legislation should be sufficiently
precise for use by judges (as a last resort) in the event of a dispute. Public
company directors are at present not seen to be effectively accountable for their
business judgments where there is a diffuse shareholding, although some
institutional shareholders are becoming more assertive.' 26 While, as suggested
above, they may delegate responsibility for investigation of specific shareholder
125 Cotterrell, n 117 above, 71.
26 Sir Adrian Cadbury, 'What are the trends in Corporate Governance? How will they impact
your Business?' (1999)32 Long Range Planning 12, 17; B. Garratt, 'Developing Effective
Directors and Building Dynamic Boards', ibid 28, 30.
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demands to a kind of 'select committee', the full company board under the
guidance of its Chairman must look at the whole picture.
The purpose of legislation is to set collective standards sanctioned by a majority
in society for the conduct of individuals. Considerations of fairness (particularly
in procedural terms) and for the morality of the marketplace are evident in
existing company law.' 27 Privatisation has somewhat clouded the distinction
between operations run for private gain and those organised for public benefit. It
cannot seriously be argued that running corporations on which large groups are
dependent for investment, for employment and for goods and services is purely a
private contractual arrangement' 28 - there is already too much state regulation for
such a statement to be credible. The crucial point is whether the central
legislation acts as a clear introduction to the terrain and sets a context for the
more detailed rules in a comprehensible maimer.
127 B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997) 142-158.
28 R.E. Frederick, A Companion to Business Ethics (Maiden, Mass.: Blackweil, 1999) highlights
International Business Ethics, Business Ethics and Work, Business's Environmental
Responsibility and Social Responsibility and Business Ethics (Part III).
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CHAPTER SIX
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES
6.1 Rights arid Remedies
Any right without a corresponding remedy will be of little real value, except
perhaps as an instrument to allow the 'right-holders' to exert moral pressure. Nor
would it be meaningful to speak of company directors as having a 'duty' towards
stakeholders who could not take action to defend their own position, though the
board may have moral responsibilities towards such persons. For reasons
discussed in Chapters Two and Four, it has been asserted that board members
should have regard to the interests of a range of participants in, and contributors
to, the life of a public company. The legal consequence of this essentially
political judgment is that there should be some possibility of action by those key
stakeholders when directors fail to follow the correct procedure in reaching their
decisions. This chapter will consider the legal form such stakeholder intervention
might appropriately take.
Liability in the common law tradition has generally been assessed and discussed
in relation to causes of action.' Knowledge of potentially available court orders
will affect the conduct of parties between themselves, even without reference of
disputes to the courts. Out-of-court compromises in business are coloured by
awareness of the remedy likely to be available if the complainant were successful
in a legal action (this has been termed 'bargaining in the shadow of the law').
Standing to pursue a legal claim is, therefore, an important bargaining weapon in
the armoury of complainant stakeholders and will have an impact on board
strategy. It can be argued that the possibility of shareholder claims one reason for
the priority traditionally enjoyed by shareholders in UK public companies.
The law in the UK has traditionally recognised two sets of limitations on the
powers of the directors to run the company as they see fit. One is the rights of
'G. Samuel, SourceBook on Obligations and Legal Remedies (London: Cavendish, 1995) viii-ix;
a cause of action, in turn, has been described by Lord Diplock as: 'a factual situation the
existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.'
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shareholders, who are given the ultimate power in respect of several important
events in the life of the company (for example, allotment of relevant securities,2
changes to its constitution3) and the ability to oversee dealings between the
company and the directors as individuals (such as any long service contract 4 or
substantial property transaction5). In addition to their collective right to regulate
the activities of the board, the shareholders have individual rights as members,
emanating from the constitution of the company, which they can pursue in a
personal capacity. 6 However, the scope of these personal rights has not been
clearly defined in legislation and only members acting as such have been treated
as corporate 'insiders' for the purpose of legal action. 7 Even directors, in their
board role, have been regarded as outside the scope of constitutional protection,8
while shareholders have taken action under the common law to prevent
employees benefiting from corporate 'generosity'.9
The second source of restraints on corporate leaders is the growing volume of
regulation by and under statute (primary and delegated legislation). This extends
far beyond 'companies' legislation in the narrow sense. Directly or indirectly,
company board members have been made responsible for supervision of
employee health and safety, consumer protection, supplier payments and
accounting compliance, among many other matters. Whereas a company, as an
artificial legal person, can be held liable for strict liability offences,'° the officers
as individuals can also be held personally responsible in law for many of its
2 Companies Act 1985 s 80.
Companies Act 1985 ss 4, 9, 17, 28, 43, 53, 121.
"Companies Act 1985 s 319.
Companies Act 1985 s 320.
eg the right to have one's votes counted: Pender v Lushington (1887)6 Ch D 70; a right to
receive dividends in cash: Wood y Odessa Waterworks Co. (1889)42 Ch D 636.
Eley v Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd (1876) 1 Ex D 88.
Beattie v E & F Beattie Ltd [1938] Ch 708.
' Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927 (a result since overturned by Companies Act 1985 s
719).
eg a manufacturer under Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987; Trade Descriptions Act
1968 (but see Tesco Supermarkets Ltdv Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127); Environmental
Protection Act 1990 (as to which see Aiphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] 2 All ER 475).
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actions (or inactions). 1 ' It follows the example of current statutes that directors
should be accountable for the supervision of stakeholder interests.'2
To these constraints upon the activities of UK public company directors may be
added self-regulatory systems, including the Listing Rules (incorporating the
Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, known as the
Combined Code, which draws together provisions suggested by the Cadbury,
Greenbury and Hampel Committees), to be supplemented by the Financial
Services Authority.' 3 There is little evidence that, in the short run, voluntary
codes and recommendations lead to widespread changes in corporate practice.'4
However, the ultimate sanction for breaches of the Takeover Code, for example,
is that those who do not abide by the rules of the market can be denied use of its
facilities.' 5 Institutional investors, in particular, have the financial influence, if
they choose to use it, to demand that companies meet recommended standards of
governance. Collective, voluntary standard-setting can work well to 'level up'
standards if the required conduct is encouraged by the prospect of commercial
penalties, including ostracism (or 'cold shouldering', in the language of the Stock
Exchange), for non-conformity.
Directors may also face personal liability in the event of corporate insolvency if
they have patently misjudged whether to carry on trading in the hope of escaping
difficulty.' 6 There is also the prospect in these circumstances of disqualification
for the director, the court's decision in this respect being based upon
eg Companies Act 1985 s35(3) (personal liability for ultra vires transactions); s 221(5) (duty to
keep proper accounting records); s 399(3) (duty to register charges).
12 Home Office Consultation Paper, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The
Government 's Proposals (Home Office, May 2000) proposes a new offence of corporate killing
and states (at 21): 'the Government is of the view that: An individual who could be shown to
have had some influence on, or responsibility for, circumstances in which management failure far
below what could reasonably be expected [sic] was a cause of a person's death should be subject
to disqualification from acting in a management role in any undertaking.'
13 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
4 eg J. Martinson, 'Half of Top Companies Fail to Comply with Hampel', Financial Ti,nes, I
December 1998, 10 (on the same page, see also S. Buckby, 'Ethical Codes of Practice not being
Implemented').
' Introduction to Stock Exchange Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
6 Insolvency Act 1986 ss 213-214.
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considerations of public protection rather than punishment.' 7 This provides a
strong incentive for directors to focus attention on the creditors if trading
conditions appear threatening. The number of directors involved in proceedings
is, however, small and the provisions themselves say nothing of how well, and for
whose benefit, companies are to be run so long as they remain solvent. Prompt
internal correction of any breach of duty is always likely to be more speedy and
cost-effective than reliance on 'policing' by an outside agency.
Executives of public companies normally have connections with legal and
financial advisors of the highest quality and board members are accustomed to
seek assistance when the qualifications and expertise of the directors do not equip
them to meet a particular regulatory requirement. There should be no greater
difficulty in principle with boards obtaining advice on potential new claims from
stakeholders. There is, of course, nothing to prevent executives from seeking to
take on board as non-executive directors individuals who have expert knowledge
of particular areas of concern for their company (for example, customer
relationship management, trade union links). There is a growing body of
evidence that public companies will gain economically in the long term from
addressing the development and management of their relationship networks.'8
Issues of principle and of practicality surround the availability of legal remedies
to stakeholders. So far as company auditors are concerned, the courts have been
eager, for reasons of policy, to define their responsibilities precisely, so as to
avoid the imposition of liability 'in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class'.' 9 However, board members, for sound business
reasons, need to pay attention to their primary stakeholders and their statutory
responsibilities. The provision of remedies in these connections should not,
Re. Sevenoakc Stationers (Retail) Ltd(1990) BCC 765.
' In addition to such established sources as J.C. Collins and J.I. Porras, Built to Last (New York:
Century Business, 1995) and T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (London:
Harper and Row, 1992), one might add the evidence of MORI (paper by P. Hutton, Director of
MORI, 'Using Research to Improve Quality and Service Provision' at SMI Conference, 28
January 1997) and that of International Survey Research Ltd (R. Maitland, Employee Morale in
the High Perfor,nance Qrganisation,(London: ISRL, 1994)).
188
therefore, be seen as adding to the board's burdens, but as reinforcing good
management practice.2°
6.2 The Derivative Action Model
A minority shareholder is permitted to take legal action to defend the interests of
a company in a limited range of situations, notwithstanding the fundamental
principle of 'majority rule' in corporate affairs. Where the alleged wrongdoers
are in control of the company's general meetings 2 ' and have in some sense
committed a fraud, 22 for example by misappropriating corporate property, a
derivative action by a minority shareholder will be allowed to proceed. This puts
into the hands of individual members a weapon with which they can defend the
interests of the company from those who are abusing their managerial powers.
The action is taken to benefit the company, not the claimant personally. The
court will need to be persuaded that the case is a suitable one for overturning the
normal situation (majority rule) and a judge may look to the view of 'the majority
of the independent minority' in deciding whether or not to allow the action to
proceed. 23 If the case is not pursued bonajIde in the interests of the company, but
for some ulterior personal reason, the court may strike out the action.24
In respect of shareholders, the Company Law Review Steering Group consulted
specifically on the creation of a new statutory derivative action in order to
improve upon the current position in two key respects: firstly, to cure the
uncertainty that surrounds the position of minority shareholders; secondly,
expressly to permit derivative actions in cases of alleged directorial negligence or
' Caparo Industries plc v Dick,nan [1990] 1 All ER 568; cf. Morgan Crucible Co. plc v Hill
Samuel Bank Ltd[1991] 1 All ER 142 (per Lord Bridge, quoting Cardozo CJ).
20 D. Levine, Working in the Twenty-First Cent uiy (ME. Shame, 1998) argues that, in particular,
employee consultation mechanisms encourage problem-solving and increase product quality and
customer satisfaction (reviewed in Financial Ti,nes, 13 January 1999, 10); see also 'Working for
the Future - the Changing Face of Work Practices' (DTI, 1999).
21 PrudentialAssurance Co. Ltdv Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1981] Ch 257 makes the point
that defacto control in a large company cannot be assessed simply by reference to the voting
rights - the pattern of shareholding needs to be taken into account.
22 Negligence will not suffice to permit a minority derivative action: Pavlides v Jensen (1956) 2
All ER 518 but matters will be different where a director has personally benefited from alleged
misdeeds: Daniels v Daniels [1978] 2 All ER 89.
23 Smith v Croft (No.2) [1988] Ch 114.
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breach of duty (including breach of trust and a director putting him- or herself in
a position where his or her interests conflict with those of the company). 25 This
would avoid the problem of lengthy, costly preliminary trials to determine
whether a particular situation fell within the exemption. It would also emphasise
the standing of the shareholder as a valid guardian of the corporate interest if the
management fails to meet its fiduciary obligations. It would not, of course, solve
the problem of the shareholders' lack of sufficient committed interest or
commercial incentive to monitor management in widely-held public companies.
There seems to be no a priori reason why others with a direct stake in the
financial health of a public company should not enjoy similar access to the courts
to protect the company from harm, under a regime of judicial supervision similar
to that envisaged to 'manage' shareholder actions. 26 Where negligence or fraud is
being perpetrated on a company, its employees, and suppliers and customers who
have a relationship of trust and interdependence with it, are often as likely to
suffer financially as the shareholders and creditors. If misdeeds come to the
attention of any of the primary stakeholders, it should arguably, therefore, be
permissible, with the leave of the court, for them to take action in the name of,
and to protect, the company itself. Any funds t'riat liave 'been misappropfiateà
will have to be returned to the company for the benefit of all participants.
However, where employees and suppliers are in a contractual relationship with
the company and the shareholders benefit from residual profits, it is the members
who would gain by any increase in value above the solvency level.
The traditional arguments against extension of the right to bring derivative
actions are essentially that this would lead to a multiplicity of cases and that the
majority of the members, as owners, should have the right to determine the course
of action taken by the company. Once the latter argument is dispensed with in
the case of public companies, practical difficulties (not least of cost and co-
'4
- Barrett v Duckeit [1995] 1 BCLC 243.
25 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Framework (DTI, March 2000) Qu. 4.6.
26 ibid Draft Civil Procedure Rules (Derivative Claims).
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ordination) still remain. Institutional shareholders have been discouraged from
bringing actions, even where directorial wrongdoing had apparently been
uncovered, on the grounds that it was for the company itself (that is, the corporate
membership as a whole, acting by majority vote) 27 to decide whether or not to
issue proceedings. One would expect this to have the effect of reducing the
monitoring and scrutiny to which public company directors were subjected.28
Whether such scrutiny by members is ever likely to increase under the present
system must be open to serious question given the lack of financial gain to
shareholders from carrying out monitoring.
Bearing in mind the severe limitations on the information provided to
shareholders (and their limited incentive to use such facts and figures as they are
given), 29 other participants may sometimes have greater opportunities to protect
the corporate interest where those in control have been committing fraud or have
been negligent. Employees, for example, may be in a far better position to
observe how directors are performing than shareholders. Through the Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1 998,° the legislature has already recognised the value to
the public of encouraging those who become aware of wrongdoing within a
company to 'blow the whistle' on employer malpractice by protecting the
'whistleblower'. Established customers and suppliers who have doubts about the
financial practices or competence of those running a company with which they
deal may also wish to take action. In the event of corporate insolvency, it is
unsecured creditors who would be likely to suffer financial hardship. In any such
case, there would need to be a preliminary process to ensure that there were
27 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204.
28 More recently this approach seems to have been confirmed in Re. Astec (BSR)plc [1999] BCC
59
(see note, S. Copp and R. Goddard, 'Corporate Governance Principles on Trial' (1998) 19 Co.
Law 277).
29 Members have no right to see accounting records and may have to wait for seven months in a
public company before the final accounts are laid before them in a general meeting: Companies
Act 1985 ss222, 242.
° This new legislation protects the employee who discloses a breach of environmental, health and
safety or other legislation from victimisation or harassment at work and renders any dismissal on
the grounds of the disclosure automatically unfair.
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genuine grounds for the suspicions aired and that the action was not being
brought out of personal malice.
As at present constructed, the derivative action is treated as a procedure to be
utilised 'for the good of the company' and is not available where the action is
brought from personal motives or where there is an alternative remedy available
(including, it seems, winding-up). 3 ' Where employees were involved, it can be
imagined that courts would often need to question the reasons of those who had
been dismissed or bore some grievance for bringing an action. So far as
customers and suppliers are concerned, if the wrongdoing is affecting the
company's performance of contractual obligations, they will normally have the
option of commencing an action for breach of contract or presenting a winding-up
petition. The restrictions on the use of the company s name in any litigation (put
in place for understandable policy reasons where minority shareholders are
involved) would usually apply with equal or greater force so far as the other
stakeholders are concerned.
It is, perhaps, unrealistic to expect that stakeholders, including employees and
long-term business associates, would negotiate all the abovementioned technical
and procedural hurdles simply to defend the position of a public company where
they were employed or with which they did business. To make matters worse for
plaintiffs, as Professor Davies indicates, the form of the (current shareholder)
derivative action is misleading in two key respects, in that 'it is required to be
brought in the representative form, even though it is the company, rather than the
other shareholders, whom the plaintiff represents' and, even more confusingly,
'the company appears as a defendant' even though its rights, and not those of
shareholders personally, are being enforced by the action.32
Easterbrook and Fischel assert: 'A dominating characteristic of the derivative
action is the lack of any link between stake and reward - not only on the judge's
H Barrett v Duckett, n 24 above.
32 
p • Davies, Gower 's Principles of Modern Company Law (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 6th ed
1997) 666.
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part but on the plaintiff's.' 33 The authors also comment that: 'Paucity of
information frequently makes it difficult for either plaintiffs or judges to
determine which actions promote maximum value for the firm.' 34 Where
claimants do have a financial stake in a company, their fate is linked to it. The
'respect for business judgment' point is unconvincing where derivative suits are
restricted to cases of directorial wrongdoing. Where such misfeasance is found to
have occurred, the costs of proceedings ought to be borne by the wrongdoers
themselves; where it is not, but the action was brought bonafide in defence of the
company's interests, it is not unreasonable that the company should meet the
expenses. Procedural rules as suggested by the Law Commission 35 should help to
ensure that costs do not escalate unjustifiably.
The main difficulty, then, is that in most public companies, there is no sufficient
financial incentive for individual shareholders to take action in resQect of
wrongdoings that harm the company. The possib(e increase in the. '.tate cf their
own shares will simply not repay the time involved and the risk of having to pay
costs if litigation fails. 36 Employees and customers and suppliers who have
contracts with the company are only likely to 'lose çersonaU'j ccrn e.'fvJ
wrongdoing if the solvency of the whole operation is put at risk so that debts
cannot be paid. Their priority will quite understandably be the security of their
own position. Channels of communication with genuinely independent non-
executive directors should provide an alternative means of expressing concerns
and having them addressed at a much earlier stage than that. In summary, it is
submitted that there are more satisfactory alternatives to the derivative action
model, so far as non-member primary stakeholders are concerned.
6.3 The 'Unfair Prejudice' Model
B F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1991) 101.
u ibid 102.
Company Law review Steering Group, n 25 above, Draft Civil Procedure Rules 50.4-50.11.
See, however Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) [1975] QB 373 - the plaintiff can seek indemnity for
costs from the company but it is for the minority shareholder to persuade the court that it has a
reasonable case to bring at the expense of the company.
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The most widely used remedy by minority shareholders in smaller companies
today is section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended in 1989). This
demands a demonstration that the affairs of the company are being/have been
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to all or some part of the
membership. The judicial view of events will depend on the arrangements that
were in place within a given company and the expectations of the participants
before the difficulties arose. Once unfairly prejudicial conduct is established, the
court has a broad discretion to address the situation and has been prepared to be
quite innovative on occasions in its use of its powers. 37 Such action can only be
brought by a company member (or one to whom shares have been transferred or
transmitted by law) but the member's standing to petition is clear.
One proposal for change to the current legislation, made by the Law Commission
and adopted by the DTI in its recent consultation, would strengthen the link
between the section 459 remedy and small private companies. It would do so by
enacting that, where a member who holds at least 10 per cent of voting rights in a
private company where all (or substantially all) of the members are directors, is
removed from directorship, unfair prejudice to the member who was removed
will be presumed. It had already become clear from the jurisprudence that the
'unfair prejudice' provision was construed as being intended mainly for the
benefit of members of small, 'quasi-partnership' companies. Public company
shareholders, it seems, will find it difficult (if not almost impossible) to establish
that they held legitimate expectations beyond the bounds of the company's
written constitution. 38 As long as the letter of the corporate constitution has been
observed, the courts have generally taken the view that there is no further legal
cause of action for investors in the stock market.
It should not be forgotten, then, that while investors in public companies may
indeed act on an 'impersonal' or 'transactional' basis, and so may realistically be
presumed to know little or nothing of the company's management beyond the
eg Re. H.R. Harnier & Sons Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 689.
38 Re Astec (BSR) plc, n 28 above.
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matters set out in formal documentation, the employees and suppliers and
customers may develop their own legitimate expectations' as to the conduct of a
public company. At the very least, a norm of consultation and information with
these contributing groups when major business developments were contemplated
could readily be envisaged. Protection of such expectations would build upon the
existing principles of protection of expectations and reliance. 39 If other
stakeholders, together with shareholders, are to enjoy a strong position in the
context of executives' work, other primary constituents' rights in law should
surely be comparable to those of members. As with company shareholders at
present, one class of stakeholder might complain of being treated unfairly by the
controlling executive (for example, by lack of consultation) or individual
participants might allege that they have been treated unfairly vis-à-vis others in
their group.
Apart from the dismissal of a director who had a 'legitimate expectation' of
remaining involved in company management, a variety of circumstances have
been accepted as good grounds for a claim of 'unfair prejudice'. The conduct of
the company's affairs other than for the corporate benefit, 4° impropriety on the
part of managementu and non-payinent of desc (aket x
circumstances)42
 have been regarded as 'unfairly prejudicial'. In an analogous
fashion, the other key stakeholders could be permitted to take legal action where
the directors were gleaning personal advantages from their corporate position
rather than acting in the interests of the primary contributors. The categories of
'unfair prejudice' should not be regarded as closed,43 as they will depend on each
individual company and its relationship with its stakeholders. The appropriate
balance of interests will vary at different stages in the company's life.
But see the apparent restrictions applied by the House of Lords in O'Neillv Phillips [199912
AER 961 (noted by R. Goddard, 'Closing the Categories of Unfair Prejudice' (1999)20 Co. Law
333).
° Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd [1993] BCLC 360.
H Re. Elgindata Ltd [19911 BCLC 959.
42 Re. Sam Weller Ltd [19901 Ch 682.
Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155.
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The range of remedies available under the auspices of section 459 to 'do justice'
in the case in question has contributed greatly to the provision's popularity. The
courts have shown flexibility in using their discretionary powers to improve
unsatisfactory management situations for the future 44 or to correct what appears to
be a clear maldistribution of assets. 45 The primary remedy so far as the
shareholders are concerned has, however, always been the purchase (by the
company or the directors) of the plaintiff's shares so as to give them an 'exit
route' from the company when this may not otherwise be available. A flexible
approach to compensation for lost employment or broken contracts would be
welcome but would naturally be guided by the level of existing remedies in
contract law and employment law if 'specific performance' of agreements were
impossible or unrealistic. As far as other primary stakeholders are concerned, the
intervention in the conduct of company business by injunction or directions at the
suit of the members is envisaged under the current section 461. Employees or
long-term suppliers could, in theory, be granted similar powers to petition the
court, to ensure that public company boards acted fairly towards them as well as
to shareholders.
Orders in respect of unfair prejudice are not directly linked to proof of specific
financial gain to directors or others. 46 It is proof of the wrongful behaviour itself,
rather than the actual cost to the claimant, that is the focus of attention. The
remedy is in general compensatory (in the sense of improving the position of the
unfairly prejudiced stakeholder in the most effective manner), rather than penal to
those who had made an inappropriate decision. Even so, directors whose
companies were repeatedly in court for unfairly prejudicial treatment of their
stakeholders would damage their reputations and might find themselves at risk of
removal from office, just as they would for repeated breaches of other legislative
requirements.
Re HR. Harmer & Sons Lid, n 37 above.
Re. Sam Weller Lid, n 42 above.
46 Re HR. Harmer & Sons Ltd, n 37 above.
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As a practical matter, how would one deal with the situation where action that
was favourable to one primary stakeholder was apparently prejudicial to another?
This might occur, for instance, where cost-cutting redundancies were planned
which would inevitably 'prejudice' the workforce for the benefit of shareholders
and customers who wish to see the business remaining 'competitive' (on price
and cost). In cases of insolvency, there is already a precedent to the effect that
the directors are not bound to give absolute priority to obtaining the highest
possible cash sum for the company's assets above consideration of the impact of
the transfer or closure of the business on employees. 47 The courts would, over
time, become accustomed to assessing whether the board had properly addressed
itself to the issue of balancing the rights of different stakeholders. If it had done
so in any case, a claim of 'unfair prejudice' by a particular stakehoJder wouid not
succeed.
Objections might be raised to the effect that, under the proposed regime, judges
would be substituting their decisions for those of the directors themselves. In
reality, the courts would be doing no more than assessing the proper treatment of
stakeholders and quasi-contractual arrangements between them and the public
company, a role for which judges are well suited by training and experience.
Standards of 'reasonable' conduct and decision-making (including in the context
of directors' duties) 48 are defined, refined and frequently adjudicated upon by the
courts. The action to be taken in respect of unfair prejudice, furthermore, need
not involve a forced reversal of company policy (any more than the forced
'buyout' of a dissenting shareholder frustrates the will of the majority in the
shareholder context). It might simply provide compensation for the stakeholder
who has suffered a breach of legitimate expectations.49
The prospect of employees or suppliers or customers in extreme cases taking
legal action because the company had been making large profits and not using or
Re We/Jab Engineers Lid [19901 BCLC 833.
48 eg Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498; Bishopsgate Investment
Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Maxwell (no. 2) [199411 All ER 261.
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distributing them in a proper manner might seem somewhat controversial, to say
the least, in the private sector. There is, however, already a 'floor' on competitive
behaviour to mitigate the perceived negative effects of the market, and with the
introduction of the national minimum wage, 5° legislation to outlaw abuse of
dominant market position 5 ' and the Late Payment of Debts (Interest) Act 1998,52
the trend towards moderate intervention by legislation seems fairly consistent.
Executives in public companies should be aware of the need to maintain a
sustainable commercial and economic base for their future operations. This
entails a proper balancing by the board of the rights of primary stakeholders.
6.4 Personal Rights of Action
The basic right of the majority of a company's membership to control the use of
its name in legal actions 53 has not prevented individual members from suing in
their own names, for their own benefit, when their rights have been violated and
they have suffered loss. Where a personal right of action is demonstrated, it is
said that the principle of 'majority rule' has no application. Unfortunately, much
confusion has been caused by the lack of any clear distinction in the authorities
between those rights which count as 'personal' rights, attendant on the status of
membership, and those which were for the company as a whole to enforce. 54 If
the courts were, in addition, to pronounce separately on the rights of employees
and those of customers or suppliers beyond the bounds of strict contract, the
picture would become less clear.
As far as the primary constituencies (other than the shareholders) are concerned,
the principal right which they would enjoy by virtue of their association with a
Arrangements between shareholders themselves are not properly the subject of actions under
Companies Acts 459 at present: Re Leeds United Holdings plc [1996] 2 BCLC 545.
° National Minimum Wage Act 1998.
SI Competition Act 1998 Chapter II.
52 This provides that, initially, small businesses can claim interest at 8% over base rate from
public companies and the public sector if payments are overdue, with the regime set to expand to
cover all business contracts; in practice public companies still have the upper hand in setting the
contractual arrangements with their smaller contractors.
Foss v Harbottle (1843)2 Hare 461.
eg compare Salmon v. Quin andAxtens Ltd[1909] 1 Ch 311 with Mo:ley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph
790 (both cases concerned decision-making contrary to procedures set out in company's articles
but the outcomes differed).
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public company, on a stakeholder analysis, would be the procedural right to have
their position duly examined and considered by the board. As with dissenting
shareholders, once relations have clearly broken down between management and
the long-standing employee or the long-established customer or supplier, there is
often rather little the law can usefully do, except to facilitate a reasonably
harmonious and fairly recompensed exit. 55
 It could, however, do that much and
sometimes might be able to produce a modus vivendi between parties, which
would allow a mutually profitable association to be resumed. If the concept of
primary stakeholders (other than the shareholders) as participants in the
company's life is to be taken more seriously, it is certainly arguable that the law
should provide this supervisory facility (or 'backstop') to each of them.
The law needs to make clear both to public company directors and to stakeholders
the legitimate expectations the latter can have of board members and of legal
protection. There will be cases where the interests of the different primary groups
will conflict, notwithstanding the managerial arguments that the long-term
interests of the shareholders will be best served by paying attention to the
requirements of customers and employees. It is not sufficient simply to identify
the responsibilities of the directors with attention to the interests of 'the
company', interpreted as those of the totality of members at present and in the
future. 56 Other participants have rights, arising from contractual provisions and
from legitimate expectations, in relation to the activities and decisions of any
public company executive.
Quantification of losses would also be a barrier to pursuit of many complaints of
directorial breach of duty where the principal grievance was that the board had
not paid proper attention to the interests of a specified constituency. It would be
problematic either to calculate the pecuniary costs of such neglect or to insist
upon satisfaction of the rights of one stakeholder in isolation. Personal actions
It could be argued that compensation for unfair dismissal and claims for breach of contract
already fulfil this function in part but both are limited in their sphere of application.
56 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [19671 Ch 254; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [19741 AC
821
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have led to injunctions to prevent company resolutions in general meeting from
being put into effect, but it would be inappropriate for other stakeholders to enjoy
that power. Clearly, where no one stakeholder is to have automatic primacy, the
court must consider the fairness and reasonableness of the board's decisions in
the light of the concerns of all affected parties and the relevant circumstances.
In the context ofjudicial review, the courts have attempted to deal with breaches
of legitimate expectation and detrimental reliance and have proceeded with
flexibility to act according to the circumstances. 57
 Thus a public body's
discretion cannot be fettered by reason of an incorrect or ultra vires decision of
one official, but where a change of policy adversely affects a party who had
reasonably relied on its continuance, that party may be awarded compensation.
The courts could, in principle, safeguard the rights of those dealing with public
companies in a similar manner. Where directors were to be allowed to exercise
commercial freedom while a principal stakeholder suffered an injustice as a
result, 58 the claimant could be awarded compensation in a comparable maimer to
public law claimants.
Personal rights enforceable by individual shareholders have been those arising
from the 'statutory contract' 59 between the company and the members, as set out
in the Memorandum and Articles of Association. 6° The entitlements of
employees are also settled by contract at the beginning of the party's association
with the company, 6 ' but after a period the employment relationship may also
encompass de facto bargains that have developed. Supplier and customer links
also raise the issue of the scope and completeness or otherwise of legal contracts.
Given the complexity of the legal issues surrounding the boundaries of the
section 14 'membership contract', there is no real reason to suppose that judges
' Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwjth D.C. [19811 2 All ER 204; Lever Finance Ltd v
Westminster (City) Council L.B.C. [1971] 1 QB 222.
58 As set out in Sir William Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 7th ed 1994) 372-378.
69 Companies Act 1985 s 14.
° The 'model form' of which is Table A, Companies (Tables A to F Regulations) 1985 (SI
1985 805).
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would be unable or unwilling to tackle the issues involved in enforcing the rights
of other constituents. The concern on a stakeholder analysis of the public
company is whether automatic enforcement of one party's expectations would
lead to other key participants being excluded from their proper consideration.62
Without adequate information systems, there would be great difficulties in
practice for stakeholders seeking to exercise any personal right of action. As a
starting point, suggestions that the Annual Report and Annual General Meeting
be more accessible and useful to stakeholders would make it easier for all to
appraise management performance. Employee rights of information and
consultation are gradually being strengthened, thanks mainly to the intervention
of European Union law. 63 Customers requiring consumer goods would be better
protected if labeling were more informative than they are now. The rule that
public companies have to disclose their supplier payment policy in the Directors'
Report could appropriately be expanded in the light of the Late Payment of
Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998.64
A separate issue concerns the right to pursue litigation connected with breaches of
environmental legislation or other criminal law. This is, of course, not for the
personal benefit of the litigant, but to secure that the legislation is upheld. Any
body, including a Non-Governmental Organisation, which can show that it has a
good arguable case and a particular expertise in the topic under discussion, should
be able to bring a prosecution. This does not have the effect of extending
managerial responsibility beyond its current bounds but merely ensures more
effective enforcement of the existing rules.
6.5 The Availability of Remedies
The contract must be in writing or particulars of it delivered to the employee within two months
of the commencement of employment: Employment Rights Act 1996 s 1.
62 R. Stewart, Managing Today and Tomorrow (Basingstoke: Macmillan, paperback ed 1994) ch
5 summarises 'common stakeholder groups for all organisations...providers of finance,
employees...clients or customers and the community.'
eg Dir. 94/45 (OJ 1994 L254/64) on the establishment of European Works Councils.
n 52 above.
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Having considered some possible structures for stakeholder remedies with a view
to choosing between the alternatives, one must then ask: to whom should redress
be available and by whom should the process of seeking that recompense be
managed? On grounds that were discussed in Chapters Two and Four, it is both
anomalous and prima facie unjust to make distinctions between the different
groups which contribute to the financial well-being of a puMic company. As a
further issue, there are matters of public concern, particularly relating to the
environment and public health and safety, where legislation is in place but
enforcement and penalties are arguably inadequate to secure the desired standard
of conduct. Could stakeholder involvement help to solve this problem in future?
It has been argued that management, headed by executive directors, needs to be
able to conduct the affairs of the company (within basic bounds of commercial
morality) as they see fit, with a minimum of interference from statutory bodies or
from officials. It is certainly true, as was remarked in the Prudential Assurance
case,65 that 'monitors' who can set in train an action costing hundreds of
thousands of pounds and taking up weeks of court time are not necessarily acting
in the best interests of the company if the cost is not justified. Judges in civil
proceedings will, however, become accustomed to taking a more active role in
case management under the provisions, which follow recommendations of Lord
Woolf. 66 The danger in requiring too much 'front loading' of evidence (as
opposed to presentation of argument at trial) is that this may increase the initial
costs beyond the reach of stakeholder groups.67
Limitation of standing to bring an action on the basis of the conduct of the
company's internal affairs to those with a direct financial interest in performance
would deter generalised interference in management by individuals and groups
65 n 27 above.
66 New Civil Procedure Rules replacing the former County Court Rules and Rules of the Supreme
Court came into effect from 26 April 1999; their impact will become apparent over time but it is
intended that judges should seek to control the length of hearings and the evidence that is
presented.
In the US, it is the availability of contingency fee arrangements for legal advice that facilitates
much shareholder and consumer activism and similar developments may be observed in the UK
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with personal grievances or ulterior motives. This is not to say that UK public
companies should not be required to be more open than they are now with
information as to their environmental and social, as well as financial,
performance. Pressure groups, ranging from Greenpeace to UNICEF, have had a
major impact on the policies of large multinational companies by organising
consumer boycotts and disseminating adverse publicity. As noted in the previous
chapter the experiences of Shell over disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform and
Nestle over their baby milk sales policy are cases in point. The reality in many
instances is that the public authorities do not have the resources to pursue all
known or suspected offenders. Where this is so, as in public law, 68 a person or
group with a sufficient interest and a good arguable case on the face of it should
have standing to proceed with an action as in substance a 'private prosecution' for
alleged breaches of existing legislation.
In public law terms, R. v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p. Greenpeace Ltd (No.
2)69 established a modern approach to pressure groups. Otton 3. (as he then was)
said in that case: 'I consider it appropriate to take into account the nature of
Greenpeace and the extent of its interest in the issues raised, the remedy
Greenpeace seek to achieve and the nature of the relief sought.' 7° After
examining those factors, the learned judge added: 'I regard the applicant as
eminently respectable and responsible and its genuine interest in the issues raised
is sufficient for it to be granted locus standi.' The issues in question concerned
the licensing of BNFL operations at its Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant. If
public bodies do not take appropriate action, their practice is thus subject to
judicial review on the suit of such 'respectable, responsible' bodies. Public
companies (including those in the 'privatised' sector) could, in principle, be made
subject to similar legal challenge. This would certainly help to counter criticisms
in the future - information such as 'The Shareholder Action Online Handbook' (Craig
Mackenzie) on the internet also facilitates shareholder campaigns.
68 Contrast R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and
Small Businesses [1982 AC 617, which appeared to indicate that if a good case were made out,
standing would not be examined separately, with R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex
p. Rose Theatre Trust Co. [1990] 1 QB 504, which emphasised the importance of establishing a
'sufficient interest' in the matter in dispute.
[199414 All ER 329.
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that large corporations were not publicly accountable for actions with public
health or major social impacts.
Once society, via Parliament, has laid down a prescribed standard in legislation,7'
there should be no real objection of principle to an interested and responsible
party taking legal steps to enforce it. Many key constituencies already enjoy
channels by which their complaints could be pursued in law against a public
company. Employees can bring actions in the Industrial Tribunal (though at
present these are hampered in practice by the fact that affordable advice and
representation may often be difficult to find). As far as protection of customers
and suppliers is concerned, there is the possibility of action for breach of contract,
but these will largely be confined to agreements which have been reduced to
documentation. Such specific rules are, it is submitted, no substitute for the
ultimate threat of civil proceedings by one of those parties if those in charge of
conducting a public company's business do so in a manner which unfairly
damages the stakeholder.
Pettet has argued that:
...some thought could usefully be given to extending section 309 of the
Companies Act 1985 so that it requires that directors should have regard
to the interests, not just of the employees, but also the company's
suppliers, customers and the community in which the company is
located.. .if the constituencies are to be extended beyond shareholders at
all, then why just to the employees?72
To this one might usefully add, if all of these stakeholder groups are proper
objects of the board's attention, why should they not be permitted to take action
directly on their own account?
70 ibid349.
e.g. in consumer or environmental protection legislation.
72 B. Pettet, 'The Stirrings of Corporate Social Conscience' in (1997) 50 Current Legal Problenis
289.
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In the case of shareholders in public companies, they at least have the 'remedy' of
selling their shares where there is an open market. Employees may find it much
more difficult to replace their jobs, while customers and suppliers may have
relatively little choice in the market where a major public company decides to
change its terms of business. Shareholders also control the market for corporate
management and will determine whether a takeover bid succeeds or fails. 73 In
most public companies at present, a dispute over their future direction will de
facto be settled by a relatively small group of investment managers from the
major institutions. The prospective new management needs only to convince the
investors that it can increase returns in order to succeed in its bid. If all
prospective arrangements were subject to an overriding duty to be responsible to
all key constituents, there would be less room for 'asset stripping' after takeovers
in Britain.74
Increased clarity of rules as regards locus standi or otherwise of stakeholders
would help to reduce expensive uncertainty In litigation. As with alt known (e,a(
obligations, the risk of actions under the new provision would be actively
managed by procedures in well-run public companies. 75 In the event of a dispute,
negotiation and accommodation would be more common than a trial. Armed
with appropriate disclosure and the ultimate possibility of sanctions in law,
constituencies could defend their interests more effectively. 76 As far as existing
legislative requirements are concerned, it is surely a matter of environmental and
social priority to see that the rules are effectively and consistently enforced.
6.6 The Range of Available Remedies
The courts have available to them in 'unfair prejudice' cases a whole range of
possible awards, including injunctive relief and specific provision as to the future
Hogg v Crainphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254; Howard Smith Ltd v Ainpol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC
821.
' A. Cosh et a!, Takeovers and Short-Term is,n in the UK (London: IPPR, 1990) discusses the
phenomenon from the perspective of the 1980s.
C. Coulson-Thomas, The Future of the Organisation (London: Kogan Page, 1997) emphasises
customer relationship management, the supply chain and quality of working life.
205
conduct of the company. A derivative action will simply restore to the
company's accounts funds which ought to have been in its possession at the start
of the proceedings. Personal actions are for the individual benefit of those who
feel they have been wrongfully deprived of some advantage that was due to them.
The distinction between the different types of circumstances has not always been
clearly drawn in jurisprudence, while the minority shareholder has been left in an
uncertain situation (which the Law Commission's proposals, discussed above,
may ameliorate to some degree). To the extent that particular groups are
prejudiced because of action taken to benefit other stakeholders, it would seem to
be justifiable that compensation should come from the company's resources.
Where the performance of directors has been manifestly inadequate, some
personal reparation from them to the company would appear to be equitable.
Where the board is found to have made an error of judgment when trying to
balance the interests of the stakeholciers, this may ot faWe, co' ecamp\e k'y
the amendment of business plans. If the board members have not acted in good
faith while exercising their duties, an order that they compensate the company for
the cost of reparation to the stakeholder may also be appropriate. An order to
provide that civil proceedings may be taken (by any party and in any maimer as
the court may direct) in the name of the company would also continue to be a
useful possibility, particularly in the event of misappropriation of assets. Direct
compensation from the company's funds is, however, likely to be the most
frequently sought remedy. In effect, this would amount to a redistribution from
the shareholders (profits available for distribution) to others where the correct
balance had not been achieved by directors. That is one purpose of the
liberalisation of access to the courts in favour of the primary stakeholders.
Reinstatement of employees who have been wrongfully dismissed, in the sense
that their interests were not properly considered by the company's board, will
frequently not be practical (one may compare the situation with unfair dismissal
The higher level of shareholder activism in the US, for instance, may in part be attributable to a
greater culture of openness - see eg R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Watching the Watchers:
Corporate Governance in the Twenty-First Centu,y (New York: Blackwell, 1996).
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claims where, although available, reinstatement is rarely sought). 77 Similarly,
where customers and suppliers perceive that a company has reneged on a long-
standing commitment, an order for future specific performance may be
commercially unwarranted where alternatives are available. Compensation could,
however, be awarded in recognition of the breach and to deter directors from
similar behaviour thereafter. If directors had not reached the proper standard in
making their assessment, it might even be considered appropriate to order that
they should reimburse the company. Where protection of existing jobs or
business connections was still feasible at the time of a hearing, and the alternative
was unemployment or decline for the claimant stakeholders, the courts could
become more interventionist in combatting the unfair prejudice directly.
Shareholders usually require an 'exit route' if they are dissatisfied with
management. In listed public companies, they have that option of departure if
they can sell their shares for a satisfactory price in the open market (this being
one probable reason for the fact that plaintiffs using section 459 have
overwhelmingly been members of small companies founded on personal
relationships). Other stakeholders may want to remain involved with the
company, perhaps on amended terms, if only because their economic future is
bound up with that of the organisation (this applies most obviously to employees,
but customers and suppliers can also become 'dependent'). There is scope for the
future conduct of the company's business to be regulated more closely using a
procedure analogous to the existing section 461. Past relationships between the
company and the stakeholder will be important in this respect and directors'
knowledge of that fact should encourage the cultivation of lasting associative
relationships where any difficulties can be resolved without recourse to litigation.
If the objective of permitting 'stakeholder' legal action is to ensure that directors
pay proper regard to the interests of all those who should be treated as part of the
corporate network, there are two elements to the assessment of final orders. One
The Employment Relations Act 1999 s 34(4) increased the maximum compensation payable for
unfair dismissal to £50,000.
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is to compensate the person whose interests have been wrongfully disregarded;
the other is to ensure that directors are deterred from breaches of duty in future.
Where directors' actions were taken in pursuit of shareholder value (and in the
process involved a breach of clear understandings previously reached with
employees or suppliers), the company's resources can, with justification, be used
to compensate those who were injured. The remedy against board members who
were personally responsible for the situation and hence for costing the company
compensation payments, at present lies in the hands of the shareholders who can
remove the directors from office.78
Shareholders, like creditors, currently also have open to them the possibility (as a
last resort) of petitioning to wind up the company on the ground that it would 'be
'just and equitable' to do so. 79 Where an alternative remedy is available to a
member, however, and it appears the petitioner is being unreasonable in pressing
for a winding-up rather than pursuing an alternative strategy, the court will not
wind up the company. 8° Since creditors (including providers of equity) will be
the parties who stand to benefit when a company is dissolved and are the parties
who suffer when trading goes on for too long, it is appropriate that they should
enjoy this power. In any reform of insolvency provisions, however, consideration
should be given to allowing or requiring other parties who would be affected by a
winding-up to be heard and their views considered in court. So far as employees
are concerned, European Union provisions on information and consultation (for
example through European Works Councils, discussed below) already go part of
the way along this route. Customers whose business interests are interdependent
with those of the public company that faces winding up should arguably also
enjoy some right of input into the decision as to its fate.
Furthermore, in discussions of corporate amalgamations and reconstructions 8 ' and
arrangements with creditors, 82 it would be desirable from the stakeholder
78 Companies Act 1985 s 303.
Insolvency Act 1986 s 122(I)(g).
80 Insolvency Act 1986 S 125(2).
81 Companies Act 1985 ss 425-427A.
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perspective to encourage interaction between shareholders and creditors and
others. Where jobs are put at risk or existing arrangements called into question in
the name of financial restructuring, there could at least be warnings to those who
would be affected (and again European Union requirements point in this general
direction). A further interesting possibility is then opened up, which is that
workers or those in the supply chain might be able to raise funds to challenge a
plan that would be contrary to their interests by proposing an alternative. UK
financial services and structures would arguably need to be more flexible than
they are now for this to have very much practical effect 83 but in a climate of lower
interest rates (directly or indirectly influenced by the conditions set for European
Monetary Union and 'Euroland' economies), 84 it could have a significant impact.
6.7 The Impact of Legal Remedies
There is little reason to suppose that the possibility of shareholder legal action
very often concerns the directors of UK public companies. As has been noted,
section 459 is, in practice, seldom available to members of public companies and
the likelihood of 'wrongdoer control' being proved, so as to bring into play the
exception to Foss v Harbottle, is remote. The possibility of embarrassing
litigation by pressure groups (which may create highly damaging, publicity
whatever the eventual result) is perhaps more often in the minds of board
members, depending on the nature of the company's activities. Directors' main
contact with shareholders is likely to be with the institutions; the priority of board
members in those communications is to guard against the company's share price
being reduced by sales of equity and to bolster confidence.
If the same duty were owed to all primary stakeholders and any of them could
potentially recover damages or other recompense from the company for losses
caused by a breach, the position would in fact be a good deal clearer from a
managerial perspective than it currently is. The accountability of directors for
82 Insolvency Act 1986 Part I.
83 W. Hutton, The State We're In (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995) ch 6.
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failure to pay due attention to all appropriate constituencies would indeed have
become a reality in the public company boardroom. This responsibility extends
beyond adherence to formal contracts. As Harris puts it:
The traditional law of contract is ill-suited to a long-term relationship
where not all future contingencies can be anticipated, and even if they can
be, the appropriate modification of the relationship will not be clear until
the contingency occurs ('bounded rationality' in economic terms). In a
long-term relationship the parties need to preserve flexibility to enable
them to respond to new circumstances in ways which maximise their joint
welfare.85
If public company directors knew that all key participants were in a position to
take action in the event of directorial breaches of duty, one would expect this to
increase their vigilance for the interests of all those stakeholders. In time use of
the 'select committee' system discussed in Chapter Three might spread, initiáfly
as a kind of defensive response antI subsequently because it 1natI provet to 'oe
useful to executives in their strategic planning. Negotiated ar ce'ctairik'j
preferable to legal actions from the point of view of business efficiency. The
senior independent non-executive with particular responsibility for stakeholder
relations (building on the idea set out in the Hampel Report 86) could also help to
provide 'early warning' of potential complaints. If, furthermore, primary
stakeholders were granted locus siandi in legislation to protect their expectations
of information and consultation and compensate for detrimental reliance on
unfulfilled assurances, those parties would at last have a legal status
commensurate with their economic importance.
Following on from the inclusive statement of directors' duties it is suggested that
wording such as the following (based on section 459) be added:
eg The Observer, 24 January 1999, front page, comments that: 'Interest rates in the 'eurozone'
are half those in Britain. Barclays say the saving on a £100,000 mortgage taken out in euros is
nearly £250 a month.'
D. Harris, Remedies in Contract and Tort (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988) 16.
85 Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report (January 1998)
para 3.18.
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A customer, employee, shareholder or key business associate of a public
company may apply to the court for an order on the ground that the public
company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the applicant or the customers,
employees, shareholders or key business associates of the company generally
or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be
so prejudicial.
As under the present section 461, it should be clear that the court can make such
orders as it sees fit to provide suitable relief if it finds the claim proven and, in
particular, may regulate the affairs of the company for the future, require the
company to refrain from doing or continuing to do an act or to do an act which it
had omitted to do, authorise proceedings to be brought in the name of and on
behalf of the company by such persons and on such terms as the court may direct
or provide for payments by the company to the claimant.
Under a European Union Directive, which has effect in the UK under the 'Social
Chapter', directors of companies which operate in more than one Member State
are going to become accustomed to interaction with employee representatives on
European Works Councils. 87 There will also be a requirement of Trade Union
recognition where a majority of the workforce so wishes, a measure which will
alter the dynamic of industrial relations in a modest way in favour of employees.88
At the same time, new technology and market forces are combining to change the
relationship between producers and customers. A standardised approach is no
longer adequate if competitors are offering 'tailored' goods and services for their
customers. Changes in employment law mean that the relationship between
management and employees is being placed on a more formal and procedural
footing than has traditionally been the case in Britain, while customers can be
more assertive as economic growth slows. The formal provision of remedies for
87 European Works Council Directive, n 63 above.
88 Employment Relations Act 1999 s 1.
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these parties would simply confirm on a secure basis trends that have been
apparent to alert executives for some time now.
The dynamic as regards environmental and social 'watchdogs' is a different one,
albeit one that feeds in to the financial health of the company. 89 Insofar as
government agencies and passive or 'interested' primary stakeholders are failing
to act to ensure that directors keep corporate activities within legal bounds, these
groups ought to enjoy legal standing to pursue proceedings. There will be those
who argue that the possibility of litigation from so many quarters might lead
directors to adopt an unduly 'defensive' management style. It is surely
reasonable that the boards of public companies should be expected to show that
their procedures have been in order and they have taken into consideration all
relevant factors in reaching their conclusions.
In addition to the US corporate law analogy,90 there is again a similarity to public
law, given the impact of public company activities and the fact that funds from
the public (in the form of pension contributions, insurance premiums and
subsidies from central and local government sources) are so heavily involved.
One would not wish to pursue this comparison too far, since the ultimate goal of
the public company is to deliver profits (however these are to be distributed), but
it is pertinent. Of necessity, many environmental and labour standards are
becoming the subject of international agreement, a development that helps to
counterbalance the economic strength of the multinational companies.
Considerations of human rights and of ecological protection are important both
for multinational corporations and for national governments.
Increasingly open and genuinely global competition, particularly in
manufacturing industries, means that directors must offer attractive deals to their
customers while seeking to train and retain the best workforce they can and build
89 PIRC, for example, makes available via its website (www.pirc.co.uk ) reports on the activities of
companies such as Shell and BP with comments on their social and environmental performance
and corporate governance generally.
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stakeholder, giving a better incentive for monitoring and reflecting the reality that
sometimes the interests of the participants are irreconcilable and choices must be
made by directors. This form of action also provides valuable flexibility as to
choice of remedy. Discussion of personal rights of action raises the issue of what
claims each primary stakeholder group might have that are not satisfactorily
protected in other ways at present. One does not wish to lose sight of the fact
that, if the stakeholder analysis is accepted, the directors caimot properly give
absolute priority to the rights of one primary group above all others.
Of the various possibilities, the most promising, therefore, seems to be the form
of the current 'unfair prejudice' (section 459) action. Ultimately, there may be
irreconcilable differences between the interests of different groups of
stakeholders, such that the directors could not please all of them. In addition to
showing they had suffered 'prejudice', claimants would, therefore, need to
demonstrate that the choice finally arrived at was 'unfair' in order successfully to
challenge the board's decisions. If board members could show that they had
properly examined all the relevant options with appropriate reference to
stakeholder interests, those individuals and the company would escape liability.
If, on the other hand, directors had proceeded in flagrant disregard of the rights
and expectations of the customers or suppliers, the employees or investors, a
suitable court order could be made for reparation in the circumstances.
In addition, the company's existing social and environmental legal duties would
be more effectively enforced if public authorities were more generously funded
and staffed to deal with monitoring. Insofar as Non-Governmental Organisations
are 'filling the gaps' at present where such public provision falls short, their
status to bring private prosecutions should be recognised accordingly. This
would not in itself expand the content of directors' duties and responsibilities. It
would simply increase the prospect of these duties being enforced in law. 93 In
convergence in industrial relations practice to co-operative and participatory management
methods.
' J. Eaglesham, 'Directors Face Prospect of Greater Duty of Care', Financial Times, 31 March
2000, 8.
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many cases responsibility for breaches would come to rest with the directors
personally. Where it is the management system within the company that is at
fault (and particularly where a company is known to be operating in an area that
poses particular environmental or public health risks), this is entirely proper.94
In the event of such new legal actions being introduced, there would inevitably be
commercial pressure on public company boards to put in place internal
mechanisms to avoid the prospect of their organisations being taken to court by
stakeholders. Where a relatively small group of shareholders (normally the
institutional investors) currently holds the effective power of removal of
directors, it is not surprising that executives invest so much time and energy in
communicating with them. 95 This could be extended to embrace other players in
the corporate field. If a greater risk of litigation improves internal 'relationship
consciousness' and management, it could enhance UK public company
performance at less cost than that of pursuing hostile takeovers. 96 It should be
remembered that many company boards, at least if their own statements are. to be
believed, are already operating in the way the new remedies would seek to
enforce (and some are frustrated when competitors fail to do so).
Board members' legal responsibilities, if extended in the maimer proposed, would
inevitably give rise to a demand for appropriate advice, in order for directors to
be able to demonstrate that good practice had been adhered to. This would be
linked to the existing requirement for an independent element on the board and
for a lead non-executive director, whose role could be to take responsibility for
stakeholder communications. The current isolation of many executives from the
needs and wishes of primary stakeholders is an undesirable, even dangerous,
T. Cannon, Corporate Responsibility (London: Pitman, 1994) ch 9 discusses 'Safety Standards
and Security' and the importance of managerial responsibility and corporate standards, using the
Union Carbide (Bhopal, India) and Piper Alpha disasters as instructive case studies.
eg 'When Prudential Wavered and MAM [Mercury Asset Management] went for Royal [Bank
of Scotland] BoS [Bank of Scotland] knew that NatWest was Lost: How RBS [Royal Bank of
Scotland] Won the Battle Between the Scottish Banks for the Hand of the Embattled English
Clearer' in The Independent, 10 Febniary 2000, 21.
J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 395-396.
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situation from a managerial perspective. Structural changes should flow from the
objective of giving different corporate constituencies a voice.
The common law tradition has a practical basis and has been concerned not with
abstract rights, but with the provision of remedies. 97 Access to the courts for
shareholders has been tightly controlled on the basis that excessive judicial
interference with commercial freedom was undesirable. 98 In an era of greater
accountability in the public sector and wider access to education and information
than were known a generation ago, this is no longer adequate. Other
stakeholders, too, are coming to demand their share of directorial attention within
the UK system. At present, many may feel morally aggrieved but legally
impotent when faced with a sharp directorial focus on short-term returns to
shareholders.99
The effectiveness of the new remedies would depend on the willingness of the
stakeholders themselves to take up active roles and seize the new opportunities
they were given. Trade unions and supplier and consumer organisations could
play a vital role in co-ordination and education. Funding of legal actions will
continue to be a problem for many stakeholders, however. Ultimately, the
experience of being rewarded for vigilance may lead to demands for more direct
participation in the management structure as a quicker and cheaper check on
executive discretion. First, however, stakeholder monitoring and empowerment
by the processes outlined above need to be experienced by both sides.'°°
In this respect the Human Rights Act 1998 may presage a major shift in UK legal thinking.
98 Stein v Blake [1998] 1 All ER 724 is a recent example of the survival of the 'proper plaintiff
principle.
The AA 1000 foundation standard in social and ethical accounting, audit and reporting
launched by the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability in 1999 aims to set process
standards underpinned by accountability to stakeholders (see www.accountability.org.uk ).
°° P. Luoma and J. Goodstein, 'Stakeholders and Corporate Boards: Institutional Influences on
Board Composition' in (1999)42 Academy of Management Journal 553, a study of firms listed
on the New York Stock Exchange concluded that 'in larger corporations in particular, stakeholder
representation on corporate boards has assumed a degree of legitimacy as a means of responding
to stakeholder interests.' The same could not be said of companies listed in London.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS
7.1 Continental European Models and Anglo-American Capitalism
In the US and the UK, efforts to reform company law in general, and governance
of public corporations in particular, have centred on making corporate executives
more responsive to the demands of shareholders - re-invigorating 'shareholder
democracy', as it is often termed. This can be seen in the Hampel Report' in
Britain and in the activities of organisations such as the LENS fund 2
 in the United
States. It is argued that institutional investors, by virtue of their financial
expertise and the size of their holdings, are becoming well placed to take up a
monitoring role over management. 3 Where monitoring has been entrusted to non-
executive directors, in the UK they usually come from the financial side of
business life (frequently with accounting qualifications) and often from the same
type of company as the executive directors they supervise. Other stakeholders in
UK public companies, including employees and suppliers, have in general not
been treated as business partners, but as instruments to be used in the production
of profit.
The UK governments of the 1 980s and 1 990s insisted that they would not allow
UK business to be made 'uncompetitive' by the importation from continental
Europe of systems and structures for public companies which were unfamiliar
(and unwelcome) to British executives. 4 In the European Union, harmonisation
of company law has been delayed, as will appear below, largely because of
British resistance to German-inspired models. This is not to suggest that there
have been no debates between other European states as to the best structure for
company law and many of the detailed rules. Each wishes to protect what it sees
as the virtues of its own system and Germany and the UK have simply been
'Committee on Corporate Governance (Chair: Sir Ronald Hampel), Final Report, January 1998.
2 The 'active shareholding' organisation run by Robert Monks and Nell Minow, authors of
Corporate Governance (New York: Blackwell, 1995).
See, for example, 'The Economist Survey: European Business: Good Heavens, Good
Governance', The Economist, 29 April 2000, S13; 'Shareholders are Grabbing the Reins in
Europe', Business Week, 29 Noveniber 1999, 30.
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particularly forceful. This has arguably lead to something of a missed
opportunity to transmit high corporate governance standards across the European
Union.
The stock market-driven model seen in the UK and the USA is, of course, not the
only form of technologically advanced capitalism that has succeeded on the world
stage. In Germany, as also in Japan, high post-World War Two rates of personal
savings facilitated bank lending to, and investment in, major industries. 'Patient
capital' and the desire for high and stable rates of employment combined to make
effective systems in which workers had a more central role than in the UK.5
Economic progress on the continent of Europe may have been unspectacularly
steady (particularly compared with the USA, which combined substantial capital
with a mobile and educated workforce), but it has generally been sustained.
Globalisation undeniably puts pressure on social market systems. One of the key
questions to be answered in the new era is surely whether different forms of
capitalism can still co-exist as they did during the latter half of the twentieth
century.6
Corporate boards are becoming more alike in practice across major industrial
economies, for example in their use of non-executive representation and
committees. This does not necessarily mean that a nation such as the UK cannot
impose its particular corporate governance requirements on companies registered
in its jurisdiction. It simply demonstrates that, with increases in global capital
movement, legislatures and regulators in many countries were dealing with many
of the same problems and issues in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Where
requirements as to information and transparency are not so strict in less
developed economies, moves are now underway by means of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund to spread good commercial practice. If non-
K. Brown, 'Byers to Calm Fears on Company Law Review', Financial Tunes, 7 June 2000, 2.
A. Giddens and W. Hutton, On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalisn (London: Jonathan
Cape, 2000) 3 1-38.
6 F. Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order
(London: Profile Books, 1999); J. Gray, False Dawn (London: Grarita, 1998) are among many
comments on this complex process.
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executives are seen principally or exclusively as monitors, it is appropriate for
them to be on a separate panel in a supervisory capacity. If they are to contribute
to the formulation of policy and the strategy of the company, it is more acceptable
for them to sit in a single group with managers.
Whatever the formal structure of the board, Charkham suggests it be judged by
two measures: the extent to which it permits the leadership to 'drive the business
forward' and the extent to which the executive is effectively supervised. 7
 He is
reluctant to 'award the palm' for the 'best' national system, but after his research
in France, Germany, Japan, the US and Britain, he inclines towards the German
model. 8 Certainly the important issue is not whether the board formally has one
tier or two. It is whether it can and does act as an effective supervisor and
whether people of an appropriate calibre and outlook are literally 'on board'.
Protection for a particular social system under the guise of companies legislation
may carry a cost in loss of flexibility in the international market. However, a
fixation with the interests (and, specifically, short-term gains) of shareholders
may, somewhat paradoxically, be a handicap in the globalised economy. The
same key stakeholders are crucial for success throughout the capitalist world.
There are several ways in which company law could give stakeholders the
opportunity to contribute to decisions in public companies. Apart from the
possibility of direct representation on the board, separate mechanisms for
consultation and legal rights to challenge unfavourable board resolutions may
also be valuable. It is not surprising, given the nature of the common law as
compared with civil codes, that UK protection of stakeholder rights depends on
jurisprudence rather than legislation. Greater attention to procedure is warranted
in the UK, as on the continent of Europe, and may result in a higher quality of
decision-making. The shareholders' conduct in selecting, and where necessary
removing, the board will not then reflect a concern with short-term dividend
payments alone. Taking over ownership and taking over the board appointment
J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 354-362.
ibid 363-364.
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role are to some extent alternative methods for stakeholders to exercise influence.
Different industries may lend themselves to different methods of participation by
stakeholders, depending on the mix of factors of production involved in each
case.
The general trend in manufacturing industry is that the balance is shifting from
mass-produced goods towards more 'tailored' products that meet the specific and
individual requirements of customers. Where multinational companies own
plants in many different countries, significant local autonomy for branches is fast
becoming the norm. Within Europe, clearly there are important national
differences, not only of language and culture, but also of climate and income,
which affect customer requirements. On the supply side, too, there are essential
differences between nations, which governments can affect, as Phelps points out:
Perhaps the most salient area in which there is a continuing and vital
contribution to industry embeddedness and competitiveness at a national
level is in terms of education and vocational training as a key input to
production. Here it becomes apparent that UK government policy over a
long period has contributed to the poor vocational skills available to
manufacturing industry in the UK.9
There are two competing definitions of national state jurisdiction over corporate
entities - the 'incorporation' doctrine, favoured by the UK, and the 'siege reel'
model, which is preferred in continental Europe.'° The former grants control to
the place where legal formalities of incorporation were completed while the latter
favours the site of the company's head office. Rights of taxation, in particular, are
a crucial issue for national governments. TM As far as the administration of the
company is concerned, there is no doubt that the state of incorporation is pre-
eminent in discerning the company's and officers' duties. Whether diversity is
seen as a positive factor depends on one's view of competition between states in
N. Phelps, Multinationals and European Integration (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1997) 18.
'° Centros Ltd. v Ehrvervs-og Selskobsslylrelsen C-212 97 (ECJ) [1999] BCC 983.
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the matter of producing corporate law where there is free movement of capital.
The supreme example of this is the United States, where Delaware has without
doubt 'won' the 'race' to be the state that attracts the largest number of major
companies to incorporate there.12
In principle, UK business leaders have indicated that they would support greater
European economic integration and availability of more measures along the lines
of the European Economic Interest Group' 3 (which is designed to promote
partnership ventures across borders) just as they, in general, support the principle
of the UK joining the single currency.' 4 Much of UK opinion, however, is not
well informed about the real opportunities for progress arising from European co-
operation. Having completed the single market in legislative terms, the European
institutions need to publicise the merits of different corporate systems and so to
spark an informed debate about further integration. If the interests of the Union's
economy would be best served by allowing the various states to compete to
develop the most popular system (as in the USA), this would be a powerful
argument against further integration. Linguistic, cultural, political and
educational factors are, however, still highly diverse as between different states
and are likely to have a primary influence on investment decisions. Even
comparatively high rates of taxation in a given nation need not deter investment
in the aggregate if revenue is used to increase skills and encourage research.'
Changes to the laws affecting companies have a commercial cost, and this has to
be balanced against the gains which it is alleged that the alterations will bring.
The UK Government has already made clear that its priority is to produce
legislation and regulation which is in a modern and accessible form and does not
As to German tax reforms see: M. Smith, 'Proposed Tax Reform in Germany for 2001/2002'
Corporate Finance, May 2000, in supplement 'Germany Meets the Challenge' 37; 'Germany's
Tax Reform' Business Europe, 30 June 1999, 6.
2 R. Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) Part III A
deals with 'State Competition for Corporate Charters'.
' Council Regulation 2137 85 [1985] OJ L199/1.
' CBI news release, 'CBI Members reaffirm Support for EMU Membership in Principle', 20 July
1999.
' D. Currie, Does EMU Need Political Union?' (June 1998) Prospect 60, 62; D. Taverne,
'Europe and the Tax Question' (July 2000) Prospect 54.
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place unnecessary restraints on managerial freedom - hence the title of the Green
Paper, 'Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy'. The compulsory
introduction of unfamiliar ideas such as employee representation on boards is,
therefore, unlikely to be welcomed. Economically and politically, different
systems of company law may well suit different nations in Europe.' 6 On the other
hand, there is much to be said for making the process of movement of capital and
of managers themselves across the European Union as open and straightforward
as possible. What follows in this chapter is a (necessarily brief) account of the
corporate governance systems in the largest European corporate economies other
than the UK, namely Germany and France, and of the progress and pitfalls of
European Union integration and regulatory harmonisation.
7.2 The German System and Co-determination
Under the German constitution,' 7 the use of property is said to be a matter of
legitimate social concern that should 'serve the common good'. Employee
thvo)vezneii't is part of the structure of all large German corporations. This has
lead, so its supporters assert, not to industrial strife, but to co-operation which has
proved to be highly productive.' 8 In large German companies, there is a formal
separation of executive decision-making by the Vorstand and monitoring of
management by the Aufsichtsrat. The other distinctive feature of the German
system is that of long-term bank investment in major manufacturing industries.
Flotation of shares on the German stock market (which is much smaller, in both
absolute and relative terms, than that of London) has tended to come at a later
stage in a company's life than is usual in the UK - a state of affairs which may be
changing, but slowly if so.'9
6 Business leaders are sceptical of any increased regulation - see Institute of Directors press
release, 'The loD says the Queen's Speech is Mixed for Business', 17 November 1999.
' Article 14(1) of the Federal Constitution of Germany.
8	 Addison, W.S. Siebert, J. Wagner and X. Wei, 'Worker Participation and Firm
Performance' (2000) 38 British Journal of Industrial Relations 7, found that mandatory Works
Councils did not impair, and might even improve, the performance of larger German
establishments.
9 Such a trend would expose German companies to international competitive pressures: see
'Business: Germany Unlocked' The Econo,nist, 8 January 2000, 62 and L. Bushrod, 'Private
Equity - Continental Buyouts Surge as Small UK Deals Face Squeeze', European Venture
Capital Journal, 1 May 2000, 1.
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Streeck, an expert in the field of industrial relations and corporate governance
from a German perspective, has written:
...today's growing markets for diversified quality products can only
imperfectly be served by an economy that is not also a society, that is, one
which is not in a particular way regulated and supported by thick, non-
economic social institutions.. .among the possible institutional
arrangements on the supply side that may sustain diversified quality
production are some that are highly compatible with traditional social-
democratic objectives like high wages, a low wage spread, workplace
participation and full employment.20
In other words, investment in training and the pursuit of strategic alliances may
best equip an economy to compete in a global market that demands flexible
responses and high levels of skills.2'
There is in corporate governance systems a trade-off to be made between
flexibility (to cut costs and workforces promptly in an economic downturn) and
stability (in the labour market and the wider economy). Competition on grounds
of quality, rather than of price, is not an easy option. It is, however, the UK
Government's favoured prescription for sustaining a prosperous, high-wage
economy. 22 The investment and scale of production required in high-technology
industries may also mean that one organisation cannot succeed in isolation in a
developing market. On the global scene, business partnerships are crucial and
growing in salience. A system that seems to 'outsiders' to be complex and
bureaucratic may deter potentially useful corporations from investing in a
national economy.
20 w• Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance (London: Sage, 1992) 10.
21 See proceedings of conference 'The Economics of the Knowledge Driven Economy', jointly
organised by the DTI and the Centre for Economic Policy Research, 27 January 1999 (DTI,
1999).
22 DTI White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy (London:
DII, 1998).
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A critic of stakeholder theory, Minford, has commented: '[Under] the leadership
of Erhard and Adenauer. . . West Germany decided to pursue policies of radical
liberalisation. . .while conceding some social partnership to unions that were in
practice highly docile and co-operative for some two decades.' He concedes that
during this period, between 1938 and 1979, German productivity growth was on
average 3.9 per cent per annum, the UK's 1.8 per cent per annum. 23 After 1979,
when growth trends in productivity reversed, trade unions in the UK were indeed
forced into 'docility' by being stripped of the legal rights they had enjoyed.
During this time, however, the UK's relative economic decline continued and
average income in Britain fell further behind that in Germany.
Further criticisms of the Aufsichtsrat system have centred on the fact that even
employee-elected members are alleged to 'go native' and focus principally on
profitability and that supervisory directors may lack the information, or indeed
the training, to act as a counterweight to the Vorstand. 24 It is certainly difficult
for stakeholder board members to put aside their constituency interests and think
in terms of the company's good when acting as board members. The German
experience shows that it is possible. If anything, there has been more criticism
from the labour side that board members elected by the workforce have not been
vociferous enough in support of employees. This is, however, perhaps to
misunderstand the point of stakeholder inclusion on supervisory boards.
Communication with the stakeholder group via its representative and appraising
the stakeholders (in the German case, the workers) of long-term business plan are
seen as important in themselves.
In the European Union, German fears of reductions in their standards of social
protection and worker participation have clashed with UK opposition to
employee involvement in management. 25
 The original Draft Fifth Directive on
public companies was based squarely on the German model, with a two-tier board
23 P. Minford, Markets Not Stakes (London: Orion Business, 1998) 70.
24 Centre for Law and Business, University of Manchester, Company Law in Europe: Recent
Developments (London: DTI, 1999) 30.
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and worker representation on the supervisory tier. This has now been much
'watered down' to permit very different systems to be chosen by different
nations. Where the capital structure of large companies also varies between
major economies, this is probably sustainable. However, with increased capital
mobility in the European Union, there are opportunities for foreign as well as
domestic takeovers in Germany. As the cohort of post-Second World War
entrepreneurs retire 26 and the work ethic gives way to a culture increasingly
reluctant to trade leisure time for more disposable income,27 the possibilities for
more 'efficient' management and cost-cutting are increased.
It has been persuasively argued that the main benefit of the German 'bank-
dominated' system is not that this, in itself, has provided cheaper capital, but that
the absence of the threat of takeovers enables management to pursue longer-term
goals. 28 This also facilitates the development of long-term relationships with
stakeholders; as Pugh put it:
In Germany, to move towards the UK's ease of transfer of corporate
control would hinder commitment to relationships of trust and co-
operation between business 'stakeholders'. This would tend to deracinate
Germany's 'social market economy'.29
To the extent that stakeholder relationships are fruitful in a business sense, any
legal change that might undermine them would also be economically damaging.
Germany, it seems, does not wish to lose its competitive advantage in this
respect.
Where investors are 'passive', there may be particular merit in the functional
clarity offered by the separate two-tier board as an alternative means of keeping
the executive in check. Within the Anglo-American system, it seems that
2S M. Andenas, 'European Company Law Reform and the United Kingdom' (2000)21 Co. Law
36.
26 C. Randlesome 'The Business Culture in West Germany' in C. Randlesome, Business Cultures
in Europe (Oxford: Heinemann, 1990) 54.
27 ibid39.
28 G. Pugh, 'Financial Systems and Industrial Performance: Germany in Comparison with the
UK' in T. Lange and J. Shackleton, The Political Economy of German Un(/lcation (Providence,
RI: Berghahn, 1998) ch 11.
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investors have recently been 'flexing their financial muscles' 30 and have
succeeded in securing management changes in a few major corporations. From a
stakeholding perspective, one could argue that this needs to be balanced by
somewhat stronger labour rights than have been enjoyed in the US or the UK
during the 1980s and 1990s. Competition law is likewise important to give
customers a genuine choice as to the supplier they use. With all these checks in
place, there is still a need for objective, long-termist input into board decision-
making. Whether it takes the form of a 'strong non-executive element' within a
unitary board or as a separate tier is far less significant; indeed the unitary board
may give its members more access to information and better communication with
the executives.
It is possible for the two-tier board system to be used in a rather different way
from that which German law provides. In Holland, for example, the supervisory
boards are self-selected from recommendations made by the employees and the
shareholders. 3 ' As in Germany, it is the supervisory board, rather than members
in general meeting, which has the right to appoint and remove executive directors
and in Holland directors are charged with considering the welfare of all
stakeholders. 32 Indirectly, therefore, employees and shareholders of major Dutch
public companies are both exercising powers over the composition of the
management team. In Germany and Holland, the quality of supervision by
employee representatives is enhanced by the provision of information to Works
Councils and in fact the great majority of worker directors are also Works
Council members. This is arguably a logical extension of recognising that, in a
public company, shareholders are effectively passive investors rather than active
29 ibid 177.
° For recent examples see A. Emmett, S. Levine and M. Slepicka, 'Shareholders Strike Back',
America's Network, June 2000, Telecom Investor supplement, 14 and A. Feldman, Shareholders
of the World, Unite!' (2000)29 Mone', 1333.
31 per Dutch Civil Code Book 2, de Structuurvennootschap (large %idely-heId company) - see J.
Maitland-Walker, Guide to European Compani' Lou's (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1993) 300-
305.
32 Centre for Law and Business, University of Manchester, n 24 above. 50.
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members, while employees have a daily commitment to the company's
activities.33
It has been said by du Plessis, an expert in continental European corporate
governance, that: 'most German writers are reasonably satisfied with the two-tier
system' and that: 'through such a system a broader spectrum of interests in the
company are formally recognised and it ensures that exclusive shareholder
control is not the norm anymore'. 34 If shareholders are not, in fact, reliable
monitors in most public companies, the supervisory board certainly provides one
answer to the problem of keeping the executive in check. However, the
effectiveness of the monitors depends on the information they are given and their
personal commitment and ability. They will inevitably be partisan to the extent
that they are representing different constituencies. The Gernxxi eiee (
shown that they can work together for the long-term goals of the company. To
this needs to be added the recognition that, without proper attention to customer
requirements, and in many cases good relationships with suppliers as well, the
public company is highly unlikely to prosper.
7.3 The French System and Leadership
The option provided by French law for large corporations to adopt a two-tier
board structure, closely modelled on the German system, is not much used in
practice, nor is trade union membership at significant levels. The social security
system and employment law rights in France are, however, more generous and
comprehensive than in Anglo-American or Asian states. Perhaps this helps to
explain why business 'leadership' has been left in the hands of relatively few
executives, while employees have shown little appetite for participation in
management as such. The large number of privately-controlled and state-owned
businesses of substance in France also helps to account for its management
On defensive tactics in takeover bids, such as use of 'crown jewels' and 'poison pills', see E.
Wymeersch, 'The Effects of the Regulation of Securities Markets on Company Law within the
EEC' in R.R. Drury and P.G. Xuereb, European Company Laws (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991),
61.
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culture. Even after major privatisation of financial institutions and manufacturing
organisations during the 1 980s, close links between government and business still
remain.
As a more rural society than either Britain or Germany, there is a sense that
France still takes a longer-term perspective and puts more emphasis on 'quality of
life' issues than the longer-urbanised societies. Some ways of life and routines,
for example in agriculture, are regarded as being worth preserving for the future,
even if they are not the most profitable now. The individual's expectations of
reasonably secure employment and good social security provision if it is needed
are seemingly held in higher regard than competitiveness for its own sake. 35 This
challenges the free market orthodoxy which seems to have 'won' politically in
the Anglo-American world (despite the election of centre left leaders in the UK
iit \.3 i'ri nt 9s - or exampXe, there are still fierce debates around
reform of the European Union's agricultural policy. It also means that France has
the highest indirect (non-wage) employment costs of any major economy.
The French response to international moves towards minimum standards for
motzitoririg public company executives has been somewhat unenthusiastic. In
i995, the Vfenot Report on corporate governance, commissioned by the Conseil
Thañona'l àu 'Patronat Trancais and the Association Francaise des Entreprises
Privees, accepted similar overall principles to those set out in US and UK reviews
(the ALl Principles of Corporate Governance in 1994 and the Report in 1995,
respectively). Similar committees were proposed to deal with nominations and
remuneration and audit to those recommended as 'best practice' across the
Channel and the Atlantic. There was, however, no real challenge to the
hegemony of the PGD in major French companies and no statement that there
should be an independent Chairman, while the notion of a separate monitoring
J.J. du Plessis, 'Corporate Governance: Some Reflections on the South African Law and the
German Two-Tier Board System' in F. Macmillan Patfield, Perspectives on Company Law 2
(London: Kluwer, 1997) ch 8.
C. Gordon, 'The Business Culture in France' in Randlesome, n 26 above, 63.
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board was rejected. No new information rights for non-PGD board members, in
line with the US position, were introduced.36
Business leaders in France, reported Letreguilly in 1998, had woken up to the
importance of corporate governance issues 'chiefly as a means to placate (mainly
foreign) institutional investors' and were voluntarily adapting to international
standards. The law was said to be progressing 'towards more transparency and a
more balanced equilibrium between the powers of the board and those of the
PDG' in line with international trends. 37 French shareholders are becoming more
active. For managers, there is an increasing threat from foreign 'predators' to
consider.38
On the international scene, French companies have been taking advantage of the
opportunities offered by the privatisation of UK utilities. 39 In the financial sector,
France's own 'privatised' banks have been staking out a strong position in the
new European market created by the single currency. Like the UK, however,
France has found that 'national champions' are often too small to compete
ijlç	 mikepace4° hs bDsiness leaders, therefore, need to
learn to co-operate effectively with their European counterparts from other
nations. Its corporate leaders are becoming more dependent on the capital market
and less reliant on French public sector contacts.
The French as consumers have traditionally been patriotic (and protectionist) and
more concerned about high quality in 'commodities' such as food and drink than
their Anglo-Saxon neighbours. At the same time, the perception has been that
quality of life is valued more highly than twenty-four-hour, no-wait-service
36 A. Tunc, 'Corporate Governance a Ia Francaise: the Vienot Report' in Macmillan Patfield, n 34
above, ch 7.
H. Letreguilly, 'France' in (1998) International Financial Law Review, Corporate Governance
supplement, 18, 22.
38 j Rossant, 'En garde, French shareholders' Business Week, 8 May 2000, 18.
M. O'Connor, 'Global Capitalism and the Evolution of American Corporate Governance
Institutions' in Macmillan Patfield, n 34 above, ch 5 refers to the possibility of a 'neutral referee'
to arbitrate between shareholders and employees.
° Gordon, n 35 above, 103.
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culture. 4 ' In the high technology industries, mergers for reasons of scale will
bring some rationalisations. Where the service sectors are concerned, American
and to some extent Anglo-Saxon cultural influences will have their impact,
particularly on the younger generation. Nevertheless the French have pride in
their own way of carrying on business, as in their national culture generally,
which will not be dented by further integration in the European Union.42
Paris has never enjoyed the same status as an international financial centre as
London, nor has the stock market in France exerted such an influence over
industrial decisions as in the UK. This has arguably allowed more individuality
at the expense of some efficiency.
c,thex the. ck of entrepreneurial leadership, in particular in
te. e.ov of' the. tonamtion of inthstry, has been stronger in
Britain, reflecting in a way the difference between the merchant banks and
the banques d'affaires. While the former have their origins in the
financing of world trade, the latter are heirs to the Credit mobilier, and
direct control of industrial companies has from the start been an essential
part of their strategy.43
France has also tended to favour national solutions to its manufacturing problems,
often with state support. Wholly or partly in the private sector, French
corporations are holding their own in a number of key sectors - the car industry
and telecommunications being particularly instructive from a British perspective.
The French Government has acted as a watchdog for some major industries with
the intention of furthering consumer interest, with somewhat limited success.
Efforts to co-ordinate industrial planning and organise supply chains have also
proved difficult, perhaps because they have not sat easily with prevailing French
culture. In common with Germany, there is usually less pressure for flotation at
" Minford, n 23 above, 182.
42 See J-M Guehenno, 'The French Resistance' (June 1998) Prospect 31 and J. Henley, 'Vive La
Belle France' The Observer, 25 June 2000, 19.
Y. Cassis, 'Divergence and Convergence in British and French Business in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries' in Y. Cassis, F. Crouzet and T. Gourvish, Management and Business in
Britain and France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 27.
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an early stage than in the UK. The takeover market has, however, grown
substantially as investors have realised their power. Many large French
companies have themselves engaged in acquisitions at home and elsewhere in
Europe in order to reach a size required to compete in global markets. This has
contributed to pressure for greater flexibility in French company law to make it
more attractive for international business.44
The traditional SA (Societe anonyme) structure for companies is also seen in
Southern European countries such as Spain. The power of shareholders to
appoint and oversee the 'administrators' is undiminished by many obligations to
consider the other constituencies. Indeed in the Spanish sociedad anonima, there
is a pm port ona? representation system whereby substantia' shaie\xo1ceis tan
appoint individual directors. 45 In general the line between private or closed
companies and open public companies is much more blurred than in Germany or
or iw!eed the. United Kingdom, with the SA form of incorporation
straddling large, medium and even small business. 46 A unitary board structure is
used for Spanish SAs, very few of which are listed. 47 France is the home base of
sign eant!y mvrt mtinationa1 companies than its Southern European
neighbours but shares the same (civil law) legal tradition.
The whole leadership of French society, in the public and private sectors, is still
very much in the hands of products of the Grandes Ecoles system. This means
that there is a real 'public service' ethos among those running the largest
businesses, and that they have close contacts with those who pursue prestigious
careers in the civil service. It also means that there is a certain deference to the
education and attainments of those in high-ranking positions. There may be little
internal debate or challenge until suddenly, a strike is upon the company, for
example. This elitism also fosters a sense of distrust between workers and
Centre for Law and Business, University of Manchester, n 24 above, 26.
' Maitland-Walker, n 31 above, 386-388.
46 A. Rojo, 'The Typology of Companies' in Drury and Xuereb, n 33 above, 41, 45.
' Centre for Law and Business, University of Manchester, n 24 above, 57.
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executives. This in turn makes European company law integration extremely
difficult as Franzmeyer has observed:
While German trade unions see an element of industrial democracy in 'co-
management', which should in addition be underpinned by profit-sharing
with employees, this kind of strategy is regarded in other countries,
especially by the big Italian and French unions, as a capitalist 'confidence
trick' which runs counter to the fundamental interests of workers. In this
instance integration cannot be pushed through according to plan - for
example, in connection with the completion of the internal market.48
7.4 European Union Legislation and Public Companies
Germany, with France and other continental jurisdictions, appears unwilling to
accede to any lessening of the protection enjoyed by employees in a systems it
feel has generally served its citizens well. The UK Government has been and
remains opposed to any suggestion that employees should have seats on the board
of public companies, either with the executive directors on any second-tier
monitoring body. Proposals for the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive on the
form of public companies were stalled as a result of disputes concerning worker
representation. 49 In its latest draft, the Fifth Directive allows for so many options
as to permit the continuance, de facto, of national jurisdictions with only minor
changes.
Corporate governance has, however, been influenced by EC Directives, which
have required significant changes to UK companies legislation. The First
Company Law Directive,° for example, provided that third parties dealing with
companies should not be affected by any internal limitations on the objects of the
company or the powers of the board. The Second Directive 5 ' introduced the
principle of a minimum capital requirement for UK public companies, though this
48 F. Franzmeyer, 'Economic, Social and Political Costs of Completing the Internal Market' in R.
Bieber, J. Dehousse, J. Pinder and J.H.H. Weiler, 1992: One European Market (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1992) 55, 67.
Draft Fifth Company Law Directive latest amendments: 34 OJ C321, 12 December 1991.
° 68/15 1/EEC (OJ Special Edition 1968 (1), 41-45).
' 77/91/EEC (20 OJ, L26, 31 January 1977, 1-13).
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has been set at a relatively modest £50,000 (of which £12,500 must be paid up
when the company becomes public). Other company law directives that have
dealt with information issues are the Fourth Directive on the contents of annual
accounts52 and the Eighth Directive 53 on the qualifications and independence of
company auditors. All of these issues, insofar as there is a common theme, seem
to be designed to increase the free movement of capital by promoting investor
confidence in European company projects outside the prospective shareholder's
own nation. Whether this has made much difference in practice to mobility of
companies or capital in practice is questionable.
The Draft Fifth Directive on the structure of public companies is by far the most
ambitious of the EC projects and has failed to make any progress for many years,
mainly because of controversy surrounding the issues of worker participation and
board structure. As provided in the latest version, which remains the subject of
negotiation, there must be supervision of executives within the board structure,
but this could be provided by either the second tier or by non-executives inside a
unitary group. There must also be employee participation in public company
decisions where there are 1,000 employees or more, but this could be provided by
Works Councils or other 'collectively agreed' structures, rather than by direct
board membership. Nothing in the Draft Fifth Directive as it currently stands
would, therefore, require the UK Government to do very much more than ensure
that the recommendations of Hampel were complied with as regards participation
by non-executives and to apply the concept of Works Councils, discussed below,
to United Kingdom public companies. The degree of discretion left to nation
states means that the ultimate product will achieve relatively little
'harmonisation', let alone 'approximation', of legal requirements across the
European Union. In a modest way, by furthering the principles of independent
supervision of central management and participation by employees, it may be
said to be spreading 'best practice'.
5278 660/EEC (21 OJ, L222, 14 August 1978, 11-31).
84/253/EEC (27 OJ, L126, 12 May 1984, 20-26).
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The European Union's website in its information on company law gives an
interesting insight into current philosophy. It says:
This setback, [regarding the Fifth Directive] together with the difficulties of
incorporating into national law legislation which, while attempting to remove
disparities between Member States laws, leads to the adoption of extremely
detailed and stringent rules and regulations has led the Community legislature
to leave national legislatures more room for manoeuvre and to allow
economic operators more scope for exercising freedom of contract. Growing
competition on world markets is furthermore prompting it to impose the
minimum constraints necessary on European firms, while providing them
with the legal instruments they are lacking.54
Aside from the controversial worker participation issue, the Fifth Directive would
introduce other changes of substance to UK company law. For example, contrary
to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 55 ten per cent of shareholders would have an
automatic right to take action on behalf of the company. 56 This is broadly in line
with the recommendations of the UK Law Commission as regards shareholder
remedies. 57 There would also be a tightening up of directors' duties to end the
system whereby directors can ratify their own wrongdoing using their own votes
in general meeting. 58 For smaller companies, this may be thought to be somewhat
rigid as a general approach. Where listed companies are seeking public capital, a
more stringent approach may be regarded as entirely appropriate.
In the field of corporate takeovers and mergers, there has been an element of
'protectionism' on the part of the UK in refusing to compromise on the voluntary
status of the Stock Exchange and the Takeover Code. As the largest marketplace
for shares and the most active takeover arena in Europe, London has a vested
interest in not losing the advantages of speed and flexibility that are said to flow
SCADpIus (European Union database), updated May 2000.
(1843)2 Hare 461.
' Draft Fifth Company Law Directive, n 49 above, Art 16.
Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Report No. 246, October 1997), Appendices A and
B.
58 Draft Fifth Company Law Directive, n 49 above, Art 18.
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from allowing self-regulation. At the same time, the benefits of ensuring a 'level
playing field' grow as European Union businesses consolidate. Political
agreement on a Draft Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers and Mergers59 has finally
been reached in June 2000 and focuses on protection of, and full information for,
shareholders, in line with existing practice in London. It also introduces
compulsory bidding for all shares once an offeror has gained voting control of a
company.
The proposed Tenth Directive, dealing with cross-border mergers, 6° has so far
foundered on the issue of ensuring that current levels of worker participation are
maintained and 'social dumping' (that is, the relocation of business to states
where social costs are low) is avoided. It is nevertheless important that investor
confidence be maintained. This failure does not seem to have acted as a
significant brake on European-wide mergers in the most capital-intensive
industries, such as the oil and aerospace businesses. Even so, the less 'high-tech'
manufacturers and retailers might be assisted in efforts to pursue consolidations
that seemed commercially justifiable if there were a single European Union
system for regulation of takeovers.
There are, of course, economic losers as well as winners from the completion of
the Single European Market. Many companies suffer losses of income and even
complete closure; many workers suffer increased job insecurity and possibly loss
of income as a result of increased competition. 6 ' Given the current size of the
European Union's total budget, 62 these are largely matters that national
governments will have to deal with, by paying unemployment benefit temporarily
if nothing else. The medium- to long-term benefits of European competitiveness
with American and Japanese companies may be bought at a high price for the
nation states.
32 OJ C64, 14 March 1989.
° 28 OJ C23, 25 January 1985.
61 Franzmeyer, n 48 above, 56.
62 Currently capped at 1.27°o of GDP.
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The areas in which the European Union has legislated to date have been largely in
the realms of administrative detail, rather than managerial priorities. As regards
information provision, for example, minimum standards have been assured in
principle across the member states. This gradualism is almost inevitable given
the divergence of attitudes towards business leadership and entrepreneurship
generally and the role of the private sector in different nations. Nevertheless,
multinational companies are increasingly treating the European Union as a unit.
An individual state whose legal framework for businesses diverges too far from
what is familiar or acceptable to Europeans and investors in Europe generally
risks losing major investment to more congenial surroundings. The Union also
has a role in setting a floor on regulation, to avoid a competitive 'race to the
bottom' between states.
Many UK company directors may not be aware of the fact that much of the
regulation that affects their operations every day (such as employment and
environmental legislation) is derived from European Union directives. Many of
them are quite enthusiastic about the principle of being able to set up a single
legal entity which could do business in any part of the European Union, just as
they tend to like the idea of the convenience and transparency of a European
currency. At the same time, many are still reluctant to adapt to different ways of
doing business. Mutual recognition of Member State rules provides one way to
unblock the legislative impasse but can only fulfil a limited function in keeping
up regulatory standards across the European Union.
The European Union has also had a major impact in the area of worker
participation and trade union involvement and recognition in particular. The UK
Government, in its EU Presidency conference 'Working for the Future - New
Ways of Organising Work' 63 (Glasgow, 28-30 April 1998), emphasised work
partnership structures and training. These were tied in to customer satisfaction
and negotiation with unions over flexible work practices. 64 The managerial
63 As reported in a follow-up brochure, Workingfor the Future (London: DTI, 1999).
64 ibid 5 and passi,n.
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prerogative of directors as not challenged and there is no mention in the
conference document of employee participation on the board. It is the European
Works Council Directive which currently provides for information of and
consultation with employees in transnational companies. 65 There is also in
negotiation a draft Domestic Works Council Directive which would provide
minimum standards for information and consultation in purely national
companies that have at least 50 employees.66
The European Company Statute, after a lengthy period of contention, has stalled
for the time being on the basis that 'mutual recognition' of companies across the
European Union will suffice. Instead of being incorporated centrally, without
attachment to any particular state, as was originally proposed, the Societas
Europea (SE) on the latest plans would be subject to differing rules depending on
its location. The disadvantage of this is that a great deal of reference would still
have to be made to the national law of a state in which a Societas Europea is
registered to ascertain the detail of the relevant regulation. Further agreement on
matters of detail is not likely for some time to come. Given the existing
European Union law on free movement of goods and services, 67 the use of the SE
form arguably adds little to the existing advantages of major European
businesses. Companies registered in Member States as legal persons also have
rights of freedom of establishment within, and can freely transfer their capital
around, the European Union.68
SCADp1us, the European Commission's internet information commentary on
Company Law, states that:
Everything holds out hope that the idea of the European company,
which was first mooted nearly thirty years ago, is shortly to become
reality. It appears that a decisive step forward has been made, with
65 94 45/EC (OJ L245 64,22 September 1994).
' European Commission, 'Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing a General Framework
for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European Community' COMM 0612 EC (1998).
67 EC Treaty Articles 28-31 (formerly 3 1-37) and Articles 49-55 (formerly 59-66).
68 EC Treaty Articles 42(2) and 48 (formerly 52(2) and 58); R. v Daily Mail and General Trust
plc C-81/87 (ECJ) [1988] ECR 5483.
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discussions focusing less and less on comparisons between a
'European' model and the different national models and more and more
on the search for a flexible formula that would leave the essential
features of the different national systems intact.69
This view may prove to be excessively optimistic.
The US has, of course, succeeded economically into the 1990s without a single
system of company law (or indeed a uniform tax structure) despite having a
single market and a single currency. It is not likely that in the near future or the
medium term the states of the European Union will cease to have very diverse
systems of company law. The challenge is to ensure that minimum standards of
regulation are maintained and that the nations learn from one another. It has also
been pointed out that enlargement of plant sizes in order to pursue economies of
scale may not, in fact, lead to more vigorous competition and hence to increased
productivity. There is a danger that markets will become more oligopolistic,
leading to reduced consumer choice and competitive pressure. 7° Pursuit of
increased size for its own sake was somewhat unfashionable as a business credo
by the end of the 1990s.
On a strict interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity (as incorporated in the
EC Treaty 7 ' and amplified by the 1992 Edinburgh Council declaration 72) it is
arguable that further harmonisation of company systems is not necessary to
complete the Single European Market nor further the goals of the European
Union. What does require co-ordination, and has received it, is control of
takeovers, with the objective of ensuring that capital flows and Union-wide
competition become a reality. As Drury puts it:
The programme for the harmonisation of company and capital market
laws seems to have based...on two premises. The first is that companies
are the most important economic actors within the Member States, and
69 SCADpIus, Company Law - current position and outlook, updated May 2000.
70 Phe'ps, n 9 above, 50.
" EC Treaty Article 5 (formerly 3b, as amended in 1992).
72 Edinburgh Heads of State or of Government Conference, December 1992.
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that they are becoming increasingly active on a wider transnational stage.
The second premise assumes the existence of a substantial connection
between the harmonisation of company and capital market laws on the
one hand, and the advancement of economic integration on the other. One
can readily subscribe to the first premise without much convincing,
however the second does become something of an article of faith...73
According to the legislators, European Union legislative and regulatory
harmonisation is not an end in itself, but a means to economic goals.74
7.5 Europe in the World
The European Union is large enough to exercise global economic and commercial
influence with the United States and Japan. In international fora such as the
World Trade Organisation, it can speak with a powerful voice to ac,se fot
standards, which include free trade, to be promulgated more widely. 75 The
introduction of the European Sing'e Currency has the potential to conso isate the
market strength of the main European economies (though the UK remains outside
it at present). However, a leadership role in setting rules of business conduct has
eluded the European Union, in large part because of disagreements over retention
of national models of regulation and governance. US multinationals have taken
the lead in treating the European Union as a single trading area and Japanese
management techniques have proved to be popular among European business
leaders. A single European market has arguably not benefited Europeans
themselves as much as it might otherwise have done because of cultural barriers
to transnational co-operation and labour mobility.76
As a general rule, it is true that social and labour costs are higher in the European
Union than in the Americas or Asia. Investors who want good returns regardless
R. Drury, 'A review of the European Community's Company Law Harmonisation Programme'
(1992) 24 Bracton Law Journal 45.
The SLIM initiative - Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market - as far as Company Law is
concerned emphasises this (Report from the Commission - Results of the Fourth Phase of SLIM
dated 4 April 2000).
' The European Commission under instructions from Member States negotiates with their global
trading partners on their behalf in trade discussions.
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of where production is actually located will need to be convinced that these
higher costs are justified by improved workforce skills, better technology and
infrastructure, proximity to markets and other countervailing advantages.77
Common standards on information for investors are an important source of
reassurance, hence the relevance of the apparently extremely technical European
Union directives on Listing Particulars and Company Accounts. General
economic stability and a reputation for integrity among public sector officials are
also major advantages for Western European states.78
US state 'constituency statutes' governing duties of directors79 and Japanese
corporate networks or keiretsu8° will demand a response from Europe if their
benefits are not to handicap Europeans by comparison. Executives of
multinational corporations have great power to move capital to where they
believe it will be most productive. Corporate governance regimes that march out
of step with such management teaching may positively discourage investment.
The trend is certainly for multinational companies to devolve more administrative
detail to the level of local management while simultaneously exercising control
from the centre as far as issues of corporate principle are conceaied. 8 ' So long a
the national legislation is clear and is perceived to reflect the social consensus,
there is no need for countries to assume that the executives of multinational
companies will object to restrictions imposed by national laws. In the end,
however, the aim must be to produce a clear guiding vision for leaders of
businesses.
76 B. Graham and M. Hart, 'Cohesion and Diversity in the European Union: Irreconcilable
Forces?' (1999)33 Regional Studies 259.
W. Wallace and J. Zielonka, 'Misunderstanding Europe' (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 65.
'S. Kaltenheuser, 'The Best Place to do Business' (2000) 13 World Trade 28.
eg IND. CODE ANN. 23 23-1-35-1(f) (1995) (Indiana statute which allows for a broad
interpretation of stockholder interests); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 33-756(d)(3) (1997)
(Conneticut statute which requires that employee interests be taken into account in a takeover
situation) in addition to well-known Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes.
80 see G. Ming-Hong Lai, 'Knowing who you are doing Business with in Japan: A Managerial
View of Keiretsu and Keiretsu Business Groups' (1999) 34 Journal of World Business 423; R.W.
Oliver, 'Killer Keiretsu' (1999) 88 Management Review 10.
81 C. Handy, 'Subsidiarity is the Word for it' (1999) 36 Across the Board, 7; C. Schwab, 'What's
Best for your Customers? ' (2000) 17 Executive Excellence 20.
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Styles of legislative drafting vary between common law and civil law
jurisdictions, further complicating efforts at supranational lawmaking. 82 UK
judges, through their fast-growing experience of European Union law, are
becoming more comfortable with interpreting broad statements of principle that
lack the detail of typical British legislation. If business people in the Anglo-
American world are inclined to think in terms of 'profit maximisation within the
law' while continental European executives perceive themselves more as
guardians of a social institution, this may in some part be attributable to their
attitudes to regulation. In Britain the general principle of 'whatever is not
expressly prohibited will be permitted' holds firm, while in other European Union
states the experience of state regulation has been much more pervasive. Clearly
the standardisation of an area as complex and detailed as 'core' company law is
only practicable in the context of a shared legal culture. It is doubtful whether
this exists across the European Union as yet, though it may be in development.
The administrative efficiency of public bodies (such as companies registries) in a
given jurisdiction and the quality of contractual and commercial law are factors
which play a part in the location decisions of multinationals. 'User-friendliness'
of local laws and the availability of high-quality legal (and financial) advice are
attractions. 83
 The extent to which regulatory requirements and legal duties placed
on directors are effectively 'policed' may also be a positive factor for potential
investors (if a negative one in the eyes of some executives!). In all of these
considerations, the UK 'scores' relatively highly, though the adoption of greater
codification and more 'plain English' (as in Canada and New Zealand) would
help to give a modern feel to UK company law. There are signs of an emerging
consensus among major industrial nations as to the requirements that should be
imposed upon publicly held corporations. Europe has played a part in this, as
Grier recognises:
82 X. Lewis, 'A Common Law Fortress under Attack: is English Law being Europeanized?'
(1995)2 Colu,nbia Journal of European Law 1; P. Legrand, 'Structuring EC Law: Tacit
Knowledge Matters' (1998) 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 871.
83 D. Charny, 'Competition among Jurisdictions in formulating Corporate Law Rules' (1991) 32
Harvard International Law Journal 423; R. Levine and S. Ahmed, 'The Legal Environment,
Banks and Economic Growth' (1998) 30 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 596.
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Reputable companies should not be ashamed to publish their accounts,
and companies that try to avoid doing so may have something to
hide...Suggestions that within the trading block of the EU there might be a
race to the bottom are therefore unrealistic and if anything, the EU
directives are encouraging ever higher standards of accountability and
disclosure, at least as far as public companies are concerned, in order to
encourage quality business and fair competition.84
Directors of transitional companies, no matter where they are based, do face
many of the same functional tasks. Dallas has indicated that the board is charged
with two main responsibilities - conflicts monitoring (for which independent
directors are essential) and business review (for which useful connections are
certainly a key attribute for a director) which should be carried out by distinct
groups. 85 This definition rather underplays the task, brought back to prominence
in the UK by the Hampel Report, of driving the business forward and the place of
technical expertise. It does, however, highlight the point that the board of a
global corporation will have to be of suitable calibre to maintain a hands-on
approach while devolving administrative work to the lower ranks of management.
When they are competing on an international level, the main rivals of European
Union public companies are clearly US corporations (which have a greater degree
of independent director input and information output) and Japanese corporations
(which have large and relatively inactive boards but include employee input and
are often in close relationships with others in the supply chain). When they invest
in European Union states, while adapting to local requirements, the executives of
such global companies will, so far as they are able, continue to exercise their
preferred style of management. If either executive jurisdiction or employee
contributions 'add value' to a business plan, they will be adopted whether the law
requires them or not. If other national companies are not matching those
standards, they will lose out in competitive markets. There is some argument,
84 N. Grier, UK Company Law (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1998) 648.
L. Dallas, 'The Global Corporate Board of Directors: a Proposal for Reform' in Macmillan
Patfield, n 34 above, ch 6.
242
then, for saying that it is the role of a national government to promote best
practice within its own jurisdiction.
There is no real consensus at European Union level either on the purpose and
nature of companies themselves or on the proper aims for those who control
them. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that efforts to take into account the
various views have been described as 'accommodation rather than harmonisation'
and this 'a polite way of describing a fruitless dissipation of energy.' 86 It is
suggested that the stakeholder model in fact provides a more realistic and useful
model of the public company than either the shareholder ownership paradigm or
the neo-corporatist standpoint. Unless all the major European governments can
agree on a single impetus for company leadership, however, further efforts in the
direction of unified provisions are likely to prove ineffectual.
As has been noted in sections 7.2 and 7.3 above, if a two-tier board system is to
be adopted, several important questions remain. Chief among them are: who
should appoint the supervising directors and what powers should those directors
have over the management? Clearly if constituencies other than the shareholders
win the power to appoint supervisory board members, who can, in turn, dismiss
executives, a shift in stakeholder rights will take place. Since the Anglo-
American system is so heavily dependent on stock markets for its capital, it is
unlikely that plans to alter their powers to dismiss executive directors would be
politically acceptable in the foreseeable future. Allowing other constituencies to
nominate some non-executive board members would be a possible compromise.
The requirement that executives give an account of themselves if they did not
accept the recommendations of non-executives could also be upheld, if
shareholders had the will to do so, under the current regime.
The Anglo-American system is heavily reliant on takeovers and the ultimate
threat of removal of executives on change of ownership as a spur to good
6 JJ• du Plessis and J. Dine 'The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law' [1997] JBL
23, 45.
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management ('good' in this context inevitably meaning successful from the point
of view of shareholders, whose votes determine the outcome of takeover
contests). Merger and acquisition activity is still spreading internationally. 87 As
continental European models have demonstrated, however, there are well-tried
alternatives to this drastic and expensive method of 'policing' management.
These include, as set out above, 'second tier' supervisory boards and monitoring
by committed, influential investors such as banks. The current UK law does not,
of course, actively prohibit steps in such directions but more could be done by
way of formalising the role of non-executive directors and facilitating substantial,
long-term investment (e.g. by amending the mandatory bid requirement). This
could empower executives to drive projects forward while ensuring that they had
to give a regular and precise account of themselves.
As far as the UK itself is concerned, it is something of an exaggeration to say at
the present time, as the authors of Farrar's Company Law have stated:
The membership of the EU means that there has been a complete parting
of the ways with the USA and a growing detachment from
Commonwealth company law reforms. Even if it wished to follow those
reforms, the UK has lost the right to do so.88
The DTI's Green Paper, 'Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy',
made it clear that the UK 'modernisation' process is likely to borrow ideas,
particularly for simplifying procedure and language, from Commonwealth
systems - and as noted above, there is little sign of national regulatory systems
being superseded by a common European system of company law.
7.6 Conclusion: Converging Capitalisms?
The latest round of transnational mergers emphasises that, as markets become
global, complementary skills and products can exist across boundaries in Europe
87 S. Reed and C. Matlack, 'The Big Grab' Business Week, 24 January 2000, 130; D. Rothnie,
'M&A Commentary: From One High to Another' European Venture capital Journal, 1 February
2000,1.
88 J Farrar and B. Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law (London: Butterworths, 4th ed 1998) 749.
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and beyond. 89 The largest corporations will be exporting their management styles
and bringing the same values to work in many different states. The law needs to
respond to this trend by reflecting the core management values that are shared
across the world. For corporations that have enjoyed widespread, lasting success,
these appear to include focus on the customer and development of employees. In
a global economy, flexibility of the labour force is important and so is co-
operation on supplies. Executives on the board need to see themselves as co-
ordinators of the work of skilled labour and managers of relationships with
others, rather than as 'experts' in all relevant areas.
The extent of active investor involvement in the major companies varies a great
deal between the different legal systems. In those states where the ownership of
large enterprises is still largely in the hands of private owners or of the state,
control of and access to business information may matter less than in the UK.
Where the public market for capital is more significant, as in this country, it is all
the more important to ensure transparency. As consumers come to have a greater
choice of goods and services with free cross-border trade, their wishes will need
to be taken into consideration. Small and medium enterprises, which include
many of the suppliers of European public companies, have also been recognised
as having an important role to play in social policy and provision of employment
and wealth. The thrust of European Union policy is towards encouraging greater
recognition of all these factors, as well as facilitating managerial movement and
flexibility.
European countries such as France, Germany, Spain and Holland have had to deal
with similar corporate governance issues to those which have been the subject of
debate in the UK and the US. Freedom of capital movement was one of the 'four
freedoms' included in the original EEC treaty. As capital has become more
mobile, the expectations of investors are being transferred with it from one
jurisdiction to another. At the same time, the European Union is still expanding
For examples in the motor industry, see The Economist, 24 June 2000 'The Global Gambles of
General Motors' and 'Car Making in Asia - Politics of Scale'.
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its activities in the social field, including setting some common employment
standards. It is natural that there should be demands at a European level for
comparable participation (or at least consideration) in the decision-making of the
company. As enterprises grow larger when transnational consolidation takes
effect, there is a common problem of control of executives at the centre.
Without a strong social fabric and the intangible but essential bonds of trust
between employers and employees and between business associates, businesses
will lack the necessary flexibility to succeed in the modern post-Fordist world.
Co-determination by investors and workers is clearly an attempt to maintain that
fabric. So, in a different way, is community involvement by large corporations in
the US. The UK has hitherto tended to rely on exhortation of 'big business' to act
responsibly. In future, this may not be enough to sustain competitive advantage.
Greater employee share ownership and increased vertical integration may reduce
the clash between different stakeholder interests but ultimately each political
entity (still the nation state in Europe) has to determine, through its political
processes, the extent to which it wishes to maintain or develop a social market
economy.
Where European integration is leading to strategic alliances, these will be
unlikely to achieve their potential unless the management teams and the
employees from both or all organisations concerned are convinced of the
desirability of the scheme. Other stakeholders also need to back the co-operation,
as Lorange and Roos indicate:
Are relevant ownership groups convinced that the venture will be
desirable from their stockholder viewpoint? What will be the effect on
their reputation and the response of the stock market? How will
customers, suppliers, existing alliance partners, financiers and and
competitors react? it is important to carry out initial preparatory efforts to
increase the likelihood that major stakeholders will accept and promote
the idea of a particular co-operative strategy.9°
° P. Lorange and J. Roos, Strategic Alliances (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 33.
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Financial institutions are far more likely than ever before to operate across
national borders. With them travels their habit of intervention in the case of
American institutions, their patience with good industrial ideas if they are
German, their public service ethos if they are French. They will not expect to be
sidelined in UK businesses. Nor can high-technology, capital-intensive
investment really succeed without them today. Shareholder rights and remedies
are, therefore, inevitably set to converge between states. The opportunity
afforded by the single European currency for financial products to be marketed
outside their state of origin gives the potential for the most successful institutions
to pool small investors' fund from across large parts of the Union. The
businesses in which the managers of those funds choose to invest will be the
companies that appear to be the best-managed and most competitive
organisations. Moreover it has been said that:
It is the UK, with its financial services industry, that should have the most
to gain from company aw harmonisat. The mc 'des Df Engsh
company law are generally accepted as the better (sic) suited for the
development of modern financial markets.9'
Both geographically and culturally, the UK sits between Europe and the US.
There has at times been a regulatory dilemma, arising from the fact that Britain
had economic affinities with the US but was bound by legal ties to EEC, then
European Union, partners. If the UK is to influence best practice and avoid being
left behind in its system of corporate regulation, it needs to take account of
European neighbours. It can also find much to learn from their traditions. The
suggestion has been that in recent generations the UK has suffered the 'worst of
both worlds' by trying to pursue Europeanism and Atlanticism at the same time,
benefiting neither from the low taxes and labour mobility of the US markets nor
by the social partnership and internal monitoring seen on the European continent.
' 
'Only mad cows and Englishmen' (1997) 18 Co. Law 65.
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Instead it could act as a bridge to help each side learn from the other's best
practice.92
Uniformity for its own sake is not the object of European Union reforms today.
One must look to see the advantages of each system and the best way of realising
these within each political and legal culture. Streeck has argued that:
Management in co-determined enterprises is exposed to constant
pressures to provide information and to give reasons for its decisions.
This has forced it to consider decisions more thoroughly, to take more
factors into account, to communicate more freely within the organisation
in general and with the workforce in particular.93
This seems to have served German industry well up to the 1990s and it has been
as much to do with works council consultation as with employee board
participation. In the new global economy, however, responsiveness to customers
and external communications are surely as important as internal communication.
Transnational business arrangements are politically desirable to those who wish
to advance the cause of European federal structures. In reality, they should be
seen by business people as possible means to serve their specific commercial
ends.94
Little would be gained by imposing on reluctant business leaders a structure with
which they disagreed in essence. The provisions which have succeeded on the
continent of Europe have done so because the employees have been involved in
delivering, and have been personally committed to, high standards of productivity
and quality. Focus on external stakeholders, including customers and suppliers,
is also essential for directors and senior managers. All those who join a public
company board should have the capacity to take a long view of matters. So long
as shareholders are solely responsible for electing and removing the directors,
however, that is where their principal loyalty will lie. To counterbalance this, it is
92 P. David, 'Britain: A Power in the World', The Economist, 6 November 1999, S15; L. Nicolle,
'UK.com Leads Europe' (2000) 125 Accountancy 70.
'n W. Streeck, n 20 above.
Lorange and Roos, n 90 above, ch 9.
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important that other stakeholders have legal rights such as those described in the
preceding chapter.
There has been a tendency among those who favour employee representation and
controls on takeovers and mergers to see the European Union as a source of
legislation to further their aims whilst the UK Government was reluctant to take
action, particularly during the 1980s. It has now become clear that the detailed
adaptation of UK public companies law via the European Union is not a realistic
option for the foreseeable future. The Hampel Committee report was particularly
disappointing in its failure to recognise implications of the UK's existing
obligations under European Union law, let alone the lessons to be learned from
other European models. The Company Law Green Paper, while discussing
developments in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada,
New Zealand and South Africa, also had disappointingly little to say on the
subject of European common ground and co-operation. 95 If the DTI, in particular,
is prepared to seize the opportunities offered by closer engagement with Europe,
there will be more chance to influence world affairs. The European Union as a
whole has the potential to set standards of investor protection, of employee
treatment and consultation and of customer service and supply chain relationship
management to which others would have to respond.
At the European Council meeting on Employment and Social Policy on 6 June
2000: 'the Council recall[ed] the overall objective to raise the employment rate
from an average of 61% today to a rate approaching 70% by 2010 and to increase
the female employment rate from 51% to more than 60%.96 It went on to
comment that: 'Special attention should be given, in this context, to the
improvement of employability and lifelong learning, exploiting the
complementarity between lifelong learning and adaptability through flexible
management of working time and job rotation, bearing in mind in particular the
' Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
The Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) and Company Law Review Steering Group,
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framnework (DTI, March
2000) similarly overlook this issue.
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challenges and opportunities arising from a knowledge-based economy...' This
is in line with socio-economic policy accepted by the majority of governments in
Member States. Company law in the European Union will need to fit in with this
agenda.
96 Minutes available at www.europa.eu .int.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PUBLIC COMPANY OFFICERS AND COMPANY LAW REFORM
8.1 The Commercial Context
The discussion of the appropriate legal form for directors' duties must take into
account the views of those who would have to work within the new rules if the
debate is to produce results that enjoy general support. The process leading up to
revised legislation may itself have 'business value' insofar as:
(a) it leads business people to reflect upon their own practice and the issues they
consider to be important in the context of their business;'
(b) it provides an opportunity to argue for 'levelling the playing field' - i.e. that
the social and environmental standards of the best performers should not be put at
risk by those content to operate at a lower level in these areas;2
(c) it provokes fresh discussion of the UK's current position relative to laws of
other major states;3
(d) it creates new opportunities to examine the economic impact of legal rules on
directors and shareholders, companies and third parties.4
Issues of board structure are also pertinent, in that an appropriate team of
directors needs to be assembled and to be organised so as to make the best use of
its skills. While few people have direct, in-depth experience of more than one
corporate law system, most of those operating at public company board level
have clear views of what works for them. Most of this chapter is given over to a
record of the views of a few of these business leaders, using their own words.
The choice of language is often very revealing. Some deep ideological divisions
Among current issues of concern are: L. Secretan, 'Customer Connections' (2000) 10 Industiy
Week 25; P. Drucker, 'Knowledge Work', (2000) 17 Executive Excellence 11; R. Moss Kariter,
'Are You Ready to Lead the E-Culture Revolution?' (2000) 22 Inc 43; A. Wong, 'Integrating
Supplier Satisfaction with Customer Satisfaction' (2000) 11 Total Quality Management S427.
2 S. Zadek, 'Balancing Performance, Ethics and Accountability' (1998) 17 Journal of Business
Ethics 1421; P. Monaghan, 'Warts and All Reporting' (1999) 124 Accountancy 61.
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The
Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) ch 4.
Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a
State,nent of Duties (Report No. 261, September 1999) Part 2.
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between individuals were revealed, as were areas of common concern.
Implications for the company law review process are also noted.
8.2 Key Issues for Discussion with Public Company Officers
8.3 These emerged from the preceding chapters and included the following:
(a) Primary responsibility of directors - to whom does (and should) the board owe
its principal allegiance?
(b) Which groups are taken into consideration in decision-making (e.g.
customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, the community, the environment)?
(c) What is the 'ranking', if any, of these various groups (does the board see the
company as being particularly oriented to one 'internal' group and how important
are 'external' considerations)?
(d) How are stakeholders considered - what are the mechanisms of
accountability?
- When - at what stage in the decision-making process does consultation occur?
- Where - at board meetings, whenever expert opinion is sought?
Changes to the law:
(e) How does interviewee react to the prospect of a stakeholder-inclusive
statement of directors' duties and quasi-derivative enforcement actions?
(f) Is the approach that such laws would require different from current practice in
the interviewee's company and if so, how?
The overriding priority in the discussions was to relate managerial practice to
actual and potential legislation.
In each company contacted, the writer spoke to the officer who was best prepared
to discuss these issues. Many larger public companies have legal directors on the
main board in addition to the Company Secretary who deals with administration.
In some medium-sized companies, the Company Secretary sits on the board with
key executive colleagues. The smaller the organisation, the more weight the
Chief Executive's own priorities and opinions are likely to carry. The perception
in some corporations that 'legal matters' are the concern of the Company
Secretary or the legal director alone, while board colleagues show little interest, is
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itself a matter for concern. Legal language and concepts are certainly perceived
to be arcane or impenetrable by many lay people (including executives).
8.3 The Interviewees
19 individuals from 18 public companies took part in meetings over the summer
and autumn of 1999. Their respective roles at the time of the interviews were:
three Chief Executives, plus one former ChairmanlChief Executive who remained
an executive Chairman and one recently retired ChairmanlChief Executive; two
Finance Directors (one of whom was also Company Secretary); two Directors of
Business Development (one of whom also covered legal affairs); two Company
Secretaries and two group Legal Directors who were on the main boards in their
respective companies; two Company Secretaries and one group Legal Director
who did not have 'main board' seats but worked closely with senior colleagues;
one Personnel Director with a board seat and two very experienced non-executive
public company directors. The individuals concerned had a wide variety of
professional backgrounds, from accounting and law to science and technology.
Only two were female (both were Company Secretaries, one of whom had a main
board seat), which reflects the proportion of women on public company boards in
1999. All had responded to a letter outlining the research proposal and requesting
their assistance that was sent to some two hundred directors and secretaries (given
at Appendix One). The key sectors represented were energy and primary
products, manufacturing, both traditional and high-technology (including
computing and pharmaceuticals) and retailing and information about companies
and individuals was principally obtained from the Kompass Company
Information Register, 5 the Hambro Company Guide6 and companies' own Annual
Reports and websites.
Within the group of interviewees, representation from a broad spread of sectors
(primary e.g. oil, secondary e.g. consumer goods, high-tech manufactures and
tertiary e.g. retail, leisure) was obtained. It was felt that financial service
Published annually (East Grinstead: Reed Business Information).
6 Published quarterly (London: Hemmington Scott).
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providers and privatised utilities, while raising interesting issues of governance,
were subject to other regulatory regimes than standard Companies Act, Stock
Exchange and Financial Services Authority rules. 7 Even excluding those sectors,
public companies whose goods and services are consumed directly by members
of the public may be expected to have a rather different set of priorities from
those which 'sell' to other corporations. Similarly, it might be anticipated that
industries (such as oil) which are capital-intensive would rate human resources
less highly than those (such as leisure) which rely more directly on the initiative
of members of staff 8 Of the eighteen companies, six are listed in the FTSE 100,
five in the middle 250, three are 'FTSE Fledglings', two have full listings but are
not in an index and two are quoted companies which do not have listings but are
likely to be seeking them. There was, therefore, experience of a cross-section of
public company sizes within the sample.
The companies whose officers were interviewed ranged from a retailer with over
300 stores from Aberdeen to Plymouth, to a shoe producer with a single UK
manufacturing base. One manufacturer's oldest business dates from the origin of
the Industrial Revolution, when the process of smelting iron using coke was
discovered, whereas another company was founded 18 years ago and is at the
leading edge of palmtop computing and wireless data transmission. Many of the
companies, such as market leaders in oil and pharmaceuticals, are of international
standing. None of those interviewed felt that current UK company law entirely
reflected the realities with which they had to deal every day. All of them were
speaking in a personal capacity, rather than as representatives of their particular
current main employers. Indeed, many interviewees consciously drew on
experiences from previous workplaces and several executives also referred to
work in part-time non-executive posts.
At the time of writing both the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Utilities Act
2000 have recently been passed.
M. Corbridge and S. Pilbeam, Employment Resourcing (London: Financial Times Management,
1998) discusses the importance of staff as a business asset.
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Each semi-structured interview lasted between 40 minutes and one hour. The
outline schedule of discussion topics is set out at Appendix Two, though issues
relevant to each interviewee's experience were explored in greater depth as time
permitted and the interviewees were encouraged to give practical examples from
their own careers and companies. The following is a selection of extracts from
interviewees' comments on some of the main issues, transcribed from tape
recordings. All of the interviewees are thanked for sparing time from very busy
schedules to take part and share their experiences. As they were promised, they
and their companies are not named in this report of what was said. The small
Roman numerals in the text below refer to the author's private records, which
identify the speaker who was responsible for each quotation.
8.4 The Boardroom Role
When asked how they perceived the role of a director, and how this differed from
management, interviewees highlighted the strategic questions determined in the
boardroom. For example: 'The role of the board is to be primarily concerned
with strategic direction and control. To be concerned with what the company
intends to do, how it intends to achieve it and how it's setting about that task.
What it shouldn't do is get involved in the minutiae of day-to-day management
tasks - that should be left to managers. It needs to ensure that managers are
competent to carry out the strategy and policy the board has agreed. The board
also needs to ensure that the company has sufficient resources for its plans, and
that implies both money and people. The board also needs to establish the tone of
the business, that is to say its general attitude towards trading, its attitude to its
responsibilities towards the environment, its staff, and to the community at large.
These are matters of leadership which only the board can provide.'
Another comment expressing similar views was: 'The role of the board as a
whole is to determine what the strategy of the business will be, the areas the
business is going to operate in, the steps the business needs to take to grow either
by organic growth or by acquisition, whether that is to be confined to one specific
area or to diversify, to have regard to the overall control of the business and see
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that there are policies and structures in place to ensure the board's strategy is
implemented. The board's role is as a force giving direction to the thousands of
employees who work to produce the profits for the people who own the business,
that is the shareholders." 1 Two other contributions used comparable wording.
One interviewee summed up the issue as follows: 'The responsibility of directors
is to direct the company, the responsibility of others below board level is to
execute the policy of the board and to manage the projects that result from that
policy and the employees who carry out those processes... [lit is the responsibility
of directors to examine, identify and develop the strategy of the company, to
identify the policies and framework of the group of companies and then to
arrange for the execution and proper operation of those strategies and policies.'1'1
A further common observation was that, in practice, the line between board
activity and management was often difficult to draw. As one participant said:
'The management committee of executive directors and myself (the Company
Secretary) look after the day-to-day running of the business and the board meets
monthly to discuss wider issues, big investments, and review the ongoing
business and how we're doing against our budgets and forecasts. In terms of
management, I wouldn't say there's a great deal of difference. In terms of
responsibility, being a director obviously carries with it greater responsibility to
the company. '" Similarly, another director remarked: 'I'm not sure you actually
see any material distinction in the way you approach things at all. Being on the
board means you have more decisions to make but a lot of people are given a lot
of executive responsibility in any case."
One interviewee put forward his views more trenchantly: 'It's a common fallacy
to believe that managers occupy one universe and directors another and in some
mystical way one is transmogrified from being a mere manager to being a
director and a lot of consultants make a lot of money from pretending that they
can in some way help with this transformation. It is of course, like a lot of the
rhetoric in this area complete and utter garbage, one is merely an extension of the
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other.. . [T]here are plenty of people in this organisation doing very senior and
responsible jobs who don't happen to be on our board and the notion that their
role and responsibilities and compass are in some way minor compared with the
board is nonsense."
An officer from a large multinational company did, however, draw a clear
distinction between the nature of board members' duties and those of other
executives: 'You have to realise that the board is there to set the general
checklists, the hurdle rates within those checklists, and then somebody else sits
down and does the specifics.. .By choosing a board of directors who are people of
wide experience, we get the right sort of perspective at the top and by having
executives who are required to interact across the whole of society and think
about the society in which they're living, we get the specificity at the bottom."
Other interviewees noted the public role of directors. One said: '1 think the main
differentiation of the directorial role is the higher profile it has, particularly from
an institutional investor perspective. It is the directors, executives and non-
executives in different ways, who are contemplated by shareholders and they're
not concerned about the others. This is reflected in the fact that the remuneration
of directors is public knowledge and the benefits package, incentive plans and so
on come up for approval at the Annual General Meeting.'" Another commented:
'Obviously the board of directors has legal and very serious responsibilities.
They are responsible for the management of the business and every decision
made. They are collectively responsible as we have a unitary board system in this
country. People further down the business, unless they do something dishonest,
as far as I know, are basically sheltered. If they are carrying out the policies of
the board they are in a relatively protected position. And obviously directors
have responsibilities, some would say principally, to the shareholders who have
invested their money in the company. They also owe responsibilities to the staff
and for compliance with legislation, whether health and safety or anything else."
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Two other participants highlighted board responsibilities to shareholders, one
saying: 'As a director you have to be driven in your decision-making by the
creation of shareholder value and wealth - that is the single most important
consideration that comes into your mind when you look at the issues facing the
company. The other responsibility is concerned with the fiduciary duties and, in
simplistic terms, making sure the company's behaving itselfi"' The other stated
that: 'Directors have specific responsibilities quite separate from the role they
may have as managers. Currently they are answerable solely to the owners of the
business, i.e. the shareholders, and they have, in law, no other responsibilities."1
It was, perhaps, surprising that more participants did not address the constituency
- or constituencies - issue at this stage, particularly given the later remarks in
many interviews concerning the power of institutiona\ investors.
Finally, one Company Secretary, who was in the midst of dealing with a
takeover, pointed out: 'If you're involved in a lot of corporate activity, you're
very much involved with directors' responsibilities, particularly when you've got
to sign statements. That helps to concentrate the mind! Aside from corporate
activity, issuing new shares and so on, most boards would meet once a month.
Then there will be more informal meetings on board matters - for example if
there are appointments to be made, interviewing people, succession planning,
those sorts of issues."
The line between executive action and directorial oversight is not always clear-
cut. These officers nevertheless see the board as providing strategic direction and
managerial leadership and carrying ultimate legal and public accountability for
corporate actions. Most of them are very conscious that they are, in practice,
reliant upon a large number of people to carry out their strategies daily - and the
larger the corporation, the more this is so. However, if management systems
prove to be inadequate, it is directors who may suffer consequences in law.9
' As in, for example, Re Purpoint Ltd [19911 BCLC 491; Re. Barings p/c (No.5) [199911 BCLC
433.
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8.5 Whose Interests Do Directors Take into Account in Making Decisions?
The question was asked without mentioning 'stakeholders' or any particular
interest groups, so as not to bias or 'lead' responses, though most interviewees
noted that it related to the 'stakeholder' issue. One director's opinion was:
'Without a doubt the primary interest group would be the shareholders. At the
end of the day, if you've got two ways to do things and they're both equally
shareholder-friendly, you might do things that would be better for your customers
or employees if you've got a choice. At the end of the day, the reason you want
to keep the customers happy is because of the impact they have on shareholders.
The reason you want to keep employee morale up and give them a good career is
because that is the future of the business for the shareholders.''
Another interviewee said in response to this question: 'The answer to that
primarily has to be the interests of the sftareho(dets, the Qw'ixes c the
and I don't think any director of a listed company can really give a different
answer to that as the prime responsibility. However, I'm conscious that there is,
if I've remembered my Companies Act right, a statutory duty to have regard to
the interests of employees - it's still there isn't it? 1 susçiect i 'm. acie the &'
company directors who does remember that it's there, it's virtually unenforceable,
but to my mind it is meaningful.. .1 personally also think that we as a
board... should have regard to wider community interests... [O]ur first duty is to
our shareholders, but I do mean all our shareholders large and small, though of
course in the last resort it is the big institutions who dictate the outcome of
shareholder votes."
There was further support for the view that the board should aim for shareholder
value, but with some qualifications: 'Our main interest is making a profit, so you
could say we're considering the interests of shareholders. Having said that, I
would obviously take a broader interest in all the elements that make up the
profit. Disgruntled employees because they're not paid properly, shoddy
products and dissatisfied customers aren't very good for profits! While trying to
make profits is the end result, you do that by running a business properly and
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ethically." Another director explained in greater detail: 'When all is said and
done, it is shareholders we are reporting to and we have to keep them satisfied,
otherwise they start selling shares, the share price goes down, we start getting bad
write-ups from the analysts and life is not rosy! If you're referring to wider
stakeholders - customers, employees etc. - all those issues have to be borne in
mind, because if your company gets a bad press and a bad image, that reflects on
the share price and the desirability of the company as a business for people to
invest in. I would say that those are secondary issues compared to the
shareholders who are the owners of the business. It's good business practice that
you run your business as effectively and profitably as possible and that will
encompass environmental issues. We happen to be in a chemicals business. We
have to make sure that's run properly, that it meets all the health and safety
requirements, that we don't pollute the local river and upset the local
inhabitants.. .1 do think that that is part of the management of the business rather
than why you are ultimately running the business, which is for the shareholders,
to make sure that people who've entrusted their funds to your business get the
returns they want.x%z
A similar point was also put forward in more blunt terms in another interview:
'These days, the pressures of the market are never far away. A company would
be very foolish if it decided to ignore its shareholders and not worry at all about
its share price, because it would then come under pressure.. .If it doesn't consider
the interests of its other - the modern word is stakeholders, it can't look after its
shareholder interests. If you rip off your customers, pretty soon you won't have
any customers! If you maltreat your employees they'll leave! If you don't pay
your suppliers, they'll offer their best lines to other people! In order to look after
your shareholders' interests, you've got to make sure you're looking after the
interests of all these other people."1
Shareholder value was perceived by at least three participants to have
strengthened in recent years, as the following extract states: 'Over the last ten or
twelve years, following the concept of shareholder value, there was a change of
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attitude through the mid-Eighties. There was a re-focusing of management, and
of executive directors towards this fulcrum of shareholder value and
responsibility to shareholders. I think there was a kind of oligarchy back in the
Fifties, Sixties and Seventies. A lot of British companies were extremely poorly
run, they weren't getting proper returns on capital and the directors were
appointed by themselves not so much on the basics of merit but on the basis of
clubs... There undoubtedly has been, though the mechanics have often not been
attractive, a re-focusing on shareholder value, proper returns to the company,
proper shareholder returns and so
The performance of a corporate group as a whole may be adversely affected by
underperformance of one part, which may lead to tough choices for main board
directors: 'If profit (for one company in a group) depends on the internal price,
which isn't related to the market price, you can't go on like that. The internal
wholesale price for beer was 25 per cent more expensive than the price we started
buying for (outside of the group)...The market is shrinking. The breweries will be
the ninth and tenth breweries to close in the north-east this year.. .We've provided
generous compensation and outplacement services where employees have met
people who would write CVs and so on. 30 per cent of the redundant employees
have already found jobs.'
Nevertheless, many directors did see their role as to some extent that of balancing
a number of important demands for the benefit of the company: 'First and
foremost come the shareholders. When we're looking at major moves for the
company, we have to look at shareholder value, are we doing the right thing for
the shareholders, because we are ultimately responsible for what we are
proposing. . . They do come first.
'Secondly, the company is enormously important - it's not about the directors'
personal ambitions, it's about where the company is going to go, in terms of
market share and new products, and obviously that has an impact on shareholder
value.. .The company as a separate legal entity, how it is positioned, how it is to
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grow, how it is progressing, its impact against competitors.. .comes a close
second.
'The third set of concerns would be customers and employees - I'm hesitating as
to which comes first, they perhaps rank equally. Without customers you haven't
got a business, so they're extremely important. Most companies rely on their
employees to produce the plans and carry out the strategy.
'Another group we must never forget of course is the suppliers.. .If we grow
larger and therefore have better buying power and therefore can dictate better
terms with our suppliers, that will have an impact on our suppliers.. .That then
has an impact on our shareholders."
Broader corporate responsibilities can also, in the stated opinion of two
participants, be compatible with the delivery of shareholder value: 'The prime
interest of a director is in the owners of the company, that is the shareholders, and
we have to act in the best interests of all the shareholders - the minority
shareholders, the public shareholders, and the others, who could be industry
players. There are other responsibilities which I think are very important. Peop'e
talk about responsibilities to the environment, to the community, to employees,
and I think you have to be very clear what is meant by that. There are a lot of
good examples which demonstrate how taking their interests into account can be
good for the shareholders as a whole... You can either choose to take a pro-active
policy on the management of safety or you can choose not to.. .If you take a pro-
active policy towards safety which results in fewer lost time accidents, fewer
injuries to your employees, you will improve the efficiency of the plant and your
ability to service the market...Similarly with the environment. The way
legislation is going, you have to take damage to the environment seriously. The
costs of not doing so can be extremely high. You can be prosecuted. The
reputation of the company can suffer. Public attitudes to the company can have a
major impact on whether or not they are prepared to buy its goods and services -
we saw the Shell example (the Brent Spar controversy and subsequent consumer
boycott) which had a serious impact on the company's financial performance and
shareholders. But ultimately those things have to be driven by what creates value
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for shareholders."°' Two other commentators independently referred to Shell's
public relations difficulties.
Questions of reputation are widely regarded as having financia) impacts:
'Fundamentally what we're looking to do is to grow the company and to develop
it and that's got to be in the prime interest of the long-term shareholder... We're
acting on their behalf, essentially, to improve the investments they've made... {J]f
you get a bad reputation you're not going to have a good business, therefore it's
essential that you take everyone whose interests are directly affected into
account. . . A lot of our involvement is with local communities. We need their
support to be able to get planning permission to run our business. We've got to
extend our quarries and run trucks all over the place.. .Fundamentally the
strategic decisions are taken in the interests of the shareholders but at the end of
the day, you have to take everyone else's interests into account who is directly
involved in whatever activity you're talking about. Employees, customers, the
community etc. are all relevant.""
An interesting example of such consequences was given: 'Broadly speaking, not
in some narrow sense, I think it's right to say we ask: "What does the Stock
Market expect of us?" There are some specific expectations the Stock Market has
of this company at this particular time and those are expectations in the market
for our shares.. .In the broadest sense, we're looking at what is in the interests of
the company and the principal measure of the interests of the company is the
impact on shareholders. Having said that, one has to qualify it. We're a drug
company. We're selling off some old sites, and quite a lot of old drug company
sites are quite seriously contaminated... Someone may come and say that there's a
big environmental risk there. Rather than having an ongoing liability to the
purchaser, we'd like it cleaned up and that's going to cost a lot of money, say x
million pounds. We don't say: "How does this relate to the interests of the
shareholders?". . . We look at that in terms of: "What should a responsible
company do in those circumstances? What's the right thing in terms of
minimising our ongoing obligations? What's the right thing in terms of our
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reputation as an environmentally responsive company?". . . If we buy the argument
that we should clean up the site, that's self-interest. Let's clean up the site, it's
going to be extremely expensive, but we don't want adverse publicity and/or
ongoing liability.. .In some ultimate sense you're asking, is this good for the long
term health of the company, and that involves the reputation of the company.
It is interesting to note that those with retail experience saw the need to balance
the interests of various stakeholders in stronger terms than most other
participants, as the following extracts indicate: 'In retail, the most important
constituencies we have are shareholders, first and foremost because they own the
business and we are in the business of making money, secondly our customers,
without whom we wouldn't have a business, thirdly our suppliers, on whom we
are dependent for the products we sell to our customers to generate a return for
our shareholders, and fourthly, our employees, who again are absolutely vital
because without them we wouldn't have a business. In any big strategic decision
we take, we always have regard to those different interests. It's interesting that
our board reflects all those various interests. We have the Chairman and non-
executives who can be said in many senses to be representing the interests of the
shareholders, although I think all the directors collectively have to represent those
interests, as they are servants in legal terms of the company but in real terms of
the shareholders. Then we have very strong representation from the buying and
merchandising community, we also have the interests of the retail part of the
business.. .through the MD, who's a retailer. We also have a Personnel Director
who is on the board representing the interests of all the employees across the
business... Most enlightened businesses in this country recognise what is, I think,
an obvious fact, which is that you cannot grow a business and sustain a business
into the future unless you have regard to these various interests. I'd in fact go
further and say I consider it to be a legal obligation of directors to have regard - to
have regard, as opposed to owing a duty - to these various interests in carrying
out their primary duty, which is their duty to the company.' Similarly, another
outstandingly experienced retailing executive said this: 'I don't think that any one
of the views on the matter would suggest that all three groups (shareholders,
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customers and employees) aren't very important. They all get top priority
treatment but at the end of the day, the shareholder lobby believes
that. . . everything you do must be done with first and foremost the shareholder in
mind. I'm not in that camp. I'm not of that view, any more.. .1 think with today's
growing short-termism of the institutional investor, who himself is being
monitored as to his performance in managing the fund, it's much more difficult
for him to take a long-term view. . . I've come to the conclusion that the
shareholder is entitled to enormous priority, but if you haven't got customers
satisfied with your product, you've got a problem, and frankly, you won't have
customers if you don't employ good staff producing the good product or the
service they're going to buy from you and interfacing with them properly,
efficiently, and in such a way that those customers will stay loyal to you. I'm of
the view now that you've got to have a very well-motivated, efficient staff and
after that, they will serve the customers well and in a manner that pleases them
and the benefits will flow to the shareholder. I'm very much of the stakeholder
approach, but it is all very marginal because it would be totally wrong to take
other than very seriously the needs of shareholders who, after all, are investing in
your company.'
In a public company which is still in governmental ownership (albeit preparing
for the sale of part of its equity) and a private sector corporation concerned with
delivering contracts for formerly 'public' services to local authorities, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the stakeholder viewpoint was strongly endorsed. The comment
of the legal directors of the former organisation was simply: 'There are many
stakeholders, not just the shareholders. A company like ours, or virtually any
major company, has many employees and legal responsibilities to
creditors.. .There are local communities in which companies operate, companies
can be dominant in particular geographies and they have responsibilities... Some
towns are one-company towns. You also have all kinds of responsibilities, to
other stakeholders, to the environment. The precise set of stakeholders will
include shareholders, employees, the community, the ones I've mentioned, but
other companies will have additional stakeholders.' 	 The Managing Director
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of the latter said: 'Obviously as an organisation which sees itself as being very
customer-orientated, we have a very strong focus towards our clients. So they
come very high on our list of priorities. Our staff are very important to us and
form part of what we are offering, because the bulk of them are ex-pub tic sector
employees. But in any event you can't deliver a strong or good service without
having a strong affinity to your employees and involving them strongly. So I
think these are two very strong areas but in addition, one cannot forget the
shareholders, not least because I am one - from a self-interest perspective, that's
important to me. I think if you get the customer focus right, if you employ people
who are dedicated to the organisation, then shareholders' interests will follow.
But if all you do is say: "I will only look narrowly at satisfying shareholders'
interests", ultimately you lose the plot."
The extent to which shareholder returns are or should be prioritised, if at all, is
obviously a matter which still ignites great controversy in management circles.
Planning for medium- and long-term profitability and growth is a concern for all
boards. Some public company leaders make explicit that they regard themselves
as agents of investors in making and executing those plans. Those directors who
see themselves as stewards or guardians of the interests of the company as an
ongoing institution are somwhat closer to the twentieth century judicial
understanding of directors' duties.'°
8.6 Which Stakeholder(s) have Priority?
Many of the most difficult decisions for directors come when there is an apparent
clash between the interests of different interest groups, for example employees
who wish to protect their tenure and remuneration and shareholders who demand
acceptable profits. One Company Secretary said: 'I think we would see this very
much as a situation where we have been given investors' money to use, in the
best way possible - but 'best' has got a wide, large, liberal interpretation. We
seek the best use of those funds in their interests to give them the best possible
return, because those people need and are indeed relying on us to provide them
For example Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421; Stein v Blake [1998] 1 All ER 742.
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with future growth and future economic welfare. We clearly have to ensure that
those funds are put to the best use in the ways in which we have declared we will
use them. We have declared we will use them in three markets and some sectors
of those markets. They are oil, the production side of the oil business and the
refining part of it, the production and marketing of chemicals and a subset of oil
production, which is gas production.'" Another interviewee spoke of financial
pressure from investors: 'People always look to their own individual long-term
interests. If they feel they're under pressure from shareholders, it's not surprising
that people will act in a manner which will try to assuage the demands of
shareholders. At the end of the day if institutions said: "We don't care, do what
you like and if you lose money, you lose money" directors wouldn't have to
worry would they? That's not what the investing public actually demands. The
investing public is not just the institutions - the institutions are investing on
behalf of a significant proportion of the people who live in the UK. At the enà o
the day, if companies don't perform, the institutions won't get the returns they
need to be able to pay their pensions.'"
Corporate reputation for responsibility can itself affect the views of potential
shareholders: 'We wouldn't invest in just anything, however socially
unacceptable it was, because we have a reputation for being a traditional, well-
established, respectable business and I think we would be careful to guard that.
To give an example of something we wouldn't necessarily invest in - genetic
engineering maybe, if it were thought to be unacceptable; on the other hand it's a
growth area and we may look at it in time. I don't think we'd want to be seen to
be involved in a business that was blatantly breaking every corner of the health
and safety regulations or seen to be abusing its workforce in any way... We've got
no existing problems and as far as I'm aware the investment community doesn't
regard us as a potentially sensitive business."
One director clearly expressed the view that shareholders were entitled to priority
as they were accepting the risks of failure: 'In law, you would have to look at
what happens when a company goes bankrupt. The pecking order then gives
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some indication of the Government's viewpoint. Tax I think comes first, the
shareholders come at the bottom, suppliers are next bottom, banks I think come
next - and I'm not sure where employees come as regards back pay they may be
owed. If you reversed those, it would give you some idea of what the
Government thinks are the stakeholders in any big business - how they split up
the spoils when it goes bust. If you take any business, the people who have an
interest in the success of that business, apart from the shareholders, are
employees, customers, suppliers and the local community that provides the
environment for the business and where people's wages get spent. If the
Government wants to change the responsibility from being to shareholders, they
have to put in place not only privileges but responsibilities.. .If the Government is
going to expect shareholders to put their money in to a risky enterprise, they have
to think about what's going to happen when things go wrong."
The treatment of employees who are made redundant in the interests of assuring
profitability was cited as significant in the following comments: 'In the very short
term, the interests might be in conflict, because you would be perceived as
putting people out on to the streets.. .The argument that is counter to that is that if
you don't have a competitive business, in the long term you won't survive and a
lot more people will be out on the streets. Telecommunications has created, as
it's grown, more jobs than it has eliminated through someone like BT having to
downsize because of competitive forces and changes in technology. . .What
you've got to do as a company, and this is a choice directors can make, is to
choose how you treat those employees when you've got to lay them off and that's
really tricky - there's no right or wrong answer to that. Some companies are
totally ruthless in the way they do it, others are more respectful of what people
are going through, in the way it's handled and the terms and conditions... You can
decide what sort of behaviour you want to have in a company, take a personal
view that you've got to take hard decisions but you can treat people with the
respect they deserve.'' From another industry which has suffered job losses: 'A
lot of change in the group has come about because of changing attitudes on the
London Stock Exchange towards manufacturing industry and the engineering
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sector, particularly towards companies which for many years have had a wide
spread of interests, which not so long ago was thought to be a great
strength...Conglomerates went out of fashion in the 1990s and we were required
to focus.. .We were known as metal bashers (though we had interests outside of
metal and we did a lot of things with metal other than bash it!), we had steel mills
and iron foundries and we have disposed of most of those. When you are
focusing, enhancing results, a major part of the response tends to be curtailment
of costs...and you cut costs by reducing numbers...That I wouldn't myself see as
setting up a situation of conflict. Why not? Because we're conscious of our
responsibilities, for example under the redundancy payments legislation, we have
always complied with that and more. In our relationships with unions and
individuals, providing outplacement services for those being made redundant, we
have done far more than the statutory requirement. In doing all that, there really
hasn't been what I would describe as a conflict in this area.'"
Another commentator highlighted a different way of aligning the interests of
employees and shareholders: 'We've had a profit-sharing scheme for over 20
years, which gives full-time employees a shareholding in the company. We look
after employees by making them stakeholders, that is owners of the company.
It's a good way of retaining loyalty and commitment. I'm in favour of that and
very much in favour of the things that successive governments have done to make
that more tax-efficient and sensible, I think that's been beneficial. I wouldn't be
in favour of legislation which would make people behave in a certain
way.. .Anything that suggests that companies shouldn't conduct their activities in
a way which will produce the greatest profit would be very unhelpful.'"
Many of those interviewed, however, took as their lodestone the long-term good
of the company as a whole as the following shows: 'It comes back to the basic
premise of doing what's best for the company. You owe a duty to all
stakeholders to take them into consideration. If you've got two different
stakeholders pointing East and West, diametrically opposed, you've got to think
what's best for the company. That will involve upsetting one stakeholder if you
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agree with the other one, but you've got to manage that disagreement and explain
why you've taken that decision.'"
To quote one example of balancing different interests: 'Let's assume we are
closing factories to produce more efficiently at the expense of some jobs. You
take a view on what you believe is good for the long-term health of the company.
That means, what course of action is likely to lead to the company being healthy,
successful, efficient and profitable? If you like, the measure of that is what
happens to the share price. Implicitly you are saying a few employees will lose
their jobs, but that is a sacrifice (quite brutal as this sounds) they have to make in
order that the ongoing viability of the business can be assured. If we are to stay a
successful and efficient drug company, we have to develop new drugs. That's a
difficult and risky business, you need a1fi the money you can get for t'nat, so if you
can stop money being dissipated in surplus factories and bring it behind
researchers and their equipment, that's what you are going to do. So the test
would be, what is in the interests of the health and future prospects of this
company? Another way of saying that would be, what's in the interests of the
majority of its employees? if we have a healthy business going forwara', that's
good for the employees who are left. . . It depends on the proposition in front of
you. You look at the impact on a whole range of constituencies from public
opinion, at the most abstract end, to employees and the stock market and you
come to a conclusion based on what is in the interests of the ongoing success and
prosperity of the enterprise. If you want to say that the principal indicator of that,
in a broad sense, is the share price, then I wouldn't disagree.x\l
Another participant summed up is response as follows: 'It's not a question of
either/or, you have to think about them all, all the time, but on a particular issue,
you may have to give somebody preference. For instance, if it becomes perfectly
clear that you need to increase the wages of a large part of your staff in order to
be competitive - the Health Service found this recently in relation to nurses' pay -
then you must do it, and if it comes off the bottom line, that's tough. At that
moment in order to look after the interests of shareholders in the long term, you
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have to diminish their expectations in the shorter term. On the other hand, you
could easily have a situation where you've formed the conclusion that a particular
plant is never likely to produce a satisfactory level of profitability, it can never be
remedied, and you'd have to close it.""
A different perspective on the question of redundancies came from a more
service-orientated business: 'The reality is that we need to look at the long term
in decision-making. It's no use letting go of 10 per cent of the employees when
they transfer (to the private sector) and then finding we haven't got enough.. .It's
much better to keep these people. The point about fleecing the customers - that
could lead to better short-term profits but not in the long run... With the long-term
relationships we have with clients, our minimum contract is five years and we
have contracts up to 15 years. It would be very shortsighted to fleece the
customers. So in both instances I have answered in what is the long-term interest
of the organisation. Once we've started seeing it in a medium or long term, the
interests of the shareholders, customers and workforce actually converge.'
Other directors agreed that the conflict between shareholder value and
stakeholder interests was false. As one put it: 'We've got to ask: "What is this
idea of 'the company?" [I]t's evolved over the last 200 years to a construct
where, in my opinion, a company is a structure in which capital, management,
employees, customers and suppliers come together to effect ends which supersede
any of the specific or particular interests of those groups... [T]he company is
apparently a very successful machine, or structure, which brings these things
together to achieve something greater than each of them can achieve
alone... There are new kinds of structure developing now which supersede the
company and Silicon Valley is an illustration of that.. .But if we stick to my
definition of what I mean by 'the company', there are four or five different
interest groups or stakeholders coming together to achieve those ends. Company
law is partly buried in history here and doesn't actually deal with the reality.
Having said all that, companies in this capitalist world we live in survive or
flourish, or alternatively die or get acquired, according to their success as
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measured in financial and accounting terms. That, if you like, is the scorecard,
the end-of-term report for a company.. . A modern, intelligently-run company is
extremely conscious that to deliver the shareholder returns, to be effective, they
have to have very positive policies for their employees, for their customers, for
their suppliers - progressive, positive policies.. .These things correlate - if they
didn't correlate, the company wouldn't be a successful form."'
This medium-to-long-term convergence of interests was the subject of another
discussion: 'I think companies do increasingly bear in mind that short-term
decisions which might seem to be for the benefit of shareholders are not always a
sensible way forward because in order to make short-term profits, that might
involve, for example, sacrificing a segment of the workforce and have longer-
term consequences that might affect profitability in the future.. .I'd certainly like
to dispel any myth that the boards of British companies are concerned Dfl)y with
producing a profit and returns to shareholders - I don't believe that's the case and
had it been the case, British business would be radically different from what it is
now.. .There's a separate issue, which is, does British business feel constrained
by thinking that the City has a short-term approach? I think British business
sometimes kids itself that the City is short-termist and the City is considerably
less short-termist than most British business people say. The stock market value
of a company such as this is not judged on what our current profits are or what
people expect in the current year. We are valued on what the market believes we
will be producing in the future, and it can only come to an assessment of our
future profits based on our proposals for investment going forward... .In the retail
business, by the very nature of what we do, we have to have regard to all those
constituencies or we wouldn't have a business. I think the same could be applied
with equal force to an industrial concern.. .The institutions would say: "How can
you hope to develop your business, to grow your business, if you don't care about
any of the factors that make up the environment in which you operate?x
One director was in favour of permitting different corporate models: 'I think to
ask people to choose between shareholder value and pluralism is wrong - I don't
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think shareholder value is necessarily different from the pluralist view. I think if
you pursue it to its ultimate conclusion, you end up with the same thing. If you
pursue shareholder value, you treat all these other interest groups well... There's
no reason why you can't have two different types of company, PLC pluralist and
PLC shareholder, with different Articles of Association. If you have a
shareholder value corporate shell and a pluralist corporate shell, let the market
develop and let people decide whether they want to work for PLC pluralist or
PLC shareholder, let suppliers decide who they want to supply, let shareholders
decide where they want to invest their money. It's typical of government, saying
we've got to choose one or the other.. .You could just say: "Here's an alternative
structure, anyone who wants to adopt it can do so", and if no-one's adopting it,
that means companies don't want it. If there's no pressure form suppliers, there's
no pressure from customers, no pressure from shareholders, to adopt this second
structure, then what's the Government rattling on aboutTth
Despite the popularity of management literature on the topic," only one
participant thought that customers had top priority and he explained his reasons:
'Customers are number one. They pay my salary.. .It's customers first,
employees second and shareholders third. The reason for that is straightforward.
If you put shareholders first, I as a shareholder receiving my dividend do not
guarantee I will reinvest in your organisation. I'll invest where I can get the best
return. Also we've got to look, particularly in the UK, at investments for the long
journey. The Japanese approach is for long-term investments, whereas if there is
a complaint against the US, it's that many investments are for very short terms.
We mustn't be too short-termist. Decisions to stay in markets and trade into
other markets are often made because people do not see how they will produce
returns quickly enough and we could be, in terms of technology, having to deal
with situations which last for years."
"For example, Patricia Seybold's Custo,ners.com (London: Century, 1998) has been in
Amazon.com's business books bestseller list (1999 2000).
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A small but significant group of public company officers interviewed perceived
themselves as primarily agents of the shareholders. The remainder took the view
that they had a more complex set of responsibilities, all of which had to be
addressed if their respective businesses were to be successful. Perhaps the most
important argument advanced by those who are in favour of shareholder primacy
has been the need for a single goal by which directors could measure their
decisions (though as seen above, some also use arguments around shareholder
'ownership rights'). Those directors who claim to make their assessments by
reference to the long-term 'good of the company', however, do not appear to feel
that they lack a guiding principle in their daily work, though they may weigh
other considerations in the balance against returns to shareholders.
8.7 Managing Relationships with Stakeholders
There were some very detailed responses to this general question, revealing
comprehensive and sophisticated communication strategies. For example: 'We
have regular contact with shareholders, one-to-one meetings. Through the analyst
community, we have meetings at least twice a year with our group of
analysts... We're also setting up an internet site so we'll be able to communicate
more rapidly. Our small shareholders will be able to tap into that, because there's
always the dichotomy between the big institutions where there are one-to-one
meetings and they have the benefit of analysts' research and private
shareholders... Of course by Stock Exchange rules you can't divulge information
that's material or price-sensitive to one class of shareholders without telling
everyone else... Obviously we have the AGM so our private shareholders have
the opportunity to ask questions of directors there. This year we did a
presentation, which went down very well.
'The customers - obviously we get feedback via the branches on how customers
are thinking, but we have also just done a large amount of independent research
into what our customers and suppliers think of us. We weren't allowed to sit in
on meetings and no names have been disclosed, so customers and suppliers were
free to tell the truth and that has been very interesting.. .We also do market
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research, so when we've done TV advertising we'll do market research to see
what the audience thinks...
'For employees - we have a regular newsletter. Also any announcements we
make go all round the group immediately. Again, hopefully people will get used
to looking at the website so they can get information on the report and accounts
and so on. We also have a European Forum, which is effectively a Works
Council. Not many companies have that in place yet."'
Another example of this systematic, integrated approach was the following: 'If
we start with the shareholders, we're a small plc and there's been a lot in the
press about availability of finance for smaller public limited companies. What
you have to do is keep the interest of the shareholders in what you're doing.
Obviously we have the AGM and put out statements. We also had two meetings
at the Barbican where we put our products out, did a presentation and invited
shareholders. We also are involved with the Guild of Shareholders, which is a
guild for smaller pics. . .In a smaller plc, institutions aren't very interested, so we
have a lot of smaller shareholders. We have a lot of dialogue with our
shareholders one to one, where you talk about what you're doing. You have to be
careful you don't stray from the guidelines about what you can say to one
shareholder alone but they will telephone us and say: "How are things going?"
'As far as staff are concerned, we have built up here a very loyal, generally young
staff around the world. We do have different systems in different parts of the
world because different regulations apply, but in the UK we have development
plans for individuals, encourage them to get training and get involved in the
business and also encourage them to move on in the business...
'For customers, you have to look at quality - we've just got ISO 9000 and that's
an indication for customers of the quality of what we're doing. For suppliers,
again it's about contact. The common thread between all those is continuous
face-to-face dialogue.'
From the retail sector came the following example: 'We have the usual Annual
Report, a half yearly report and a series of investor newsletters, four times a
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year... We have Stock Exchange announcements.. .to keep the market informed.
We have an AGM like all companies and we use the opportunity to sell our
philosophy to shareholders and put forward our ideas.. .We also have a
programme of institutional shareholder meetings where we see institutions on a
regular basis, usually the Finance Director and the Chief Executive make
presentations outlining our strategy, so there's quite a good flow of information,
subject to the usual constraints of price sensitivity...
'We regularly have meetings with our suppliers where we invite suppliers to
come and see us and discuss our plans. . . We used to have thousands, we're now
down to seven hundred world-wide and we've had conferences with suppliers to
brief them on the changes...
'We have a series of regular communications with employees, an in-house
quarterly magazine, a glossy one, which we encourage peop'e to conttib.xte to arid
which we put things in to explain what's going on. Whenever we announce
trading results or make any other announcement we circulate it by e-mail. We
have focus groups, discussion groups where we encourage employees to
participate... We are also setting up a European Works Council.
'On the customer side, we produce a magazine, which is free to customers, on a
half-yearly basis. We have a lot of contact with our customer base through the
fact that a large proportion of our customers is store card holders, so they get
direct mailings."
Other respondents focused on shareholder relations: 'Institutional investor
relations have long been the prime responsibility of the Chief Executive and the
Finance Director.. .In the 1980s we consciously set out to develop an institutional
investor relations programme... Apart from the main board directors I've
mentioned, two senior managers who are not on the board, our group treasurer
and corporate planning manager, have also been involved. My own links with
shareholders, which go back to my time as group secretary, have been with.. .the
individual shareholders.. .At the Annual General Meeting, I talk to the small
shareholders and my colleagues talk to the merchant banks.'
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Two respondents highlighted increasing pressures from shareholders, particularly
institutions: 'Shareholders are increasingly demanding on short-term returns.
Quarterly reporting has made that much tougher. I think if you communicate
openly and regularly about the issues you're dealing with, you can begin to
manage this short-term/long-term trade-off. If you're a company that's doing the
right thing, there shouldn't be any major conflict between the short term and the
long term. " A Finance Director commented: 'In terms of the institutions, we
see them face-to-face at least twice a year.. .Last week and this week I've seen 15
of the top 20 shareholders. They are primarily concerned with profits. On a scale
of one to 10, profit is 10, the next thing is about two. They're not interested in
employee relations unless suddenly we have a strike, they're not interested in the
environment unless we have an environmental issue, and customer relationships
are about: "How can you make money?" It all comes back to the same thing.dhl
One director, however, emphasised that directors retain substantial control over
corporate decisions, at least as long as they are seen to be producing consistent
financial results: 'We believe that the shareho1ciers. . .wou\à expect us to run the
business for its overall long-term health, as measured by the long-term value of
the capital and the payments we make twice a year. I don't believe that anybody
buys a share... so that we can say: "Sorry, you've put ten quid in here and it's
only worth eight quid and we've halved the dividend, but we've got some happy
customers and lots of employees who would otherwise be fired.. .and the
community is delighted because we've been giving your money to art galleries.
You haven't made any more money but we've looked after all the constituents
except you.".. . Do we ask them about charitable giving, do we say: "Do you mind
if we give Lx million to charity?" No we don't ask them that. It's none of their
business, they're only the owners!...If we said: "Do you mind us giving Lx
million to charity?", most of them would say: "No, we don't mind that, it's de
minimis compared with the totality of funds of which you're stewards, as long as
you're looking after us and the share price is rising.".. .If we didn't spend £2.1
billion on R&D, there'd be more money to give to the shareholders, but that's the
business... Similarly you could say: "Why do you have such generous redundancy
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terms?" We could halve our redundancy terms tomorrow and they'd still be
much better than anybody else's... so why don't we do that and leave more
money for the shareholders?.. .The answer is - we do believe in the right to
human dignity.. .but also treating people properly, and in financial terms
generously, is part of what [the company] is all about.1c
One comment emphasised that in many large companies, much responsibility
must still be devolved to the operational level: 'We have an environmental report
once a quarter, supplied to the board. Other things that happen, formal decisions
and approvals are notified to the board. By the same token, where we've got
fined - for discharges and things like that, you can't avoid it completely - that
sort of information goes up to the board. . . We've got 400 sites - no one thing we
do in any particular place would actually have implications that would be huge,
but we try to avoid fines as much as possible... We've got a general environment
policy and general health and safety policy but we have directions which are far
more detailed and far more onerous at the operational level. You have to, they
are dangerous places to work, quarries and brick factories.. .There's no way we
can set those standards at Head Office, we have to leave that to the local
level.. .There are industry statistics all the time about injuries and to be perfectly
honest, it's financially advantageous not to have accidents happen because it
means your insurance premiums are significantly less. The insurance industry
continually watches what happens and if we set up a good record we get lower
premiums."
Other companies rely chiefly on the board making deductions from the figures
presented to it: 'I don't think the board sees any information concerning
customers or employees. The board sees financial figures and it will make
deductions from those figures - obviously if you're not selling well, there's
something wrong with your customer link. The board assesses management by
their financial returns, but uses the financial performance to draw other
conclusions. We don't have customer surveys or employee surveys. It's a small
business so the directors are in touch with what's going on.' In a similar vein:
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'With customers, you can look at your sales figures and see if your market share
is decreasing or increasing. If your market share is decreasing, your customers
love somebody else better! Top line, so to speak, tells you quite a lot. Some
companies have procedures for giving people reports on complaints, press reports
- these things have a habit of getting back to customers. As far as employees are
concerned, you can look at what the turnover rates are and how these compare
with those of your competitors. Among your senior managers and directors, you
will know who's resigned and why."
There appears from the wide range of comments to be a broad spectrum of
policies concerning stakeholder communication and relations. Satisfying and
informing the institutional shareholders is understandably a priority for public
company directors whose positions may depend on the votes of those major
investors, but many are also conscious of the needs of the smaller shareholder and
all are aware of Stock Exchange rules on disclosure of information. As far as
customer and employee relationships are concerned, however, policies and
procedures differ, with retail and associated businesses often at the forefront of
new thinking.' 2 Insofar as the UK has traditionally had a poor reputation for
employee development and customer satisfaction compared with continental
Europe and the USA, an updating of the Directors' Report to include simple
measures of, for example, employee turnover and customer complaints might
focus directors' minds on those areas. The Operating and Financial Review,
which it is proposed that public companies would have to prepare under a new
UK Companies Act, covers many of these issues. As drafted, however, the
proposal leaves much of the judgment as to which matters are 'material' (and
therefore need to be disclosed) to directors, giving considerable scope for
variation of standards between reports.'3
8.8 Changes to Company Law
2 M. Goyder, Living To,norrow's Company (Aldershot: Gower, 1998) sets out the so-called
'inclusive approach' to management of companies.
3 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Fra,nework (DTI, March 2000) paras 5.77-5.92.
279
Of the officers interviewed, many were firmly against the notion of directors
owing legal duties to constituencies other than shareholders. One said: 'My view
is that if people wish to organise and form an institution of any kind, then there is
the freedom and flexibility within the current Companies Act for them to do
so.. .If they can show that they cannot do what they want under the present
system of company law, then it's for them to make their case.. .What is clear is
that there needs to be, within that range of options.. .a type of company, in which
the members clearly have the right of control over the people at the top and in
which the directors are accountable to them and them alone, which is the normal
kind of company which is used for business purposes and which will continue to
be necessary for business purposes. If they change the law in such a way as to
deny those companies behaviour which.. .gives shareholders exclusive control,
exclusive accountability, then business will simply move, people will go to other
jurisdictions.. .[I]f smaller companies are forced into a situation where, in order to
get the benefit of incorporation, they have to give away their property rights, then
I think people will say: "I'm not going to give away my property rights, I own
this enterprise and I will find some other method of incorporation which will
recognise that.". . . Behind all this debate, unfortunately, is the political process,
this idea that we are going to expropriate and force a change in our existing
companies, we're going to take away the rights that current shareholders have.
That's the threat that is behind the screens and I just can't believe that the present
government would be stupid enough to listen to it, even though there are those
people on the far left who presumably would want to waltz in with their sickles
and cut off the heads of people in business, as it were."
Another interviewee also spoke, in less colourful terms, of illegitimate wealth
transfers: 'Firstly, to change the law to force directors of companies to take other
interest groups into account at the expense of shareholders is a bad idea because,
at the end of the day shareholders will leave and take their money away. If you
force them to act at the expense of shareholders, then you've got a wealth transfer
away from shareholders towards some other part of the business. It's a tax if you
do that, and you're taxing some people on a different basis than others, for
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example shareholders in a business with a lot of employees. There's a principle of
equality. Secondly, if you're going to have this sort of pluralist view, there has to
be some basis on which to make decisions. Otherwise what do you aim at?
You're giving directors carte blanche to do what they want and say: "It's in the
interests of this group or that group.Itv
The concern about potentially conflicting obligations was raised by others: 'To
have as your overriding focused objective the interests of shareholders, taking
into account all the other things and it being of course legitimate to have regard to
those things, but subordinating them to the overall objective, in other words the
status quo, does seem to me the only realistic and practical way of formulating
directors' duties. If you said you've got a whole series of duties, all spelled out,
shareholders are one group, employees another, would that make any difference
to the way we ran our business? I don't think from a practical point of view it
would improve the way we run our business. We'd either take no notice of it,
which is what I'd be inclined to do, or we'd get ourselves thoroughly
confused!.. .At the end of the day we're a business, not a charity or an academic
institution, we're a commercial enterprise, and it seem to me it's an illusion to
pretend that we're running the business other than in the interests of its owners.
Of course that's a simplification and it's not to the exclusion of the other people.
If you pursue and facilitate those interests you are likely to be pursuing the
interests of the owners, not the current owners necessarily, the current and future
owners (and the share price is only a crude measure of those interests), but unless
what you're doing is directed to the overall health, strength and prosperity of the
business, as measured principally by the interests of the owners, I don't see how
you could run a business, other than by paying lip service to all these fashionable
lists of stakeholders - and if you're doing things out of fashionable deference,
I'm not sure that's a good reason for doing them at all!'
The role of institutional shareholders again came under the spotlight in
discussions: 'The emphasis placed by institutional shareholders on duty towards
them alone is restrictive. If our duty as directors is to be widened, that can only
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work if it is accompanied by a cultural change in the attitude of our own
shareholders. As long as they are going to see that our only legitimate duty is
towards them, creating towards shareholder value, they are likely to see anything
else as being inconsistent with that. Duty towards suppliers? Of course you've
got a duty towards suppliers, it's a duty to screw them into the ground. Duty
towards customers? Of course a duty to our customers, give them the finest
products, the best service, to enhance our profits. Why? Because it creates
shareholder value... We get no credit in the City for saying we've got ISO 14000
unless they're ethical investors, and the funds they control are relatively small. I
personally would welcome a widening of company law to require directors to
have regard to those wider interests, because it's a personal view that we should
anyhow, but I find it difficult at the moment to develop those wider interests
because of the pressures from institutional investors. Unless new legislation
eased the pressure from institutional shareholders and itself established the
cultural change I've talked about, I don't think it would work, not in this
country. ,Ivi
This was echoed by another Company Secretary: 'At the moment it is pretty clear
where the directors' responsibilities lie. I think most public companies will look
at the wider picture anyway. I don't think any public company will only look at
shareholders. I think if you say you have to take all these groups of people into
account before you make a decision - at the end of the day, the shareholders own
the company. How are we going to explain to them that, looking at everyone's
interests as a whole, we did not wish to make 1,000 people redundant because we
were concerned about that wider responsibility, therefore profits are affected and
their dividends are being cut? I think that would be quite a difficult one to
explain to shareholders, personally! I think that if the law is changed, there'll
have to be a change in the mindset of shareholders. Otherwise the directors are
going to be between a rock and a hard place. The shareholders' interest is that
they've put their money in and they'd like to see the return on their money. If
that were not happening because of other interests we were forced to take account
of, that would be very difficult to explain."
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It was yet another Company Secretary who voiced concerns about excessive
regulation and bureaucracy: 'I know Hampel said that we shouldn't just be box-
tickers, shareholder value and performance is really what counts, all of which I
agree with. I know the approach of institutional shareholder representatives who
send out reports on AGM resolutions - their voting recommendations are based
purely on corporate governance. Not one of them would say: "The company's
performed outstandingly for the past three years, so even though on the face of it
they don't seem to comply with that particular provision, they are obviously a
well-run business." We tend to find that, being a family business, there are
certain areas where we don't comply with best practice, and indeed we say so.
We have a combined ChairmanlChief Executive, and we have some non-
executives who are part of our larger controlling shareholder group, although
distantly related to executive management, who are fiercely independent. We
maintain that having a significant financial stake in the business aligns their
interest more closely with the shareholders than someone who has no tie and, if
things get difficult, is able to walk away. That is not accepted because on the face
of it there's some relationship... and therefore you get a black mark. That seems
to me to ignore the success or otherwise of the business.. .I'm not sure that the
level of disclosure we have to make helps. I'm not sure many people read it apart
from people who commentate on it for a living and I'm not sure it actually helps
to inform shareholders... Given the proliferation of what has to go into the
accounts, I personally would not favour compulsory disclosure on the
environment or stakeholder practice in general, not least because businesses are
so different.Ihh1
Other contributors also raised directors' responsibilities other than in 'core'
company law: 'Why do we need to do that (expressly extend directors' duties)
when there is social policy and environmental legislation? If that's not enough,
how does making directors say: "I've thought about the environment" help? I
might have thought about the environment and decided to ignore it! What is it
that we're trying to encompass in company law that has teeth on it? If we just put
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obligations that require us to make statements in the Annual Report, what does
that really do, does that really impact on the way we behave, unless those
statements can be followed up to prove you have or haven't done something? Or
is it saying there are not enough companies that think on this broader scale and
it's trying to force more companies to do that? I think the thing that I worry
about is imposing more bureaucracy that actually doesn't change the way people
behave... The second concern is with smaller companies which are publicly listed.
Can they afford to spend the money on these wider obligations or should they be
operating within a general legislative framework rather than a specific corporate
law framework which is in addition to that?' Further discussion along the same
lines came in another meeting: 'I think there's too much time being spent on the
legislative side and not enough on the business needs. Nowhere in Cadbury and
Greenbury has anyone said: 'Have you got enough new products coming on line
to ensure the continuity of this business?" We're now into the world of internal
controls and general financial controls. When you see a business the size of GEC
with people spending weeks and weeks on this compliance and a business our
size. there's an imbalance. I would like to see different rules and regulations for
pics our size compared with others.. .1 just do not be'ieve embodyiag al ot this i.
the Companies Act vould change the way directors behave. If you're saying
some directors ignore these other issues, I don't think the Companies Act helps
s ou or would force directors to consider them, because I think those other issues
are the directors' responsibility already. If they fail to abide by them now, they're
going to fail to abide by them under the Companies Act.k
A concern as expressed in two separate interviews that the increasing volume of
legislation was designed to trap a small number of determined miscreants, who
would disregard the rules in any event: 'A director can't treat employees in a
ay that's outside the law. There's regulation about how you treat customers,
sale of merchantable goods, how to treat creditors - there's a whole range of
legislation that constrains how directors can run a business. In a sense, we are
almost too constrained. We have to be answerable to the shareholders, but we
hae to run a business according to all these rules...Most legislation is concerned
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to prevent the five or four or three per cent of unscrupulous people in any walk of
life, whether it be employers, trade unionists or whoever. 95, 96, 97 per cent of
people will behave in a reasonable manner according to the lights of the times
that they live in. . . The trouble is that all these laws are passed to try to trap the
five per cent. They don't trap the five per cent because they still evade the law -
I bet there are still plenty of employers paying less than the minimum wage in
certain industries, though most of us are obeying the minimum wage law."
Expressing a similar view: 'At the end of the day there are companies that behave
very responsibly and companies that don't. I take the view that in all matters,
including remuneration, 98 per cent of directors and the companies try to do their
job as well as they can, as efficiently as they can and with integrity and proper
concern for all the groups of people involved. There's a very small percentage of
boards that don't. One thing that's worried me over the years is that the press
takes it the other way, that 98 per cent are crooks and only two per cent are decent
human beings! I think most people try to do their best in life and are decent
ordinary people. . . Drawing up a tighter legal framework is not going to make a
big difference, there's always going to be somebody who finds a way atound
everything. If you take directors' responsibilities, I don't know how many
hundreds of pages they are, and I'd add that I take the view, which many others
hold. that corporate governance has gone far too far. Company reports have
reached the stage where most shareholders don't want 80 pages, we have to send
out a condensed version. . .1 think it's just gone out of control and we should let
things settle down. There's always going to be somebody who cheats and
behaes like a crook but I think in the main most companies are behaving
themsehes ell.'
Four participants did feel that a recasting of directors' duties would be useful in
arious va s, so as more closely to reflect the reality of the way they carried on
business and to make the board's obligations more transparent: 'The issue really
is 'shether one wants to have a restatement of the position to say that it is
permissible. in exercising their functions, for directors to have regard, among
other matters but not exclusively, to all these things. Employees, customers,
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suppliers, creditors.. .the question is whether you need a statement that
encapsulates that permissiveness, and I think the fear of many people is that if
you do that it will lead to there becoming a duty to have regard to and
commercial decisions will end up being the subject of constant attack and judicial
review... But it cannot be beyond the wit of man to develop a coherent statement
of what the various factors that can be considered are and without imposing
further duties on directors and without their commercial decisions being open to
attack.. .1 think it's quite difficult logically to argue against this encapsulation in
the Act if one accepts this is what happens, as long as you ensure this doesn't
give rise to a whole series of enforceable duties. For example, if in reaching a
decision the board had considered the interests of various stakeholders, would it
be open at the current time for one of those groups too bring an action on the
grounds that the directors were in breach of duty because they had given
insufficient weight to one of those stakeholder groups? The answer must be
'No'. So even if you put a statement in the law, it caimot be beyond the wit of
man to create a statement that doesn't give rise to any litigation by those
groups.. .It wouldn't change the way things are done here... You can only decide
what's in the best interests of the company by having regard to the interests of a
these different groups anyway.Iü The responsibility to the company as an
institution is emphasised in the following extract: I don't want directors to be
tied down to a checklist, but they need to have a framework, they need to
understand their responsibilities. They need to realise that executives and non-
executives are a team and they need to understand they have social and business
responsibilities and I think that's the way they should be judged.. .1 think we want
to see better management of our companies and then shareholder value will come
naturally, rather than shareholder value by rape and pillage, which has often
happened in the past when people have one the most cut throat things in order to
achieve the most dazzling revenues...[T]here's a mortgaging of the future and a
kind of fashion parade to sell it off at an inflated figure, which of course the
company can't sustain. There are a lot of things like that which we should make
sure can't happen... The important thing about the social implications is that it
should be - I won't say a legislated measure, but people should be aware they can
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expect to be judged on it. If your statement of account does not make any
statement relating to risk, which can relate to sexual harassment, unfair dismissal,
environmental issues and so on - if you've not done that, I do think it's right that
you should say: "How have we allowed for this?" These are the elements of new
legislation which I do think are important.'
The view was reiterated in another interview at this point that there need not be a
conflict between directors' duties to the company and delivering value to the
shareholders: 'If you follow the model I was describing, doing the best for the
company and taking into account the different stakeholders, whatever the law
says, you'll still be arriving at the same decision. If you're looking at shareholder
value, the best way to increase your shareholder value is to follow that process of
doing what's best for the company. If you've got a stakeholder, say the
employee, who doesn't like what you're doing to increase shareholder value, if
you don't take that stakeholder view into account, at the extreme you're going to
have a strike and that will affect your value. You've got to manage that
stakeholder and that's the best way to maximise your shareholder value. It's for
the Chairman and the Chief Executive to persuade the stakeholders that their
decisions are for the benefit of the company and if it's for the benefit of the
company it will also be for the benefit of shareholder value.' Another
participant broadly agreed: 'The directors' duties are owed to the company, but
they're answerable to the shareholders in law. That's a subtle difference, but it's
very important. The duties of directors are towards the future of the company, to
keep it and make it prosper. Their duties are not owed to a particular body of
shareholders who happen to be there today. They have to be accountable, but
what they're accountable for is their stewardship of the company. I think you
could define more closely what directors' duties are in the Act (a new Companies
Act). I don't think there's any problem about that and I'm inclined to think that
they should be defined. The Germans have no difficulty under their law in
defining the duties of supervisory and management boards. I don't see any
reason why we should have any difficulty in defining the duties of executive and
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non-executive directors. In practice there should be different duties of care. I
would like to see duties of directors more clearly spelt out.''
A line was drawn by one director between assembling and 'streamlining' existing
rules and adding new provisions to impose 'best practice': 'If what it's doing is
trying to assemble the range of publications there are in various other bits of law,
then I think it's a good thing because it's important for everybody to understand
where they are, not least directors themselves, because at times they're not clear
as to what their responsibilities are. So probably I would welcome that. In terms
of additional legislation, i.e. additional burdens.. .if they aim to reduce bad
practice that's a very useful thing. I think the bulk of directors, while they would
be nervous, would ultimately welcome that because directors have high standards
and ideally don't want to suffer from those ho feet they can a 1rnxse ne system.
On the other hand, if legislation means the opposite, which is encouraging high
standards, then I think there is more of a problem. ..You can legislate against bad
practice more easily, but if you try to enforce high standards this is more
problematic. I don't think any legislator is clever enough to be able to think of all
the ways that a director can be good! So from that perspective I think that might
fail ultimately and you've got to rely on the good people finding their way
through to achieving and delivering high standards.'" A similar distinction was
made by another interviewee: 'The problem you come up against in expressing
responsibility to those groups is that you actually try to define it too carefully.
You end up with Greenbury, Cadbury, Hampel, all those financial corporate
governance rules.. .If you don't have good products, if you don't have customers,
if you don't have good suppliers, never mind what the financial rules say, you
have no business. The danger of having company law legislating these things is
that I fear they might go down the financial route... What I can see could be of
some advantage, though it may make the whole thing more cumbersome, is if
within company law you're able to pull together more of the legislation, but it has
become so complex. Employment law alone is so complex, you need full time
expertise on that. But the danger there is that company law is for companies,
employment law is for sole traders, partnerships, companies, everyone. If you are
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actually going to pull all that together, you're going to end up with an
unworkable solution. If you start looking at suppliers, you start talking about the
legislation on payment of creditors. Shareholders' rights are encompassed within
company law already. If you pull all that together, I just can't see how it's going
to be a workable document.hh1
It was somewhat predictable that officers of companies would be nervous about
possible extension of their legal responsibilities. The fundamental division
between the (relatively small) group who perceived themselves as agents of
shareholders who in turn 'own' the company and those who took a more
'corporatist' view was again evident here. The logical outcome of pursuing the
former position would be a reconsideration of cases that appear to have given
priority to the company as an entity (rather than individual shareholders) and
repeal (without replacement) of section 309 of the Companies Act 1985. Given
that this course of action seems politically unacceptable in any event,' 4 a pursuit
of the more expressly stakeholder-inclusive statement of duties is seen by some
company directors to be desirable, though the directors interviewed would resist
any move to empower stakeholders to challenge board decisions in court. The
current proposed Trial Draft Statutory Statement of Directors' Duties is
something of a hybrid, encompassing an 'inclusive' statement of matters 'to
which (a director) is to have regard' within a framework of shareholder primacy.'5
As was discussed in Chapter Five, it is difficult to imagine such a compromise
satisfying many of the parties concerned.
8.9 Changes to Board Structure
Many of the directors and Company Secretaries interviewed were sceptical about
any change and felt that the present (UK) board system was effective. For
example: 'I think English company law works pretty well. It depends on the
person, but it can be quite dangerous to have particular representation of groups
on a board. Take worker representatives - are they representing their members or
4 Company Law Review Steering Group, jIodern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
The Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) 4 1-42.
' Company Law Review Steering Group, n 13 above, paras 3.37-3.82.
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are they representing what's best for the company? I think it's difficult for
employee representatives as they have in France and Germany to think: "What is
the best for the company?", because they're not there for the company, they're
there to represent their particular stakeholder. I don't favour that.. .In this country
big companies operate on that dual level anyway. It's more structured on the
continent, they would have levels of what can be decided by each board. In
practice we have delegated financial authority. I don't see an awful lot of
difference. It's already there. Formalising it to comply with German law, for
instance, which says: "You must comply with this structure" doesn't make much
difference. ,Ixix
Appropriate board size has been an issue for some public companies: 'When we
had the main board reduced in size we then set up a managing directorate which
consists of the directors of all the trading operations with the managing directors
of all the local companies. The group is not a board of directors as such, it's an
operating group, and the Chief Executive of that group is on the main board. As
it happens it's the Chairman, which is not necessarily an ideal situation, but that's
how we have dealt with it. I am not a great believer in working on the basis of
having such-and-such representation. Here we have meetings, we explain to
people what's going on, we're perfectly open with them, and that is much better
communication.. .As soon as employees go on the board, they're not really
employee representatives at all, they're directors, unless they're just sitting there
as observers and I can't see any benefit in that at all. So no, I don't support that
idea."
Some expressed their opposition to change more strongly: 'I would firmly state
that the longer we can avoid having supervisory boards the better. I think what
we've got works well. You need to be able to work quickly and efficiently. I'm
not convinced certainly from our experiences in Europe dealing with supervisory
boards. The longer we can keep away from it the better! I have to be perfectly
honest, I don't think (employee representation) is something I would relish.
There are also questions of confidentiality.' 1"" Another example of such views
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came from a Company Secretary: 'We've got direct experience of the split level
board because we did have a large Dutch subsidiary until earlier this year and a
German subsidiary before that, so we're quite used to dealing with supervisory
boards and Works Councils. Having had that experience, we would all be
unanimous in saying the UK system is considerably better. It's much easier for
decisions to be made. Unfortunately the split-level system can really prolong
timetables when in today's world, frankly, you often don't have a lot of time to
make decisions. If an acquisition comes your way, you've got to get on with
it. . . We would be against introducing two-tier boards. The US structure, which is
weighted towards non-executive directors, I suppose we almost reflect in the way
we run this group at the moment, because we only have three executive directors
and three non-executives. The three executive directors are the Chief Executive,
the Finance Director and myself as Legal Director, so we're not typical."
The issue of delay and time was raised again in another interview: 'I have seen
the two-tier board at work because our main German subsidiary is an AG listed
on the Stock Exchange.. .1 think what happens is you get supervisory boards
representing external interests, the banks and employees. They look at major
financial matters like the annual budgeting process and statutory review and on
the whole I think those matters are dealt with superficially.. . You may have the
Chief Executive there, but apart from that you've got nobody there who knows
the business in detail, so when a budget comes up to them.. .the chances are they
will pass it through on the nod because they don't understand it.. .Now under our
system, with a unitary board meeting regularly, more often than supervisory
boards, even our non-executive directors, who are selected for what they can
bring to the company rather than because they work for a particular bank, have
much more detailed knowledge of us as a company. Their backgrounds enable
them to look sensibly at, for example, the budget and say: "Do you really think
you're going to achieve that sales groTh? Are things as bad as your budgeting
suggests?" - in other words sensibly and actively and involvedly to raise
questions on it . . .1 think it leads to quicker and more effective decision-making to
have that unitary structure. I have seen when we have been buying businesses on
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the continent that management can, maybe on occasion must, shelter behind their
supervisory board. They say: "Yes we have done a deal with you, but we'll have
to refer it to the supervisory board and they next meet in ten weeks' time -
sorry.".. .I've seen that lead to some very lengthy negotiating procedures,
transactions falling away."°"" A participant whose experience of the two-tier
system had generally been more positive made the same point: 'I have been
involved in Germany and France in organisations which have supervisory
boards.. .1 found having those supervisory boards with employee participation did
not stop us from doing what was right in the long term for the business. . . The way
you manage those boards is critical. Openness of communication and the
creation of trust facilitate those boards behaving in a constructive way. If you
create an adversarial relationship, a union versus anti-union culture those boards
aren't going to work so well, are they? In both France and Germany, there is a
social context within which those boards operate. You can't just impose that kind
of system without understanding the wider issues.. .1 think the role of the non-
execs is ultimately to ensure that executive directors are acting in the interests of
shareholders and, given what we were saying about safety and the environment,
the non-execs ought to be the conscience of the management on those issues. It
comes back to how you create shareholder value in the long term. Non-execs can
ask those sorts of questions - "Have you thought about your safety plans7 Have
you thought through the implications of what you're doing? How are you
treating your employees?" - because that's good for the shareholder.. .1 don't
think you need to impose the formality of a supervisory board with different
representatives on it. One of the issues is that the more people you have to
consult on decisions, the slower the decisions. It's almost axiomatic that it takes
longer. . . because if people represent their constituencies, they have to go back to
their constituencies. In business today.. .you've got to move very
The issue of board unity exercised two interviewees in particular. One
commented: 'It's hard enough to manage a board with five executive directors
sitting round a table, without special interest groups. I think inevitably when you
have more than two parties in negotiations, it's horrible! The way we work now
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is that employee representation on the board is through the Managing Director,
customer representation is through the Marketing Director, and we have people
who are responsible for the environment and suppliers.. .By their very nature,
people who get on the board are like-minded enough, or they wouldn't get on.
There's a lot of criticism of 'old boy networks', that if you're a woman you won't
get on the board, if you're a foreigner or if you've worked your way up from the
factory floor you won't get on the board, and that's valid. I think we do need to
have a debate on the board because I know people do say: "That's terrible", but at
the same time, when you look at the people who do get on the board they've
already been pre-screened. This person, they might come up with ideas, they
won't agree with everything that's there, but they're not going to drive us up the
wall, they're not going to cause a great amount of disharmony or confrontation,
because if you did that, you wouldn't get on the board."°" The other said that: 'I
personally think it's quite important that there must be an ultimate decision-
making entity that has the final 'yea' or 'nay'. I can see why some people will
say that worker representation at board level is important, but I'm not sure I'm
convinced by it. Your workforce is probably your most important asset and
therefore a constructive relationship with them is essential ti the business, bu
think ultimately there has to be a board which is controlling and implementing
the policies it deems to be appropriate for the business. In our own case, we're
too small to have a two-tier board in any event. I can understand, if you have a
thirty thousand-man workforce, unionised, that some form of senior
representation is important, but I still am not sure. I've not had practical
experience of how they work, but I think my personal preference would be to see
a single, responsible entity, a unitary board where ultimately the buck stops.'"
Criticism of the close-knit oligarchy featured in another analysis based on
experience: 'As to different representation, I think there is some merit and a case
to examine in Britain as to whether we should move to a two-tier board, a
supervisory board which is responsible to shareholders and an operational board
which has representation of stakeholders but must execute the policy of the
supervisory board. There might well be a lot of logic in that.. .It's interesting that
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these structures tend to come from the political system, so in America you have a
President who executes and a supervisory board which plays the role of Congress.
In fact, they often get hi-jacked and you'll find that you have a Chief Executive
who's President of the company and Chairman of the board, so what you really
have is a dictator. I've seen many cases in many major American companies and
I don't think it's very helpful!...The real schism that exists currently among
public company directors is between executives and non-executives, and we
might eventually see a split. You might find that the executive board then brings
in more of the stakeholder elements. One of the problems with companies is that
directors in effect elect themselves. You get the oligarchy back again, the old boy
network. ,Ixxvjj
One contributor expressed further concern about potential conflicts if different
groups had board representation: 'There's no question that an organisation
constituted in that way would lead to an even more powerful board which was
less accountable to anybody than the Chairman and the board currently are. We
do have the problem of making the group accountable, as they currently in law
are accountable, but making them accountable fully to the very large group
outside which cannot act very easily to hold the board of directors to account. If
you divide that group itself into these factions who are going to argue about how
things are done, or you go for the Dutch style where the board is not responsible
to any group, then you have conferred enormous authority on a group that is
unaccountable... One reason that's often given in favour of representation of
additional groups on the board is that all additional information helps to make
better decisions but that information comes anyway and you can draw in by
whatever means are necessary. If the board is doing its job in a way which is as
thorough and comprehensive as possible, it will want to consider information
about the effects of its operation, insofar as the board itself is making those
decisions that affect those constituencies. Another thing you need to bear in mind
is that the kinds of decisions the board tends to make are the large-scale
decisions, so very general decisions, and not the specifics. The board may make
very general statements about how employees should be treated - those are
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statements of ethics, of fair practice and ethical principle. It's not ever going to
get involved in setting the remuneration or the rewards, except for the CEO."°"'
Another director was more relaxed about employee representation in principle but
still had reservations about its practical effect: 'Non-executives should just be
independent, they should not be representatives of any particular group. I have
no problem with the idea of worker-elected directors. I'm an advocate of a
system of Works Councils. That's operated in the group for a long time, it's been
very successful.. .Anyone who takes the position of a worker director has to take
on all the responsibilities of the other directors and take into account all the other
aspects of the business, and I think some people find it quite difficult. When you
do examine all the other business factors, it may not be easy to sell that to your
electorate.' lxxix
The issue of the role of non-executive directors is a crucial one, as the following
response clearly shows: 'We in this country have a unitary board but we have
non-executive directors who bring, supposedly, outside experience to the board's
debates. It's another way of using the experience of people from outside the
business. The principle of having people from outside the company with other,
wider experience and abilities is a good one. I personally think the British system
is as good as or better than the supervisory board. America has a different system
again. I think every system works in one degree or another, there are examples in
every system where it works extremely well and examples where it has failed. I
don't have a strong view as to whether the supervisory board is better than the
unitary board, but certainly outside experience and involvement in discussion and
debate is sound. I can't say I'm terribly impressed with the German system and
the idea that you should have a director who represents the workers' interests,
because it seems to me that every member of the board should be seriously
interested and involved in the workers' wellbeing because a satisfied, well-
motivated staff is good for the board and the company. So I'm not at all
convinced that you should have one person doing it. In fact I could make the
argument that it would be to the detriment of the staff, because that single person
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would be isolated and seen as having only one point of view, the workers' point
of view...That type of board structure, I'm not in favour of, I'm against it."°°' A
different perspective on this question was the following: 'The advantage of our
approach, of having executives and non-executives is that, albeit that company
law has the illusion that we all have the same duties and responsibilities, in reality
you have a bunch of, by definition, amateurs who come up to meetings six times
a year while the rest of us work here every day of our lives and it's an illusion to
pretend we're all doing the same thing. However that model which, albeit
occasionally, has the two groups coming together as peers does optimise the
engagement of the non-executives - I believe that if they're sitting as some
abstract board, perhaps with the Chief Executive and people coming in to make
presentations, they can't be as closely in touch with the reality and the
complexities of the business and therefore can't add value to the business. I agree
that you could say, they're different animals, some non-executives are clearly
members of the great and good from outside, and they're really just representing
external interests, whether that equates to shareholders or whoever, surely you
should acknowledge that differentiation? I say 'No' to that, because all that does
is to exacerbate the inherent difference between the two groups and after all,
we're all trying to do the same thing. I think having execs and non-execs as an
integrated board, albeit that it will only meet x times a year, increases the chances
of a common understanding, by them of the business we run, and by us of where
they're coming from and their perspective.''
Two directors, on the other hand, felt that supervisory board structures could or
should be permitted, but ought not to be imposed: 'If you ask me whether I like
supervisory boards, I think they're one possible solution. In practice in America
they're getting pretty close to that now, only having one executive on most of
their major boards.. .1 think the question of worker representation on boards is a
quite different issue and one shouldn't muddle up the two. The reason it works
reasonably in Germany is because it's part of a system where there are Works
Councils and a whole atmosphere of what they call 'Mitbestimmung' pervades the
way in which it operates. I don't think that would suit the Anglo Saxons, but I
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can see that it is an alternative... I can't see any reason why if a company wanted
to run things that way it shouldn't do it. I certainly wouldn't impose it. If people
hated it, they'd find a way round it. . . The Germans manage to do a hell of a lot
better in industrial terms than we do! You can't put that entirely down to the
business structure.. .but you can't say they've been held back by it! Non-
executives if they're a decent bunch improve the whole process of decision-
making simply by being there. The executives have to analyse and explain what
it is they propose to do and that in itself is beneficial. It makes people do their
homework, it stops people shooting from the hip too much and occasionally their
contribution is to get rid of the Chief Executive and replace him. Part of the time
their job is to encourage the Chief Executive and the other executives who have a
lonely task battling against their competitors and to back them up and inspire
them... Encouraging management in their entrepreneurial efforts, driving the
business forward, is a very important function."°"
Arguing more forcefully in favour of allowing different board structures, another
director said this: 'I personally think that if a company wants to set up that
structure they should be permitted to do it. I think the less restraint companies
are under the better. If one company feels it's in theiv interests to c.%o tViat, \rie,
but don't make everybody do it. If you lay down certain ways things should be
done, you might well miss something someone's doing that's very successful,
that works for them. I think it would be much better if you put duties on boards
and let them sort out the best way to accommodate those duties. I would be in
favour of ruling out nothing, but not compelling a particular framework. Large
companies may have a board with a majority of non-executive directors, which in
a way is like having a supervisory board, and then there's day-to-day
management that goes on underneath that. Smaller companies probably do it all
in one. We for example have two non-executive directors. They do the job with
informal consultation and formal board meetings on a regular basis in which the
non-execs provide a balance to us.. .1 would be sorry to see legislation which
forced us to run our business in a particular way.'''
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The effectiveness and efficiency of the process were the key point for many
contributors, as this extract from an experienced executive who now holds non-
executive director posts shows: 'My view is that I want a mechanism that works,
that allows the greatest interaction so we actually know what's going on. Our
system is quite good provided you've got the right representation and the right
mechanism. One of the dangers is that you can have a group management board
and the plc board, which involves the non-executives, doesn't really have any
involvement with that - it may be management by seeing the bits of paper. . .1
don't mind what the structure is. A team should be open, it should have well-
defined roles and responsibilities, it should have well-defined review procedures
and the interactions should involve customers, shareholders as well as employees.
All of these things are important.'1'°°"
There was, then, generally strong resistance to any imposition of a representative
or two-tier board structure for UK public companies. This came both from those
who are strongly of the view that shareholders 'own' (and hence should control)
public companies and those who believe that directors should aim to balance the
interests of different groups and come to conclusions in the interests of the
business as a whole. Considerations of speed and efficiency were also raised. It
was acknowledged that supervisory boards or non-executive director majorities
might work well in other jurisdictions and might even be worth trying in some
UK organisations,' 6 but the consensus was very firmly against any compulsory
change to UK board structure.
8.10 Conclusion
One senior manager from a major accountancy firm expressed scepticism when
the project was mentioned that one could obtain 'sensible' answers regarding
governance questions 'except at the very top' (that is, the very largest
companies). Happily, this proved not to be the case. Most people, particularly
further down the public company 'pecking order' were, as he put it, 'too busy
' Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
The Strategic Framework (DTI, February 1999) 45-46.
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worrying about whether they'll have a business next year'. Yet as Hampel says,
good governance is as important for smaller companies as for the largest.
Legislation which helps to promulgate the most effective practice is surely to be
welcomed, rather than feared. It would assist directors in their dealings with
investors and with employees to highlight board responsibility for the corporation
as an entity.
The task of those in senior positions in business is to articulate a clear vision of
the organisation's goals and ethos. The modern so-called 'triple bottom line' of
social and environmental value and financial performance will concern ever-
increasing numbers of employees, customers and shareholders.' 7 If the law does
not reflect this reality, it will be out of line with real boardroom life.' 8 As many
of the interviewees acknowledged, corporate reputation provides the direct link
between treatment of stakeholders and profitability. Whether operating globally,
nationally or locally, a favourable image with the public who are potential
consumers and employees and investors is a valuable, if fragile, asset. Directors
are responsible for protecting it.
Clearly no definitive conclusions can be drawn from meeting with such a small
sample of public company officers. Strong impressions were, however, formed
in the course of the first two meetings and reinforced by later interviews. Many
of the directors felt that the dichotomy posited in the DTI's Company Law
Strategic Framework document between shareholder value (no-one objected to
'enlightenment'!) and 'pluralism' was false, as the only way to deliver strong and
sustainable returns to shareholders was to pay attention to all stakeholders,
particularly customers, employees and suppliers but also the natural and social
environment. Several also made the point that the demands of the market, and
particularly institutional shareholders, constrained the board's freedom of action..
It was said that new rules to give other stakeholders more attention would have to
' J. Elkington and S. Fennell, 'Can Business Leaders Satisfy the Triple Bottom Line?' (1998) 1
Visions of Ethical Business 34.
8 G. Chandler, 'Annual General Meeting of X plc, May 2005: The Chairman's Speech - A
Vision' (1998) 1 Visions of Ethical Business 18.
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be accompanied by a cultural change on the part of major shareholders. If new
statements and duties in company law helped to achieve this, many of the public
company directors and secretaries who were interviewed would approve of them.
Public company directors, on the evidence collected in these meetings, well
understand that their primary responsibility is to develop and maintain the
business for the long term. The extent to which they feel able, in practice, to do
this depends on the demands of finance providers. In the real public company
boardroom, no director can operate without reference to customers, employees
and suppliers and the world outside the company. Institutional investors are
beginning to appreciate that their interests as providers of pension payments and
insurance cover, often thirty and sometimes up to fifty years hence, coincide with
those of the companies in which they invest.' 9 John Monks, General Secretary of
the TUC, has called for a new approach of industrial partnership to recognise
stakeholder interests and align the interests of employees as employees with those
of employees as consumers and investors. 20 It seems that many leaders of major
businesses would not fundamentally disagree with this, while many of them
would emphasise commitment to their customers and the community where they
operate, as well as the vital importance of meeting shareholder expectations.
' In The Guardian, 14 September 1999, 11, John Monks' statement to the TUC's annual
conference that the TUC had been approached 'in recent months by top companies in retailing,
leisure and finance, employing more than 150,000 people, to discuss partnership agreements' is
quoted.
20 J. Gates, The Ownership Solution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998) contains a much fuller
discussion of direct employee ownership.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION - THE FUTURE OF UK COMPANY LAW
9.1 'The Business of Business'
There is widespread acknowledgment, noted in Chapters Four and Eight, that if it is
to become and remain a thriving business enterprise, a public company needs to do
three (possibly four) closely interrelated things: to produce competitive returns for
shareholders, to satisfy its customers in order to produce those profits and to recruit
and motivate excellent employees (and, where appropriate, build successful
relationships with suppliers) so as to achieve those goals. Several of the public
company directors and secretaries interviewed for this study also commented that
they needed to operate, and to be seen to be operating, in a way that was acceptable
to society, not least because otherwise, there was the threat of yet more legislation.
Many of them regarded attention to these issues as simply matters of 'common
sense' or suggested that consideration of primary stakeholders was implicitly
required by current company law and regulation. However, there was some
recognition that a change in company law might 'he'p to alleviate misunderstandings
of what was required and foster good practice on the part of corporate leaders who
might otherwise conduct business in a less desirable maimer. Corporate reputation in
this way provided the link between ethics and profitability. This concluding chapter
will explore the economic implications of potential new legislation and the form any
new rules might take.
Another driver for change in management has been the concept of the 'balanced
scorecard' as a measure of a company's overall performance, which has been taken
up by several major organisations in one form or another.' Some have begun
producing separate environmental and social reports in addition to their statutory
financial reports.	 Others choose to include information as to social and
R. Kaplan and D. Norton, 'The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance' (1992)
Harvard Business Review 280.
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consequences the architects of government privatisation policies may not have
foreseen.6
Where major companies choose to be socially and environmentally active, they are
increasingly looking to tie their efforts to key areas of their commercial operations
and to gain public approval, and sometimes political capital, by their discretionary
expenditure. As central and local government seeks to manage, rather than to
supply, key services, those organisations that are seen to have contributed positively
to the wider community will have an advantage in demonstrating that they can
deliver all-round 'Best Value'. 7 Governmental bodies, in turn, can attract and
maintain major investment by managing the provision of infrastructure and an
attractive environment. More generally, better education, improved health of the
workforce and re-generation of deprived urban and rural areas help to improve both
productivity and markets. Profit over the long term for shareholders, many of whom
will be institutions representing individual savers, is compatible with tackling these
issues. Indeed investors themselves are increasingly looking to optimise the long-
term benefit of their investments.8
What has recently become known as 'brand value' (aptly defined by Bayley as: 'that
intangible, but valuable mixture of associations and expectations that all successful
products carry') 9 is a key component in public company success or failure. The main
point for contemporary business is that products that match their advertising and
deliver good value can only meet these expectations. At much the same time as
Bayley's words appeared, Unilever, one of the largest multinational organisations,
6 R. Geddes, 'Ownership, Regulation and Managerial Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry'
(1997) 40 Journal of Law and Economics 261.
As local authorities are required by Part I of the Local Government Act 1999 (which came into force
on 1 April 2000) to provide.
This concern with the 'long term' and an inclusive approach is reflected in the Company Law
Review Steering Group's draft statement of directors' duties in Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (DTI: March 2000) paras 3.40-3.58, but without
sanctions to back the exhortations.
S. Bayley, 'Hallelujah! Praise the Brand' (2000) 169 Blueprint 40, 41.
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announced plans to focus its efforts on 400 of its 1600 global brands.'° Another
Anglo-Dutch behemoth, Royal Dutch-Shell, has taken some time (and considerable
attention to matters of corporate governance) to recover from damage to its
reputation and 'brand value'." Klein's No Logo criticises holders of some of the
best-known global brands, including Nike and McDonalds, for exploiting workers,
consumers, the environment and the communities in which they operate.' 2 More
positively, in The Future of Brands, Clifton and Maughan comment: 'The term
'stakeholder brands'... suggests a 'third way' for brand futures that reflects political
trends: capitalism with a strong social agenda."3
On the global scale, Castells gives a reminder that between 1995 and 1999, the top
five growth stocks in the Standard and Poor's index were Dell Computer, Cisco
Systems, Sun Microsystems, Qualcomm and Charles Schwabb, all companies that
are building their business around the internet. He comments: 'Internet stock frenzy
is in fact an indicator of the decisive shift of the economy to the new sources of value
and growth." 4 The so-called 'new economy' makes finance, employment, products
and supplies more unpredictable. Adaptability demands quick responsiveness to
changes in the demands of stakeholders, customers, employees and others. Many
will choose to list on stock exchanges in the United States, in London and in Tokyo,
so that their shares can be traded for twenty-four hours a day around the globe. High
standards of information and administration are required to serve the needs of new
and growing 'high-tech' companies.
'° A. Roddick and G. Roddick, 'Shell Still has Much to Do', The Guardian, 18 September 2000; D.
Gow, 'Fuel Gauge: Shell Profits Back on Track', The Guardian, 11 February 2000.
'i. Finch, 'Unilever Washes Hands of 1,200 Brands', The Guardian, 22 September 1999; J. Doward
and F. Islam, 'Household Names Face Axe as Unilever Slims Down', The Guardian, 26 September
1999.
2 N. Klein, No Logo. Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (London: Flamingo, 2000).
3 R. Clifton and E. Maughan, The Future of Brands (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 106.
M. Castells, 'Information Technology and Global Capitalism' in W. Hutton and A. Giddens, On the
Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000) 52, 63.
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As far as setting board structures for UK public companies in the light of these
challenges is concerned, when the Hampel Report stated that: 'there is no support
(among UK business leaders) for the unitary board', it conflated two issues that can
better be considered separately. There is indeed little evidence of support for
'constituency' representation in UK public companies. In practice, executive and
non-executive functions are separated into different board committees, with the
executive often having to 'sell' ideas to the non-executives and expecting to account
to them for the execution of plans. It is also regarded as important by many directors
that the board, while taking responsibility for the future and development of the
whole business, should have among its members individuals with good knowledge of
the key stakeholders who can alert all directors to their concerns. The European
Works Council model of employee representation will gradually become familiar in
Britain and consumers' organisations continue to develop their brand of activism.
Awareness of the importance of those specific groups, in particular, can be expected
to spread even to public companies that have so far resisted 'stakeholder' or
'inclusive' approaches.
A new statement of directors' duties (as part of a new Companies Act in due course)
is recommended, as explained in Chapter Five above, in order to spell out the
internal and external zones of responsibility of public company directors in this
changing environment. This would help to shift the balance of power in the
relationship between public company executives and major institutional investors. It
would be ineffectual, particularly in organisations where it might have most impact
on managerial viewpoints, if there were not sanctions as a last resort to require public
company directors to take proper account of the requirements of their main
participants. It is therefore recommended, in Chapter Six above, that the primary
stakeholders in public companies should have a legal right of action (by analogy with
the statutory right of action for shareholders under section 459 of the Companies Act
1985) if they can show that they have suffered unfair prejudice as a result of
directorial decisions. In addition, it needs to be clear in company law that directors
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do have the right to consider such matters as the natural environment and the wider
community. That would make it all the more important to have a diverse range of
people of appropriate calibre and experience on public company boards.
9.2 Economic Effects of Legislation
While governments have increasingly used cost-benefit analysis to assess proposed
legislation in recent years, Ogus argues that their tecimiques have been
unsophisticated and insensitive to many important issues.' 5 The 'Law and
Economics' approach and body of scholarship, he adds, has much to contribute to the
debate. Regulators aim to govern the prices charged by firms that are natural
monopolies, so as to secure the maximum 'social surplus' from the organisation's
activities and distribute it between consumers and shareholders as they see fit.' 6 The
motivation and control of managers who may have their own agenda in rulming a
company, distinct from that of the shareholders or other interested parties, is another
problem that economic analysis has addressed.'7
Several major sectors of the economy are not correctly or appropriately valued by the
free market, including healthcare and education, basic research and public
infrastructure projects, as Kuttner points out. In addition, airlines, railways, power
companies and telecommunications are prone to monopoly pricing in the absence of
substantial regulation.' 8 National governments therefore still have an important role
to play in balancing reasonable profit with social value. There will also be an
important place for international regulations to entrench environmental, employment
Al. Ogus, 'Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and Economics' (1998) 6
European Journal of Law and Economics 53.
6 B. Salanie, The Economics of Contracts (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1997) 4 1-42 discusses the
problem in theoretical terms.
' ibid 138-139.
8 R. Kuttner, 'The Role of Governments in the New Economy' in Hutton and Giddens, n 14 above,
147, 154.
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and social standards, firstly across Europe, secondly throughout the industrialised
world, and as an ultimate goal, for all nations.'9
English commercial law as a discipline arose out of the common law contractual
tradition which, unlike civil law, does not recognise the duty of 'bargaining in good
faith', nor indeed the enforceability of promises not secured by consideration.
Nevertheless, equity and statute law have increasingly sought to protect the
expectations of contracting parties and those whose bargairthxg position 'as
perceived to be relatively weak. In the employment context, UK law has long ago
left behind the notion that freedom of contract between employees and workers is
sufficient and that government therefore should not intervene. 20 In the consumer
area, too, there is substantial legal regulation. 21 As the market has inexorably
extended its reach, especially throughout the 1 980s, there has also been a demand for
more 'active government', more particularly in the late 1990s. This extends to
regulation and governance of the largest businesses including public limited
companies. A common justification for its introduction is so-called 'market failure'
as a result of lack of perfect information or barriers to entry. Benington aptly
observes that: 'In the 1990s thinking has tended to move beyond.. .polarisation and
demarcation between public and private sectors, market and state, to recognise both
the interdependencies and the blurring of the boundaries between the two.'22
Considerations of 'economic efficiency' in law are increasingly influential in debates
about legal reform. If the law provides a framework to structure enforcement of
bargains and to reduce transaction costs, it is seen as economically beneficial. The
" R. Ball, 'Making Accounting More International: Why, How and How Far Will It Go?' in J.
Rutterford, Financial Strategy: Adding Stakeholder Value (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1998);
FT.com Site, 'Big Win Hangs in the Balance for Accountants', 6 June 2000.
20 The latest scheme of regulation is set out in the Employment Relations Act 1999.
21 See for example the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1984 and the
Consumer Protection Act 1987.
22 J• Benington,, 'Risk and Reciprocity: Local Governance Rooted in Civil Society' in A Coulson,
Trust and Contracts (London: Polity, 1998) 227, 231.
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idea of efficient resource allocation according to utilitarian goals is prioritised.23
Such definitions of efficiency are not, however, value-free. 24 Many of the changes in
the Employment Relations Act 1999, for example, were introduced despite initial
opposition from business leaders. The UK Government has declared that,
particularly where privatised utilities are concerned, but also in regulation of
businesses such as banks and supermarkets, it wishes to end what the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry called 'rip-off
Britain.' 25
 A balance of public services and regulated markets 'serving the common
good' is a declared political objective of the Labour Party stated in its constitution.
That there should be some connection between access to funds by public offerings
and corporate accountability and responsibility seems a proposition that is difficult to
refute in principle.
Much regulation of business is of course separate from company law, being found,
for example, in specific employment and environmental rules that apply not only to
companies, but also to partnerships and sofe traders. Pressures for rore
and specific regulation are likely to increase in the absence of renewed trust in
business and business leaders. It would be more congenial to many such leaders to
examine these matters in the context of the long-term success of the business. A
requirement to create a balance of interests makes rulming a corporation complex but
beneficial to society at large. The Turnbull Committee's recent accounting
guidelines were concerned with the management of risk and recommended that
directors should confirm in their Annual Reports that their companies had a sound
system for 'identifying, evaluating and managing the company's key risks.' 26 This
23 C.W. Maughan and S.F. Copp, 'Company Law Reform and Economic Methodology Revisited'
(2000)21 Co. Law 14, 18.
24 ibid 20.
See, for example, speeches by Gordon Brown and Stephen Byers in September 1999 at the Labour
Party Annual Conference.
26 All UK listed companies have been required by the Stock Exchange to comply with these general
standards since 1999.
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Review Steering Group reflects this in its comments about reporting standards and
the proposals for the new Operating and Financial Review.
Shocking incidents that have caused critics to call the corporate form itself
'potentially criminogenic' (even when the individuals involved thought of
themselves as law-abiding) include the P&O Herald of Free Enterprise disaster28 and
the rail crashes at Clapham and Paddington, as well as cost-benefit analysis of car
and drug safety effectively balancing profits against the lives of consumers. 29 Those
at the centre of such large organisations need to take responsibility for the
establishment of systems to ensure that fiscal, social, environmental, health and
safety and consumer regulations are properly respected. Cultural change within such
bodies is perhaps the single most powerful preventative agent against serious
wrongdoing. Company law can send out important signals about managerial
responsibilities to those who would not consider themselves as subjects of criminal
law. 3° More active and vigilant customers and suppliers and empowered employees
are a line of defence against criminality that arises from systemic failure rather than
deliberate acts of individuals. If they were given sufficient influence to challenge the
financial priorities of the board they could have a salutary effect on the conduct of
public companies.
9.3 The UK Company Law Review Process
The input of highly respected Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as
Oxfam, Traidcraft Exchange, Amnesty International and War on Want demonstrates
that the Review has to some extent succeeded in its aim of extending the debate
beyond the confines of 'City' institutions and corporations. It is recognised that the
operation of business has a direct impact beyond the executives and investment
managers, and even beyond employees and customers of corporations. NGOs and
G. Slapper and S. Tombs, Corporate Crime (London: Pearson, 1999) 149.
29 ibid 141.
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others are highlighting the broader issues in a constructive maimer. The fundamental
tension is between those who see the company as a means for economic ends alone
and those who view public companies as social actors. With a UK Government that
is keen to engage with business but also wishes to address the concerns of the trade
unions and has highlighted consumer interests and the difficulties often faced by
small suppliers, any simple 'profit maximisation' dictum will not suffice. Attempting
to move towards a consensus is likely to be a slow process3! and the overall result
must be examined for its coherence and workability.
The Civil Service response from the DTI has been cautious. As far as the
international standing of UK company law is concerned, the DTI have had some
concern that other common law jurisdictions had 'left the UK behind' in their
modernisation and streamlining of company codes, Canada and New Zealand being
regarded with particular favour. Less familiar traditions such as those of continental
Europe are regarded with greater scepticism, if not outright distrust. Institutional
frameworks and ideology are important in defining regulatory restraints. 32 For
example in the discussion of 'The Scope of Company Law', the Steering Group
contrasted 'Enlightened Shareholder Value' with 'Pluralism' (essentially the
'stakeholding' or 'inclusive' approach). Ferran remarks: 'responses in the media to
the publication of the first consultation document (in February 1999) tended to
favour the view that discussion of the Pluralist approach was probably included
precisely in order for it to be shot down',33
 though she acknowledges that enhanced
reporting obligations may go some way to deal with 'Pluralist' objections.
° M.R. Ferrarese, 'An Entrepreneurial Conception of the Law? The American Model through Italian
Eyes' in D. Nelken, Co,nparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) 157, provides an
interesting perspective.
31 The Steering Group is expected to produce a further major consultation document in autumn 2000
and a final report to Government Ministers in March 2001.
32 G. Haag, 'Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European
Perspective,' (1997) 4 European .Journal of Law and Economics 337.
E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 642.
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There is a danger that the quality of the final legislative product could be adversely
affected by the fact that the Review adopted a narrow, traditional 'core company law'
focus. The whole debate about the parties to whom directors should owe their
responsibilities was excluded from the Review's original statement of its objectives.
This was despite the acknowledgment that the current section 309 needed to be
retained or replaced if the impression of retrograde motion was to be avoided. The
further step which was surely quite logical - namely questioning whether employees
and shareholders alone should have a privileged position in this respect and why
employees should not be allowed to bring actions on their own account - was
ignored (or side-stepped). The desirability in principle of employees and the major
customers and suppliers having a place in board decisions fits with management
priorities in real public companies. There are, however, many possible methods of
achieving this effect in law.
The principle for the new Companies Act of 'think small first' (that is, concentrating
on material which will be suitable for 'close' private companies as the default option
and adding the provisions for pubtic coccpanies stpame'j') mea'n nat athñona\
matters applicable only to public companies should be clearly identifiable. 'Core'
company law is never likely to encompass more than a broad-brush outline of
accounting and reporting responsibilities. Accounting standards are sophisticated
and change with developing business priorities and teclmologies. Nor is it
foreseeable that the influence over composition and membership of listed company
boards would be removed from the listing authority (the Financial Services
Authority). The expertise required within the top management of a publicly-held
corporation could usefully be broadened so as to affirm that, to give two examples,
employee relations in a 'people' business and supplier links in manufacturing are an
essential part of the corporation. The law needs to reflect this commercial reality.
The quality and quantity of representations and comments made to the DTI have an
impact on the prospects for reform. After a sluggish start to the public dialogue,
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there are some encouraging signs in this regard and the latest major consultation
document shows the influence of some of the submissions. The political task is to
ensure that the opinions of all relevant groups are taken into account and integrated
into a coherent whole. The style of any new legislation may be more purposive and
accessible than previously, nor could it be expected that purely technical and specific
regulation would last the necessary period of time. 34
 The majority of the responses
received to the Consultation Document published by the Company Law Review
Steering Group dealt in some manner with the issue of the scope of company law.
Not surprisingly, those who are not usually engaged in dealing with the technicahtie
of company law, such as the social and environmental NGOs, are most inclined to
express their views on the principles that should underlie corporate reform (the so-
called 'scope' question).35
Veljanovski, a leading commentator on law and economics, has observed: 'In
practice, it is astounding how rarely lawyers and civil servants are prepared to state
clearly the goal of a law or to assess the extent to which specific laws have achieved
their intended results.' 36
 The law is regarded by economists, as Veljanovski puts it,
as a 'giant pricing machine' that imposes 'constraints and penalties that alter the net
benefits of different courses of action' and thus influences behaviour. 37 It seems
intuitively much more plausible that people acting in a business capacity would be
guided by a rational cost-benefit analysis than that individuals about to embark on a
criminal act of violence, for example, would be deterred by possible penalties. It is,
however, for Parliament as a democratic political body to set the results it wishes to
attain by using these tools. The DTI has commissioned empirical research focusing
on the needs and views of entrepreneurs and of finance providers (both shareholders
DTI Consultation Paper, Modern Company Lawfor a Competitive Economy (DTI, March 1998)
para 1.5.
DTI Summary of Responses to the Consultation Document, published by the Company Law
Review Steering Group (DTI, December 1999).
C. Veljanovski, The Economics of Law (Hobart Papers 114: lEA, 1990) 36.
ibid 87.
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and to a lesser extent lenders, particularly banks). 38 The fact that others, including
employees and customers but also representatives of the environment and society,
may have different interests in and concerns about corporations is not expressly
acknowledged within the research programme.
9.4 The Company Law Review - Possible Outcomes
One danger of a review over a long period of time, carried out by disparate groups of
people, is that the results may end up as a melange of ideas included to accommodate
a range of interest groups, with no-one taking responsibility for the coherence of the
product. Furthermore, as the European Union's experience has amply demonstrated,
where there is no agreement on the fundamental principles underlying law reform, it
is extremely difficult to reach any consensus on the details. The DTI's concepts of
'modernising' the law and ensuring that the UK is 'competitive' remain helpful in a
general sense but somewhat vague. As any awareness of the German, Japanese and
US corporate systems indicates, many different 'modern' structures have succeeded
in producing successful businesses. The UK has always been in the position of
needing to decide where its own loyalties and priorities lie, given its strong links to
Europe, the Commonwealth and North America. If it can harness the economic
dynamism that comes from relatively light regulation to deliver the avowed political
ends of greater fairness and sustainability, it will have achieved some of the best of
all worlds.
As Deakin and Michie note, game theory in economics predicts that: 'unfettered
competition may not be welfare-maximising' and 'regulatory intervention may
increase economic welfare.' 39 More generally, they acknowledge the strong
argument that: 'a contract which is optimal from the point of view of the immediate
parties to the transaction may have sub-optimal effects for society as a whole.' 4° The
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Developing the Framework (DII, March 2000) ch 11.
S. Deakin and J. Michie, Contracts, Co-operation and Competition (Oxford: OUP 1997) 9.
40 ibid7.
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authors also point out that nexus-of-contract theory is unrealistic in some key
respects: '[T]he theory acknowledges that constraints on information exist at the
level of the principal's capacity to observe the agent's characteristics and behaviour,
but takes little account of the transaction costs of designing and implementing the
incentive structures which contracts are understood to embody.' 4 ' This is written in
the context of a discussion on the trade-off between formal contracts, co-operation
and competition, but could equally well apply to those who argue that the company
is simply a 'nexus of contracts' and that directors are solely agents of shareholders.
Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson assert that institutional structures are fundamentally
important, given the significant failures of market contracting. Such legal
frameworks are not a substitute for, but should be a support for, trust and specific
long-term relationships, which are also economically important.42
Several of the public company officers in interviews conducted for this study
adverted to the fact that they were faced with a plethora of specific 'constituency'
legislation. Environmental protection, for example, was subjected to a
comprehensive regime of rules by comprehensive UK legislation in 1990.
Employment law was developing under the new Employment Relations Act in a
direction more favourable to workers than had been seen since the 1970s, while
consumers enjoyed legal protection of a high order. Perhaps the missing piece of the
puzzle was stronger legal enforcement in the UK of the agreements and relationships
between suppliers and purchasers. There was general agreement that it was
impossible to legislate for and enforce corporate responsibility to the wider
community. 43 Given that consideration of all of these groups was essential to sound
directorial thinking, to legislate for an appropriate balance so as to locate the other
major pieces of legislation in a comprehensible structure was regarded by many as a
laudable aim.
' ibid 7.
42 ibid ch 5: S. Deakin, C. Lane and F. Wilkinson, 'Contract Law, Trust Relations and Incentives for
Co-operation : A Comparative Study.'
P. Nobel, 'Social Responsibility of Corporations' (1999)84 Cornell Law Review 1255.
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Greater flexibility and lack of prescriptiveness have been cited as the advantages of
'best practice' and 'codes', as opposed to legislation. Where a company competes
with another enterprise that is not adhering to the same standards of accountability
and governance, it faces unequal, arguably 'unfair', competition. In order to enjoy
the advantages of limited liability and public status, a company needs to be prepared
to undertake corresponding obligations. These should be debated and their
parameters set in the political arena, rather than inside the Stock Exchange or the
Financial Services Authority. Garratt predicts that 'professionalization' of the
directorial task will involve: 'the need for an agreed and publicly accountable
director assessment and registration process' and 'an agreed and policeable code of
conduct to determine the ethical relationships between directors, shareholders and
stakeholders.' 44 This will, in turn, feed in to the corporate policy and strategy,
internal supervision of management and external accounting rules.
Other bodies such as the Stock Exchange and the Financial Service Authority are
concerned with corporate governance, while public company directors and their
advisers have to deal with several different systems, the most significant demands
being the requirements for the application for and maintenance of their listings.
There is at present little co-ordination of the different regimes that affect such
companies. For example, the Companies Act 1985 as regards takeovers allows
compulsory purchase of the remaining shares once the offer has been accepted by
ninety per cent of the 'target' shareholders. At the same time, the City Code on
Takeovers on Mergers provides (Rule 9) that once a holding has reached 30 per cent,
a bid for the remaining shares is mandatory (save in exceptional circumstances).
Some progress has been made in the European Union towards harmonisation of
takeovers with a view to facilitating the growth of major enterprises across markets
which on their own would not be large enough to sustain corporations that could
compete with those of North America and Asia. The Mandatory Bid Rule has not
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yet been introduced in continental Europe, where long-standing shareholding
arrangements are common, though the draft European Union Takeovers Directive
proposes such a change along the lines of the UK City Code.45
Here again one sees evidence of the UK being torn between its European Union
obligations and the gradually increasing influence of European Law, on the one
hand, and on the other, a continuing attraction to the ideas of common law
jurisdictions that have already modernised their company law. Both traditions would
suggest shorter, clearer codes with somewhat less attempt than in past Companies
Acts to set out all the details in the primary legislation. Nevertheless a coherent and
modern philosophy would entail the recognition that the financial system is operated
to serve the investment needs of the business community, which in turn is in place to
meet the demands for goods and services from the wider community. The United
States of America, with its federal competition in corporate law and Japan, with its
cross-shareholdings and employee power, have different priorities. Both also present
problems of their own.46 Worthwhile ideas that can be fitted in to the existing
corporate governance system are to be welcomed whatever their provenance.
9.5 European and Global Influences
As the greater co-ordination of social and commercial law across the European
Union gathers pace, one may expect political pressure for 'levelling up' of regulation
to ensure high standards of consumer and environmental protection. The increased
volume of intra-Single Market trade is necessitating greater co-operation on control
of corporate mergers, which in turn is almost bound to influence corporate structures,
as noted in Chapter Seven above. Continental Europe has traditionally been more
ready than the English-speaking word to recognise the corporation as a distinct social
entity. Further afield, even where it has traditionally been argued that deregulation is
B. Garratt, The Fish Rots from the Head (London: HarperCollins, 1997) 207.
Draft Thirteenth Company Law Directive, first proposal COM/1995 655 (7.2.1996), last amended
COM/1997/565 (10.11.1997).
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the norm across the Atlantic, measures such as the increased minimum wage and
action against pollution have shown a different trend in the I 990s. In the Pacific
region, there is still somewhat greater reluctance to accept legal measures that would
set limits to competitive practices. However, this has been in the context of
traditional cultures which set clear rules of conduct and if those break down under
the increasing pressure of globalisation, there may be greater acceptance of a need
for new legislation in future.
Given the trend towards greater decentralisation of large organisations, including
multinational companies, the challenge of compliance with national law in their
various countries of operation should not prove to be insurmountable. Agreements
as to basic minimum standards between the major countries will help to prevent
'capital flight' from more regulated economies. Where laws are found to conduce to
good economic performance, they can become a source of competitive advantage.
The use of new technology and efficient administration so that government
departments and agencies match the performance standards that international
business sets for itself is important. Taxation rates are also more significant than
core company law in the major location decisions of multinational companies. The
European Union will need to decide how far it is prepared to allow tax competition
between Member States, but for the time being the UK Government is prepared to
undercut its continental neighbours in this respect.
It is submitted that trade is not in practice as 'globalised' as some commentators have
suggested and that it remains feasible to set and enforce standards at the national
level. 47
 In primary production and simple manufactures, there is little doubt that
environmental and labour standards need to be agreed internationally and this is
slowly being achieved. An increasing part of the economy, however, consists of
service activities and more technologically advanced manufactures that are not, in
L.A. Cunningham, 'Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global
Corporate Governance' (1999)84 Cornell Law Review 1133.
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fact, internationally mobile to any significant extent. The UK Government thus has
considerable 'regulatory space' within which to govern the activities of corporate
business registered in Britain. Capital is the most internationally mobile factor of
production and major investors have an incentive to choose jurisdictions with high
regulatory standards. If social protections are to be maintained for unskilled workers
in the face of new global competitive pressures, Europe will need to act collectively
and to foster innovation and quality in production.
Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson conducted a comparative study on contracts, co-
operation and competition in Britain, Germany and Italy respectively and sought to
identify the key features of national systems. They found distinct differences in that:
'[N]early all of the German firms replied that they normally used continuous
contracts (agreement to take a particular quantity of supplies over an indefinite
duration or, more usually, for a fixed period of one year or more), compared to
around a quarter of the British firms, and less than a fifth of the German firms.'
Framework contracts (for delivery on demand) were normal in over half of the Italian
firms, around a quarter of the British firms and less than a fifth of the German firms.
Ad hoc repeat contracts were used by none of the German firms but the remainder
(approximately half) of British and Italian firms. 48 The researchers acknowledge that
there is a trade-off between flexibility and responsiveness to changing economic
circumstances, on the one hand, and stability and predictability of institutions and
relationships, on the other. Each legal system and business culture finds a different
way of managing this particular balancing act.
As far as the role of business people in society is concerned, entrepreneurs in the
USA, from Ford and Rockerfeller to Gates and Dell, may be considered ruthless
about the pursuit of their objectives, but once they have achieved their commercial
P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalization in Question (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
48 S. Deakin, C. Lane and Wilkinson in Deakin and Michie, n 39 above, 119.
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aims, they have often give away a large proportion of their wealth in philanthropy.49
By contrast, in general European business is subject to higher costs and more
stringent regulation but contributes less of its profits to charitable and social activity.
In the UK, politically, there is a perceived need for greater investment in many
public services, yet a reluctance to will the means to pay for them by general
taxation. There is every sign that business will continue to be engaged by
government to help meet economic and social aims. Very recently, great controversy
has surrounded the decision of BMW to sell its Rover cars production facility at
Longbridge. 5° That of Barclays Bank to close rural branches at the same time as
proposing large bonuses for some directors has also caused considerable public
debate.5'
Shareholder activism and the role of non-executive directors have in some high-
profile cases crossed the Atlantic to Britain. 52 Works Councils and manufacturer's
liability have come to the UK mainly through European Union directives. At a
global level, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance represent an inter-
governmental effort to map out a set of criteria to deal with the issues that arise from
the separation of ownership and control. These include a principle that directors
should consider stakeholder issues as well as provision for the protection of
shareholder interests. 53 The model has been greatly influenced by the Anglo-
American style of corporation (Dignam even refers to the OECD as 'a free market
cf. British publications such as Directory of Social Change, A Guide to Company Giving (London:
Directory of Social Change, published annually) and Hollis, Sponsorship and Donations Yearbook
(Teddington: Hollis, annual), which show a more restrictive approach with many UK companies
stating that they will only give to projects 'local' to their area of operation or do not consider
unsolicited appeals.
° FT.com Site, 'BMW Sells Rover for GBP tO' (10 May 2000) and 'BMW Directors Under Fire' (16
May 2000).
51 FT.com Site, 'Barclays Postpones ATM Decision' (23 April 2000) and 'Barclays Says Sorry for
Closures' (27 April 2000).
52 The removal of Maurice Saatchi as Chief Executive of the company he and his brother founded is
one celebrated instance. Following a barrage of questioning at its AGM in July 2000, British Airways
is to review the payoff, worth £2,000,000, given to its former Chief Executive Bob Ayling.
OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1998, at www.oecd.org) Principle V and
passufl.
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think tank'). 54 It will be of great interest to see how the Principles are applied in
other cultures unaccustomed to negotiated regulation (which Dignam said was
'becoming increasingly discredited' in the UK) 55 especially as they are 'non-binding
and do not aim at detailed prescriptions' but 'can be used by policy makers as they
examine and develop their legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance
that reflect their own economic, legal social and cultural circumstances...'56
As Chapter Seven demonstrated, there is much that UK legislators could learn from
the legal systems of continental Europe, as well as the former commonwealth and the
global economic giants, the USA and Japan. 'Deregulation' is not the only message
to be heard from their successes. Systems that foster workplace partnership and
customer focus appear, on the evidence of the past two generations, literally to pay
dividends. While there are certainly arguments about adapting specific
methodologies to national cultures, with the increasing speed of change and cultural
globalisation, those arguments are perhaps not as strong as they were, enabling ideas
which have been seen to succeed to be transplanted across national boundaries. All
states hope to attract major corporations and thiis 	 ati'e	 ci t
Governments in the major industrialised nations can only hope to put mechanisms in
place in their own corporate regulation so that such developments in business benefit
all stakeholders and the wider community.
There is international pressure to make company accounts and reports more
transparent and comparable across boundaries. Use of the internet and the falling
costs of communication should mean a greater volume of cross-border investment in
future. Indeed many of the European Union's directives in relation to companies
deal with accounting and auditing rules. Companies listing on several stock markets
have sometimes found that their stock was valued quite differently in different
A. Dignarn, 'Exporting Corporate Governance: UK Regulatory Systems in a Global Economy'
(2000) 21 Co. Law 70, 74.
ibid 76.
S6 OECD, n 53 above, Preamble.
321
jurisdictions. This is not sustainable in the long run given the level of product and
labour competition across boundaries. More relevant and reliable figures and facts
are needed from public companies in order to permit fair comparisons by investors,
employees, customers and suppliers.
9.6 Directors' Duties
The public company officers who were interviewed for this study (as set out in
Chapter Eight) could be divided into two groups - those who saw themselves as
agents of shareholders and those who perceived their responsibilities as being to the
company as an institution. The former are arguably closer to nineteenth-century
notions of corporate responsibility than to the current judicial and managerial
understanding of the role of the board. As institutional investors assert their power,
for example in determining the outcome of hostile takeover bids, it is unsurprising
that directors feel under pressure in a commercial sense to prioritise shareholder
concerns. The picture is, however, more complex than that. There is no large
surplus pool of labour in the UK or the US in the year 2000, a fact that clearly
increases the bargaining power of workers. 57 At the same time, consumers remain
price-conscious and in Britain buyers are increasingly aware of goods being sold
more cheaply in continental Europe and North America.58
Leadbeater has offered six reasons: 'Why it pays to be good (eventually)'. He lists,
firstly, the need to attract 'bright, young, intelligent, mobile staff who are concerned
about the company's reputation; secondly, that trust is 'vital to the exploitation of
knowledge'; thirdly, that 'large, regulated companies in quasi-public markets, risk
the loss of their licence to operate if people think they are acting to operate';
fourthly, companies 'find themselves facing angry, affluent consumers in their
domestic markets, unhappy with their labour practices'; fifthly, as economic value
shifts to intangible assets, 'corporate brands that can be trusted will become ever
' See W. Hutton, The Ethics of GoodBusiness (Report of a Young Fabian Conference held on 17
July 1999) 18.
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more important and finally, 'social engagement can help to spur innovation within a
company.' 59 All corporate boards will have to deal with these issues. Failure to do
so would indeed be a factor impacting on corporate performance. This is particularly
the case for retail companies, which rely on their brand images. With internet
companies attracting major investment, despite most having made no profit as yet,
the power of ideas and brand recognition is also strong in the new economy.
Among non-executive directors, there is a similar dichotomy between those who take
the view that they should keep returns to shareholders 'honest' and those who see the
non-executives as potentially providing a wider perspective for the board's
discussions. Even among public companies, there is a range of sizes, and while some
are adopting a de facto two-tier board by the use of executive committees and non-
executive monitoring, smaller public companies express concern that they have
difficulty in finding directors who are willing to serve in a non-executive capacity.
The benchmarks under the Combined Code that the board should contain at least
one-third non-executive directors and that non-executive audit and compensation
committees be established appear to be effective in terms of structure. Increasingly
detailed reporting of directors' remuneration and recommendations that executive
service contracts be granted for only one year have had rather less practical effect.
If directors are given broader responsibilities to stakeholders, they can obtain their
information as to stakeholder views in a number of creative ways. Partnerships with
trade unions are being entered into by increasing numbers of large organisations,
even ahead of the introduction of statutory trade union recognition rights in the UK.
Consumers are being encouraged to assert their rights and preferences as they do in
the US. Many of the largest public companies have dedicated 'public affairs' teams
whose task it is to deal with opinion formers and pressure groups and to discuss their
concerns, using such methods as surveys and 'focus groups'.
See B. Hughes, ibid 15.
C. Leadbeater, 'Why it Pays to be Good (Eventually)', New Statesman, 6 March 2000,26.
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One of the UK's largest investing institutions with investments exceeding four per
cent of the UK stock market, the Prudential Assurance Company, announced in 1999
that it was 'mainstreaming' the environmental and ethical assessment of businesses
throughout its portfolio by instructing the respected analysts EIRIS to review all
companies in which it invests. The Prudential's ethical investment policy states:
'We expect those companies in which we invest to be able to demonstrate and report
on appropriate environmental and social policies.' 60 If this form of proactive
investment management is taken up widely (beyond the ethical funds per Se), it will
have a large impact on the London stock market as a whole. All UK pension funds
are now obliged to publish their policies as far as ethical investment criteria are
concerned (though not to pursue a particular ethical agenda) and on exercising their
shareholder rights (including voting). 6 ' Ultimately this could help to bridge the gap
between the interests and demands of shareholders and the responsibility of business
to serve the wider community and enhance the environment.
The suggestion that on first becoming company directors, individuals should be
required to sign a form which contains a statement of their duties or at least
acknowledges that they have read such a statement would undoubtedly be helpful.
At the public company level, however, a more sophisticated regime of training and
analysis is required. Klein62 observes that, while there is a positive linkage between
executive input in finance committees and corporate performance, overall non-
executive input into business strategy is essential. This presumably underlies the
idea, now encapsulated in the Listing Rules, that a public company whose shares are
to be quoted should have sufficient depth and breadth of expertise on its main board
to meet the demands of investors and analysts. Other stakeholders need to be
informed and included.
60 Available at www.prudential.co.uk .
61 Occupational Pension Scheme Amendment Regulations 1999 (SI 1999 No. 1849) Reg. 2(4), adding
new Reg. 1 lÀ to Occupational Pension Scheme Amendment Regulations 1996.
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The principal actors in setting corporate agendas are inevitably the board members,
though other senior employees often have important responsibilities. While there is
a single dominant individual, the organisation can come to be identified with him or
her. This is a situation that presents increasing risks of abuse as the corporation
grows. There needs to be sense of collective responsibility between all board
members. Legal responsibilities to all key stakeholders and the prospect in the last
resort of legal action by stakeholders would enable directors to put demands by
shareholders in an appropriate context. Non-executives can play a key role in
contributing to assessment of all of the relevant factors. 	 -
9.7 Stakeholder Remedies
The notion that stakeholders other than shareholders should have the right to impugn
board decisions is understandably one that provokes concern, and indeed outright
resistance, among some public company officers. Since current legal remedies for
shareholders are not easily accessible (section 459, the main statutory provision, has
been interpreted in a manner unhelpful to shareholders in public companies,63 while
institutional and other investors with small holdings have effectively been
discouraged from taking derivative actions on behalf of large companies against the
wishes of the general meeting 64) and incentives for shareholders to monitor board
performance are still relatively weak, more and broader accountability is,
nevertheless, surely to be welcomed. It is something of a truism that shareholders in
UK public companies have little prospect of making any impact on executive
decisions. Some powerful financial institutions are changing this situation, but are
somewhat hampered by the lack of any effective sanction except the sale of their
shareholdings. In the light of great uncertainty about whether takeovers really
62 A. Klein, 'Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure' (1998)41 Journal of Law and
Economics 275.
6 Re. Blue Arro plc [1987] BCLC 383; Re. Astec BSR,) p/c [199812 BCLC 556.
PrzidenIialAsurance Co. Lidv Newman lnduiries Ltd[1982] Ch. 204; Smith v Croft (No.2)
[1988] Ch. 114.
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deliver value for the premiums paid to the shareholders of bidding companies, this is
surely regrettable.
If it is accepted that employee loyalty, customer relationships and public trust will be
crucial to business success in future and are underpinned by moral convictions, 65 then
introducing legal mechanisms that will ensure greater concentration upon those
matters is doing no more than spreading best practice. Some commentators have
objected that without a single overriding objective, directors will be unable to make
effective decisions or will be freed from any genuine accountability. 66 To this, the
response must be that the long-term benefit of the company as an institution provides
an intelligible and clear guideline for managerial conduct. Provision of the products
or services, rather than short-term profits, is the motivation for lasting success.
Innovation is vital in the information technology and communications sectors, and
also in manufacturing and retail.
There are strong arguments to the effect that a requirement to report on a wider range
of issues than the immediately financial would be beneficial to business as well as to
its stakeholders and would be entirely practicable. Any astute investor seeking long-
term rewards will be concerned to assess the quality of a company's relationships
with its key stakeholders and its broader social and environmental policies as well as
its financial structure. 67 Economic development has advanced at a great pace in
Western Europe and North America, at the expense of the environment and of social
cohesion. Some balance is now being restored as the governments of all major
industrialised countries acknowledge that collective and individual action is
necessary as a safeguard against environmental degradation and abuses of human
K. Gibson, 'The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory' (2000)26 Journal of Business Ethics 245.
66 E. Sternberg, Just Business (London: Warner, 1995) is a well-known example. See also J. Wood,
'Undermining the Case for Capitalism' in J. Treasure, Business Responsibilities (London: Foundation
for Business Responsibilities, Issues Paper No. 2, 1997) 101 (and reply given by Michael Ivens - n 83
below).
67 R. Ball, 'Making Accounting More International: Why, How and How Far Will It Go?' in J.
Rutterford, Financial Strategy: Adding Stakeholder Value (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).
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rights. Basic indicators of performance and impacts are required both in business
and in government.
Organisations of shareholders such as PIRC and the National Association of Pension
Funds and the Association of British Insurers are putting in place their own codes
and standards on corporate governance matters which build on, and in some cases go
beyond, the demands of the Model Code. By recommending voting on resolutions at
Annual General Meetings, they are forcing public company directors to explain and
justify measures that do not accord with best practice. They are greatly exercised by
matters such as directors' remuneration and performance. In addition, many such
'active shareholders' also have explicit concerns with environmental and human
rights issues. In practice, these bodies take the attention of company directors and
sometimes claim publicity in the print and broadcast media.
Stakeholders in other jurisdictions are at present much more accustomed to the idea
of asserting their legal rights through access to law. Consumers in the United States
are an obvious example, as are environmental pressure groups in Scandinavia. The
culture that there is little or nothing that can be done to prevent the financial
dominance of a few corporations harming the interests of these stakeholders is
largely a British one. If the benefits of doing business in Britain are perceived to be
sufficiently great, inward investment need not be affected. This will require
significant public investment to ensure that human resources and basic infrastructure
reach the required standards, to upkeep of which profitable businesses, in turn,
should contribute through taxation.
The perspective of trade unions and consumer groups in Britain has been much less
co-operative with management than is the case in continental Europe. This is
unsurprising when the primary objective of the public company system has
traditionally been to secure rewards for shareholders, an orientation that has lead to
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disaffection among both workers and consumers. 68 A culture of secrecy and
impenetrable corporate plans has added to the general impression that directors and
senior managers are 'not to be trusted'. This does nothing to facilitate new
accommodations with stakeholders when market demands change or teclmological
developments demand speedy responses. Takeovers in the British system of liquid
capital markets have arguably reduced consumer choice and affected the earning
capacities of many workers.
As high-technology industry grows, increasing flexibility to pursue fresh ideas
without the impediments of slow bureaucracy or control from a conservative, out-of-
touch group at the apex of the organisation are at a premium in world markets. In
many respects the UK system looks likely to serve this new commercial world well.
Unitary boards, distinct divisions of liability between companies within groups and
relative shareholder quiescence (at least as long as the rate of return meets their
demands) are all conducive to 'strong leadership' and adaptability. On the other
hand, a workforce that lacks the education new industries demand and infrastructure
that will not enable it to operate to its full capacity are potentially limiting factors.
As public-private partnerships and Private Finance Initiative contracts require the
private sector to take the risks of delivering public infrastructure, from hospitals to
rail, on time and of maintaining them, the concept of public provision is being
transformed. Such activities are secure business opportunities but may not yield the
rates of return that UK institutional investors have come to expect.
9.8 Entitlement and Empowerment in Company Law
There is a trade-off between flexibility and inclusiveness in corporate governance
systems. Macey points out that all arrangements must to some extent be a
compromise between extreme positions:
68 Z. Bauman, Work, Consunierisni and the New Poor (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998) ch
2; S. Franks, Having None of it: Wo,nen, Men, and the Future of Work (London: Granta, 1999) ch 3.
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Taken literally, no corporation could sustain either the abstract goal of
shareholder wealth maximisation or the broad stakeholder model. Sustained
application of the generalized shareholder-primacy norm is unachievable given
management's control, power and relationship to other constituents. Similarly,
the fact that shareholders supply the capital necessary to fuel the corporate engine
precludes the sustained application of the generalized stakeholder model.69
Public companies in reality have considerable scope to distribute the profits from
their activities in many different ways. Who benefits most from corporate
profitability depends to a considerable extent on the legal system under which the
company operates.
The discussion so far has made clear that companies in practice have to deal with
new challenges as technology progresses. One is the changing nature of work in a
post-modern, post-industrial society. Another is globalisation, or at least the
internationalisation of many product markets. The effect of these phenomena on
corporate legal structures will be considered below. As O'Neill says: 'companies
operating solely within one jurisdiction with limited international business do not
appear to be about to be subjected to further radical change by way of European
corporate directive'. 70 Many companies are essentially domestic and national laws
need to work within and with particular national cultures.
Commercial dependence on knowledge workers is continually increasing. Co-
determination by way of the German corporate structure has, however, produced
supervisory boards that tend to be unwieldy, meet infrequently and receive less
information than smaller unitary boards. The belief that employee representatives
could misuse information may have led to the weakening of the supervisory board.7'
Employee ownership is growing in Anglo-American corporations as another means
69 JR. Macey, 'Convergence in Corporate Governance' (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 1166, 1171.
70 M. O'Neill, 'When European Integration meets Corporate Harmonisation' (2000)21 Co. Law 173,
178.
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of enhancing employee identification with the corporation. If it means that workers
are investing their savings as well as their labour without gaining overall control, it
may not ultimately be beneficial to them. Respect for and consideration of the time
investment of employees need to be balanced with the rights of other constituencies.
While some employment lawyers have focused on company law as a vehicle for
enhanced labour rights, there has been less structural analysis of companies
concerning customers and suppliers. Nevertheless a producer focus is prima fade no
more efficient commercially than short-term financial focus. All parties in long-term
relationships can suffer when takeovers or sales of businesses occur. Sharing of
business risks among stakeholders is reasonable and equitable. Information and
consultation are the keys to developing sound relationships that facilitate this
flexibility. Litigation should be reserved for use as a weapon of last resort if
channels of communication are sound.
Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances are changing the shape of business in
many sectors. An important, unresolved, debate is whether one corporate governance
system will become dominant or whether different methods of monitoring can co-
exist as being equally effective ways of dealing with the same issues. In alliances of
companies: 'it is difficult to know where the boundary of one firm ends and another
begins.' 72
 This may mean changes to the law on groups of companies in the UK, for
example. As the Daimler-Chrysler merger showed, bringing together different
cultures in terms of ownership and remuneration can be problematic. Moves to unify
European Stock Exchanges are in train but are also likely to bring problems of
cultural difference.73
71 J. Gordon, 'Pathways to Corporate Governance? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism
in Germany' (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 219, 232.
72 M. Bradley, C.A. Schipani, AK. Sundaram and J.P. Walsh, 'The Purpose and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society' (1999) 62 Law and Contemporary Problems 9, 31.
London Stock Exchange Press Release, 'London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Borse to Merge to
Create iX. Agreement with Nasdaq to Create a High Growth Market', 3 May 2000; J. Mackintosh
'UK Regulator Stands Firm on Exchange Merger', Financial Ti,nes, 20 July 2000.
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Each system needs to be understood as an integrated whole. Kohl points out that:
'The principal monitoring mechanisms [over management] are market competition
(in capital and product markets), takeovers, a good board of directors and/or a
concentrated shareholder'. 74 At least two of these mechanisms need to be strong in a
given system to ensure that the vast majority of companies do have effective
monitoring, though different jurisdictions may have different balances between the
various methods. Bratton and McCahery state from review of literature and
performance: 'Germany and Japan held out no institutional practices suited to fill
America's monitoring gap.' 75 Executive compensation and short-term planning
horizons show that the Anglo-American system has its own faults. The law is,
however, commonly interpreted to give directors more discretion than the
'shareholder primacy' rhetoric would suggest.
This brings one back to consideration of the fundamental questions posed by
Chapters Two and Three. What is the true nature of the corporation? It is
inconsistent (as economic liberals tend to do) both to say that the corporation is
simply a nexus of contracts and to say that the shareholders 'own' it. It is better to
recognise the identity of the corporation. What is the proper task of the board? They
must be in charge of co-ordinating all the inputs and taking care of corporate
reputation. A system that delivers anything less will not produce the conditions for
lasting business success.
Focus on the corporation as an institution is a starting point for broadening of
directorial focus, but it does need 'teeth' in the form of legal remedies. Sarra asserts:
Although the recasting of the purpose of the company to a goal of enterprise
wealth maximisation is the first step in taking account of the stakeholders such as
H. Kohl, 'Path Dependence and German Corporate Law' (1999)5 CoIu,nbia Journal of European
Law 189, 209.
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workers, it may be inadequate as a singular strategy.. .Any extension of fiduciary
duty must be accompanied by enforcement mechanisms.. .Just as the courts have
enforced the reasonable expectations of shareholders in determining the scope of
the fiduciary obligation, judicial guidance regarding the obligation to workers
could be based on the same notions of reasonable expectations.76
This part of Sarra's argument accords with the views advanced in Chapters Five and
Six. Re-formulated directors' duties and judicial enforcement of stakeholder rights
are both necessary for further progress.
9.9 Conclusion
Prime Minister Tony Blair has stated:
Just as joined-up thinking is now vital to the way we must do government, so it is
with business. That means focusing on all aspects of business - on flexibility and
family-friendly employment policies, on learning and qualifications, on products
and markets, on partnership and working together, on environmental standards
and customer satisfaction, on bottom-line finances and long term thinking, on
responsibility and prosperity.77
The DII, as a Government department, is presumably expected to share in advancing
this vision when formulating the new Companies Act. The main difficulties are that
competition is still often not open and fair and that prosperity is unevenly distributed.
If UK company law is to be truly 'modern', all stakeholders will need to have rights
and responsibilities under it.
Even if it were desirable, it is impractical when drafting company law to be
prescriptive as to the results to be attained by businesses or the distribution of profits.
That public company status should be matched by greater accountability seems a
W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the
Firm: The Case against Global Cross Reference' (1999)38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
213, 265.
76 J Sarra, 'Corporate Governance Reform: Recognition of Workers' Equitable Investments in the
Firm' (1999)32 Canadian Business Law Journal384.
In a foreword to the Report of the Committee of Inquiry, A New Visionfor Business (1999).
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difficult proposition to refute in principle. The current Trial Draft Statutory
Statement of Directors' Duties as promulgated by the Company Law Review
Steering Group speaks of a duty to: 'promote the success of the company for the
benefit of the members as a whole' 78 (emphasis added), which does not adequately
recognise the social role of corporations. Reference is also made, importantly, to
both: 'the company's need to foster its business relationships, including those with
its employees and suppliers and the customers for its products and services' and: 'the
impact of its operations on the communities affected and on the environment', but
without introducing remedies for the parties mentioned.
In the field of reporting requirements, there is some readiness on the part of the DTI
to impose appropriate requirements specifically on public and listed companies.79
There seems no good reason why broader duties in this respect should not be
imposed on the directors of such companies. With ever more communication
available via the Internet and e-mail anywhere in the world, the information demands
of customers, investors and employees are likely to intensify even further. 8° Public
company directors have become accustomed to the fact that their remuneration is
published8 ' and they are subject to restrictions on the extent to which they can deal in
their shareholdings. 82 They also have to face Annual General Meetings and handle
public announcements of major developments in corporate life. Greater openness is
part of the answer to corporate misfeasance, but not the whole of it since prevention
is better than discovery.
Structural changes to the public company board have also been discussed above.
The point that representation of stakeholders would be alien to British industrial
See n 8 above.
' See n 3 above.
° The controversy surrounding the Government's E-Commerce and Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 demonstrate that it has not yet fully worked out a legal response to the issues raised
by e-commerce.
SI In the company's Annual Report as the Listing Rules require.
S2 Most listed public companies follow the Model Code on Sharedealing in their own constitutions.
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relations culture has some salience at present. Progress such as European Works
Councils and trade union partnerships may gradually change this, but that may take a
generation to achieve. Non-executive directors are generally seen to have performed
a useful function, but the way is not yet clear for them to become a majority on
public company boards in the UK as they are in the USA. The place of executives
who both know their particular industry and are committed to the work of their
company is assured. If executives and non-executives are to collaborate
successfully, they need to share a vision of what their company is trying to achieve
over the long term.
Turning to enforcement of the new 'inclusive' duties, courts have already been called
upon to deal with interpretation of wording such as 'unfair prejudice' and 'just and
equitable' considerations. In so doing, they have paid due attention to the
circumstances of each case including the expectations of the various parties. There is
no reason to believe that they would not be equipped to deal with the requirement
that public company boards should give due consideration to stakeholders. Courts
have also shown a willingness to adapt their judgments of company directors' duties
to changing business expectations and would be able to do so if deciding petitions
within a new framework of stakeholder rights. Distinctions between the levels of
different stakeholders and their representation (direct or indirect) which make for a
complex commercial 'balancing act' on public company boards. Renewed corporate
governance arrangements leading to long-term profitability and social cohesion
would have benefits within and beyond the commercial sphere.
Most public companies have accepted their business and social responsibilities, even
if it was: 'as Moliere's Monsieur Jourdan spoke prose without being aware of doing
so.' 83 A new Companies Act can give greater force and clarity to the whole debate
83 M. Ivens, 'The Case for Business Responsibilities' in Treasure, n 62 above, 107, 111 (responding to
John Wood - n 62 above).
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about the proper role of business. Koslowski writes in his examination of the ethics
of capitalism:
Against the critique of interest groups of interest groups of the allocation
and distribution effects of a capitalist economy, one must recall one of the
oldest views of justice in the European tradition, the idea of balance and
measure. The theory of market failure as well as that of government failure
indicates that a balance must be found between society and state, market
and voting.84
This thesis has attempted to reach just such a balance.
84 P.F. Koslowski, 'The Ethics of Capitalism' in B. Harvey, Business Ethics: A European Approach
(Hemel l-lempstead: Prentice Hall, 1994) 236, 245.
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APPENDIX ONE
Letter sent to Public Company Directors and Secretaries
[Brunel University]
Dear
I am conducting doctoral research in the Department of Law at Brunel University
and examining company law and more specifically directors' duties and
stakeholding. I am writing to ask if you would be willing to assist in this work by
giving your own views on key topics in this field.
In the light of Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and most recently the Company Law
Green Paper, you will be aware of the ongoing debate as to whether directors should
owe duties to shareholders alone, or also to employees and customers, or to wider
constituencies (e.g. the community, the environment) as well. In order to discuss
current and possible future law on the subject, it is vitally important to gather the
opinions of experienced public company directors themselves as to how they see
their role and how they might respond to any new legislation. I would be very
grateful if you could spare a little of your time at your convenience to meet me to
discuss some of these matters and so make the thesis representative and practically-
grounded.
If you are willing to participate, I would like to assure you of several important
points:
1. All views expressed will be treated in the strictest confidence and used only for
the purposes of this research. Individual responses (e.g. interview records) will be
seen only by myself and my supervising tutor at Brunel and not by anyone else.
2. No individual director will be identified in or identifiable from the thesis.
Responses will be used as a basis for general discussion of the opinions of plc
directors overall.
3. The research project is entirely independent academic work, designed to provide a
greater understanding of public company directors' perspectives and the implications
for the law; it is funded by a studentship of the Department of Law at Brunel.
In order to gain a true picture of the views of public company directors on these
important matters, I will need the help of many people as possible. This will involve
a discussion lasting up to one hour and covering the issues mentioned above with
ample opportunity for you to express your opinions.
If you would be willing in principle to help in this work, the location and time for
interviews will of course be at your convenience. Perhaps you would confirm by
post or e-mail if you would be willing to spare up to an hour for me to visit and I will
contact you to arrange an appointment.
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Thank you for your attention to this letter. I look forward to hearing from you in due
course.
Yours sincerely
Janice L. Dean
MA (Oxon), LL.M (Manchester)
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APPENDIX TWO
Company Directors and Secretaries:
Interview Questions for discussion
Ai. Executive Directors
1. What is your role in the Company/on the Board?
(e.g. departmental responsibility, technical expertise)
2. How does the task of a Director differ from general management work?
How much time is spent on Board responsibilities as such in a typical month?
(Do your feel that the Board enables and encourages you to take a long-termist view
of planning?)
3. Have you ever experienced conflict between your responsibilities as a Director
and the demands of your executive position?
(How can the independence and objectivity of all Board members be preserved?)
Au. Non-executive Directors
I. What is your role on the Boardlin other Companies?
(e.g. committee membership, executive positions)
2. What can a part-time outsider' Director contribute to a Board?
How much time is spent on Board responsibilities in a typical month?
(Do you feel that the Board enables and encourages you to provide critical scrutiny?)
3. By what means do you obtain your information on the operation of the company
and on the performance of executives?
(How can the independence and objectivity of all Board members be preserved?)
B. Board Decisions
In making decisions as a Director, whose interests do you regularly consider?
Shareholders and investors
Employees and managers
Customers Suppliers
Local Communities Other groups
2. At what stage in the decisionmaking process are these relevant interests
examined?
How (eg presentations at/reports to board meetings. consultation exercises)?
Why (eg long-term gain from good public relations. on principle)?
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3. Does one particular group take precedence over all others when decisions are
made?
If so, why is this?
4. What is the 'ranking order' of the various relevant groups in decisionmaking?
Why is this?
5. How is conflict between the interests of the relevant groups usually resolved?
Do you see it as part of the role of Directors to balance these interests?
6. Do public companies have additional roles in society (eg environmental
protection, supporting charity?)
In practice how are these responsibilities kept under review and balanced against
accountability to the relevant interest groups?
C. Changes to the law.
1. Would you favour a change in the law on Directors' Duties to include other
'stakeholding' groups?
Why or why not?
2. If yes, which groups would you wish to see included?
Should these groups have the right to take legal action if their interests are not
considered?
3. What practical differences might such a change make to you and to your Board
- if the legal statement of directors' duties were to change
- if the included groups had a legal right of action?
4. If there were to be a change in the law, might your Board need to alter its
decisionmaking process to be more inclusive of the relevant groups, which might
include employees and customers, the community and environment?
If so. how might its decisionniaking change?	 -
D. Board Structure
I. Should interest groups other than shareholders be directly represented on the
Board? Why or why not?
If so, which groups (e.g. employees, community, major customers or suppliers)
should be represented?
2. Should executive managers and non-executive monitors be separated in the board
structure? Why or why not?
If so. how should members of the supervisory level be selected?
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